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CONTENTS

I. THE FUNCTION OF METAPHYSICS
Frederick C. Copleston, S.J.

II. WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IF EVERYBODY ACTED LIKE ME?
A. C. Ewing, M.A., Litt.D.

III. THE MEANING OF LIFE
Professor L. J. Russell

IV. THE GENERAL NATURE OF A MORAL DUTY
W. J. Rees, B.A.

V. BERKELEY AND RYLE: SOME COMPARISONS
R. Miles, M.A.

VI. DISCUSSION: TECHNICAL RESEARCH AND PHILOSOPHY

VII. NEW BOOKS

VIII. ELEVENTH INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF PHILOSOPHY
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IX. INSTITUTIONS NOTES

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CONTENTS

	PAGE
I. THE FUNCTION OF METAPHYSICS. FREDERICK C. COPLESTON, S.J.	3
II. WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IF EVERYBODY ACTED LIKE ME? A. C. EWING, M.A., LITT.D.	16
III. THE MEANING OF LIFE. PROFESSOR L. J. RUSSELL	30
IV. THE GENERAL NATURE OF A MORAL DUTY. W. J. REES, B.A.	41
V. BERKELEY AND RYLE: SOME COMPARISONS. T. R. MILES, M.A.	58
VI. DISCUSSION: PSYCHICAL RESEARCH AND PHILOSOPHY	72
VII. NEW BOOKS	75
VIII. ELEVENTH INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF PHILOSOPHY (AUGUST 1953, BRUSSELS)	95
IX. INSTITUTE NOTES	96

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JANUARY 1953

THE FUNCTION OF METAPHYSICS¹

FREDERICK C. COPLESTON, S.J.

I

ARISTOTLE stated that philosophy began with "wonder" and that men continue to philosophize because and in so far as they continue to "wonder." Philosophy, in other words, is rooted in the desire to understand the world, in the desire to find an intelligible pattern in events and to answer problems which occur to the mind in connection with the world. By using the phrase "the world" I do not mean to imply that the world is something finished and complete at any given moment: I use the phrase in the sense of the data of outer and inner experience with which any mind is confronted. One might say just as well that philosophy arises out of the desire to understand the "historical situation," meaning by the last phrase the external material environment in which a man finds himself, his physiological and psychological make-up and that of other people, and the historic past. One might discuss the question whether the desire to understand ought to be interpreted or analysed in terms of another drive or other drives. Nietzsche, for example, suggested in the notes which have been published under the title "The Will to Power" that the desire to understand is one of the forms taken by the will to power. Or it might be suggested by some that the desire to understand is subordinate to the life-impulse, in the sense that it is the necessity of acting in a given historical situation which drives us to attempt to attain clarity concerning this situation. But I do not propose to discuss these psychological questions. I am concerned at the moment to point out that philosophy—and I include metaphysical philosophy—has its origin on the conscious level in the desire to understand the

¹ This paper represents a lecture given at The Royal Institute of Philosophy in February 1952.

world. We are all familiar with children asking for explanations without any other obvious motive than that of resolving some perplexity, solving some difficulty or understanding some event or set of events; and I suggest that philosophy, as far as its original motive is concerned, is inspired by the same sort of desire which is observable in children.

What I have been saying may appear very obvious and trivial. But the original drive behind philosophical inquiry may possibly become obscured owing to the contention of some contemporary anti-metaphysicians that metaphysical problems are pseudo-problems which have their origin in linguistic confusion and error. Metaphysicians, it is said, were misled by language; they did not understand the proper use of terms; and they thus came to utter a lot of unintelligible sentences—or rather sentences which, though *prima facie* intelligible, can be shown by analysis to lack any definite meaning. That some metaphysical theories were due in part at least to linguistic confusion I should not attempt to deny, though I do not think that this can properly be said of metaphysics in general. But I am not now concerned with assessing the part played by linguistic confusion in the genesis of metaphysical theories. What I should like to point out is that we are not entitled to say of any question or theory that it is meaningless until it has been formulated. Otherwise we do not know what we are calling "meaningless." The questions must first be raised before analysis of them is possible. And they were raised in the first place because the people who raised them wanted to understand something, because they wanted answers; and this fact remains true even if it could be shown that they were mistaken in thinking that there was anything to understand or that any answers to their questions were possible. I think that it is as well to have drawn attention to this point, even if it appears to be a trivial point. For acquaintance with detailed disputes between metaphysicians may give the impression that metaphysics is a mere verbal game and obscure the fact that in its origin metaphysics arises simply out of a natural desire to understand the world or the historical situation.

II

It is evident that science, too, owes its birth to the desire to understand. Francis Bacon emphasized the practical function of scientific knowledge, and living as we do in a highly technical civilization we are not likely to forget this aspect of science. We are also aware to-day of the part played by hypothesis in scientific theory, while the development of mathematical physics in particular has led thinkers like Eddington to lay great emphasis on the role of *a priori*

mental construction in the framing of physical hypotheses. But though on the one hand technics obviously has a practical function while on the other hand we are now aware of the hypothetical character of scientific theory, it is not, I think, unreasonable to say that philosophy and science had a common origin in the natural desire to understand the world. However much any one may be inclined to stress the practical function of science, he can hardly maintain that astronomy proper, as distinct from astrology, had any other origin than the desire to understand.

Originally, of course, there was no clear distinction between philosophy and science. Nor, indeed, could there have been. The distinction could not be drawn until science had developed far enough for the distinction to be brought clearly before the mind. It is sometimes difficult to say, therefore, whether a particular theory of a Greek philosopher should be classed as a metaphysical theory or as a scientific hypothesis, a primitive scientific hypothesis, that is to say. In a state of affairs when philosophy and science are not yet distinguished, it is a tautology to say that contours are vague and outlines obscure. For example, any philosopher to-day who wishes to defend the Aristotelian hylomorphic theory must of necessity present it as a metaphysical theory; for it would be absurd to present it as a rival physical hypothesis to, say, the atomic theory. And he will probably also wish to maintain that it was propounded by Aristotle as a metaphysical theory. If he does not maintain this, he lays himself open to the charge of holding the theory merely out of respect for tradition. He is determined to keep the theory, it would be said, because it was Aristotle's theory; but since he sees that it cannot now be put forward as a rival physical hypothesis he changes what he admits to have been originally a physical hypothesis into a metaphysical theory in order to preserve it from attack on scientific grounds. A person, on the other hand, who does not wish to maintain the hylomorphic theory and who regards Aristotle's idea of "form," for example, as having been given definite content by the concepts of structure developed at a much later date by the various empirical sciences, may be inclined to speak of the Aristotelian theory as a primitive scientific hypothesis. And arguments could be adduced both for and against this way of speaking. One might say against it, for instance, that the theory involves mention of an entity, or rather of an essential constituent of entities, which is in principle unobservable. I refer to "first matter." On the other hand, an alchemist might say in favour of calling the theory a primitive scientific hypothesis that one could derive from it the testable conclusion that the so-called "baser" metals can ultimately be turned into gold. But it might also be claimed that the whole dispute is superfluous. It is only to be expected, it might be said, that at a time when the sciences

had not yet taken shape speculative theories should have been put forward which it is difficult to classify in terms of distinctions which were made at a later date; and one should not attempt to make any rigid classification of this sort. To do so serves no useful purpose. All that one can profitably do is to distinguish, or to attempt to distinguish, those early speculative theories which represent answers to questions which have proved to be or are thought to be answerable by some branch of science from those other theories which represent answers to questions which are not answerable, or which we cannot see to be answerable, by any branch of science. The latter type of theory is properly called a "metaphysical" theory. As for the former type of theory, it does not matter much whether one calls it a metaphysical theory which has been succeeded by scientific theories or a primitive scientific theory, though the latter way of speaking may involve a misuse of the term "scientific." The main point is to recognize that theories of this type have been succeeded in the course of time by fruitful scientific theories which have formed the basis for further research, hypothesis and experiment. It is a matter of minor importance whether we say that the movement was from metaphysics to science or from "primitive science" to science proper. On the whole, however, it is preferable to speak in the first way, since the development and progress of the sciences have involved their gradual purification from metaphysics.

I do not want to discuss the terminological question any further or to make any definite recommendation about the proper way of speaking. But it seems to me undeniable that at least some lines of inquiry were once pursued by philosophers in a speculative manner which are no longer pursued in this way. It is significant that when Aristotle stated that philosophy began with wonder he went on to state that people wondered first about the more obvious difficulties and that they then gradually advanced and stated difficulties about greater matters, like the phenomena of the moon and sun and stars and about the genesis of the universe. Astronomical inquiries were once regarded as pertaining to philosophy. But this is not so to-day. If we want information about the sun or the moon, we do not turn to philosophers for that information. Again, if we want information about the physical constitution of matter, we turn to the physicists. Questions about these matters are now classed as scientific questions, not as philosophical questions. And this is not simply an affair of terminology. The point is that we do not think that questions of this sort can be answered by means of the pure reason, that is, by arm-chair reflection alone. We see that another method, or other methods, are required. (I say "we see"; but as a matter of fact it was more or less clearly recognized in the late Middle Ages that if we want to learn empirical facts, *a priori* deduction will not enable us to do so.)

THE FUNCTION OF METAPHYSICS

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It seems to me, then, that it is undeniable that the empirical sciences have gradually taken over some tracts of the territory which was once supposed to belong to philosophy. And in this sense it is true to say that the field of philosophy has been narrowed. On the other hand, it is undeniable that philosophers have asked questions which cannot be answered by any particular science. Some might, perhaps, take exception to the use of the word "cannot" in an absolute sense. They might prefer to say of these questions that we do not see how they can be answered by any particular science. But I fail to see how a question about the origin of all finite beings, for example, could conceivably be answered by any empirical science. So I am content to say quite simply that philosophers have asked a number of questions which cannot be answered by any particular science. And if anyone chooses to say that these questions are the properly philosophical questions and that questions about the sun and moon were never proper philosophical questions, he can go on to say that philosophy proper has *not* in fact been narrowed.

I do not mean to imply that all questions which cannot be answered by the empirical sciences are "metaphysical" questions. For I think that there are moral questions which cannot be answered by empirical science but which one would not normally call "metaphysical" questions. But I confine my attention in this paper to metaphysical questions. And I think that both metaphysicians and anti-metaphysicians would agree that as far as words are concerned a number of questions are properly called "metaphysical" questions. Some anti-metaphysicians would then go on to say that these questions cannot be answered scientifically because they are unanswerable and that they are unanswerable because no intelligible question has been asked. Speculative questions about the "Absolute" or about the "Cause" of "the world" or about the spiritual soul would be classified as questions of this sort. But I want to leave aside for the moment this type of difficulty and to ask whether there are any inquiries which the anti-metaphysician would concede to be meaningful and which at the same time can sensibly be called "metaphysical."

III

A good deal of attention has been paid by modern philosophers to the analysis of statements about material things like chairs, tables and so on. And some have argued that objects like these are "logical constructions" out of sense-data or sense-contents. This might be taken to mean that a table, for example, is a fictitious entity, in the sense that there is no existent entity denoted by the word "table" but only a multiplicity of entities called "sense-data" or "sense-contents." We should then presumably have a form of idealistic

phenomenalism, arrived at by philosophic reflection rather than by scientific hypothesis and verification. For it would be as difficult to prove scientifically that a table consists of sense-data as it would be to prove scientifically Berkeley's theory that material objects are "ideas" presented to us by God. In this case the theory might well be called a "metaphysical" theory. What other name could one give it?

But those analysts who maintain the truth of this theory refuse to allow that it means that a table, for example, is a fictitious entity. The statement that a table is a "logical construction" out of sense-data or sense-contents is a linguistic statement, not a statement about the constitution of material things. What it says is that sentences which name a material thing like a "table" can be translated into sentences which refer to sense-data or sense-contents but which do not contain the word "table." This interpretation of the theory of "logical constructions" as a purely linguistic theory is highly ingenious; but I feel some misgivings about it. A table is a "phenomenon" in the sense that it is an object appearing to us; and if we say that statements about this phenomenon can be translated into statements of equivalent meaning about sense-data, it is difficult to avoid the impression that what we are saying is that this phenomenon is a collection of sense-data. I am not concerned with the truth or falsity of the contention that a table is a collection of sense-data. What I want to remark is this. The contention is not a metaphysical contention in the sense that anything is said about a substance in Locke's sense of the word "substance"; but it seems to me to be metaphysical in another sense, namely in the sense that it is not the result of any physical or chemical analysis of the table. It is the result of a philosophical analysis of meaning, and in this sense it can be called "linguistic"; but it is not linguistic in the sense that it concerns words exclusively. Philosophical analysis is not the same thing as grammatical analysis. I suggest, then, that the theory of "logical constructions" can sensibly be called a "metaphysical" theory¹ and that what it does is to replace the metaphysic of substance by a phenomenalist metaphysic. Possibly this is felt by those analysts who tend to exclude the sense-datum theory and the theory of "logical constructions" in the name of "ordinary language."

Perhaps one can apply the same line of reflection to the analysis of causality. This is often represented as an instance of linguistic analysis. So it is in a sense. But in what sense? If it is simply an analysis of the meaning of the term as used by scientists, or by a number of them, or if it is simply an analysis of the meaning of the term as used by certain social groups at certain periods, it is linguistic

¹ It may be said that I am neglecting Carnap's distinction between the "formal" and "material" modes of speech. But I am not at all happy about the way in which this distinction is applied.

analysis in a strict sense. But if it is possible by means of this analysis to establish what people "ought" to mean by causality, the procedure involved does not seem to me to be radically different from the procedure followed by those philosophers who would have regarded the analysis of causality as an instance of metaphysical analysis.

It may be objected that metaphysicians have imagined that they could find out fresh information about the world by reflective analysis, whereas in point of fact we cannot do this. We can analyse the way in which people speak about the world, but any facts we learn in this way are linguistic facts. But I think that a distinction ought to be made. There is certainly a sense in which philosophical analysis gives no fresh knowledge of "facts." For example, by analysing relation-sentences we do not obtain fresh knowledge of actual relations: that is obvious. Nor do we obtain knowledge that things stand in relations to one another in some sense. For this knowledge is presupposed by the ordinary use of language involving relation-sentences. But we can obtain information of what it "means" to say that one thing stands in relation to another thing. As this knowledge concerns "meaning" it can be said to concern linguistic usage; but it can also be called a knowledge of what relations "are"; it is not knowledge simply of what A or B thinks is the meaning of relation-sentences. And it seems to me that this kind of analysis can sensibly be called "metaphysical" analysis. It is certainly not physical or chemical analysis. It may be objected that it is precisely in order to distinguish it from physical and chemical analysis that it is called "linguistic analysis"; but what I am suggesting is that what is called by philosophers "linguistic" analysis is not radically different from what in the past has been known as "metaphysical" analysis.¹

There is, of course, an obvious comment which can be made about what I have been saying. An anti-metaphysician might reply as follows. "Leaving aside the question whether your account of analysis is correct or incorrect, I am quite prepared to admit that if you choose to call analysis 'metaphysics,' metaphysics is possible and has a useful function. But to call analysis 'metaphysics' does nothing at all towards justifying metaphysics in the sense in which I reject metaphysics. If an astronomer rejects astrology, it would be futile to select some part of astronomy and call it 'astrology' under the impression that astrology in the sense in which the astronomer rejects it was thus being justified."

There is obviously truth in this line of reply. I entirely agree that to call analysis as practised by the modern analyst "metaphysics" does little to justify metaphysics in the sense in which the anti-metaphysical analyst rejects metaphysics. At the same time I do not

¹ One may note in passing that Carnap found himself compelled to distinguish "syntax" and "semantics."

think that my line of argument is as futile as the analogy about astronomy and astrology might suggest. In the first place I have maintained that some at least of what passes for "analysis" bears a marked resemblance to what used to be called "metaphysics." The analyst might reply, of course, that he does not deny the resemblance but that the kind of inquiry referred to should be called "analysis" and not "metaphysics" whether it is practised by Plato or by Berkeley or by a modern analyst. The point is, however, that the phrase "linguistic analysis" may be misleading; and to draw attention to resemblances of the kind mentioned may help to show how it can be misleading. In the second place it is not, I think, futile to point out that the interpretation of the word "metaphysics" which is fairly common to-day, that is, as a study of or talk about transcendent and unobservable entities, has not been the sense in which the word has been exclusively understood by metaphysicians themselves. If one analyses, for example, the meaning of the word "thing," one is, I suggest, engaging in precisely one of those pursuits which metaphysicians have not infrequently engaged in and which they have regarded as pertaining to metaphysics. And it is just as well to realize this.

However, as I have said, the classification of analysis, or some of it, as "metaphysics," does little or nothing to rescue what the anti-metaphysical analysts call "metaphysics." And I want now to turn to this subject.

IV

(I) If one looks at the history of metaphysical theories which involve reference to a being or to beings in some sense transcending empirical reality, one will see that in some of them the transcendent being is postulated in order to explain or to account for the world being in some respect like this rather than like that. In the myth of the *Timaeus* the divine craftsman is postulated (with what degree of seriousness it is unnecessary to discuss here) to account for the intelligible structure of the world, that is, for what Plato took to be the world's intelligible structure. Again, in Aristotle's *Metaphysics* the first unmoved mover is postulated as the ultimate explanation of "movement." In Whitehead's philosophy eternal objects and God seem to have the function of explaining how the pattern of the world comes to be what it is, while in Bergson's *Creative Evolution* the idea of the evolutionary process leads on to the idea of a creative power at work in the world. In the case of metaphysical theories of this kind their function seems to be that of explaining what may be called the *how* of the world rather than the *that* of the world. This distinction certainly cannot be rigidly applied to philosophies like

those of Whitehead and Bergson; but it applies very well in the case of Aristotle, who did not postulate the first unmoved mover in order to explain the existence of things, but rather in order to explain a feature of things, namely "movement" or becoming.

It is obvious, I think, that a metaphysical theory of this kind can claim to be taken seriously only if it is based on the conviction that any non-metaphysical explanation must be regarded as insufficient. An anti-metaphysician may think that all metaphysical theories are gratuitous hypotheses; but one could not expect him to give serious consideration to a metaphysical theory which even for its author was a gratuitous hypothesis. It is indeed unlikely that agreement will be reached in all cases whether a given feature of the world or a given set of empirical data can be adequately accounted for without the introduction of metaphysics. And I fail to see that the anti-metaphysician is entitled to issue a kind of advance prohibition against the introduction of metaphysics if he is unable to shake the conviction of another philosopher about the inadequacy of any non-metaphysical explanation. He is entitled, of course, to challenge the metaphysician to show that a metaphysical theory is required; for when any feature of the world can be adequately accounted for in terms of phenomenal causes, one should not drag in a metaphysical entity or theory to account for it. But, as I have said, agreement about the adequacy of non-metaphysical explanations is unlikely to be reached in all cases; and the metaphysician has as much right to his convictions on this matter as the anti-metaphysician has to his. In my opinion, there could be only one cogent ground for ruling out all metaphysical theories. This ground would obtain if it could be shown that the questions asked and theories propounded by metaphysicians are all meaningless, in the sense that to one or more of the terms no definite meaning can be assigned. But, as I said earlier in this paper, linguistic criticism of metaphysical questions and theories has to await their formulation. One has to allow the desire for understanding full play and permit it to lead to the formulation of questions and problems. Once a question has been asked, it is legitimate to ask what it means; but one is hardly entitled to say in advance: "Be silent! For if you speak, you will utter nonsense." One does not know *a priori* that nonsense is going to be uttered.

(2) Some metaphysicians might perhaps comment that I have misrepresented what they try to do. They do not take some isolated or selected feature of reality and build up a speculative theory on a narrow basis: they are more concerned with working out a general theoretical standpoint from which empirical data of various types can be seen as forming a coherent pattern. It is true that one type of metaphysician has tried to work out a system of philosophy, a

comprehensive world-view, in a purely deductive manner, and that a procedure of this sort involves the application to empirical reality of a preconceived scheme, with the result that inconvenient data are slurred over or explained away. And it is true that some metaphysicians have emphasized one aspect of reality at the expense of other aspects. Schopenhauer is a case in point. But it is an exaggeration to suggest that metaphysicians in general attempt to force empirical data into a preconceived scheme or that they attend exclusively to one aspect of empirical reality. A philosopher like Bergson was not concerned with elaborating a "system." He considered problems separately, moving from one problem to another. And though his conclusions certainly converged on the formation of a unified world-view, this was the result, rather than a presupposition, of his reflections.

It is doubtless quite true that metaphysics does not stand or fall with the validity of Spinoza's method. And it is, I think, an exaggeration to depict all metaphysicians as endeavouring to prove a preconceived system. But a full understanding of reality has surely been the limiting goal of speculative metaphysics, even with those who have recognized from the start the practical unattainability of the goal. And though this does not involve the *a priori* assumption of any definite answers to questions, it does involve the assumption that reality is intelligible. But we should never attempt to understand anything unless we believed that there was something to understand. Whether subsequent confirmation of our initial belief is forthcoming is another question.

(3) The attempt to understand empirical reality involves at the end, even if not at the beginning, an attempt to understand the *that* of finite beings. In the *Tractatus* Wittgenstein has said, "Not *how* the world is, is the mystical, but *that* it is." I should not care to use the word "mystical" here. But, provided that I am not understood as contradicting what I have said earlier about metaphysics and analysis, one might perhaps say, "Not *how* the world is, is the metaphysical, but *that* it is." I should be inclined to say at least that the more prominent this existential problem is in a philosophy, the more metaphysical the philosophy is. The attempt might be made to dress up some metaphysical theories in the guise of scientific hypotheses, but it would be difficult to pass off any answer which might be given to the problem of the existence of finite beings as a scientific hypothesis in the common understanding of the term.

What I am concerned with is the question why this problem constantly recurs. Its prominence in western philosophy may be connected in part with Judaeo-Christian theology; but it is not peculiar to western philosophy. It is, indeed, easy to say that the problem is a pseudo-problem, which has its origin in linguistic con-

fusion. We should ask, it may be said, only precise questions. If we ask for the cause or the causes of a given phenomenon, we can be given, in principle at least, a definite answer in terms of other phenomena. If we do not ask precise questions, we shall find ourselves talking about "all phenomena" or "all finite things" or "all empirical reality" or about "finite being as such." And all these phrases give rise to logical difficulties. The metaphysician trades on linguistic confusion, vagueness and imprecision; he is able to impress other people only in so far as they are already involved in the same confusion as himself or in so far as he can involve them by the use of obscure and probably emotively-charged language in this confusion. Yet the fact remains that the problem of which I am speaking continues to be raised. Indeed, if the more important metaphysical problems are excluded from academic philosophy in a given period or in a certain region, what happens is that they are raised and discussed outside the confines of academic philosophy. It may be said that this is largely due to the fact that human beings are prone to wishful thinking, and that there are always a large number of them who endeavour to find some rational or pseudo-rational justification for what they believe or want to believe on other grounds. But what is the origin of this "wishful thinking"? That metaphysical speculation, when it is indulged in, is the fulfilment of a desire of some sort is obvious enough: nobody would practise it otherwise. But more than this can be said on the subject. And I want to suggest what seems to me a possible origin of the problem of the existence of finite beings.

The primary datum is not, I think, either subject or object but the self as existing in an undefined and unarticulated situation. Man finds himself "there," within the area of Being. The consciousness of the self as a reflectively apprehended centre and of definite external objects, a consciousness which grows with experience, presupposes a pre-reflective awareness of existing in encompassing Being. As empirical knowledge grows and as definite objects are marked off within a general field, that is, as "my world" is gradually constructed, these objects are still conceived, perhaps in a very vague way, as existing against a background of Being or as within encompassing Being. And accompanying the building-up, as it were, of a definite empirical world there is an articulation, an expression to the self, of the nature of this background. By a great many people it is thought of as "the world" or "the universe." There are, I think, many people who, perhaps without clearly recognizing the fact, conceive themselves and other things as existing within "the world," as though all definite things were phenomena existing within an all-encompassing and metaphenomenal "world." In this sense there is an implicit metaphysic in the outlook of many people who are far

from being metaphysicians. Again, the pre-reflective awareness (perhaps one might say the "felt" awareness) of things as standing in relation to an obscure Ground of existence may be expressed in the way in which we find it expressed in the writings of some poets. On the other hand, there may be an attempt to render explicit on the reflective level this pre-reflective awareness. And this attempt gives rise to various metaphysical systems. The attempt to state the "felt" dependence of finite things may give rise to a system like that of Spinoza or to a theistic philosophy or even to a philosophy like that of Sartre, with its conception of the *en-soi*. I do not want to argue here in favour of any particular philosophy or type of philosophy; but I do suggest that the question of the ultimate Ground of empirical existence would never be raised, were there not a primary implicit awareness of existing against a background of Being. To avoid misunderstanding I had better say that by using the word "Being" with a capital letter I do not mean to imply a direct awareness of God. A pre-reflective awareness of dependence or of what used to be called "contingency" is not the same thing as a direct awareness of God. If it were, there could hardly be those disputes between rival metaphysical systems of different types, to which we are accustomed in the history of philosophy.

It may be said that I have been putting forward a purely gratuitous hypothesis. I do not think that this is the case. I think that my hypothesis helps to explain a prominent feature of certain types of poetry, the origin, in part at least, of speculative metaphysics, a good deal of natural religion, and even the common though perhaps implicit conviction that things exist in "the world." I am perfectly well aware, of course, that what I have been saying is extremely vague: it could hardly be anything else when one attempts to discuss a matter of this sort within the limits of a few sentences. In any case, though one certainly ought to strive after clarity language can be used to draw attention to what lies on the pre-reflective level; and one function of speculative metaphysics is to make explicit the pre-reflective awareness of which I have been speaking and to state its implications. Once the attempt to do this is made linguistic difficulties arise, and the philosopher must consider them honestly. But one should not allow oneself to be paralysed by Wittgenstein's dictum that "what can be said at all can be said clearly." It is indeed obvious that "whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent"; but one is not compelled to choose between absolute clarity on the one hand and silence on the other. Language can have various functions: it can be used to "draw attention to." And when one has drawn attention, one can then endeavour to express in clear language, so far as this is possible, what one has drawn attention to. This, I think, is what speculative metaphysics tries to do in regard

to the primary awareness of Being. One cannot bypass linguistic analysis, but one must first strive to state. Otherwise there can be no analysis.

What I have been saying will be regarded by some as a relapse into "mysticism," as an exhibition of the inherent weakness of metaphysics, as confirmation of the theory that metaphysical propositions possess no more than emotive significance, and even perhaps as an indication that metaphysicians stand in need of psychoanalysis. But many quite ordinary people possess an implicit metaphysic; and the real reason why the central metaphysical problem constantly recurs in different forms in spite of critical analysis is, I think, that it springs from man's existential situation, accompanied by an awareness of dependence or "contingency," and not from linguistic confusion. It is open to anyone, of course, to deny this. But one might, perhaps, reverse Wittgenstein's saying, "the limits of my language mean the limits of my world," and say, "the limits of my world mean the limits of my language," "my world" signifying here the experience which I am willing to acknowledge. Inability to find any value in metaphysics may very well be an indication of the limits of a man's "world."

WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IF EVERYBODY ACTED LIKE ME?

A. C. EWING, M.A., LITT.D.

In this paper I shall use terms such as "intrinsically good" which may be deemed old fashioned by many readers and which certainly to my own mind presuppose an objective non-naturalistic theory of ethics. I still hold such a theory and I have not mastered the new jargon by which a sort of higher synthesis between that and other theories is supposed to have been effected, but I do not think that such a view as mine of ethics in general is necessarily presupposed if one is to understand or even agree with the contentions of my article. These relate to a specific problem as to certain ethical actions, which will arise on any view that admits the possibility of giving any sort of legitimate reasons for ethical judgments, as we all do in practice. After all a naturalist can easily translate "intrinsically good" into his own terms, say, valued for its own sake by most people who experience it, and there will still be a question as to what is intrinsically and what is merely instrumentally good and other questions as to what is the logical nature of certain arguments in ethics.

Now what I wish to discuss is the use of an ethical argument of a peculiar and puzzling type, the argument that I ought to do or not do something, not because of the particular effects of what I myself do but, because if people in general did not or did do it, the results would be very evil. Few, if any, philosophers would to-day maintain that all our duties can be derived from Kant's principle that we ought not to act according to any law which could not be universalized (even if Kant did himself, which has been doubted); but it can hardly be denied that something like this principle does play a considerable part in our ordinary ethical thought. There is indeed an important difference between the way in which Kant uses it and the way in which it figures in the thought of most people. Kant thought that what made a principle wrong was that its universalization would involve some inconsistency, either a sheer logical contradiction, or an inconsistency with what we could not help willing, and tried by the use of this criterion of inconsistency to avoid a straightforward argument from consequences. But as generally used the argument is not that we could not conceive or at least consistently will the universalization of a principle, but simply that its universalization would lead to bad consequences. In this form the argument, though by no means a universal solvent of ethical problems, is certainly quite common, and as we shall see it is quite often

accepted in preference to the straightforward utilitarian criterion where the two seem to conflict. What I want to ask here is whether this can ever be rationally justified, and, if so, under what circumstances.

Now *prima facie* the use of the principle seems very hard to defend. Why on earth should I be debarred from doing something, not because my doing it produces bad consequences, but because, if everybody did it, which I know will not be the case, the consequences *would* be bad? How can it be relevant to cite against an action not the results likely to accrue from it, but results which *would* accrue if something else happened that certainly will not happen? Why should I not tell a lie when there is something to be gained by it merely because it would have a bad effect if everybody under similar circumstances told lies? My lying certainly will not make everybody tell lies. And it is clear that in fact we more usually make ethical decisions either by arguing direct from the likely consequences of the particular act proposed or by referring to a principle taken as self-evident than by arguing from the consequences which would be likely to result if everybody were to act in the way in question. But it cannot be denied that we sometimes argue in the last-mentioned fashion.

To show this I shall take three instances. Suppose a man argued thus: I should not be asked to pay any income tax. For while the surrender of the money makes a substantial difference to me, if I kept it its loss would make no appreciable difference to social welfare. The small amount I can pay is only a drop in the bucket, and it can hardly be contended that if it were not paid any social services or the rearmament drive or anything else on which government expenditure is held to be desirable would in practice suffer at all. Therefore by utilitarian principles I ought not to have to pay it, since its payment by me produces an appreciable evil (for me) and no appreciable good, and the tax-collector or those above him act wrongly in demanding it from me. What is the objection to this attitude? I do not think it is an adequate reply to say that, if an exception were made in one case and not in others, it would have the effects of a bad example, because these could be avoided by secrecy. Yet I think we should all hold the plea to be unjustified, and the reason is surely not that the calculation as to the effect of the particular act of paying one's tax is wrong, but that, if the argument were admitted in one case, it would have to be admitted in all, and then no taxes would be paid by anybody, a situation which certainly would have disastrous results.

Take another case which seems to me clearer still. Suppose during the war somebody of military age and in other respects liable to military service had argued as follows: "What will be the result of

my enlistment? It certainly will not shorten the war or turn defeat into victory. It may result in the killing of more Germans, but that is not an end in itself but an evil and only, if at all, to be valued as a means to the end of bringing the war to a speedy and victorious conclusion, which end I have just pointed out is not furthered by my enlistment. Further, in considering my proposed enlistment we must set on the debit side the facts that I shall be less happy than in my civilian occupation, that I shall be exposed to grave danger of death and mutilation, that I am likely to be in situations in which I shall suffer greatly, that those who are fond of me will be anxious and worried. On the one side we have no appreciable good effects, on the other very appreciable evil ones. Therefore on utilitarian principles, it is clearly not right but wrong for me to enlist, since it will definitely do great harm and there is no evidence that it will do any appreciable good." What would be our reaction to this? It seems to me plain that hardly anybody would accept the argument, and that the natural reply would be that, if everybody behaved like this, the war would have been lost and that therefore the man in question ought not to behave like this. The situation is indeed complicated by the fact that there were conscientious objectors who thought in any case that the war was wrong, but I do not think this need obscure the issue. For it is quite clear that no appreciable number of them regarded enlisting as wrong for the reasons I have suggested, but for quite different ones. I think almost all opponents as well as supporters of the war would regard the argument I have given as a bad one and would do so because they considered as relevant not just the effects of one man refusing to enlist but the effects that would result if this attitude spread to most people, though in fact there was no reason whatever to anticipate that it would spread to most people. If it is objected that to refuse to enlist would be to break the law, or that it could not be carried out with impunity unless deceit were practised, and that these things are evil, let us take the case of a country where military service was voluntary as it was in England during the earlier part of the First World War. It is plain that the argument I have given would in that case still strike almost everybody as invalid.

A still simpler instance is provided by a parliamentary election. Except in the extraordinarily rare case where a seat is won by a single vote, which we can dismiss as too extremely unlikely to be worth considering, one man's vote will make no appreciable difference whatever, yet we should still hold it his duty to vote and vote as intelligently as he could on the ground not of the effects of his particular vote but of the effects which would accrue if it were a general practice not to vote or to vote without reflection. These three instances do show, I submit, that besides any utilitarian criterion based on the anticipated effect of the particular action in

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WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IF EVERYBODY ACTED LIKE ME?

question we do also employ as criterion a consideration of the consequences which would result if everybody acted in the way proposed, and that in some cases this is regarded as over-ruling the direct utilitarian criterion altogether. Other examples of this second criterion are provided by the frequent cases in which the keeping of certain rules is impressed on an individual by asking him the question—What would happen if everybody broke the rule as you have done? Of course, it might be said, that though people did commonly argue like this, they were wrong in doing so, and it is part of the purpose of my paper to consider whether this is the case. The attitude certainly strikes me in my ordinary ethical thinking as reasonable, and so it would, I think, almost everybody, and though this is no proof, it certainly is a strong presumption in its favour.

Can any further argument be adduced to back up this presumption? It must again be emphasized that the use of the criterion in question is an odd one and one which needs more support if it is to be defended. That the badness of the effects of my doing something constitutes a good reason against doing it is obvious enough, but it is by no means obvious that the fact that the universal or general adoption of the course of action would have bad effects is a reason against my adopting it. The question presents itself why I should ever abstain from doing something otherwise desirable, not because my action would produce bad effects itself, but because the occurrence of something quite different, namely everybody doing it, *would* have these evil consequences. It seems plain, further, that there are both courses of action such that it would be bad if everybody pursued them and yet good that some people should pursue them, and almost as plain that there are courses of action such that it would be good if everybody pursued them and yet bad that some or most people should when others do not pursue them. The pursuit of any worth-while specialized career is an example of the former class of cases, complete non-violence of the latter. For, even if there is a case for pacifism in relation to international war, there is hardly one for not using violence, if necessary, to stop would-be murderers.

Now it seems to me that there is a distinguishing feature present in the three cases I have mentioned, which enables us to see why the universalization criterion is applicable there and not in other cases where this feature is missing. In all three the argument from the consequences of the particular act in favour of not doing it is of such a nature that, if it were accepted, it could be used to excuse all or most people. I suppose nowadays every individual called on to pay his taxes will miss the money more than the State would if deprived of his share of taxation. Likewise the argument against enlistment would apply not indeed altogether to everybody (since there are some people who seem to like fighting in a war better than a more peaceful

occupation, though even these run the risk of death, maiming or permanent injury to health, and usually have relatives who would be anxious), but at any rate to most people. And the argument to the effect that no appreciable good is done by voting would, if valid, show that it was no one's duty to vote. Now suppose the individual who was trying to excuse himself used arguments which, if valid, would not excuse all or most people but were peculiar to himself or would only excuse a limited number. Then our attitude would change. Of course, we might still think the argument very unjustified or trivial, but if he could show that the act in question would in his case lead to very serious consequences beyond any that it would involve in most cases, we should have to treat it with respect. And the law by allowing reductions in taxation and exemptions from military service for certain causes admits this in principle. If a man argued that he should be taxed less than most other people with his income or even not taxed at all because he had ten children to support, he might well be right, and there might be similar circumstances which justified a man otherwise eligible in not volunteering for military service in a major war, while we should all admit that a man was justified in not voting because his temperature was 104 or because he was 500 miles away.

Is this difference in attitude capable of being justified by a logical difference between the two kinds of case? I think it is. If the excuse given is one which, if valid at all, would be applicable to everybody or to most people, it would seem to follow clearly that it cannot be valid. If an argument consistently carried out leads to the conclusion that nobody or hardly anybody ought to pay taxes, it seems plain that there must be something wrong with the argument, since it is plainly not true that nobody or hardly anybody ought to pay taxes. To use general terms, if it is right for me to do or abstain from doing something because of a certain argument, it must be right for everybody to whom the argument applies; but it cannot be right for everybody to whom the argument applies because, if all such people acted accordingly, the results would be disastrous. It therefore cannot be right for me. This seems a perfectly valid type of argument, whatever one may think of its application in a particular case. If, on the other hand, an argument is based on circumstances not common to all or most people, but to a very limited number, there is no similar presumption against its validity. Few object to the proposition that some people should be excused income tax. This distinction may be applied to Kant's attitude to lying. Kant differs from the views I discuss primarily in this article because he does not profess to base his principle on the badness of the effects even of general lying but on an alleged inconsistency, but I do not think this makes my remark irrelevant. He pointed out what would happen if

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WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IF EVERYBODY ACTED LIKE ME?

everybody lied whenever they thought it suited them and concluded that one ought never to lie even to save the victim of a would-be murderer. Now this might be justified if the argument were one which could equally be used to justify any lying, but it is clear that in the case of the attempted murder there is an argument available which could not be used in defence of most cases of lying, namely that the lie will probably save a life. We could, I think, only object to such a lie on the kind of ground I have been discussing if we thought that the universalization of the principle—lie to would-be murderers in so far as this is the most efficient way available of hindering them in the commission of the crime—would have bad effects, and not merely because we thought that the general adoption of lying in other cases also would. Now while it is plain that the general adoption of a policy of lying by people whenever they thought it expedient would have bad effects by destroying mutual trust, it is far from plain that the adoption of such a policy towards murderers would. It is not by any means clear that it would be better if murderers could rely on any information they were given about the whereabouts of their victim. Nor can one claim to find a contradiction in it, as Kant did with the more general principle—Lie where it is expedient to do so. It is a question which class we take as our basis—the larger class of all lies or the smaller class of lies to murderers to save somebody from being their victim, and using the criterion I have given it is plain to me that we should take the smaller. For it is plainly not true that it follows that, if I am justified in telling a lie to a murderer to save life, everybody is justified in lying whenever it suits his convenience, since there are highly relevant ethical circumstances present in the narrower class which are not present in all cases of lies. The universalization criterion cannot, I insist, be plausibly applied where there are ethically relevant differences between the act proposed and other acts of the same class which exclude the argument for the act from applying in most or all cases of the class. For we are then not compelled to choose between admitting its validity in no case at all and admitting its validity in most or all cases. We must then either judge the act purely on its merits or apply the universalization criterion within a smaller class, namely, that class which has in common with the particular case before us all or most of the points that in the latter are ethically relevant.

Philosophically the issue I am discussing has a wide importance because it might be held to provide the utilitarian with a way of escape from many of the criticisms he has to meet. As such the universalization test was used by Hume and, I think, even Bentham. Can it be so used without abandoning utilitarianism? If he takes this course, the utilitarian will admit that a particular action will produce

more harm than good and yet ought to be done by him, thus apparently contradicting his principles. But he may say that he is still appealing to utility, only it is the utility not of a single act but of a whole class of acts of which the former is a member. Of course, if the single act is a necessary condition of the whole class of acts being performed sufficiently to secure the good in view, the reply is valid from his point of view, but it was not so in the cases I have mentioned. My payment of income tax is not a necessary condition of the government being able to secure funds sufficient for its work, nor is my vote a necessary condition of the candidate I favour being returned (nor—alas!—a sufficient one). All that can be said is that, if a consistent thinker admits the argument against voting or paying taxes in my case, he will have to admit it in every or almost every other case, and that the effect would be very bad if it were so admitted in practice. So the question arises—is the utilitarian not then abandoning his utilitarianism and appealing to a different principle, the principle that he ought to be consistent even in cases where it is not for the greatest good that we should be consistent? If I omit to pay my taxes while expecting other people to pay theirs I am in a sense acting inconsistently,¹ but why should I not act inconsistently if it does more good than harm to do so? From the hedonistic utilitarian point of view must not the answer be that there is no reason at all? And even if the utilitarian is prepared to admit other values besides pleasure, it does seem very doubtful whether he can reasonably claim sufficient intrinsic value for consistency to be in accord with our ordinary ethical practice in the cases discussed. It would certainly seem very odd to say that the reason why a man ought to fight in a war was because it was intrinsically valuable that he should be logically consistent. Is logical consistency in a particular action so valuable as to outweigh the disadvantage of being maimed or blown to bits, incidentally depriving oneself of any future opportunities of being logically consistent (unless you postulate a future life which, whether justifiable or not on other grounds, cannot be postulated to get one out of this sort of dilemma)? There is a story of an Irishman who was called a coward because he ran away in a battle, and he replied that he would rather be a coward for five minutes than a corpse all the rest of his life. Would not the argument of the Irishman, though its statement does not show the analytic care and verbal exactitude which we expect of a philosopher, be on principle valid against a utilitarian who contended that it was wrong for one man to

¹ I should not, in doing this, be acting inconsistently, though I should be acting wrongly, if my set policy were to secure as much material advantage as I could for myself regardless of other considerations, but then I should not be acting *qua* universalistic utilitarian, and it is universalistic utilitarianism that I am discussing here, not egoism.

WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IF EVERYBODY ACTED LIKE ME?

avoid danger in battle on the ground that, if everybody acted like that, the result would be disastrous? Is it not better to be logically inconsistent in a single act than to die or incur great risk of death.

I think, however, that there is more in the universalization criterion than this. As I have suggested, the utilitarian may argue as follows: If it is right for me to do act A, it would be right also for everybody else under circumstances similar in all ethically relevant respects to do act A. But if everybody else did act A under the circumstances, the results would be disastrous. Therefore it would not be right for everybody else to do it. Therefore it cannot be right for me to do it. Here is a direct logical proof, which invokes no premisses that would not generally be accepted by utilitarians. The premisses are—(a) that, if it is right for me to do something, it would be right for everybody to do it under ethically similar circumstances, (b) that an act (or class of acts) is wrong if it does harm rather than good. These premisses are part of the ordinary stock-in-trade of utilitarianism. The second is just utilitarianism on its negative side, the first besides being necessary for *any* satisfactory system of ethics is a corollary of the principle that what makes an action right or wrong is just the good or evil it produces. Utilitarianism would be contradicted at once if two actions which produced the same amount of good relatively to evil were not either both right or both wrong. And from the two premisses the conclusion follows in strict logic. It is not that logical consistency is intrinsically valuable, but that the utilitarian cannot without logical self-contradiction deny the ethical conclusion in question. But the utilitarian is not out of the wood yet. For the conclusion remains inconsistent in the instances I have given with another proposition which he holds, namely, that the rightness or wrongness of an act depends on the consequences of the particular act. So the argument which started as an attempt to defend utilitarianism by enlarging its criterion seems to have now turned into an objection against utilitarianism in general. Utilitarianism cannot be true if it does really lead to two inconsistent conclusions, namely, that certain acts are both right and wrong.

One conceivable way out which the utilitarian might adopt is to say that among the circumstances ethically relevant to my action should be included the fact that most people will, e.g., pay their taxes in any case, and consequently it might be right for me or any other particular person not to pay them (if he could get away with it), but wrong to do this if the number of evasions were ever so great as seriously to threaten the national revenue. But besides contradicting our moral convictions, this reply is open to the objection that, whether the number of evasions were in fact so great or not, it would still remain true that the amount *I* pay would not make any appreciable difference to the situation, and the same would apply to

the other cases, military service and voting, so I should still be under an obligation to do something that did no appreciable good. (As a matter of fact I imagine the financial position of the country would be very appreciably improved to-day if everybody were perfectly fair about Income Tax and never evaded in any way any part of what was really due.)

The utilitarian cannot, I think, legitimately appeal to the bad effects of the example of not adhering to a general rule even when no specific good is done in a particular case by keeping to it. This for two reasons. (a) The bad effects are to a large extent due to the fact that the action is thought wrong, and therefore cannot be used as a ground for its wrongness without a vicious circle. (b) All or most of them could be avoided by secrecy.

Now, if asked for a justification of the type of argument in question, most people would have recourse to the concept of fairness. They would say that it was unfair that I should "get out of" making a contribution which other people in my position are rightly expected to make. This introduces a new conception, namely that it is not only the total good or evil which matters but also the way in which they are distributed, a view which utilitarianism is usually understood as denying, but which can be brought within the framework of "ideal"¹ as opposed to hedonistic utilitarianism by ascribing intrinsic value to fairness of distribution as such or at least intrinsic disvalue to acts which militate in favour of unfairness. Or utilitarianism could be abandoned here in favour of the conception that it was *prima facie* wrong to act unfairly. Neither course would indeed enable one to avoid the contradiction just mentioned unless it were held that in all such cases the intrinsic badness or *prima facie* wrongness of the unfairness outweighed the gain to the individual or his family. But I suppose this might be maintained, and then we have what is perhaps a valid argument in favour of either abandoning utilitarianism or modifying it by the admission that fairness is intrinsically good or unfairness intrinsically bad or both, for otherwise we have the contradiction I exposed: namely, unless there is an intrinsic evil unfairness, to set against the harm done to the individual and perhaps his family by doing something which produces no appreciable good, it follows from utilitarianism that it is both his duty and not his duty to do the same thing, his duty because if it is not his duty it would be no one's duty and it obviously is someone's duty on utilitarian grounds, and not his duty because if it were his duty it would be an exception to the principle that we ought always to aim at producing the greatest good.

¹ I.e. the view that the right action is the action most conducive to good, good being not limited to pleasure or happiness but supposed to include other values such as virtue and knowledge.

Under what circumstances can we rightly use the criterion of universalization? Not, it seems, in all cases where the total omission of a class of acts would have disastrous effects. It would be a great disaster if nobody adopted farming as a career, but we certainly cannot conclude that everybody ought to become a farmer nor even that everybody who has no particular objection to farming should become a farmer. Even if it would be disastrous if everybody who was hesitating between farming and another occupation chose the latter in preference to farming, this would not, I think, be even a subsidiary reason for anybody in this position choosing farming, unless there was a real shortage of people willing to farm. Otherwise a real shortage of workers in the alternative occupation (provided it were at all a valuable one) would outweigh the bad effect of a merely hypothetical shortage of farmers. That it would be a disaster if nobody were to enter a particular occupation is quite compatible with there being far too many men at a particular time engaged in the occupation. Again it would, I think, be completely ruinous for some places if nobody bought herrings, but, at least while these places are reasonably prosperous, this does not put me under any obligation whatever to buy them. Again, suppose I thought that some very good object could be achieved if a great number of people including myself contributed but could not be achieved in any degree without their co-operation, I should be under no obligation to contribute if there were no prospect of the others also contributing.

These examples suggest that the universalization criterion can only rightly be applied if the following conditions are satisfied: (1) the act which it is proposed that the man in question should do must belong to a class of acts such that, if done by all or a large number of people, they produce a good result; (2) the value of the result must increase (not necessarily in the same proportion) as does the number of people who perform such acts. This would exclude the case of an occupation, which may always conceivably become overcrowded. But (3) the increment involved for each fresh individual must not be appreciable or at least not appreciable enough to outweigh the hardship to the individual. If it is, we need not apply the universalization criterion because the action is already justified by its own effects. (4) There must be some hardship in doing it. This again excludes the farming case because there is no hardship in choosing one occupation rather than another to which one is equally attracted. If there is no hardship in taking a course, we cannot say that, if a man did not take it, it would be unfair for him to expect others to do so. It is not *necessarily* unfair of me to leave responsibility to others in a party equally qualified, because they may like having the responsibility. (5) The purpose of the class of acts in question must not be capable of achievement unless the acts are done by people who are

under no more obligation than the man in question and would suffer no less hardship through doing it than he would. This excludes those cases where there is a special reason why a particular individual should not be expected to do it.

Where there is a law capable of ethical approbation or an agreement that everybody in a certain class should perform the act, this greatly increases the unfairness of not performing it, but it is not a necessary condition of this being unfair. It is unfair not to share at all in common tasks in a party even if there is no prior agreement that I should. It is more difficult to find a case in which there is not at any rate a sort of vague general understanding involved, but it is clearly not the understanding which makes it unfair. It is rather that the understanding exists because the taking of no share by one member without a good reason is assumed to be unfair. Nor is a man necessarily released from an obligation to share in a common task because the other people concerned are good-natured enough to excuse him. It is unfair to accept all the sacrifices that other people are willing to make and not make any oneself.

Another difficulty about the universalization criterion is how to determine what class is to serve, so to speak, as our standard of measurement. The same act is usually included in a number of different classes, and according to which class we select the result will often be very different. There are, for instance, many further complications about the bearing of the principle on voting. As I have said, since the chance of my vote settling an election is negligible, there is no obligation to vote at all unless the universalization criterion is applied in some way, and no doubt it justifies the view that it is in general our duty to vote. But, suppose we take the case of a convinced Liberal. What is he to do? One would naturally expect him to take as his standard class, the class of all voters, and in that case one might expect him to hold that he ought to vote liberal because, if everybody voted liberal, the result would be good. But he might rationally hold—as most English people probably do hold—that it would be a very bad thing if there were no opposition through everybody voting alike. In that case it is difficult to see how we are to apply the concept of the standard class. However, the Liberal might say that the principle he is using is that everybody should vote for the party which he thinks best, and that therefore he votes Liberal. But in that case he may be confronted with the objection that the effects of everybody voting for the party he thinks best are not at all what the Liberal desires, as is shown by the election results for many years back. If he thinks it very desirable indeed that the Liberals should win the election, he will think that the results would be better if, the electors thinking as they do, everybody did not vote for the party he thought best. Perhaps the

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WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IF EVERYBODY AGED LIKE ME?

answer is that, though it might have good results in a particular election, in the long run it would be very bad if the people thus made a practice of insincerity in voting. I do not wish to deny this, but if he uses this argument the Liberal has extended his standard class to include not only the electors at this election but the electors for many years back or on, perhaps generations, and if he extends it so far why not extend it further and include the voters in all countries? Yet it would be perfectly consistent for a Liberal to hold that his party was the best for this country without holding that the party which comes nearest the outlook of British Liberals was the best for all countries on the face of the earth. And what reason is there for extending the class rather than narrowing it? If he narrows it, he may get different results. Suppose he includes in his standard class not all voters but all Liberal voters, and suppose he thinks that, though the Liberals are the best party, it is very much more important that the Conservative or the Labour Party should be kept out of power than that there should be a Liberal minority, and he also thinks that if all Liberals by conviction voted Liberal the party he dislikes most would have a majority. In that case he would not hold it a good thing for all Liberals to vote Liberal. But complications thicken, for he need not hold that it would be a good thing for them *all* to vote for another party. A stable majority might be secured for the party he thinks second best by *most* Liberals voting for it, and then he will think it better that the rest should vote Liberal. In that case how can he apply the *universalization* principle? Presumably his belief that most Liberals should vote, e.g. Conservative ought to carry some weight in favour of his voting Conservative, but not by itself a decisive weight, for he does not think that *all* Liberals should. But he may take as his standard a narrower class still, the class of Liberals in his own constituency. This might again lead to a different result. He might (though this has become unlikely) live in a constituency in which the Liberals were still one of the two strongest parties and to vote Liberal provided the best chance of keeping out the party he disliked most. He would then think that all Liberals by conviction in the constituency ought to vote Liberal and would accordingly vote Liberal himself. But suppose he lived in a constituency in which the chances of the Liberal candidate were practically zero, but in which if Liberals all voted for that candidate, it was very likely that a candidate of the party he liked least would be returned rather than one whom he liked not very much less than the Liberal. In that case he would seem on his principles justified in not voting Liberal. So the results may be very different according to which standard class we take into account, and the question arises how we are to decide which. The question is even more complicated than I have indicated because besides the possibilities I have men-

tioned there are a great number of intermediate possibilities, e.g. where it is reasonably *possible* but not at all likely that the Liberal will get in and *more likely* that the result of people voting Liberal will be that it puts in the candidate whom the voter in question likes least. Again, if all the Liberals who thought their candidate would not be elected in all contested constituencies voted for another candidate the Liberal would in most cases have no votes at all and the moral effect of this might lead to the party losing at the next election what few seats it still holds.

I have taken this case not in the hope of deciding a political question by an abstract philosophical principle, but as an illustration of the difficulty of selecting one's standard class. As I have already indicated, it seems to me that the class which has the best claim for choice as standard class is the largest class, including the particular case, whose members have in common with it all features that are seriously relevant ethically, and that the nearer we approach to this class the more likely we are to be right. In deciding whether a man ought to be asked to pay taxes it is better to consider the class—all taxpayers of approximately his financial status rather than the larger class, all taxpayers; in deciding whether he ought to fight in a war, the class all men of approximately his age and responsibilities rather than all citizens; in deciding whether he ought to vote Liberal in a particular election the class all Liberals in his constituency and all constituencies where the situation is similar, rather than all voters in every constituency. The reason for this is that we can only argue that we ought not to act in a certain way because of what would happen if everybody acted in that way on the ground that, if it were right for us to act like that, it would be right for everybody to do so and it is not right for everybody to do so. Now if there are circumstances ethically relevant to our decision which are not present in all cases in our standard class, we cannot argue that if I ought to act like this everybody in the class ought to, and the only argument I can see for the application of the universalization criterion disappears. Should we therefore, in so far as we use the universalization criterion at all, take into account *only* this class as standard? That is where the argument points. Certainly a Liberal ought to consider besides the effects in his own constituency the effects on the whole country of Liberals voting in a certain way, but perhaps he need not ask—What would happen if all voters or all Liberal voters in the country as a whole did so and so? but only—What would happen to the country as a whole if all members of the narrower class of voters in my constituency or in constituencies where the situation is similar did so and so? We must remember that, while it can be argued that a single vote by an ordinary voter has no appreciable effect, we cannot say this about the return of a single

WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IF EVERYBODY ACTED LIKE ME?

member of Parliament, and therefore once we have decided what member of Parliament is most likely to be returned under certain circumstances, we can consider the actual effects of his return without bothering about the universalization criterion further. But I am far from feeling dogmatic about the matter, and a further difficulty remains. Suppose the class I have defined is that consisting of members which have in common with my proposed action characteristics a , b , c , and suppose c is only very slightly relevant to the ethics of the action, so slight that its introduction is almost trivial, while a and b are ethically very relevant. Ought we not to take as a standard rather the larger class whose members have characteristics a and b in common? Or ought we not at least to consider both classes? However there is one comfort here: since c is *ex hypothesi* very unimportant the results are likely to be almost always the same whichever of these alternatives we adopt. But the question of the application of the universalization criterion is one which has not been discussed nearly enough by philosophers, and this paper is of the nature of pioneer work on the subject, though I can refer to an article by Professor Broad.¹ The question clearly has important practical bearings both on politics and on private ethics.

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¹ *International Journal of Ethics*, 1915-16.

THE MEANING OF LIFE

PROFESSOR L. J. RUSSELL

I

THE question I shall deal with is often put in the form "What is the meaning of life?" I shall consider this form later on, but I do not want to begin with it, partly because it assumes that life has a meaning which can be called "the" meaning, an assumption which will have to be looked into, and partly because I want to start with something which looks very much more vague.

In speaking of life I am thinking of the lives of human beings, especially of our own lives; and I shall start by asking what kind of attitude we are to take toward our own lives and those of other people. I do not want to make this an exclusively moral question in any traditional sense, but I shall assume that on such a matter one's attitude may be taken after reflection and discussion, or can be changed by reflection and discussion. Taking an attitude toward a situation is different from accepting some statement as true or false; it is partly dependent on what one believes to be true, partly relative to the attitudes one takes toward other situations. I shall assume that discussion is one of the ways, to be approved, by which attitudes can be modified.

One point which is central in any discussion of our topic is that our life in this world is ended by death. The effects we produce may be short-lived, or may be lasting, but our own stretch of living comes to an end, and is as if it had never been.

I shall argue that the main danger in this discussion is that of turning away too quickly from those things in our lives which are liable to cease, and be as if they had never been, and seeking for something enduring instead. I am not objecting to a search for something enduring. I shall argue that if you start with the idea that what does not endure is of no account, you will be unable to give an adequate account of anything that does endure.

The most obvious mistake is of the type, "jam to-morrow, but never jam to-day." One kind of humanitarian view, while very attractive, shows this mistake.

On this view, individuals are mortal, the succession of individuals endures. What anyone achieves in his own lifetime vanishes at his death except in so far as it affects the lives of his successors. In our descendants we can attain an immortality—or at least an endurance—denied to ourselves. Thus while we can get no satisfying attitude toward our own lives by considering them as units complete in themselves between birth and death, yet we need not look for anything

beyond this world to help us out. Our lives can serve our successors. "To leave the world a little better than we found it" can be our sufficient motto.

As a complete answer, this fails. It fails precisely because it gives nobody any jam to-day. If we can find satisfaction in our lives only by thinking of them as preparing the way for our successors, then our successors will be in precisely the same position in regard to their lives. A series of lives is in this respect no better than a single life, or than some period in a single life. What has to be made clear at the outset is that no period either of a single life or of a series of lives is any better off in this respect than any other.

I am not of course urging that we should take no thought for the morrow, and live entirely in the present. What I am urging is that it will not do to make our attitude toward our life in the present depend wholly on the contribution it makes toward some life in the future. The stress is on "wholly." If the fact that our present life will pass away makes it impossible for us get a satisfactory attitude to it in its own right, it is mere self-deception to take satisfaction in it as a preparation for some future life of the same kind. The thing to get clear about is that it is actual living here and now that is the stuff of which the lives of conscious human beings are made. As such it passes away; and if it leaves traces, it leaves them as constituents of some actual living which will then be here and now in its turn, and which in its turn will pass away. The here and now has in the end to stand in its own right.

Once more: this does not mean neglecting the future. It means not neglecting the present. There are times of stress when we have to concentrate on the future. But it is a mistake to take these occasions as giving the pattern of existence, and to say, "you cannot serve both the present and the future."

What is wrong then with the type of humanitarian view I have mentioned is not that it takes satisfaction in the thought of our serving our successors, but that it takes no satisfaction in the thought of our living our own lives.

II

So much by way of preliminary. I have used the phrase "taking an attitude to our lives." And this phrase may appear not sufficiently precise. Let us see if we can be more explicit. Is there any sense in which we can speak of life as having meaning, or significance?

A number of senses of the word "meaning" can be ruled out straightway; e.g. the sense in which A means B whenever A serves in some way as a sign of B.

Let us consider whether life has meaning in the sense of function or purpose.

We may see a body of men doing something, and ask what is the meaning or significance of their acts. What we are looking for is some purpose their acts are leading toward, or some further set of acts, with the nature of which we are familiar, with which these acts are connected.

We do speak of a series of acts of a person as having meaning in this sense of exhibiting or realizing purposes. A person may have throughout his life a single dominating purpose which to a large extent controls all his acts. And we might speak of this purpose as giving meaning or significance to his life, or as being the meaning of his life.

Here then is one sense in which we could speak of someone's life as having a meaning or significance. But it would not apply to everyone. Many people do not have a single dominant purpose: rather they have a variety of purposes, often with little relation to each other.

In another sense, allied to this one, though quite different from it, the meaning of a person's life would be found not in what he explicitly purposed, nor even in what he was aware of having accomplished, but rather in such changes in the total course of events as were brought about in part through his existence. This is a sense in which an historian may speak of the significance of the work of some statesman. There will of course be a variety of consequences, but if there is some predominant consequence which attracts the attention of historians, this will be spoken of as the significant one. It may be some effect which neither the agent himself nor any of his contemporaries fore-saw; and will in general involve the co-operation of many agents, each pursuing his own purposes—but this is a wide subject, which I need not pursue further. All I need note is that this sense belongs to the general type which finds the meaning of the life of an individual or of a set of individuals in terms of consequences which affect the lives of other individuals later in time. While it contributes to our understanding of life, it does nothing to meet the difficulties raised in the first section.

III

At this point it may be objected that none of this gives us what we want when we are asking for the meaning of life. For even the series of lives, however long it may last, is transitory, and we want a meaning or purpose in relation to what is not transitory.

The kind of thing which is being insisted on here can be expressed tersely in sentences such as "Unless we are immortal, our life is meaningless," or "life has meaning only in relation to the eternal."

It should be noted that statements of this sort are not statements

of fact. They express a view about the only kind of meaning that is acceptable in this inquiry. Anything which passes away, on this view, can be of no possible interest except in so far as it contributes to what does not pass away.

Let us look at this view.

There are two possible ways in which we can think of the immortal or the eternal,—one simple, one difficult.

(i) The simple one involves merely the notion of going on for ever in time. The individual person persists, while the succession of experiences through which he passes do not themselves persist, although they may be remembered, or may cause changes in his personality. What is significant in the changing experiences is just their persistent effects. We have a present which is always passing away, but which is perpetually enriched from the past.

As to this view, once more it seems to me to err by overstress on the persistent. A life which goes on in time is made up of stretches of experience, all of which are transitory. Unless some transitory stretches are of some interest in themselves, the whole stretch can be of none either. What is the use of enriching a future experience if this future experience is of no interest except in so far as it enriches an experience still further in the future?

One has to ask, then, in what way the fact that a person's life continued in time for ever would give to the experiences he was actually living through at a particular time a meaning or a significance which they must lack for a person whose life came to an end in time. Or we may put it differently and ask, what difference would the fact that he was to live in time for ever make to a person's attitude toward the experiences he was actually living through at a particular time? A succession in time, however long it lasts, is made up of stretches in time; and any actual experience, wherever it may come in the series, is in relation to the series as a whole in exactly the same position as any other actual experience. You are no nearer to finality later than earlier. The fact that you were to go on for ever might then leave you with an attitude free from the anxiety of someone who could not get away from the fact that, like a condemned prisoner, he was doomed to die. It might leave you free to live through the present stretch of experience, enriched by the past, not forgetting the claims of the future, but remembering that the time for living is now.

What is meant by "living now" requires consideration, but whatever else it involves, it seems to involve an ungrudging giving of oneself to the pursuits one is actually engaging in, whether they are means to some future end, or pursuits engaged in for their own sakes, here and now. While security from annihilation can serve this freedom, it may bring dangers.

This is especially the case as regards the unsatisfactory conditions under which other people are living. If we feel that their present life is merely an infinitesimal part of an eternally prolonged existence, we may be less likely to want to do something about it. From this point of view, it may be rather a disadvantage than an advantage for the members of a community to believe in immortality. They may be more likely to feel that the task of getting decent conditions of life for everyone is urgent, if they regard the present life as the only one.

But I do not want to stress this connection; it is only a possible and not a necessary one.

It is sometimes objected that the thought of a purely temporary existence would take away from us all sense of moral responsibility, or at least would make us feel that we had neither time nor justification for doing anything but acting with the maximum self-regard. I see no need for this. Firstly, because I cannot see any ground for connecting this belief in the duration of our existence with any necessary attitude toward it on our part; and this holds of the statements I have made myself in the previous paragraph. People can take this attitude; they do not always do so. The poor are often more ready than the rich to help the poor. Thus even on the assumption that a purely temporary existence must be one in which the thought of annihilation gives the predominant colour to all one's activities, there is no justification for supposing that it should naturally lead men to be selfish. Personally, I should deny this assumption.

Thus I cannot see that the thought of our life as going on endlessly in time enables us to see in it a "meaning" it would not have, considered as coming to an end. Each portion of it has still to be lived through, and each portion of it still comes to an end.

It may be objected that I am saying nothing of the notion of progress toward personal perfection; and that it is just this which would give a meaning to an endless life, which would be absent from a temporary one. If we come to an end, all our striving to realize an ideal of personal excellence becomes meaningless. It not merely takes on a meaning, but becomes the meaning of our lives, if we have no end.

To this I should reply that (when we take eternity in the sense of going on forever in time) personal excellence is something to be sought after for the sake of excellence of living, and not living something to be done for the sake of achieving personal excellence. The ideal of personal perfection cannot, I think, do what is being demanded of it. It is put forward as if it were something which, if achieved, would be absolute and abiding; and it is contrasted, in this respect, I imagine, with living itself, which perpetually passes away. The contrast is, however, misleading. The terms used in giving an account

of a personal ideal are abstract, and draw the attention away from the fact that what they refer to can be manifested only by doing something or other. Thus the main point I am trying to develop is not met, but only evaded, by this reference to the ideal of personal perfection. To live is to be active in this way or that, during the present stretch of existence; this stretch will give way to a further stretch; and if living in the present has no meaning in its own right, you cannot give it meaning by reference to some type of living in the future. The same problem will arise for this future living, when it becomes present.

I conclude that the attempt to give life a meaning by introducing the possibility of it as enduring in time for ever, does not succeed. If living which passes away has no meaning, living which goes on and on has none either.

IV

(ii) I come now to the second meaning of the immortal or eternal, which I spoke of as the difficult meaning. Here the eternal is conceived as in some sense timeless. One possible way of conceiving this I can make nothing of, viz. of an eternal as having no reference to time whatever, distinctions of past, present and future vanishing completely and being replaced by an eternal "now," even "now" being an inadequate word in this context. The notion of a timeless being in this sense seems to me quite unhelpful, and to speak of a timeless activity seems to me a mere playing with words.

More hopeful, perhaps, is the approach which starts with the time series, and suggests that certain features of it, those which give rise to our problem, are the result of our imperfect apprehension. If we saw the reality of which time is an illusory appearance, we should see it as eternal in some sense which we can dimly approach by analogies of various kinds.

With this meaning, which I shall not attempt to elucidate, the statement "life has meaning only with reference to the eternal" leaves us just where we were, with two exceptions.

(a) We need not think of the transitoriness of our existence as an essential feature of it. All our acts, however transitory, become transformed into aspects of the eternal. The mother of a family, queuing to provide meals daily for her growing children, reflecting each day that it will all have to be done again to-morrow, will, if she can rise to this new attitude toward the transitory, have the comfortable sense that what she is doing, fully understood, belongs to eternity. And that, perhaps, if it gives her a sense of the value of her daily acts, is to the good.

What has to be guarded against here is the danger of letting this

conception diminish the lively sense, which it is so important to keep of the freshness of each act, even though it may appear no more than a repetition of an act which has been performed innumerable times before. We do not want a notion of eternity to give added poignancy to the dismal thought so many people express by the phrase "the eternal round." But it is not easy to keep the idea that living is a constant meeting of new and fresh situations, while at the same time holding that the temporal character of our experience is somehow illusory, and I do not see how it can be done on the plane of concepts. What is involved seems to be a firm decision to insist that while transitoriness is the result of an imperfect apprehension of the eternal yet the transitoriness of the transitory makes an essential contribution to the nature of the eternal. You must insist on having it both ways.

Even though one may succeed in this, the position is not yet quite satisfactory. For so far, the doctrine of eternity makes no distinction between any one event and any other. Every change is transformed in exactly the same way. Some supplementary principle is needed if we are to distinguish between the kinds of contribution to the eternal made by different types of act. This brings me to the second of my two exceptions.

(b) Various principles of distinction have been suggested. The tests of coherence and comprehensiveness (used by Bradley in his account of degrees of reality) can be dangerous, applied to human acts; they can easily be used to justify tyranny if it is sufficiently large scale, unscrupulous and efficient. The tests are certainly insufficient. Or again there is the view for which goodness, truth and beauty have more of the nature of eternity than any other characteristics or features of existence, so that they can be spoken of as the eternal values. The notion of eternity here seems to me full of difficulty, and by no means straightforwardly connected with the notion of the eternal as the real of which the time process is an illusory process.

The view I want to discuss is still more common and widespread in its influence, and has a longer tradition behind it. It is the view which distinguishes between spiritual and material things, between spiritual and material interests. The suggestion is that the spiritual is more akin to the true eternal, the material to the transitory. The one is ennobling, the other base and degrading, save in due subordination to the spiritual.

This distinction, however long and august the tradition supporting it, seems to me objectionable. I need not dwell on the gross perversions of it which led some men seeking holiness to take literally the rule to "mortify the flesh," or the form of it, less violently perverse but perhaps even worse in their widespread consequences, which have

led even well-disposed persons, whose power could have been helpful, to work in opposition to material progress. One application of the view, respectable, though it seems to me absurd, is the old classification of sight and hearing, as the higher senses, since less material, smell, taste and touch as the lower. Familiarity with the distinction has given many simple people, anxious to stand well with their God, an uneasy sense that they ought not to enjoy a great many things they would naturally enjoy if they were not made to feel that the bodily functions, being material, belong to the baser side of life.

It may be said that there is not much danger of this at the present time. I reply that there is always danger in a doctrine of this sort. What is wrong with it is the suggestion that there are certain kinds of activity in themselves as a class higher than others—e.g. philosophizing higher than taking a bath, reading poetry higher than enjoying the smells of the garden, or of pine woods, or of a well-cooked dinner!

The task of distinguishing between more worthwhile ("higher") and less worth while ("lower") ways of living is much harder than this. The division of interests into material and spiritual is far too simple, and quite inadequate.

All interests are human interests, interests of persons. I use the word "person" in its everyday sense, as the singular of "people." In speaking of a "person" I am thinking simply of this or that human being, who walks and talks, takes up room, eats and sleeps, loves, hates, reasons, feels—to whom are to be attributed such characteristics as he is found to have. It is such a person of whom I am speaking when I say that all interests are interests of persons, and to say this is to say nothing more than that it is persons who are interested.

All interests, then, are interests of persons. There is not one of them which cannot form a valuable ingredient in a rich and full life, and not one which cannot be pursued in such a way as to impoverish life. In themselves, none is "higher" or "lower" than any other.

When I am writing this, I stop and make myself a cup of coffee. Shall I be any the better if I do not give myself as freely, and with as keen and vivid attention, to the making of the coffee, as I do to my writing? Will it be better to go through these movements with a half-deadened mechanism? And when I drink the coffee, am I to do it as if I were ashamed? I would wish to be fully alive in all I do. I do not want to live all my life drinking coffee, but neither do I want to live all my life writing or thinking. I want to feel the waves beating against my body, I want to make things with my hands, I want to smell the fragrance of the earth and to watch the changes in the sky. I want to trifle as well as be serious. I do not want to be a fragment of myself. Nor do I want to divide myself into higher and lower parts. What each person is to do with his life is for himself to decide, and a

discussion of possibilities would be out of place here. The point I would stress is that if some of his activities are to be described as "higher" or as "lower" than others, it will not be because some are connected with spiritual, others with material things (a distinction I should reject), but because of the way he engages in them, because of their place in his life.

To sum up so far. The reference to the eternal, as what enables living to have meaning or purpose, seems to me to be unsatisfactory. If eternity is regarded as a time process going on for ever, we are no nearer than we were before to seeing in what sense this time series can have meaning or purpose; while if eternity is regarded as the real, of which the time series is an illusory appearance, then everything in the time series must be related to the same underlying reality, and supplementary principles have to be brought in if some acts or events are to be shown to be more akin to the eternal than others. I do not wish to argue here that all such attempts are bound to fail, though I do not feel that the reference to something eternal is enlightening. The use of one particular distinction, that between material and spiritual things or interests, seems to me to be objectionable both in its theoretical basis and in its practical consequences.

Two important points seem to me to be involved in this attempt to relate life to something eternal. The first is a decision that transitoriness shall not be taken as reducing what is occurring now, to nothingness, once it has passed. This decision allows one to welcome, and to value, the experiences of the present for what they are, and not merely for such effects as they may have when they have passed away.

The second is an attempt to find principles, not referring exclusively to consequences, to guide one in one's choices among the various activities open to one at any particular time.

I should approve both the decision and the attempt. But the decision can be made independently of any reference to eternity, which is only one way of seeking to justify it. And the reference to eternity seems to me to distract attention from some of the important issues in the search for principles. On the main question, whether relation to something eternal enables us to understand in what sense life has meaning, I should answer in the negative. In effect, what we are left with is simply the insistence that all our experiences have significance, although we do not know what this significance is.

V

Is it necessary to ask for a meaning of life, in any sense of a meaning or purpose considered as outside or beyond the living itself?

When we are confronted with a work of art which perplexes us, we may feel that what we lack is an apprehension of the artist's meaning. The artist we suppose intended to express something, and to convey something which we have failed to grasp. If we can relate the work of art to the artist's intention, we can legitimately say that we understand what he means. This is one sense in which a work of art can be said to have meaning. We sometimes, however, think of a work of art as something relatively independent of the artist, and as having a meaning or meanings beyond any the artist himself intended to convey, and even beyond anything that could be regarded as an expression of something in the artist. A work of art can take on new meanings in new contexts.

Both these senses of "meaning" have to be interpreted with care, in relation to a work of art. We have to avoid treating a work of art as a mere instrument for the conveyance of some meaning or significance external to it. (Once again, the emphasis is on "mere.")

I say to my friend on the bus, "This is where we get off." The set of noises I make serves to draw his attention to something entirely different. It is not the noises, but what they signify that I want him to attend to. Similarly, when I smile encouragement to a child who is trying to do something difficult. The situation is different when I smile just in friendliness, where the friendliness is in the smile, or if you will, is the smile. It is this type of situation that is of predominant importance in the case of the work of art.

To the question, "What is the artist trying to communicate?" the central answer is, "the work of art itself."

I do not want to go into all this, which is pretty familiar, nor into the question how we are to describe the difference in our apprehension and feeling when we feel that we do, and when we do not, "understand." What I want to stress is the point that if a work of art is to be said to "have a meaning," we must be careful to avoid the suggestion that it exists simply in order to draw our attention to something other than itself. I should prefer not to say of a work of art that it is its own meaning, though if you are to use such a word as "meaning" that is the least objectionable way of speaking. Of course a work of art shines partly by the light cast on it from other works of art and from our whole experience (including our knowledge of the artist) and partly itself adds to the whole play of light. It illuminates and is illuminated. In that sense we can say that it is full of meaning which reaches beyond itself. But to speak in this way is quite different from speaking of "the" meaning of a work of art. A phrase like this I should prefer to avoid altogether.

I think it is more illuminating, less misleading, to say that the concept of meaning or purpose, as exhibited in the phrase "the meaning or purpose," is inappropriate.

And if so, it will be equally inappropriate to say that a work of art is meaningless or purposeless.

I should use similar considerations in regard to "the meaning or purpose" of life. If we are to seek for any meaning for our actual living, it must not be in something outside or beyond that living itself. Our living can be enriched by many things other than itself, including the lives of other people; it can contribute enrichment beyond itself; in these senses it can be full of meanings beyond its own existence. But here as in the case of the work of art, it seems better to say that the concept of meaning or purpose, as exhibited in the phrase "the meaning or purpose" is inappropriate; and equally inappropriate to say that life is meaningless or purposeless.

VI

If this view is taken, then our question in relation to our life will be different. It will be just the question, how to live.

A number of the points raised in our discussion arise here, with a different bearing.

The main one is that of the character of the time series, namely, that to-morrow is just as transitory as to-day. Hence, while the activities of to-day may be means toward the activities of to-morrow (and often should be, though not *only* this), we cannot lay down as a general principle that the life of to-day is for the sake of the life of to-morrow. Especially if this is our answer to the question what justifies life.

"What is your aim or purpose in life?" is a misleading question—misleading through emphasis on only one aspect—if it is intended to be the only, or the main form of the general question, how to live. For it tends to throw the chief emphasis on the future. But the claims of the present are equally important. We might indeed say that the adjustment of the claims of the present and those of the future is the main task of any person.

I am tempted, however, to say that the hardest task, for many people at any rate, is just the task of living now.

Birmingham.

THE GENERAL NATURE OF A MORAL DUTY

W. J. REES, B.A.

I PROPOSE in this article to reconsider, in the light of some recent developments in the theory of knowledge, certain general questions about the nature of duty. In particular, I propose to consider the question of the relation between our moral duties on the one hand, and our knowledge or ignorance of facts and of moral principles on the other.

When we reflect upon the relationship which exists between our duties and our knowledge or ignorance of facts, we seem compelled to adopt one of two views. We can hold, either that it is our duty always to do the act which is morally required by the *facts of the external situation*, or else that it is our duty always to do the act which is required by what *we think are the facts of that situation*. The former view is usually referred to as the objective view and the latter as the subjective view, but for the purposes of this article I shall call them the *factually objective* and *factually subjective* views respectively.

When, again, we reflect upon the relationship which exists between our duties and our knowledge or ignorance of moral principles, we seem once more compelled to adopt one of two positions. We can hold, either that our duty is always to act in conformity with the principle which is the *right principle* in the actual or supposed situation, or else that our duty is always to act in conformity with the principle which *we think is the right principle* in that situation. For my present purposes I shall call these two views the *ethically objective* and *ethically subjective* views respectively.

It is notorious that all the above standpoints lead to a number of extraordinary paradoxes. Nevertheless, it would be fair to say that in both the above cases the subjective view at present justifiably holds the field. This view I now propose to challenge. What I shall argue is that the dichotomy in terms of which the problem has been presented is a false one, and that we are not obliged to accept either of the alleged alternatives. But in so doing I hope to establish an objective view of duty which, being essentially different from the objective view as now understood, will meet all the arguments now put forward by holders of the subjective view, while avoiding the paradoxes associated with either of the older views.

I

It is convenient to approach the problem now before us by enquiring into the nature of our accepted moral rules. Since Prichard

delivered his famous British Academy Lecture on *Duty and Ignorance of Fact*, it has been generally understood that there exists a logical connection between certain interpretations of our moral rules on the one hand, and certain answers to our present problem on the other. It has been generally held that our moral rules recommend or condemn certain actions, and, for this reason, it has been generally held that they imply the factually objective view. If one's duty is always to *do* something, i.e., to bring about some change of state in some existing thing, then this seems to imply that what makes anything a duty is the character of the external situation rather than what a person thinks about that situation. Prichard, it is true, dissented from this conclusion, but while doing so he also paid his respects to the logic of the argument by rejecting its premiss. In his opinion, since the objective view was plainly false, it was necessary to interpret our moral rules in such a way as to conform with the subjective view. He held consequently that what a moral rule recommends is not that a person should *do* a certain action, but that he should *set himself* to do it. To this extent, the solution of the present problem seems to depend upon our reaching a correct analysis of the nature of our moral rules.

Many attempts have been made to analyse correctly the nature of our moral rules. It has been variously held that they recommend certain actions, that they recommend that persons should set themselves to do certain actions, that while some recommend certain actions others recommend certain feelings. All these views have at least one thing in common. They all presuppose that our moral rules recommend certain events or occurrences rather than certain dispositions. It is necessary at the outset to enquire whether this supposition is correct.

There are at least three reasons for believing that the supposition is false. (a) Some moral rules are stated with the use of determinable dispositional verbs for which there exist no corresponding occurrent usages, e.g., such rules as that persons ought to honour their parents or love their enemies. If honouring one's parents and loving one's enemies were occurrences of a certain kind, then it would always be appropriate to ask a person how long it took him to honour his parents or to love his enemies, how often he had done either of these things in the past twelve months, and when he proposes to do either of them again. But we all understand that questions of this kind are inappropriate and that they are, in fact, quite meaningless. (b) Some moral rules can be stated without the use of any active verb at all, but simply with the use of the verb "to be," e.g., a man ought to be honest, tolerant, punctual, kind, etc. In these cases, there is not even the grammatical suggestion that what the rule recommends is a certain event or occurrence. On the contrary, these rules seem even

more plainly to recommend certain dispositions. (c) In a large number of cases in which we do use the active verbs in order to state our duties, these duties can be quite easily stated with the use of the verb "to be," e.g., "A man ought to speak the truth" means the same thing as "A man ought to be truthful," and "A man ought to act justly" the same thing as "A man ought to be just." This indicates that although these active verbs have appropriate occurrent uses, their use in a moral rule is dispositional and not occurrent.

It seems clear, then, that our moral rules recommend neither actions nor feelings but certain dispositions. If this is correct, then it should be possible to analyse any moral rule into a series of hypothetical propositions which would jointly express the meaning of the rule. This can, in fact, be done. We may take the following two well-established rules, the rule that a person ought to honour his parents and the rule that a person ought to speak the truth. To honour one's parents is, among other things, to visit them if they are lonely, to offer them help if they are destitute, to carry out their wishes about the division of their property after their death if they have expressed such a wish, etc. To say, therefore, that a person ought to honour his parents is to say, among other things, that if a man's parents are alive, if they are lonely, and he knows this and can visit them, etc., then he ought to visit them; or, that if his parents are alive and destitute, and he knows this and can help them, etc., then he ought to help them; and so on. Similarly with the rule that a person ought to speak the truth. To say that a person ought to speak the truth, as this is understood in the context of a moral rule, is to say among other things that if a person is asked a question about a matter of fact, if he understands the question, and if he knows the answer and is able to give the answer, etc., then he ought to give the correct answer; or, that if a person writes a book, and if the book contains statements about matters of fact, then he ought to assure himself that these statements are correct or else not write them; and so on.

If this analysis is correct, then its bearing upon the problem of the general nature of a moral duty is clearly important.

In the first place, it is possible now to regard our duties objectively without having to hold that a person needs to be omniscient in order to know his duties, and without having also to hold that a person may have duties which neither he nor anyone else knows or even thinks that he has. On the old factually objective view this was not possible. If our duties depend solely upon the facts of the external situation, then no person who is not omniscient can certainly know what his duty is in any situation; and if nobody is in fact omniscient, then a person may well have duties which neither he nor anyone else knows or even suspects that he has. This difficulty is now avoided.

A person has now a duty to support his indigent parents only if he knows or believes on reasonable evidence that they are alive and in need of help. Moreover, this is not merely a restatement of the old subjective view. On the present analysis of a moral rule, a person's knowledge or ignorance of the facts of the external situation is a fact in a wider total situation, and it is the wider total situation, rather than any factors taken separately within that situation, which determines a person's duties. This is only another way of saying that the dichotomy in terms of which it is customary to present these problems about our duties is itself a false one, and that the alternatives offered to us, in the shape of the old objective and subjective views, are alike spurious alternatives.

Secondly, we can now regard our duties objectively without having to hold that a person will have done his duty whenever he does a right act from a wrong motive. On the older objective view, this again was not possible. A person's duty, on that view, was to do the act required by the facts of the external situation. A person, consequently, who visited his lonely and invalid parents would have done his duty even if his motive in doing so was solely to secure a will drawn up in his favour. We can now, however, restate the whole matter under review here in a new and different way. If the analysis now given is correct, then the statement of a moral rule implies not only that certain overt actions are obligatory under certain circumstances, but also that those actions should be done from a certain motive. When we say that if X knows that his parents are lonely and invalid he ought to visit them, we are also implying that X ought to be such a person that whenever he knew that his parents were lonely and invalid he *would* visit them, and would do so *because* he knew that they were lonely and invalid. This is why the rule that a person ought to speak the truth means the same thing as the rule that a person ought to be truthful, and why it is that moral rules can be stated with the aid of the verb "to be" as well as with the aid of the active verbs. Any moral rule implies not only a duty to do certain actions under certain circumstances, but also a duty to acquire a certain character. If this is so, it is possible to take an objective view of our duties without having to hold that a person has done his duty whenever he has done a right act from a wrong motive. On the customary interpretation of the facts involved here, we would have to say that such a person would not have done his duty because, although he would have obeyed the rule and would have done the act morally required by the facts of the external situation, he would have done so from an immoral motive. On the present interpretation, we can now say that he has not done his duty because, his motive being what it is, he has not done the act morally required by the facts of the total situation, and has not consequently obeyed the rule.

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Thirdly, it is possible to hold an objective view of duty, while allowing that our duties are determined also by our own capacities and abilities. On this view, a person has a duty to do only what he *can* do. The word "can," however, is ambiguous and needs to be analysed further if we are to develop fully the implications of this position. On one use of the word "can," to say that a person can do a certain action is to say that there is no physical incapacity which prevents his doing that action; on another, it is to say that the person knows how to do the action, that he has learnt how to do it and has not forgotten. But there is also a third use of the word which is important in the present context. When we say that a person did everything he could do to repair a broken marriage, we imply that he did all those things which *were likely* to bring about that state of affairs. We do not imply, for example, that he watered the garden, took a bath and read the newspaper, and did all the things which he was physically capable of doing, and knew how to do, but which would not be in the least likely to repair a broken marriage. Moreover, it is immediately clear that, in the great majority of the situations of life, no person can have a duty to do anything unless he *can* do it in *all* these senses of the word "can." No person can have a duty to swim out to sea to save a drowning man unless he is free from cramps and broken bones, unless he knows how to swim, and unless there is some likelihood that swimming out to sea might save the man. To say, therefore, that a person has a duty to do what he *can* do is to say that he has a duty to do those actions which (a) he is physically capable of doing, (b) he knows how to do, and (c) are likely to bring about the state of affairs which he has in view.

Two things follow from this. (a) There is now no difficulty in holding an objective view of duty while allowing that infants and animals do not have duties. On the present view, no creature which cannot act from motives, as distinct from instinct and habit, and which has not acquired various kinds of abilities and some knowledge of probabilities, can have a duty. These factors are now, however, no longer merely subjective factors, but integral factors in a total and actual situation determining a person's duties. (b) It is possible to give a realistic account of the *extent* of our duty in any situation. This has been a particularly embarrassing problem for both the older views. It has always appeared fatal to the old objective view that, in order to do his duty, a person would have to *succeed* in any task which the facts of the external situation might make it necessary for him to undertake. It has been said, therefore, that one's duty is always to *try* to succeed, where "trying" is some kind of event which may or may not have success as its causal consequence. But this again is an uncomfortable position. If trying to succeed involves *doing* anything, then one must at least succeed in that. Parity of

PHILOSOPHY reasoning then requires that we should move a stage further back again indefinitely, until finally one's duty becomes, as with Prichard, a duty to "set oneself" to do something. But this entirely subjectivist position is still uncomfortable. Since one must still succeed in setting oneself—whatever "setting oneself" may be—we are led still further back either to a point where one's duty is to set oneself to set oneself, *ad infinitum*, or else to a point where all duties vanish. Neither view can offer any satisfactory solution to the problem. Yet the solution is quite a simple one. The extent of our duty is always determined by the facts of the external situation in so far as we know the facts and can act in accordance with the requirements of the situation as we know it. Our duty is always to succeed if we can. If this is all that is meant by "trying to succeed," then, certainly, it is our duty always to try to succeed; but if by "trying" we mean some kind of event which may or may not have success as its causal consequence, then it is never anybody's duty merely to "try" or merely to "set himself." If a man *can* save his friend from drowning, it is his duty to *save* him, not to "set himself" to save him, and leave the rest to the laws of nature.

Fourthly, it is possible, while still regarding our duties objectively, to allow for the existence of a class of duties which are unaccountable on either of the two customary views. These are duties which Prichard described as being "of the nature of an insurance in the interests of someone else." On the older objective view, the driver of a car, on entering a main road—to take Prichard's own example—would have a duty to stop or slow down *only if in fact* there was traffic, but we all think that he would have a duty to slow down whenever he could not certainly know whether there was traffic or not. On the subjective view, on the other hand, he would have a duty to slow down *only if he thought* there was traffic, but we all think that he ought to slow down if he did not certainly know whether there was traffic, no matter what he otherwise *thought* about the situation. The existence of this duty, although Prichard himself failed to realize this, is an equally valid objection to both views. On the present view, it presents no difficulty. If a car is entering a main road and the driver does not certainly know whether there is traffic or not, and if slowing down would be likely to injure nobody and might possibly prevent an accident, then the driver ought to slow down. One of the important grounds of this class of duties is that the agent cannot possibly know some relevant facts about the external situation; but this is itself a fact in a wider total situation, and it is the wider total situation which determines a person's duty, not merely his ignorance of some of the facts of the external situation.

Lastly, and more important, we can allow for these elements of truth in the subjective view, while still allowing that it is possible for

THE GENERAL NATURE OF A MORAL DUTY

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persons to *correct* their beliefs about their duties. We all do in fact think that there are times when persons ought to enquire more fully into the facts of the external situation, and we all think that there can, and sometimes does, exist such a thing as culpable ignorance. On the subjective view it is very difficult to see how one could account for these facts, since whatever a man thought was his duty would be his duty, and no further enquiry into the facts could make it either more or less of a duty. On the present view these facts are easily accounted for. To say that a man ought to honour his parents is to say, among other things, that if his parents are alive and destitute, and that if he does not know for certain whether they are alive or whether they are destitute, and if he can find out, then he ought to find out. We absolve a person from a duty on grounds of ignorance only on certain generally understood conditions, which is tantamount to saying that we do not do so under all conditions.

There is no doubt, then, it seems to me, that the view which I have now put forward represents a considerable advance on both the customary views. There has been levelled against the old objective view, however, an argument which, if it is valid at all, may also be levelled against the present view. This is an argument first stated by Prichard in his British Academy Lecture, *Duty and Ignorance of Fact*.

Prichard's argument is based on an analysis of what is meant by *doing* something, and may be stated briefly as follows. (1) To *do* anything is to cause a change of state in some existing thing, that is, to cause a thing of the kind A to assume a state of the kind x. (2) *Causing a thing of the kind A to assume a state of the kind x* must further be analysed to mean *causing an event y which will cause a thing of the kind A to assume a state of the kind x*. Thus, to speak the truth is "to cause another to know our thought by causing certain sounds which will cause him to have this knowledge." (3) From this it follows that if the duties prescribed by a moral rule are duties to do anything *in this broad sense*, then no person can ever know that a moral rule is applicable in any situation here and now. No person can know what action *in the strict sense* will satisfy a given rule, since no person can ever certainly *know* that any act which he can do will cause a thing of the kind A to assume a state of the kind x. The argument, if it is a sound one, is a valid refutation not only of the old objective view but also of the view which I am defending.

Already, however, it is clear that Prichard's analysis must be incorrect at some point. It is quite impossible to believe that "A person ought to speak the truth" either means or can mean that "A person ought to cause another to know his thought by causing certain sounds which will cause him to have this knowledge." If this were so, then a person who was speaking the truth would be telling a

lie whenever he was being misunderstood, and speaking the truth whenever he told a lie, provided he was misunderstood in a certain way. A similar difficulty would arise no matter what duty we might try to interpret in this way. If we say that A ought to repay his debt to B, what we must mean on Prichard's view is that A ought to transfer certain ink to a certain piece of paper, which will cause B to have the money which A owes him, i.e., to draw a cheque for the amount which A owes him. But it seems quite clear that this is not what we mean. The latter duty is quite plainly not a restatement of the former duty; if it is a duty at all, then it is a different duty and a more specialized one. To say that A ought to repay his debt to B by cheque may often be an appropriate counsel of prudence, but nobody thinks that in recommending this he is stating a moral duty, unless he thinks that there is a separate obligation involved over and above the obligation to repay one's debt.

The source of Prichard's error may be traced to the second stage of the argument as given above. Although Prichard is right in saying that to do anything is to cause a thing of the kind A to assume a state of the kind x , the analysis which he proceeds to give of what is meant by "causing a thing of the kind A to assume a state of the kind x " is plainly incorrect. It presupposes that the word "cause" is here used in the sense in which it is normally used in the theoretical sciences, that is, in a sense in which the same cause will always have the same effect and vice versa. In the present context, there is no justification for this assumption. When we refer to a cause in the practical sciences, as distinct from the theoretical sciences, we refer to an event or state of things which *we can control* in such a way as to control some other event or thing, e.g., the cause of the lorry stopping on the hill was that it was overloaded or that it ran out of petrol, not that the gradient was too steep. In this sense of the word "cause" there is no one thing which is always the cause of anything else. To cause a thing of the kind A to assume a state of the kind x is, therefore, not to cause an event y which will cause a thing of the kind A to assume a state of the kind x ; it is to cause *any event which is within our control* which will cause a thing of the kind A to assume a state of the kind x .

If this is a correct analysis of what is meant by "causing a thing of the kind A to assume a state of the kind x ," then one must certainly agree with Prichard that no person can ever certainly *know* that any act which he can do will enable him to cause a thing of the kind A to assume a state of the kind x . But neither is this knowledge now any longer necessary in order that a person may know what his duty is. In order that a person may know what his duty is when his friend is trapped by the tide, he does not need to know for certain that throwing a rope over the edge of the cliff will save his friend,

for it is not his duty to save his friend *in this particular way*. His duty is to do *whatever he can do* to save his friend. If there is nothing that he can do to save him, then he will not have failed in his duty, provided he has done those things which he could do and which could be considered likely to save his friend.

This disposes of Prichard's argument. It does so, however, only by emphasizing a more serious difficulty with which we have been confronted for some time. Although a person does not need to be able to predict any event with theoretical certainty in order to know what his duty is, he does need to be able to predict events with a fair degree of probability. It is also notorious that there are subjective and objective theories of probability which parallel the subjective and objective views of duty. We are therefore left with precisely the same problem as that with which we began, except that it is now in a different field. Fortunately its solution is the same in this as in the previous field. Rules of probability, like moral rules, can be interpreted as hypothetical statements. The statement that persons tend to spoil their grandchildren, for example, may be interpreted to mean, among other things, that if X is a grandparent and his grandchildren are often in his company, and if this is all the knowledge that we have about X and about his grandchildren, then there is a fair degree of probability that the grandchildren will be spoilt. If we knew more about X and about his grandchildren, then the degree of probability would be higher or lower or unchanged according to the nature of the additional information that we had. This being so, the probability of an event is determined not only by the facts of the external situation but also by the person's belief about the facts of that situation; both are integral and objective elements in a *total* body of facts which determines the probability of an event.

This, it seems to me, enables us to state without paradox the true relationship which exists between our duties and our knowledge or ignorance of facts, and thus to establish the view of duty which I have now put forward.

II

It is necessary now to consider the relationship which exists between our duties and our knowledge or ignorance of moral principles. Persons may be ignorant of moral principles, or may hold principles which other persons think they ought not to hold, or may not fully understand the principles which they do hold, or they may be in doubt as to whether they accept certain principles or not. It seems therefore that, for this reason alone, an act which appears right to one person may appear wrong to another. When this is so, it is asked, which act ought a person to do, the act which *is* right in the

given situation, or the act which he *thinks* is right? We are then left once again within the ambit of the same kind of antinomy as that, which arose on a consideration of our knowledge of facts.

The argument which gives rise to this antinomy is now very widely accepted. While it contains one important element of truth, it contains also at least one fallacy of fundamental significance.

The fallacy in the argument is the fundamental assumption that knowledge of a moral principle can itself be a ground of obligation. On grounds of logic, this assumption is untenable. If knowledge of a moral principle were itself a ground of obligation, then we should have to include it among the conditions stated in the protases of the hypothetical propositions into which a moral rule may be analysed. If this were done, the rule that a person ought to honour his parents would then have to be interpreted to mean, among other things, the following: If a man's parents are lonely and he knows this and can visit them, and if he knows that when a man's parents are lonely, etc., he ought to visit them, then he ought to visit them. No moral rule can be analysed in this way. If this statement, together with some others like it, now constitutes the rule, then parity of reasoning requires that a person should also accept and understand *this* statement, and the full meaning of the rule would then have to be extended to allow for *this* condition, and so on, *ad infinitum*. Since no person could have a duty until he had understood and accepted the last of this infinite series of ever-expanding hypothetical propositions, it would follow that no person could ever have a duty to do anything at all. We must therefore allow that knowledge of a moral principle is not itself a ground of obligation.

This sets us free to reconsider several important matters. These include, chiefly, the relationship between moral duties and moral principles, the relationship between knowledge of moral principles and knowledge of facts, and the general nature of a moral duty.

It is generally held that one of the conditions on which a person can have duties is that he should be capable of understanding a moral rule. This, it seems to me, is true. The question which arises is what kind of condition is this condition, and how is it related to the other conditions which are generally understood in the formulation of the rule. Here the truth seems clearly to be that although ability to understand moral principles is a condition of a person's having duties, it is a condition of a different logical order from those understood in the rule. It is not a condition under which I may have a specific moral duty, but a more general condition under which I may be held to be morally responsible. It is not a condition which *determines* my duties, but a condition which must nevertheless hold whenever certain *other* conditions do determine my duties. If a man has any moral duties, he will also know some corresponding moral

THE GENERAL NATURE OF A MORAL DUTY

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principle or principles, but it is not knowing moral principles which will determine his duties. What will determine his duties will be the conditions generally understood *in* the principles, and these cannot without logical absurdity include knowledge of the principles themselves. Intelligent adults do not derive their duties from the prior acceptance of certain moral principles; on the contrary, they derive their knowledge of moral principles (in some way which need not here be determined) from their knowledge of their moral duties.

It follows from this that in the case of intelligent adults their knowledge of moral principles is determined ultimately by their knowledge of facts. Persons hold conflicting moral principles because in the great majority of situations in life their duties have been different; but their duties have been different in many situations only because the facts, or their opinions about them, have been different. If a pacifist holds that to kill another man is wrong as a matter of principle, while another person denies this, it is because for the pacifist the facts of every situation, in so far as he knows the facts, render it wrong to kill a man, while to the other person the facts of some situations, in so far as *he* is aware of them, make such an action right. Disputes and doubts about matters of moral principle have their origins in disputes and doubts about matters of fact, in so far as these are widespread over a large number of similar or partly similar situations. A greater knowledge of facts enables us consequently to revise our duties and in due course to *correct* our moral principles; a greater knowledge of moral principles does not enable us to correct our knowledge of facts, nor in any last resort our knowledge of our moral duties.

This is of the greatest significance to the understanding of the general nature of a moral duty. If knowledge of a moral principle is a necessary ground of obligation, then an objective view of duty, of whatever kind, is finally impossible. Our duties will be determined by certain moral principles which will be arbitrarily chosen and incorrigible in the light of any objective facts. If, on the other hand, knowledge of a moral principle is not a ground of obligation, then an objective view such as I have advocated here is entirely possible. Our moral principles will then be determined by our moral duties and, like the latter, will be corrigible in the light of increased knowledge of the facts. If we examine our own moral experience, this latter view seems plainly correct. If a normally intelligent adult justified a flagrant breach of faith on the ground that he did not know that persons ought to keep their promises, not merely would we not condone his breach of faith, but we would also regard him as a cheat and a liar. If he sought to justify his action by saying that he had come to the conclusion that persons ought not to keep their promises, not only would we still condemn his action, but we would also condemn

his principle. To introduce matters of moral principle as grounds for an obligation is not merely objectionable in logic, it is false to the facts of our moral experience and morally dangerous in practice.

Nevertheless, there remains in the accepted view an important element of truth. The view which I have defended presupposes that we are dealing with relations between adult and intelligent persons who are able always to decide their duties on the merits of each individual case. While this assumption is often a realistic one to make, it is certainly not always so. All persons are not adult, and intelligence is notoriously a matter of degree. Moreover, even normally intelligent adults, for reasons of unavoidable human inertia, often rely in individual cases on principles which they have independently established for themselves in the past, or which have been embodied in the moral code of the society to which they belong. It is a fact that we bring children and many adults to regard certain kinds of actions as duties by bringing them to accept certain moral principles, and that we bring them to change their views about their duties by bringing them to accept different principles. Where *these* circumstances obtain, the view which I have now criticized is essentially the true view, and many of the statements which I have so far made about our moral duties and moral principles will need therefore to be reversed. (a) Moral duties will now be derived from the prior acceptance of moral principles rather than vice versa; (b) a person's moral principles will now often be derived from the moral code of other members of the society, rather than from a direct consideration of duties known independently of the existence of the code; (c) moral doubts and moral disputes will now exist independently of any doubts or disputes about matters of fact, and will be soluble on this level only by the acceptance by one person of the moral principle or principles of another; and, finally, (d) knowledge of a moral principle will be a ground of obligation, and the question whether it is an objective or a subjective ground can consequently arise. The question will now, however, be of the following form: does a person's duty depend on the moral principle which does conform to the moral requirements of the total situation, or upon the principle which he thinks conforms to these requirements?

Before proceeding to deal with this question, it is necessary to examine the position which we have now reached. It has already been argued that, on grounds of logic, knowledge of a moral principle cannot be regarded as a ground of obligation. Now, as a result of an examination of the facts, we have to admit that knowledge of a moral principle can be a ground of obligation, and that if this were not the case many persons who now have duties could have no duties at all. In short, it appears as if the requirements of logic and the evidence of the facts were now at variance.

This appearance of paradox may be removed provided two facts are noted:

(1) It is already clear that the concept of a ground of obligation is ambiguous. It may mean (*a*) a first order condition determining a person's duties, or (*b*) a second order condition determining when certain other conditions of the former kind determine a person's duties. Knowledge of facts is a ground of the former kind and cannot be a ground of the latter kind; knowledge of moral principles, when it is a ground of obligation at all, is a ground of the latter kind and cannot be a ground of the former kind. This means that there is no discrepancy between the requirements of logic and the evidence of the facts. On the requirements of logic, knowledge of a moral principle cannot be a ground of obligation in the first sense; on the evidence of the facts it can be, and very often is, a ground of obligation in the second sense. Far from being incompatible, both of these statements appear to be quite plainly true.

(2) The second fact to be noted is that knowledge of a moral principle, as a higher order ground of obligation, may be understood in the formulation of a moral rule, if the rule is treated for these purposes as a series of concealed higher order hypotheticals. I understand by a higher order hypothetical one which includes another lower order hypothetical as its apodosis. An example of a higher order hypothetical would be: "If A implies B, then if A is true B is true," or "If A is true then B is true—provided A implies B." As may be seen from these examples, the condition stated in a higher order hypothetical is a condition under which another hypothetical is true or applicable. This is precisely the position when a moral principle is regarded as a ground of obligation. We are then holding that a certain condition (i.e. knowledge of a moral principle) is a condition under which certain hypothetical propositions about persons' behaviour are applicable to the behaviour of certain persons. This being so, the rule that a person ought to honour his parents will now have to be interpreted to mean, among other things, the following: "If a man's parents are lonely, etc., then he ought to visit them—provided he is old enough to understand that persons ought to honour their parents." The importance of this is clear. When a moral rule is interpreted in this way, knowledge of a moral principle may be regarded as a ground of obligation, in the second sense above, without giving rise to an infinite regress of principles. The regress of principles only arises from an attempt to include a second order condition in the protasis of a first order hypothetical; it disappears if it is included in the protasis of a second order hypothetical, as a consideration of the previous examples will show.

The recognition of these two facts enables a further development of our previous analysis of the nature of a moral rule, and by so

doing makes possible a solution of the ethical problem with which we are now faced.

If my argument is so far correct, then the concept of a moral rule is likewise ambiguous. This conclusion is inevitable once we admit that what is seemingly the same rule may be analysed both into a series of first order hypotheticals and into a series of second order hypotheticals. It might be said in opposition to this that what we have here is not two different kinds of rule, but two different ways of applying the same rule. But this is clearly not the case. There is only one way of applying a moral rule, and that is by using it as a second order determinant of duties for those persons who would be insensitive to their duties otherwise. Nor is it simply a difference between *having* a rule and *applying* the same rule, although this is at least a part of the difference. It is a difference between having one rule and having *another* rule about the application of the previous rule. An identical verbal form conceals two different kinds of rule.

This same conclusion may be reached if we compare any moral rule with a scientific law. An essential difference between a moral rule and a scientific law of any kind is that the latter cannot be interpreted in this hybrid manner. If it is true that stones of a certain kind sink in water, then this may be interpreted to mean among other things that, "If x is a stone of a certain kind, and if x is thrown into a well, etc., then x will sink." But it cannot be interpreted to mean that, "If x is a stone of a certain kind and is thrown into a well, then x will sink—provided this rule is true or provided this is an established scientific law." It cannot be interpreted in this way because the truth or otherwise of this rule, or our belief or disbelief in it, in no way determines the tendency of the stone to sink in water. If this were also true of moral rules, we should then have to hold that the existence of certain moral rules in a community in no way affected the duties accepted by that community. To hold this would be simply to refuse to face facts. For these reasons we seem to be justified in holding that a moral rule is a hybrid rule, and that this is at least one of the factors which distinguishes moral rules (and, I would add, other so-called normative rules) from scientific laws and what are called positive laws generally.

We may now investigate the implications of this analysis. In the first place, it is now possible to regard all our duties objectively, while allowing for the element of truth in the ethically subjective view. To say that a person ought to honour his parents is now to say, among other things, that if a man's parents are lonely and he knows this and can visit them, then he ought to visit them—provided he is capable of understanding this rule, and knows that it conforms to the moral requirements of the total situation. In this way, a person has a duty under a moral rule if he is capable of

understanding the rule and knows that it is a well-founded rule. This, therefore, is not equivalent to a simple restatement of the ethically subjective view. On the present view, a person's duty is determined not simply by the person's understanding and acceptance of the rule, but also by the conformity of the rule with the moral requirements of the known facts. We reach the position, once again, that the dichotomy in terms of which it has been customary to present this problem is a false one, and that the alternatives presented by the ethically subjective and objective views are not genuine alternatives.

Secondly, it is possible, while still regarding our duties objectively, to give a fuller account of the fact that we think persons ought to act from certain motives rather than others. We have already seen that a moral rule can be stated both with the aid of the active verbs and with the aid of the verb "to be"; that a moral rule implies not only that certain overt actions are morally required under certain circumstances, but also that persons ought to acquire certain characters. The recognition of the logical ambiguity of the concept of a moral rule affects not only the former interpretation of the rule but also the latter. The rule that a person ought to be truthful will now have to be interpreted to mean not only that X ought to be such a person that whenever he was asked a question about a matter of fact, etc., he *would* give a correct answer, and would do so *because* he knew the facts to be what they were. It will also have to be interpreted to mean that Y ought to be such a person that if he knew that persons ought to speak the truth, then he *would* give a correct answer whenever he was asked a question about a matter of fact, etc., and would do so *because* he knew that persons ought to speak the truth. A person's duty is very often a duty of acting merely from a knowledge of the facts of the situation, but it is also very often a duty of acting from a knowledge of certain moral principles. We may thus account for the element of truth as well as the element of error in Kant's famous maxim that duty is the necessity of acting from respect for the law.

Thirdly, it is now possible to distinguish between the duties of children and the duties of adults, while allowing that children can also be *taught* to *know* their duties. On neither of the customary views is this possible. On the ethically subjective view, although the duty of a child in a given situation might well be different from that of an adult in the same situation, there is no reason why a child could not *know* his duty as well as any adult. If a child's duty is merely to obey the rule which he thinks is the appropriate rule in the situation, then the fact that someone else may think or even know that it is inappropriate, cannot justify any intervention by that person in the child's behaviour. On the ethically objective view, on the other hand, no

child could ever know that he had any duties at all. If a child's duty is to obey the rule which *is* the appropriate rule in any situation, then the child's experience is such that he could not possibly know what that rule is; and although adults might well teach him to do in certain situations the actions which they might regard as their own duties under similar circumstances, no child could regard those actions as duties. On neither view would it be possible to teach children to know their duties. Yet it seems plainly to be a fact that, whereas we generally find it difficult to teach adults their duties, we can nevertheless teach children theirs. The explanation is a simple one. Duty, for intelligent adults, is the necessity of acting in accordance with the moral requirements of the facts of the total situation; and although a person may be taught the facts, he cannot be taught to see what duties they imply. For children, on the other hand, duty is the necessity of obeying a moral rule; and persons may be taught moral rules as well as taught how to obey them. A child's duty is not, therefore, to obey the rule which *is* the appropriate rule, nor the rule which he *thinks* is the appropriate rule, if these are stated as mutually exclusive alternatives; his duty is to obey the rule which appears to him to be the most appropriate on the evidence available. To a child, this evidence consists of parental advice and parental example, supported by such knowledge of the world as the child has acquired. This accords with intelligent practice in the teaching of children.

Finally, we can allow for the element of truth in the ethically subjective view, while also allowing that persons have a duty of acting as far as possible from true rather than false moral principles. We all do, in fact, believe that there exist true and false principles in morals, or that there exist immoral as well as moral principles. On the ethically subjective view, it is difficult to see what rational justification there could be for this belief, since, on that view, any principle which a person actually held would always be as well-founded as any other. There need now, however, be no difficulty in accounting for the rationality of this belief. To say now that a person ought to honour his parents is to say, among other things, that if a man's parents are lonely, etc., then he ought to visit them—provided he knows that this is an appropriate rule to obey in this situation, or provided he can find this out, or provided the evidence at his disposal, such as the advice and example of others, indicates that this is so. While on this view no person has a duty which neither he nor anyone else knows or thinks that he has, every person has nevertheless the duty of finding out as well as he can what moral rule is the appropriate rule to obey in any situation. Although no person can have a duty which he cannot conscientiously carry out, no act becomes his duty merely because he can do it conscientiously.

This, it seems to me, enables us to state without paradox the true

THE GENERAL NATURE OF A MORAL DUTY

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relationship which exists between our duties and our knowledge or ignorance of moral principles. It completes, therefore, the statement of the general nature of a moral duty made in the first part of this paper, and enables us to hold throughout a consistently objective view.

One further point remains to be considered. It remains to say what kind of objectivity is now ascribed to our duties and moral principles.

On the older objective view, moral duties and moral principles would have been objective in the sense that they would have possessed some kind of existence which was independent of all human thought. A person's duties would have been determined by the nature of situations external to any moral agent, that is, independently of what any person may have thought either about the facts of those situations or about the appropriateness of any moral principles. On the present view, moral duties and moral principles are objective, not in the sense that they are wholly *determined* by the facts of an external situation, but in the sense that they are *corrigible* with reference to the facts of that situation. The view differs, therefore, from the customary objective view in that it does not require or presuppose omniscience on the part of the agent, and from the subjective view in that our beliefs about our duties and our moral principles can now be corrected, which they could not be if the subjective view were true. The view is consequently objective in a sense which is familiar. Provided this sense is understood, the description requires no further justification.

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BERKELEY AND RYLE: SOME COMPARISONS

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THIS paper is divided into two sections. The first aims at showing in a general way that the programme and methods of Berkeley and Professor Ryle are to a large extent similar. The second deals with one problem only. It is an attempt to provide interpretation and commentary on Berkeley's attack on "absolute existence" and on Ryle's attack (which comes to the same thing) on the view that there can be different "kinds of existence," "kinds of status," or a *number* of different "worlds."

I

Neither Berkeley nor Ryle are casting any doubt on the truth of our ordinary beliefs. Berkeley expressly states that he is prepared to appeal to the judgment of "plain common sense."¹ His task, so he says², is "to clear the first principles of knowledge from the embarrass and delusion of words." What both he and Ryle are concerned with is the unravelling of problems raised by the misuse of language. "I come now to consider," he says, "the source of this prevailing notion" (*sc.* the doctrine of abstract ideas), "and that seems to me to be *language*"³. This is comparable to the familiar dictum of Ryle that certain ways of talking generate "fog." Berkeley uses the word "dust." "We have first raised a dust, and then complain that we cannot see."⁴

It follows from this approach that, for Berkeley no less than for Ryle, consideration of how words are used in *ordinary language* becomes all-important. "Suppose," says Philonous,⁵ "a traveller should tell you, that in a certain country men might pass unhurt through the fire; and, upon explaining himself, you found he meant by the word *fire* that which others call *water*: or if he should assert there are trees which walk upon two legs, meaning men by the term *trees*. Would you think this reasonable?" And Hylas says, "No; I should think it very absurd. Common custom is the standard of propriety in language."

No one denies to the philosopher the right to coin technical terms or to use words in a new way, provided he makes clear how the new

¹ 3rd dialogue between Hylas and Philonous, p. 274. (Page numbers refer to the Everyman edition.)

² *Principles of Human Knowledge*, Introduction, § xxv.

³ *Ibid.*, § xviii. ⁴ *Ibid.*, Introduction, § iii. ⁵ 2nd dialogue, p. 250.

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BERKELEY AND RYLE: SOME COMPARISONS

sense of the word differs from the familiar one. If he fails to do this, however, there is danger that he is simply creating fog. The doctrine of *material substance*, according to Berkeley, gives rise to just this sort of fog.

Philonous: I am not for imposing any sense on your words. You are at liberty to explain them as you please. Only I beseech you make me understand something by them. You tell me that matter supports or stands under accidents. How? As your legs support your body?

Hylas: No, that is the literal sense.

Philonous: Pray, let me know any sense, literal or not literal, that you understand it in.¹

And the suggestion that matter may be an *instrument* meets with a very similar rejoinder. "An instrument, say you?" says Philonous.² "Pray, what may be the figure, springs, wheels and motions of that instrument?"

The appeal to ordinary language which we find in Berkeley has a singularly modern ring. The same goes for Berkeley's arguments about *what it makes sense to say*. Thus Philonous asks with sarcasm, "It is then good sense to speak of motion as of a thing that is loud, sweet, acute, or grave?"³ And Ryle asks with similar sarcasm whether volitions can be strong or weak, difficult or easy, enjoyable or disagreeable.⁴ Again, there is a hint in Berkeley of Ryle's distinction between *look, listen, sniff*, etc. on the one hand, and *see, hear, smell*, etc. on the other. Berkeley calls attention to the "effort" character of the former group, and points out that "drawing air through my nose" is not smelling.⁵

Despite the emphasis on common sense and common language, however, it is all too easy to suppose that both Berkeley and Ryle are putting forward some grotesque and fantastic theory—or rather, that they are denying things, about "matter" and "mind" respectively, which the rest of us (and they themselves when they are not being philosophical) can see to be obviously true. This is quite wrong. It is the Hylases of this world who puzzle themselves about "Mind" and "Matter" in the grandiose sense. Berkeley and Ryle aim not at creating puzzles but at dispelling them. "It is to this" (*sc.* the doctrine of *material substance*), says Philonous,⁶ "that you are indebted for being ignorant of what everybody else knows perfectly well." The interesting point of comparison is that misunderstandings of both Berkeley and Ryle take the same form.

¹ 1st dialogue, p. 231.

² 2nd dialogue, p. 254.

³ 1st dialogue, p. 212.

⁴ *The Concept of Mind*, p. 64.

⁵ 1st dialogue, p. 227.

⁶ 3rd dialogue, p. 264.

Both philosophers put forward their main thesis by means of a negative existential statement. Berkeley, so it seems, denies the existence of matter, Ryle that of "the-ghost-in-the-machine." "In attempting to explode the myth," says Ryle (*sc.* of the ghost-in-the-machine), "I shall probably be taken to be denying well-known facts about the mental life of human beings."¹ There are several corresponding passages in Berkeley; for instance, Hylas says:² "In denying matter, at first glimpse I am tempted to imagine you deny the things we see and feel; but upon reflection find there is no ground for it." Dr. Johnson "refuted" Berkeley by kicking a stone; and he might have supposed that, if he suffered from tooth-ache, or decided (by an act of will) to do something, or thought hard about a problem, this was quite enough to constitute a "refutation" of Ryle.

The denial of existence, however, is not straightforward. Neither Berkeley nor Ryle is putting forward hypotheses about what the world does or does not consist of. "I assure you, Hylas," says Philonous,³ "I do not pretend to frame any hypothesis at all. I am of a vulgar cast, simple enough to believe my senses, and leave things as I find them. To be plain, it is my opinion, that the real things are those very things I see and feel, and perceive by my senses. These I know, and finding they answer all the necessities and purposes of life, have no reason to be solicitous about any other unknown beings. A piece of sensible bread, for instance, would stay my stomach better than ten thousand times as much of that insensible, unintelligible, real bread you speak of." The mistake is to assimilate "There is no such thing as *Matter*," "There are no Mental Events" to "There are no cats at Aunt Jane's." Cats just "aren't there"; but neither Berkeley nor Ryle is asserting that something "isn't there." We know just what would be the case if there *were* cats at Aunt Jane's, and in fact there are not. We do not know what it would be like at all if there were either a Material Substratum or a ghost-in-a-machine. The early Logical Positivists who swore by what they called the "verification principle" rightly regarded Berkeley as their great precursor in this matter. Indeed he does occasionally pay homage to the concept of "meaninglessness." For example, Philonous says⁴: "Where there is not so much as the most inadequate or faint idea pretended to: I will not indeed thence conclude against the reality of any notion or existence of any thing; but my inference shall be, that you mean nothing at all; that you imply words to no manner of purpose, without any design or signification whatsoever." There are, in fact, three moves here, which we may set out in parallel columns:

¹ *The Concept of Mind*, p. 16.

² 3rd dialogue, p. 301.

³ 3rd dialogue, p. 265.

⁴ 2nd dialogue, p. 258.

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BERKELEY AND RYLE: SOME COMPARISONS

Berkeley.

1. There is no such thing as Matter.
2. Sentences about Matter, if by "Matter" you mean an unknown substratum, are meaningless.
3. The things we see, feel, etc., are matter.

Ryle.

1. There are no Mental Events.
2. Sentences about Mental Events, if by "Mental Events" you mean events in the life of a ghost, are meaningless.
3. People see jokes, solve puzzles, etc., and these *are* mental events.

Berkeley is prepared to make move 3. "Retain the word matter and apply it to the objects of sense if you please."¹ Ryle makes move 3 with no hesitation. He rather short-circuits move 2, though the influence on his work of early Logical Positivism is considerable.

All the comparisons so far made seem to me to indicate not just incidental points of similarity, but correspondence of a more systematic kind, indicating that both philosophers are doing the same sort of job. I hope to emphasize this point still further by calling attention to the treatment given by each to problems connected with the status of psychology and physiology.

The word "psychology" is wedded to the dogma of the ghost-in-the-machine. A psyche is clearly a rather tenuous and esoteric ghost; and the word "psychology" conveys the suggestion that there is a special ghostly "world" that we *look at* (introspect), much as we look at familiar objects like trees and houses. Ryle's chief objection to "introspection" is that it suggests *looking at* ghostly activities, as though the "mental" was a special "world" we could look at, in contrast with *another* "world," called the "material" one. (He is not criticizing introspection as a laboratory technique. When you have measured with a stop-watch how long it takes me to solve a puzzle, it may also be helpful if I let you know how I set to work, what I thought, etc. But this is not *looking at* a special world, any more than a man who reports that he has tooth-ache has *looked at* his tooth-ache.)

Assuming that we wish to reject the story of the psyche or ghost, we ought, strictly speaking, to throw out the word "psychology" too; for psychology is clearly the study of the psyche. On the other hand, to say that there is no such thing as psychology (particularly if one is a professional psychologist) seems outrageous. (The predicament is as bad as that of the—no doubt apocryphal—Professor of Metaphysics who disbelieved in the possibility of his own subject.) The psychologist tests people's intelligence, finds out if they are colour-blind, etc., and to say that such tests are *not* psychology is to be perverse beyond bounds. Despite her early and disreputable associations with ghosts, the word "psychology" is likely to survive.

¹ 3rd dialogue, p. 301.

Psychology in this sense proceeds, as Berkeley would say, *by way of ideas*.¹ It is certainly *not* the study of what he would call *spirit, mind, or soul*, though it is the study of *mind* in Ryle's sense. Ryle's "mind" is something very different from Berkeley's "spirit." Testing intelligence or colour-blindness belongs in the same epistemological plane as studying the falling of apples or the movement of tides. Berkeley does not use the word "psychology"; but his position is entirely in line with that of Ryle, and much of his *Essay towards a New Theory of Vision* is what we would now call psychology. He makes clear that he is proceeding by way of ideas, and never suggests for a moment that he is studying a special world occupied by a ghost.

The physiologist, too, proceeds by way of ideas. Berkeley puts into the mouth of Hylas something very like what Ryle would call the "official" theory about brain-events and sensations, namely that the ghost is "localised" somewhere in the brain, if only the physiologists could tell us where. "It is to be supposed," says Hylas,² "the soul makes her residence in some part of the brain, from which the nerves take their rise, and are thence extended to all parts of the body; and that outward objects, by the different impressions they make on the organs of sense, communicate certain vibrative motions to the nerves; and these being filled with spirits, propagate them to the brain or seat of the soul, which, according to the various impressions or traces thereby made in the brain, is variously affected with ideas." Philonous points out that the brain itself is known by way of ideas, and that hypotheses about the brain are investigated in the same way as any other scientific hypothesis.³ What is more, the "official" theory still leaves us with an insoluble puzzle at the end. "What connection is there," asks Philonous, "between a motion in the nerves and the sensations of sound and colour in the mind?" Berkeley and Ryle both see that at any rate *some* of the worry over what is commonly called "*the* mind-body problem" can be solved by fog-dispersal methods. It should, perhaps, be added that in the last resort there is something which just has to be accepted, viz. that if the appropriate area in the brain or on the periphery is damaged, the person cannot see, solve problems, control movements, etc. "We are *chained to a body*," says Philonous.⁴ This looks like a return to ghost-in-machine terminology, with the ghost tied up inside; but Philonous adds at once, "That is to say, our perceptions are connected with corporeal

¹ Throughout this paper I use Berkeley's phrase "by way of ideas" to refer to the knowledge obtained by means of common sense and scientific observation.

² 2nd dialogue, p. 241.

³ The chief point of Philonous' argument here is to show that the physiologist's story is not a *causal* explanation of perception; but this is very problematic.

⁴ 3rd dialogue, p. 278. My italics.

motions. By the law of our nature we are affected upon every alteration in the nervous parts of our sensible body." I do not know if this is a great, unfathomable mystery, or a moderately interesting scientific fact. At any rate Berkeley and Ryle are both in a better position to be rid of *unnecessary puzzlement* than holders of the "official" theory.

II

I wish to suggest in this section that Berkeley's doctrine of spirits leads him to a position not far removed from that adopted by Ryle in *The Concept of Mind*.¹

At first sight this suggestion seems grotesque and even shocking. After all, Berkeley believed in minds, spirits, souls; and are not these just the sort of ghost-in-a-machine which Ryle is attacking? The two views seem diametrically opposed.

The similarity arises because both philosophers agree in regarding the notion of "absolute existence" as unintelligible.

To put the matter another way, Berkeley appears to *accept* the antithesis of "Mind" and "Matter," and then to deny that there is any of the latter. But it is not difficult to see that he is in fact rejecting the antithesis. In the same way Ryle could easily be misinterpreted as *accepting* the Mind-Matter antithesis and then denying that there are minds. But it is clear that he, too, like Berkeley is rejecting the antithesis at the outset.

Newtonian physics, says Berkeley, tells us nothing about *absolute existence*. Nor, says Ryle, does twentieth-century psychology.

One of Ryle's targets is what he calls the "Fido"-Fido theory of meaning. Every word or expression is, on this theory, alleged to have attached to it "a thing, process, person or entity"² of which it is the name, much as the word "Fido" is the name of the dog, Fido. He suggests in *The Concept of Mind* that, under the influence of this theory, people have been misled about the functions of the word "I."

"People feel vaguely," he says³ "that since 'I' and 'you' are not public surnames, they must be names of another and queer sort . . . of some extra individuals hidden away behind or inside. . . . Gratiuous mystification begins from the moment that we start to peer around for the beings named by our pronouns. Sentences containing pronouns do, of course, mention identifiable people, but the way in which the people mentioned are identified by pronouns is quite different from the way in which they are identified by proper names."

¹ In what follows I am much indebted to a lecture (unpublished) by Professor D. M. Mackinnon.

² *Philosophy*, Jan. 1949, p. 69. Discussion of Carnap's *Meaning and Necessity*.

³ *The Concept of Mind*, p. 187.

And here is Berkeley, apparently falling nicely into the trap: "What I am myself, that which I denote by the term 'I' is the same as what is meant by soul or spiritual substance. . . . These words do mean or signify a real thing."

This is no mere lapse. Berkeley's view needs to be taken seriously. He is well aware of the difficulties in the "Fido"-Fido theory of meaning. "It is thought," he says,² "that every name hath or ought to have only one precise and settled signification." And again:³ "He that knows names do not always stand for ideas will spare himself the labour of looking for ideas where there are none to be had." He sees the difficulty in the case of his own doctrine of spirits. "It will be objected that if there is no idea signified by the terms soul, spirit and substance, they are wholly insignificant, or have no meaning in them. . . . In a large sense indeed, we may be said to have an idea, or rather a notion of spirit, that is, we understand the meaning of the word."⁴ This at least shows that Berkeley does not simply shelve this problem, as is sometimes supposed. And indeed he even tackles the nightmare question of whether the way your blue looks to you *resembles* (his word) the way mine looks to me.⁵ (I do not know what would be made of this question on Ryle's view. There seems no means of finding out the answer; but I suggest it is very perverse to say with the orthodox Behaviourist or Verificationist that the question is meaningless.)

The crucial passage in Berkeley's doctrine of spirits is *Principles* cxlii. "After what hath been said, it is, I suppose, plain, that our souls are not to be known in the same manner as senseless inactive objects or by way of idea. Spirits and ideas are things so wholly different, that when we say, They exist, they are known, and the like, these words must not be thought to signify any thing common to both natures. There is nothing alike or common in them; and to expect that by any multiplication or enlargement of our faculties we may be enabled to know a spirit as we do a triangle seems as absurd as if we should hope to see a sound."

The following passage in *The Concept of Mind* is in some respects parallel, though it needs to be emphasized once again that Berkeley's "spirit" is not the same as Ryle's "mind." "It is perfectly proper to say, in one logical tone of voice, that there exist minds and to say in another logical tone of voice, that there exist bodies, but these expressions do not indicate two different species of existence, for 'existence' is not a generic word like 'coloured' or 'sexed'."⁶ Ryle then points out the incongruity of saying "that there exist prime

¹ *Principles*, § cxxxix. My italics. ² *Ibid.*, Introduction, § xviii.

³ *Ibid.*, Introduction, § xxiv.

⁵ *Ibid.*, § cxi.

⁴ *Ibid.*, § cxi. Cf. § cxxxvi. My italics.

⁶ *The Concept of Mind*, p. 23.

numbers and Wednesdays and public opinions and navies," and says that it is equally incongruous to say that there exist "both minds and bodies."

Ryle's examples are not entirely satisfactory. To say that there exist in conjunction "prime numbers and Wednesdays and public opinions and navies" is certainly odd; but are not the limbs of this conjunction taken on their own rather odd also? Would anyone ever want to say "There exist Wednesdays"? And how would we contradict him? Also, even if it is allowed that "There exist public opinions" and "There exist navies" are sensible statements (and they are certainly sensible if we add qualifications, e.g. "There exist navies larger than the British"), they are still statements whose truth or falsity is known by way of ideas. Ryle's example of *prime numbers* illustrates his contention better; for he wishes to show that "kinds of existence" is a misleading expression; and the temptation to speak of different "kinds of existence" is highest where the truth or falsity of two or more sentences is known in different ways. The existence of spirit, in Berkeley's sense, is like the existence of prime numbers—something not knowable by way of ideas. The crucial point, on which Berkeley and Ryle are in complete agreement, is that we should not be misled by the fact that we use the word "exist" in connection with words of many different categories into supposing that there are "kinds of existence" in the way in which there are *kinds of dog*. In a speech to the murderers Macbeth gives a catalogue of *kinds of dog*—"hounds and greyhounds, mongrels, spaniels, curs," etc. There can be no similar catalogue of existents, nor does it make sense to provide a list of *what exists* in the way one might provide a list of furniture in a house.

This, I believe, is what Berkeley has in mind when he says that the notion of "absolute existence" is unintelligible.¹

What has "absolute existence" seems to be thought of as an ultimate ingredient of the universe, rather as fruit, currants, and spices are the ingredients of a plum-pudding. The ingredients of the universe would be such things as Mind, Matter, Monads, Universals, Numbers, Values, Sense-data, Electrons, etc. It is supposed that one or more objects from this list receive a privileged status. The lucky ones are termed "substances" in the philosophers' sense; and they are sometimes said to be *real*. The enquiry into "what really exists," into these ultimate ingredients of the universe, is *metaphysics*.

Now once we see, as Berkeley and Ryle saw, that to give this function to the word "exist" is a mistake, then "metaphysics" in

¹ According to Lord Russell (*Mind*, July 1951), Wittgenstein once held that all existential propositions were meaningless. Possibly Wittgenstein was thinking along the same lines as Berkeley and Ryle.

this sense becomes a logical impossibility.¹ There do not exist both spirit and matter (or both God and finite things, or both facts and values) in the sense in which there exist both fruit and currants. In Ryle's terminology, the words belong to different categories, and it makes no sense to conjoin or disjoin them.

Berkeley's account of our knowledge of God is of particular interest in this connection; for Hylas in the dialogues puts forward views which we tend to ascribe to a militant Logical Positivist "Since therefore you have no idea of the mind of God, how can you conceive it possible, that things should exist in his mind? Or, if you can conceive the mind of God without having an idea of it, why may not I be allowed to conceive the existence of matter, notwithstanding that I have no idea of it?"² Philonous replies that God is not known by way of ideas, but is conceivable after the manner of spirits. "My own soul may be said to furnish me with an idea, that is an image, or likeness of God, though indeed extremely inadequate. For all the notion I have of God is obtained by reflecting on my own soul heightening its powers and removing its imperfections."

The usual criticism of Berkeley is that, despite his attack on the absolute existence of matter, he lapses into just the "metaphysics" which he claims to be opposing. Does he not say that there are substances, ultimate ingredients of the universe, only that they are spirits, not matter? And is not this as "metaphysical" as anything could be?

Now it is possible to give a "metaphysical" twist to Ryle's thought too. Part at least of Ryle's programme is to show how sentences about minds, mental activities, etc. (e.g. "He solved the puzzle," "He is intelligent") can be known, as Berkeley would say, by way of ideas. It would then be added that what we know by way of ideas are the non-ghostly things of everyday life, such as sticks, chairs, and putty, known in some quarters as "material objects." Materialism is a typical "absolute existence" theory, and a naive reader of Ryle might be forgiven for interpreting him as an old-fashioned materialist propounding the exact opposite of Berkeley's "immaterialism." This is not Ryle's intention; but, as Wisdom has pointed out,³ he "often uses words which suggest that he does wish to say that in the sense

¹ To refer to the mistake involved here, I use the words "metaphysics," "metaphysical" in inverted commas. I should like to make clear that I am not denying the possibility of metaphysics in any militant sense. I am not saying, for instance, that the only legitimate types of statement are those whose truth is known by empirical observation. It is simply that the word "metaphysics" (and even more the word "ontology"—see G. J. Warnock "Metaphysics in Logic," *Proc. Ar. Soc.*, 1950–51) is frequently understood as being wedded to the "absolute-existence" mistake; and the Berkeley–Ryle view which attacks "absolute existence" has, I believe, only to be stated to be agreed with.

² 3rd dialogue, p. 267. ³ J. Wisdom, *Proc. Ar. Soc.*, 1949–1950, p. 151.

in which the average man is reducible to individual men the mind is
reducible to the body."

Ryle, of course, does not talk of ideas. When necessary, he would no doubt choose to speak of *things* and *events*. If he used the word "idea," the only difference on this "metaphysical" interpretation would be the substitution of one "absolute-existence" theory for another. Instead of materialism we would have phenomenalism—"nothing exists except the ideas themselves."

There can, however, be more sophisticated versions of the "absolute-existence" interpretation of Ryle. Even if people are no longer puzzled by sentences whose grammatical subject is "the average man" or "nobody," by hypotheticals, disjunctives, performances, expletives, etc., they may still wish to give a privileged status to those statements which can be empirically harnessed to the world they can observe. (Thus, "The infant-mortality rate has decreased," would be harnessed, rather indirectly, to events in a large number of homes.) Such people are concerned with things and events, and insist on returning in the last resort to the familiar sticks, chairs, and putty (or their equivalents in sense-data). "For it is clear," they would say, "that *nothing exists except these*." But to attribute such a view to Ryle is a gross misinterpretation.

It is, of course, no justification of this "metaphysical" account of Ryle to appeal to common language. Ordinary people *do* sometimes use the words "substance," "substantial." The plain man eats a substantial meal. In his younger days he may have played about with substances in a chemistry laboratory. Substances are things like wood and cement—good, solid stuff which you could hit with a hammer.¹ Perhaps even sticks and chairs are substances, though this is rather more philosophical. There are no implications here, however, about "absolute existence." Using the analytic-synthetic distinction, we may say that the statement "Substances are things like wood and cement" is analytic, whereas statements involving "absolute existence," e.g. "Nothing exists—there are no substances—except sticks and chairs and things like them" is plainly synthetic. Similarly, consideration of how the words "fact" and "true" are used in common speech proves nothing about "absolute existence." It is substance *in the philosophers' sense* which is of interest to Berkeley. "Matter, or material substance, are terms introduced by philosophers . . . but are never used by common people; or, if ever, it is to signify the immediate objects of sense. One would think, therefore, so long as the names of particular things, with the terms substance, body, stuff, and the like are retained, the word *matter* should never be missed in common talk."²

¹ I owe this criterion of substance to Mr. A. G. N. Flew.

² 3rd dialogue, p. 301.

Interpreted "metaphysically" Berkeley and Ryle are in stark opposition with no prospect of reconciliation. Indeed the curious thing about these "absolute-existence" statements is that there seems to be no means of discovering the right answer to them, and no hope of putting "metaphysics" on a "royal road." They are permanent insolubilia, nor is it clear, even if we did find irrefutable answers, just what it would be that we had learned. Divested of "metaphysical" trappings, the two writers are still not in complete agreement, but their dispute is brought down to a manageable problem.

To start our examination of this dispute, we should perhaps consider how literally Ryle's witticism of the ghost-in-the-machine is to be taken. A ghost, however esoteric or recondite, must presumably be known by way of ideas. Berkeley, in the passage quoted above (*Principles* cxlii) makes two points in particular:

1. Spirits are not known by way of ideas.
2. It is a mistake to say that spirits and ideas have different kinds of existence, as though they had something in common that made comparison possible. (Berkeley says the two are *different*. Strictly speaking, they themselves are neither alike nor different, though the logical categories to which they belong are different.) Only if they were knowable by way of ideas could Berkeley's "spirits" be the same as Ryle's "ghosts."

When Ryle says that "I" is not the name of a ghost, and Berkeley says that "I" is not the name of something known by way of ideas does not this suggest some possibility of agreement?

Of course this is not the whole story. It will be objected against Berkeley that "I" is not the name of anything at all, and that a "real entity" exists "answering to" the word "I."

The mistake involved in the "Fido"-Fido theory of meaning is to treat every word as a substance-word, as the name of a *thing*. Now Berkeley would agree that there is a perfectly good sense in which lead and putty are things. What he denies is that they are *substances* in the philosophers' sense. In this sense substance is spiritual. "I" is a substance-word, "lead" is not.

I shall try to show that this view is at least plausible. I do so by means of psychological considerations.

It has been pointed out by Koffka¹ that the world we experience consists of "things" and "not-things." Koffka's problem is to examine the conditions which lead us to regard some parts of our environment as *things*. Like philosophers, he is interested in borderline cases: "Quite frequently we shall be in doubt as to whether one of our data is to be counted a thing or not. . . . Are clouds things? Yes, is fog, air, light, cold? . . . A fog which we see creeping up"

¹ K. Koffka, *Gestalt Psychology*, chapter 3, p. 70.

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 mountain valley has a thing-like quality similar to that of clouds, but a fog which makes an ocean liner reduce speed and sound its piercing horn is not thing-like at all."

Koffka's conclusion is as follows: "Thus we may single out three characteristics of things which will severally and jointly be characteristic of things: shaped boundedness, dynamic properties, and constancy."

Berkeley might therefore base his case on the fact that, in the case of ourselves, two of these three conditions are fulfilled. We live through a period of time, and we can *make* things happen.

The empiricist tradition, if Berkeley is right, has gone entirely astray over the question of causality. The "three-move" game mentioned in section I of this paper in connection with "Matter" and "Mind" is thought to be playable over the word "cause." Move 1 is that there is no such thing as causality, only succession according to a rule. Move 2 is that sentences using the word "cause" to refer to an invisible, occult force are meaningless. Move 3 is that succession according to a rule *is* causality. Those who defend an "activity" view of causality would quarrel with this programme from the start. If they are right, the denial of causality in move 1 can only be taken at its face-value. The statement is false, they would say, not meaningless; and a few glances at things bumping into one another will convince us of its falsity.

Berkeley does support the empiricist tradition about causality to some extent. He denies that there is causal activity between the things we perceive. Indeed one of his chief purposes in saying we perceive ideas, not things, is that "things" suggests something active. But he never doubts that a cause is something active; and this leads him to suppose that the only causes are spirits. "I have no notion of any action distinct from volition," says Philonous,¹ "neither can I conceive volition to be anywhere but in a spirit: when I speak of an active being, I am obliged to mean a spirit."

Although Berkeley makes free use of the words "will" and "volition," he seems largely to avoid the mistakes which Ryle criticizes in this connection. One version of the mistake is to suppose that, when I lift my finger, the ghost operates on my body as the driver operates on the controls of a car or some craftsman on his instrument. Berkeley sees that this will not do, and produces the classic remark, "I never use an instrument to lift my finger, because it is done by a volition."² Ryle says,³ "The question, 'What makes the bullet fly out of the barrel?' is properly answered by 'The expansion of gases in the cartridge'; the question, 'What makes the cartridge explode?' is answered by reference to the percussion of the detonator; and the

¹ 3rd dialogue, p. 276.

³ *The Concept of Mind*, p. 81.

² 2nd dialogue, p. 253.

question, 'How does my squeezing the trigger make the pin strike the detonator?' is answered by describing the mechanism of springs, levers, and catches between the trigger and the pin. So when it is asked 'How does my mind get my finger to squeeze the trigger?' the form of the question presupposes that a further chain-process is involved, embodying still earlier tensions, releases, and discharges though this time 'mental' ones." If I understand Ryle here, the following passage in Berkeley seems to present a parallel:¹ "The will is termed the motion of the soul: this infuses a belief that the mind of man is as a ball in motion, impelled and determined by the objects of sense, as necessarily as that is by the stroke of a racquet. Hence arises endless scruples and errors of dangerous consequence in morality."

We are acted upon, according to Berkeley, as well as active. When we perceive, there is a causal transaction performed on us. "I agree as well as you," says Philonous to Hylas, "*we are affected from without.*"² This, combined with the view that the only causes are spirits, constitutes Berkeley's special proof of the existence of God. His whole treatment of causality, however, is very difficult. It is enough for purposes of comparison with Ryle to suggest that he has quite a good case for saying that "I" is a substance-word. The grounds for this are that it is the name of something that lasts through time and has dynamic properties. It does not follow that "I" is a substance-word in the same way in which "chair" is a substance-word. It is the suggestion of a ghostly reduplication of the world of chairs which Ryle is concerned to attack.

If dynamic properties are the chief distinguishing-mark of substance,³ so that it becomes true to say that what has dynamic properties is necessarily a substance, then Koffka has re-clothed in psychological terms the old maxim that only a substance can be a cause. What in formidable jargon was once called "the *substance theory of the Self,*" which Berkeley accepts and Ryle rejects, seems to stand or fall on the merits of a border-line case. Dynamic properties and constancy, yes; shaped boundedness, no.⁴

Some may suppose that moral and religious beliefs are relevant to our views about "the self," and that it is easier to "think nobly of the soul" if we regard it as a substance.⁵ Certainly on Ryle's view it

¹ *Principles*, § cxliv. ² 3rd dialogue, p. 276. ³ Cf. Plato, *Sophist*, 247E.

⁴ I suspect, however, that philosophers have not sufficiently appreciated the complicated nature of awareness of our own body-image or "schema." Abnormal cases are particularly instructive, e.g. phantom-limbs, or failure to recognize parts of one's body as "belonging." See specially H. Head, *Aphasia and Kindred Disorders of Speech*.

⁵ Cf. Mrs. Kneale, *Proc. Ar. Soc.*, 1949-1950: "What is the mind-body problem?" p. 121, for an excellent discussion of this point.

BERKELEY AND RYLE: SOME COMPARISONS

seems that the noble things will have to be said in a different way; but the lurking suspicion that Ryle has forbidden us to say them at all is quite unjustified. And once we have seen the snares in the story of the ghost, provided we observe reasonable cautions we may continue to use it.

What both Berkeley and Ryle are attacking is a "two-world" theory, in which we are required to believe in two separate *kinds of substance* or *kinds of existence*. This is wrong, not because in fact there is only *one* world, just as in fact there might have been *eleven*,¹ but because to suppose that there are any *number* of worlds in this sense is to mistake the function of the word "exist." We may quite legitimately speak of "the world of values," "the world of mathematics" and so on, provided this is not understood in a "metaphysical" sense. Although Berkeley and Ryle both lend themselves to "metaphysical" interpretation—"not 'matter' only 'spirit,'" "not *two worlds* but *one world*"—I do not think that such an interpretation does justice to the philosophical insight of either.

In brief, if "stick" and "putty" are substance-words, "I" is not the name of a substance. If "I" is a substance-word, "stick" and "putty" are not. The mistake is to suppose that *both* "I" and "stick" or "putty" are substance-words, having a separate kind of existence. It is this view which constitutes the "category-mistake" which both philosophers are attacking.

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¹ See *The Concept of Mind*, p. 199.

DISCUSSION

PSYCHICAL RESEARCH AND PHILOSOPHY

To those who are familiar with the symposium on the relevance of psychical research to philosophy read at the Joint Session of the Mind Association and the Aristotelian Society held in July 1950, the Presidential Address delivered by Dr. B. L. Atreya of the Benares Hindu University to the Psychology Section of the Indian Philosophical Congress which met at Poona in December 1951¹ may be of interest. We all know that Dr. Rudolf Metz² regarded the preoccupation with psychical research as a regrettable weakness in British philosophers. But M. Gabriel Marcel's introduction to the recently published collection of essays *Mors et Vita*³ by MM. Dufour, Dumas and others indicates that not all Continental philosophers would subscribe wholly to Dr. Metz's criticism. Indian philosophers as a body have not been following with close attention the new developments in "parapsychology." Dr. Atreya, however, has made it clear that a reorientation of attitudes is urgently needed. He has traced the origin of psychical research to the resolute application of the scientific method to the "deeper nature of man." He has made appreciative references to the work of the British S.P.R. conducted along impartial lines during the last seventy years. He has quoted statements by Continental and American researchers.

Critics may not approve of some of the alleged evidence for the "paranormal" (e.g. the researches into the "human double" carried out by Durville, de Rochas, Matla and Zaalberg van Zelst and Geley's observations on "teleplasticity") cited by Dr. Atreya. He does not refer to the outstanding work of Soal which would have lent force to the statement that "the implications of these observations are even more important than the facts themselves." But apart from all questions about evidential standards, Dr. Atreya's Address suggests the need for an "East-West synthesis" in philosophy. One gets the impression from recent pronouncements by British philosophers like Mr. A. G. N. Flew, Mr. C. W. K. Mundle and Mrs. M. Kneale that their approach to psychical research is more or less coloured by the current Empiricism and the insistence on the Analysis of Language which is held to be necessary if we are to avoid entanglement in pseudo-problems. It has been suggested that a "mind terminology" fogs all the issues of psychical research. Dr. Atreya has unflinchingly stated his opinion that some reformulation of F. W. H. Myers's "subliminal" hypothesis seems most promising in this obscure domain. It may be worth while for us to examine this contention with reference to the three "sublanguages of psychology" distinguished by G. Bergmann:⁴ the M-language used in describing "thoughts," "wishes," "perception," etc.; the B-language relied upon in describing overt behaviour; and the P-language specially devised for psychology and adopted in neuro-physiological research. These languages are, as Bergmann admitted, still imperfectly intertranslatable, notwithstanding the fact that brain physics seeks to establish P-to-M, reflexological research P-to-B and psycho-analysis M-to-B isomorphisms. Dr. Atreya may be interpreted as arguing that psychical research suggests both M-to-B and M-to-P relations but that the M-language we need would have to be largely extrapolatory; it would have to refer to "subliminal states" which are

¹ *Proceedings of the Twenty-Sixth Indian Philosophical Congress*, 1951 (published by the Secretary, Indian Philosophical Congress, Basavangudi P.O., Bangalore 4, South India), pp. 55-64.

³ Paris, Plon, 1951.

⁴ *Philosophy of Science*, 1940, 7, pp. 415-23.

not directly verifiable by ordinary observation and are deduced by a tentative metaphysical speculation. The operand on which the operators of experimental psychical researchers operate is presumably not the "subliminal" itself but the various puzzling relations it bears to the ordinarily introspectable states and overt human behaviour.

The objection that to postulate a "subliminal mind" inaccessible to ordinary observation and having a status vastly different from that of any supposed "neural mechanisms" is methodologically unsound ought not to carry great weight in a complex branch of investigation like psychical research, where a narrowly conceived operationism may stifle the theory building without which new lines of inquiry cannot be chalked out. "Paranormal cognition" breaks away from our systems of scientific expectations and it is idle to suppose that a hypothesis attempting to account for it would satisfy common-sense requirements. On any strictly operationist view, it may seem that the temporal characteristics of human experience are much too primitive to be evaded and that metaphysical theories alleging the "unreality of time" lapse into wild and inarticulate nonsense. But, in handling the problems of psychical research, it will not do to assume at the outset that propositions about "temporality" are always unambiguously "assertable" in the usual sense.¹ Suppose we confine our attention to a single observer and operate with events as triads ordered by "linear betweenness," then the crux about precognition may be that there are situations in which we are unable to say unambiguously, even in principle, that y (say) either is or is not "temporally between" x and z , i.e. (xyz) may not unambiguously imply the "falsity" or the "truth" of (xzy) . The serious difficulty about the connexity of events that precognition suggests, which has no parallel in Relativity or Quantum Mechanics, is masked when we speculate on "betweenness" in its purely *spatial* aspect, for instance when we adopt the two-dimensional theory of time proposed very tentatively by Professors Broad and Price and say that y precedes z in "the familiar time-dimension" and follows z in "an unfamiliar time-dimension." May not paranormal cognition prove intractable to our ordinary language habits? I have elsewhere² pointed out that there is much in the symbolism of mysticism that would seem to suggest a radical scepticism about familiar categories and ordering relations. So great an authority as Mr. Tyrrell³ has cast serious doubts on the propriety of using sentences of the kind "Paranormal cognition occurs" in speculation on psychical research.

The muddles of psychical research are not, as the professional philosopher is tempted to suppose, about "discarnate minds" or "disembodied persons" but about those human beings whose activities orthodox psychologists profess to be able to study. Psychical phenomena bring with them the possibility that the human self has aspects prescribing limits to the amount of correlation we can achieve by adopting exclusively scientific methods of investigation and what Carnap called a "definite language."⁴ The most experienced psychical researchers may be inclined to agree with Dr. Atreya that any hypothesis commensurate with various forms of "paranormal cognition" is bound to be quite as far-reaching as "survival." "Survival" may have to be to be stripped of some misleading associations: to go no farther, the notion of a linear prolongation of our familiar "time." No philosopher facing these issues can afford to

¹ See my "Note on Precognition" in the *Journal S.P.R.* for November-December, 1951, and my note in the *Journal* for January-February 1952.

² "On the Denial of the Law of Excluded Middle," *The Philosophical Quarterly* (published by the Indian Institute of Philosophy, Amalner, E. Khandesh, Bombay), Vol. XXIV, No. 2 (July 1951), pp. 59-73.

³ *Proc. S.P.R.*, Part 173, Vol. XLVIII (May 1947), pp. 107-8.

⁴ *The Logical Syntax of Language* (Kegan Paul, 1937), § 17, p. 51.

be unconcerned with the insights harvested by the great mystics of East and West. The frankly experimental attitude to the subject-matter of philosophy recommended by Professor W. H. F. Barnes,¹ and more recently by Mr. Stuart Hampshire,² may be needed if we are going to deal with psychical research in an honest and competent way. M. Marcel has suggested that the records of psychical research deserve to be studied not only from a technical scientific standpoint but in an "existential" context. Dr. Atreya has pleaded for a re-examination of Indian *Yoga* in the light of psychical research. He has concluded his Address with the words: "We have arrived, I venture to say at such a juncture in the history of civilization that a comparative study of psychical research and Indian thought should be pursued in right earnest."

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¹ *Philosophy*, Vol. XXII, No. 81 (April 1947), pp. 43-4.

² *Ibid.*, Vol. XXVI, No. 97 (April 1951), pp. 142-5.

NEW BOOKS

The Art of Letters, Lu Chi's "Wen Fu," A.D. 302. By E. R. HUGHES. (Pantheon Books Inc., New York, 1951. Pp. xviii + 261. Price \$4.50.)

Lu Chi's *Wen Fu* deserves attention both as a *tour de force* in a difficult poetic genre and as a landmark in the history of Chinese literary criticism. Written in meticulous antithetical couplets rich in imagery and allusions, it extols the function of literature, discusses the virtues and vices of different styles of writing, and, above all, describes the experience of every poet—what Mr. T. S. Eliot calls the “intolerable wrestle with words and meanings.”

Professor Hughes has made a laudable attempt to render accessible this Chinese *ars poetica* to the English reader. In addition to a translation of the poem, he has provided a long commentary, a biography of the poet, and a sketch of Chinese literary history up to Lu Chi's time. Moreover, he raises numerous problems which should interest philosophers and literary critics no less than sinologists, problems such as the influence of the language and the literary form in which one writes on one's way of thinking and *vice versa*. The solution of these problems Professor Hughes wisely leaves to the reader, and contents himself with the task of interpretation.

It is to be regretted, however, that the information he gives is not always accurate, nor is the translation of the poem itself impeccable. Space allows mention of only a few errors. On p. 14 Professor Hughes makes the puzzling remark that “*p'ien wen* had a rival, the *ssu liu t'i* (four-six style),” when in fact the latter is a species of the former. Furthermore, the expression *p'ien wen* (double-harnessed writing) was not, as he seems to think, invented by eighteenth-century critics: it originated from the T'ang essayist Liu Tsung-yüan's phrase “*p'ien ssu li liu*” (double-harnessed fours and wedded sixes). Lu Chi's courtesy name should be spelt Shih-heng, not Ssu-heng (p. 29). The word *fen* in *tien fen* does not mean “rich soil” (p. 115); it is part of the phrase *san fen wu tien* (The Three “Greats” and the Five Classics) which comes from the *Tso Chuan* and refers to the supposed writings of the Three August Ones and the Five Emperors (San Huang Wu Ti). Professor Hughes need not complain that commentators have no precedent to cite for the term *pu li* which he translates as “unreason” (p. 107), because it is clear from the syntax of the line “*fu ho fen erh pu li*” that *li* is here used as a verb, not as part of a noun, and the whole line, rendered by Professor Hughes as, “where, then, is disorder and unreason?” actually means, “what confusion is there that will not be put in order?” The above two errors are the more surprising in view of the fact that both expressions have been correctly translated by M. George Margoulies in his French version, with which Professor Hughes is apparently acquainted. Finally, the line quoted by Professor I. A. Richards at the end of his Forenote, that letters might “give aid to governors and generals when ruin is impending” (pp. x and 108) is unfortunately a mistranslation. The phrase *wen wu* here does not mean “governors and generals,” but refers to the Sage Kings Wen and Wu of the Chou Dynasty. The line, then, should be rendered as, “to save (the tradition of Kings) Wen and Wu from falling into ruin,” and it is derived from (of all books!) the Confucian *Analects* (XIX, 22).

J. J. Y. LIU.

An Essay in Modal Logic. By GEORG H. VON WRIGHT. (North Holland Publishing Company, Amsterdam. Pp. 90. Price 15s.)

Prof. von Wright considers four groups of concepts. Members of the first group are the concepts traditionally called modal: e.g. *necessary*, *possible*, *contingent*, *impossible*. These he calls "alethic modalities." The other group are: the "epistemic modalities" (*verified* or *known to be true*, *undecided*, *falsified*, or *known to be false*); the "deontic modalities" (*obligatory*, *permitted*, *forbidden*, *indifferent*); the "existential modalities" (*universal*, *existing*, *empty*). The starting-point of Prof. von Wright's essay is the observation that the relations between the members of any one of these groups are formally analogous to the relations between the members of any other of the groups. For example, if a proposition is necessary (*verified*) its negation is impossible (*falsified*); if a proposition is neither necessary nor impossible (neither verified nor falsified) it is contingent (*undecided*). If an act (property) is obligatory (*universal*), its non-performance (complement) is forbidden (*empty*); if an act (property) is not forbidden (*empty*), it is permitted (*exists*). The object of the Essay is to extend the use of truth-tables and normal forms as decision methods from quantification theory (the field of existential modalities) to the analogous groups of concepts.

To illustrate Prof. von Wright's procedure, I shall briefly describe, in the simplest form, his application of these methods to the first group of concepts. He first introduces two principles of Alethic Modalities, which may be expressed as follows:

I Given two logically equivalent propositions, the proposition that the first is possible is logically equivalent to the proposition that the second is possible.

II If a proposition is logically equivalent to a disjunction of other propositions, then the proposition that the first proposition is possible is logically equivalent to the disjunction of the propositions that each of the other propositions is possible.

Now any molecular (truth-functional) proposition can be expressed in a perfect disjunctive normal form. Then, by I, the proposition that any such proposition is possible is equivalent to the proposition that its perfect disjunctive normal form is possible; and this proposition is equivalent, by II, to the disjunction of the propositions that each of the disjuncts of the normal form is possible. Call the members of the disjunction (D) the *constituents* of the original modal proposition. (The constituents will themselves, of course, be modal propositions.) Then any proposition to the effect that some molecular (truth-functional) proposition is possible is a truth-function of its constituents. Similarly, any molecular complex of such modal propositions is a truth-function of the constituents of the complex. This exhausts the first-order modal propositions considered in the system. (The modal expressions other than that "possible" can be eliminated by definition in favour of "possible.") Truth-tables can now be constructed to determine the status of any first-order modal proposition. The only restriction on the distribution of possible truth-values among the constituents of such a proposition is that imposed by the principle

III Any given proposition is either itself possible or has a negation that is possible.

The calculation of the truth-conditions (and hence the determination of the logical status) of the modal proposition in question then proceeds on the basis of Principles I and II and the ordinary principles of the truth-functional logic.

The next step is to extend the system to deal with molecular complexes of both non-modal and first-order modal propositions. These are similarly shown to be truth-functions of their modal and non-modal constituents. (The non-modal constituents are the atomic non-modal propositions occurring in the complex.) For this extended system the restrictive principle III is replaced by the stronger principle

III' If a proposition is true, then it is also possible.
III' entails III.

A system of epistemic modalities is then constructed on analogy with the system of alethic modalities. With one technically unimportant variation, the principles I, II, III and III' are replaced by exactly corresponding principles in which the word "possible" is replaced by the phrase "not falsified." The remaining epistemic concepts are held to be eliminable by definitions in favour of "not falsified." Prof. von Wright finds it "a remarkable fact of language that there is no unique epistemic word which corresponds to the alethic word 'possible,'" i.e. "no specific term to cover the ground of both the words 'verified' and 'undecided'" (pp. 31-32). On this I have two comments. First, it seems to me not remarkable, but entirely natural, that there should be no word to cover just this ground; for such a word would be largely otiose. Second, it seems extremely doubtful whether (outside systems like Professor von Wright's) the word "possible" is ever used to cover just the ground "either necessary or contingent" which it covers in his system.

The analogy between the systems of alethic and epistemic modalities will have the result that just as "it is true that p but not necessary that p " expresses a contingent formula, so "it is true that p , but not known (or verified) that p " expresses a contingent formula. Now certainly a proposition may be true without being known to be true. And certainly someone may intelligibly say, "It is true that p , though nobody knows it." But if he said "It is true that p , though nobody knows it, not even I," we should feel there was something (linguistically) wrong. Facts of this kind may lead us to wonder how far a system of epistemic modalities can contribute to the philosophical elucidation of words like "know."

The next system is that of deontic modalities. Here "permitted" takes the place of "possible" in the fundamental principles. Theorems such as the following are provable: An act the performance of which renders obligatory the performance of one or the other of two acts each of which is forbidden is itself forbidden. One is reminded of the intoxicating Leibnizian prospect of settling debated questions in morals by taking our pencils and calculating. This chapter contains an excellent joke. The author writes: "Ordinary language and our common sense logical intuitions apparently do not provide a clear answer to the question whether a tautologous act [e.g. the "act" of either going or not going to the cinema] must be obligatory or not"; and then argues that we had better accept the principle that it is obligatory. For if the tautologous act is not obligatory, a self-contradictory act is permitted; and the system allows us to prove that if a self-contradictory act is permitted, any act is permitted; and the door is open to moral anarchy (pp. 31-39).

The next chapter studies the combination of epistemic and existential modalities. It contains three systems: that dealing with epistemic-existential sentences (e.g. "It is known that something is red"); that dealing with existential-epistemic sentences (e.g. "Something is known to be red"); and that dealing with molecular complexes of sentences of both kinds. The first two involve no new governing principles: the last requires two new principles, which place further restrictions on the admissible combinations of truth-

possibilities of the constituent propositions of which the propositions studied by the system are truth-functions. These principles, neither of which can be converted, are:

IV If it is known that everything possesses a certain property, then everything is known to possess this property.

V If there is a thing which is known to possess a certain property, then it is known that something possesses this property.

Further extensions of these systems are possible. For instance there could be a system studying molecular complexes of epistemic-existential and existential sentences. Analogously there can be systems studying alethically modal-cum-existential sentences (e.g. "It is possible that something is red and green") and molecular complexes of these and existential sentences. In Appendix I, the theories of the modal and mixed modal syllogism are "cleared up" by interpreting them as just such systems.

Finally, systems of higher order modalities are considered, treating of such sentence-forms as "It is possible that it is necessary that p " and of molecular complexes of these and higher and lower order modal sentences and non-modal sentences. In the systems initially considered the same basic principles are used as for the original systems of alethic modalities. The multiplication of "constituents" is less than might be anticipated, as it emerges that, e.g. first-order modal sentences are disjunctions of second-order modal sentences and that first-order modal constituents are therefore unnecessary. The systems can be further simplified by the introduction of certain "Principles of Reduction," viz.:

VI If it is possible that a certain proposition is possible, then the proposition in question is possible

and VI' (which entails VI). If a certain proposition is possible then it is necessary that the proposition in question is possible.

If the stronger principle is accepted, higher-order modal propositions can be shown to be equivalent to molecular complexes of first-order modal propositions, and the decision problem for molecular complexes of modal propositions of any order and non-modal propositions is reducible to the decision problem for molecular complexes of first-order modal propositions and non-modal propositions. In Appendix II, Prof. von Wright illustrates the possibility of exhibiting the various systems of alethic modalities in axiomatic form and compares them with the systems developed by C. I. Lewis.

Prof. von Wright asks whether the Principles of Reduction are true or not (pp. 71, 76). He does not attempt to answer the question, but expresses warnings against over-hasty acceptance of them on the grounds, first, that readiness to accept them may be due to confusing them with other propositions which sound similar, and second, that the epistemic analogies are not encouraging. For my part, it is his question I find difficult to understand. Since there is (as far as I know) no well-established usage of second and higher order modalities to which we can appeal, how are we to answer his question unless it means "Shall we accept either or both of these principles?" Even this question we could answer other than capriciously only if there were some use we had in mind for higher-order modalities. But Prof. von Wright poses his question quite as if it stood, and called for an answer, independently of any use we made or might propose to make of higher-order modalities.

In ingenuity, notational perspicuity and economy, elegance and clarity of presentation, Prof. von Wright's Essay is a model of such performances. To

complain that it does not shed much light on the philosophical problems connected with the concepts he discusses would be as ungracious and irrelevant as to complain of an ingenious toy, that it was not a useful tool.

P. F. STRAWSON.

New Hopes for a Changing World. By Bertrand Russell. (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd. 1951. Pp. 218. Price 9s. 6d.)

This book, which diagnoses the evils of our time and suggests remedies, is divided into three parts, dealing with the conflicts of man and nature, of man and man, and of man and himself. The villain of the piece is fear. "The thing that above all others I have been concerned to say in this book," states Mr. Russell toward the end, "is that because of fears that once had a rational basis, mankind has failed to profit by the new techniques that, if wisely used, could make him happy. Fear makes man unwise in the three great departments of human conduct: his dealings with nature, his dealings with other men, and his dealings with himself" (193).

The changes in our world which Mr. Russell stresses are those due to the rapid development of science and technology. What is new is the vast increase in scale of modern industry, in the power it gives, both for construction and for destruction, in the costliness of its equipment, in its need for raw materials drawn from all parts of the earth. World-wide planning and control are needed if these enormous forces are to be used beneficially. The conflicts of man with nature can be resolved with the aid of scientific techniques, but only if conflicts of man with man cease. And this makes urgent the resolution of the conflicts of man with himself. In the past, the conflict within man was a reflection of the other two conflicts, which were forced on man by his environment. It is now the source of them. Get rid of this third conflict, give "encouragement and opportunity for all the impulses that are creative and expansive," get all men to feel deeply "that happiness and the means to happiness depend upon harmony with other men." "If men could think and feel in this way, not only their personal problems, but all the problems of world politics, even the most abstruse and difficult, would melt away" (17). These quotations are from the first chapter, but they seem to express Mr. Russell's final solution. The same note is struck again and again throughout the book.

Not that he does not pay attention to the factors a political realist would stress. But on the whole he concentrates on the factors in the make-up of human beings which lead to fear, hatred and cruelty; he leaves one with the feeling that the material conditions of the problems would be easy to deal with, if the human factors were right.

This seems to me to be a mistake. He would be right if questions of policy turned wholly or mainly on statements about the material facts; but this is not the case. People—especially those with different social traditions and different types of social institutions—have different views about what general way of life it is desirable to foster, and differences of policy are often due to this. Again it is very often difficult to decide what material consequences would be likely to follow from this or that policy, so that risks of varying degrees have to be taken, affecting different bodies of persons; and differences on this question cannot be smoothed out by good will, in the absence of close social bonds between the disputants. It is not merely because people hate, not even because they are stupid or blind to their self-interest, that situations arise in which neither side will give way. I agree that it is a mistake to say that you can't stop fighting because you can't change human nature; I agree

that the kind of change in human attitudes Mr. Russell wants to bring about is necessary, if conflicts of a deadly character are to be got rid of. I agree with him on the desirability of getting rid of a morality based on prohibitions and a sense of sin. But I do not think that his problem can be solved, as he appears to hold it can, by a combination of psychological and economic measures—economics to deal scientifically with the material factors, economics and psychology to produce men of co-operation and good will. Not sufficient attention is paid to the role of social institutions in determining behaviour. The whole problem seems to me much more complex than his discussion suggests.

The inadequacies of Mr. Russell's treatment come out clearly, I think, in Chapter VI on Social Units, and Chapter VII on The Size of Social Units.

In Chapter VI we are told that larger social units grew out of primitive families, and three points are made, which bear on the question of the strength and the possible size of social units. (i) Social cohesion is only effective when it has a psychological counterpart in the feelings of members of the group. (ii) As social units grow larger, the psychological mechanism from which they derive support is gradually diluted. (iii) Every new social organization tends to weaken the hold of older organizations. What is lacking in this is an analysis of the way in which particular types of social organization are maintained by habits of behaviour, felt to be important because of the way in which they serve ends felt to be important; and it is through these habits of behaviour that the "psychological counterpart" is kept strong. The development of a new social organization (such as the State) may indeed weaken the hold of an older one (e.g. the family) if it relieves the older organization of some of its important tasks, and so cuts out the need for the old habits of behaviour, and if this happens without the older organization developing new functions, performing new tasks, which involve new habits of behaviour. As social units become larger, the linking of the individual members through organizations involving social habits distinctively related to the larger social unit becomes more difficult, but is still necessary, if loyalty to the larger unit is to be strong; and imaginative beliefs related to the larger unit in association with these habits become of great importance.

Discussing the question of size in Chapter VII Mr. Russell argues that the psychological factors are the great obstacles to growth, and in particular that nationalism is to-day "the chief obstacle to the extension of social cohesion beyond national boundaries" (60). He speaks of its "pernicious doctrine" (67) and describes it as "the chief force making for the extermination of the human race" (69). The only aspects of nationalism to which he refers are things like the falsification of history and the pretence that one's own nation is morally superior to all others, neglecting all the complex interrelations between people who feel themselves to belong to the same nation, brought about by common institutions, inter-marriage, inter-employment (if one may use such an expression), common traditions, and so on. His only attitude to this is to suggest that it must be got rid of. I think that a deeper study of it, and of the conditions under which it has developed, is essential if we are to realize the full problem of supra-national unity, which is just the problem of building up appropriate similar complex inter-relations between the people of different nations. Mr. Russell turns away from all this, to suggest that "the real obstacles to world-wide social cohesion are in individual souls. They are the pleasures that we derive from hatred, malice and cruelty" (70), and the solution he offers is "by changing the sources of happiness and the unconscious impulses which mould our moral phrases" (70-71). All this as I have said seems to me totally inadequate, due to a disregard of modern sociological analysis.

Mr. Russell's review of world problems is wide, and he leaves us in no doubt as to what he thinks necessary to be done to meet them. The steps he advocates seem to be important, but they take us only part of the way, and it is doubtful whether they could be made by themselves on the large scale needed.

One feature struck me in many parts of the book, which I can characterize in one of Mr. Russell's own phrases. "Women," he says (72), "become emancipated from men in proportion as both become slaves of the State," and he adds: "This statement is too epigrammatic to be quite true, but it may serve as a slightly inaccurate condensation of the truth." While "slightly" seems to me an understatement, "inaccurate condensation" seems to me fitting: it applies to many statements in the book, and the reader should be on his guard. These "inaccurate condensations" are stimulating, many of them amusing, but they are a species of social caricature. While his aim is completely serious, Mr. Russell's method of social analysis is frequently that of the caricaturist.

L. J. RUSSELL.

Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics: a commentary by the late H. H. JOACHIM, edited by D. A. Rees. (Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1951. Pp. vi + 304. Price 25s.)

The *Nicomachean Ethics* has aroused very different feelings in different people, and will probably continue to do so. Two quotations will illustrate this. Jane Harrison wrote in her reminiscences that after an upbringing in a narrow school of Evangelicalism, to read it "was like coming out of a madhouse into a quiet college quadrangle where all was liberty and sanity. . . . The doctrine of virtue as the Mean—what an uplift and revelation! The notion of the *summum bonum* as an 'energy,' as an exercise of personal faculty. . . . I remember walking up and down the College garden, thinking could it possibly be true." In Professor Basil Willey's opinion, on the other hand, "that work should surely rank high in any list of the world's most boring classics."

Probably more readers would incline to Professor Willey's view than to Miss Harrison's, and for this there are definite reasons to be found in the *Ethics* themselves. Aristotle says more than once (1103 b 26, 1179 a 35) that the general aim of the treatise is not theoretical knowledge (*theoria*) but practical action. He then discloses near its end that in his view the best and highest occupation for man, and the most distinctively human, is precisely theoretical knowledge and not action. Moreover his own consuming interest in *theoria* is abundantly proved by the rest of his works. In the *Ethics* he admits that since man is not a god, but dependent on his fellows for a decent existence, practical good sense and the moral virtues are necessary and the wise man ought therefore to be ready to give his advice in these matters also. But it is clear that for him this excursus into the practical is made from a sense of duty rather than from inclination, and it is no wonder therefore if the result lacks in general that infectious fire and enthusiasm which gleam even through the rough notes (which are often all that we have) of his approaches to the workings of nature or the subject of its first cause.

This peculiarity of the *Ethics*, as a work in which the philosopher—by definition a seeker after accurate knowledge of unchanging reality—descends to a study in which scientific accuracy neither can nor should be demanded, since its subject-matter is the changeable and contingent, accounts for much of the dissatisfaction felt by a critic like Professor Willey. Nor can one wholly

¹ Christianity Past and Present, Cambridge U.P., 1952, p. 29.

PHILOSOPHY

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dissent from his strictures on the character of the Magnanimous Man as mixture of "Pharisee, romantic hero, and moral prig." Yet after all there is more. The friend of such diverse characters as Plato and Antipater, the writer of that exquisite little poem to his murdered friend Hermias which was the direct occasion of his own banishment, had a right to speak on friendship, and spoke of it well. There is also his description of the true self-lover as the man who loves the highest in himself. This real self Aristotle describes in his own way as the reason, not, however, as that which leads a man to complete retirement in study or laboratory, but that "which apprehends the truth, and in virtue of which men desire a common good: i.e. *nous* is that which unites us in common interests and ideals, and is the source of knowledge. . . . Such self-assertion, Aristotle maintains, is not inconsistent with self-sacrifice (Joachim, pp. 256-7). As Aristotle says (1169 a 20), the true self-lover "will sacrifice money and honour and generally the goods which men fight for securing for himself the genuine good (*to kalon*). For he would choose a intense pleasure for a short time in preference to a long period of feeble pleasure; and he would prefer a year's noble life to many years of life without distinction, and one fine and great action to many small actions. And this perhaps, is the experience of those who give their lives for friends or country. They choose great good for themselves."

The commentary which has given rise to these thoughts is that contained in the late Professor H. H. Joachim's Oxford lectures on the *Ethics*, delivered with many revisions between 1902 and 1917 and now edited by Mr. D. A. Rees. Mr. Rees has translated many words and phrases from the Greek for the convenience of Greekless readers, but on the whole this detailed and scholarly commentary will probably be of more use to classical students. Like other works on the *Ethics*, even the best, it bears out a long-standing impression that the treatise is fundamentally readable and in many places easier to understand than are its commentators. Better than studying it with a commentator open for constant reference is to read it straight through and only apply to notes where an explanation seems absolutely necessary. Of course like any work of Aristotle's, though less than some, it needs to be considered in the context of his whole thought, and in particular of those fundamental concepts like matter and form, potency and act, which were the outcome of his reflection on the philosophy of Plato and coloured all that he wrote. Joachim deals with these in an introduction, but might perhaps have made more use of them in the explanations of the commentary itself, e.g. at the beginning of Book II. Similarly, on p. 6, "the activity of thinking with itself, its object" might have been elucidated by a brief explanation and application of the principles of thought in the *De anima* as the informing of the mind by the intelligible form of the object. This explanation is in fact admirably supplied on pp. 293 ff. with reference to the nature of God, but the reader who has only reached p. 6 might be glad at least of a reference forward. On the other hand the explanation on pp. 38 f. of the *psyche* as a developing series is an example of just the sort of supporting reference which a student needs. On logical matters (which obviously interested Joachim especially) the commentary is inclined to go too far, inserting for instance on pp. 80-5 a long excursus on definition illustrated from the *Categories* which is unnecessary and an explanation of the context and likely to seem confusing to the student. The same applies to the elaborate logical explanation on pp. 54-6 of a passage of which, as Joachim begins by saying, "the general sense is clear."

There is one statement, on p. 67, which is surely erroneous, and since the matter is of central importance, should not be passed over even in this short review. It is this: "Now according to Aristotle, all movement persists unless"

and until it is checked by an opposite movement." Aristotle did not discover the law of inertia. The contrary is true, as has been most recently noted by Professor Butterfield: "Such motion"—i.e. motion other than that to the natural place of an element—"depended on the operation of a mover, and the Aristotelian doctrine of inertia was a doctrine of rest—it was motion, not rest, that always required to be explained.... The essential feature of this view was the assertion or the presumption that a body would keep in movement only so long as a mover was actually in contact with it, imparting motion to it all the time."¹ (It should be noted that Joachim is not here speaking of natural motion, but of the movement set up in the organ of sense by the object perceived.)

I have concentrated on the point of view of the student, since the lectures were after all designed for undergraduates. Applied to as needed, they will give him valuable help, though they must, one would think, have sometimes been hard going in the lecture-room itself, and are perhaps better digested by considered reflection on them in their present printed form. The more mature Aristotelian scholar will find much in them to interest him, and occasionally to arouse his combative spirit. This is as it should be, and Mr. Rees and the Oxford Press deserve warm thanks for making them generally available.

W. K. C. GUTHRIE.

British Empirical Philosophers. Edited by A. J. AYER and RAYMOND WINCH.
(Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1952. Pp. 560. 25s.)

This book includes extracts from those works of Locke, Berkeley and Hume which are very widely studied under the title "Theory of Knowledge." The theory of moral judgment is (as usual) excluded, although surely Hume's account of morals is a vital contribution to empirical philosophy—even if philosophy means Theory of Knowledge.

In his brief introduction Professor Ayer discusses the fundamental principles of empiricism and derives from them the logical thesis that nothing is a genuinely descriptive proposition unless it describes what could be experienced or (to make elbow-room for scientific theories) unless it entails propositions which describe what could be experienced. This thesis was regarded by Locke and Hume as a factual (psychological) one; but they also recognized, and Berkeley recognized much more clearly, that logical questions were involved. Ayer holds (as we all know) that this thesis is a matter of definition: and he represents the inquiry into ideas and impressions as an attempt to construct a new language in which it would be possible to describe *only* what could be experienced. Ayer discusses our knowledge of physical objects, causation and the nature of self, as these problems arise in the authors represented. Ayer's own views are close to Hume's but without Hume's feelings of bewilderment and jeopardy.

This introduction is (as one would expect) clear and penetrating; and it has the merit of showing a beginner that the issues raised in the classical texts are still living. For here, at any rate, is one distinguished contemporary who understands these metaphysical questions in very much the traditional way and is busy looking for a solution to those which he thinks have not yet been solved. It may puzzle the beginner to find that what Locke and company

¹ *Origins of Modern Science*, G. Bell, 1949, pp. 4–5. Aristotle does indeed go so far as to say that in a vacuum there would be no reason why motion, if once started, should ever stop. But this for him is only part of an argument designed to show that the existence of a vacuum is impossible.

PHILOSOPHY

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hoped to discover by observation and reflection Ayer hopes to invent by definition. But that is worth puzzling over.

What else besides this useful twenty-page introduction does one get for one twenty-five shillings? (1) A new abridgment of Locke's *Essay* to less than one quarter of its original length. (Professor Wilburn's version in the Everyman Library is rather more than one half of the original length.) The abridgment is necessarily also a selection and very much cuts down the discussion of such questions as religion, morals, personal identity, "powers" and even of our idea of space, time and number. It also necessarily omits nearly all the engaging asides and anecdotes and the Epistle to the Reader, which certainly have great value for the beginner. Nothing is done to mark abbreviated paragraphs and a note on p. 30 which states that the "numbering shows where whole paragraphs and chapters have been omitted" is not to be believed. For where (as is often the case) paragraphs are omitted at the end of a chapter there is nothing to show it; and in Book III the last five chapters disappear without mention. It is indeed difficult to find what one wants (should it happen to be here) chapter and paragraph numbers are not given at the tops of the passages and the book has no index.

The remainder of the volume comprises: (2) Berkeley's *Principles*, the *First Dialogue* and also extracts from the *Second* and *Third Dialogues*. (3) Hume's *Treatise*, Book I (omitting the chapter on the Immateriality of the Soul) together with the Introduction and Appendix; and a dozen pages from the *Enquiry*. (4) Three short extracts from Reid, *Intellectual Powers*, Essay II. (5) Two chapters from Mill's *Examination of Hamilton*. The very brief biographical notes do little to enlighten and nothing to encourage the new reader. In the case of Mill the order of events in his life has been seriously disturbed by the type-setter. The titles and dates of the authors' principal philosophical works are given but that is the only attempt that has been made at a bibliography.

KARL BRITTON.

Foundations of Inference in Natural Science. By J. O. WISDOM. (Methuen
Pp. x + 242. Price 22s. 6d.)

Dr. Wisdom says of his book: "The subject-matter is what used to appear in the second half of logic books under the heading 'inductive logic'." He adds: "The book is largely a critical survey of the views of scientific inference that have been developed over the last thirty years or so, from the time at the end of World War I when the late Lord Keynes and Professor C. D. Broad broke new ground." Of his own viewpoint he says: "Professor Popper has convinced me that induction plays no part whatever in science—that there is no inductive method and that nothing approximating to inductive inference is used. What appears to be inductive is assimilated by the method of hypothesis and deduction—the hypothetico-deductive system."

In accordance with these statements in his Preface, Dr. Wisdom first sets forth what he takes to be the universal method of science—the formulation, testing, reformulation and retesting of hypotheses, all observation being made in the light of hypotheses. He admits that a problem remains why we should trust hypotheses which have withstood experimental attempts at falsification. He then sets out the view of induction as the formulation of laws as generalizations from sets of observations and maintains that this not only falsifies the actual procedure of scientists, but also that it cannot dispel the philosophical problems which remain on Dr. Wisdom's own view of scientific

method, and that it raises insoluble problems of justification of its own. Finally, he tackles the "problem of induction" and answers it with a modification of Reichenbach's well-known "heads I win, tails I don't lose."

The book is a useful one. The style is clear, the argument as simple as the subject-matter will allow, and the train of thought is clear and lucid. It should, apart from some technicalities on probability, be comprehensible to the undergraduate and the amateur, who should be profitably stimulated by it.

Having made it clear that I think well of the book, and having added that I find myself in general agreement with parts of its thesis, I wish to make two critical comments, one philosophical, the other historical.

Dr. Wisdom seems to me to overstate a good case in claiming that *all* observation in science is made in the light of an hypothesis and with the aim of testing this hypothesis. It is a matter of history that, in the light of the discovery that any electrical field was surrounded by a magnetic field, Faraday made the (incorrect) hypothesis that magnetic fields would be surrounded by electrical ones. So he observed a magnet within a coil to which an ammeter was attached, and, the hypothesis being wrong, got no reading on his ammeter. This much fits in nicely with Dr. Wisdom's theory. But to have a magnet in a coil Faraday had to put it there, and at the end of the experiment he had to take it out. During this pre- and post-experimental setting up and dismantling of the apparatus Faraday noticed that he got a momentary reading on his ammeter as the magnet was moved. This chance observation led him to discover the theory of electro-magnetic induction. Now it is true that if Faraday had been totally ignorant of physics and totally incurious he would not have heeded the momentary reading; if he had not been a great scientist he might not have made the right hypothesis to explain it. In so far as it had not occurred to Faraday to suppose that the movement of a magnet would disturb the normal rest of an ammeter needle we can say that the observation was made against a background of expectations. But if Dr. Wisdom is going to claim that this case falls within the scope of his theory that the job of observation is always to test pre-existing hypotheses, then this involves such a watering down of the meaning of this theory that it becomes a platitude which it would never have occurred to J. S. Mill to dispute. It seems from his remarks on p. 7 that Dr. Wisdom would make this claim, but I think he would be unwise to do so. No one denies that an observer must be able to distinguish the unusual and be curious about it. There is a stage in human thought at which it becomes unprofitable to ask which comes first, hypothesis or observation, as unprofitable as to ask which comes first, the hen or the egg. Even at more advanced stages of thought there are important observations which should be regarded as chance, in contrast with those which a scientist sets out to make to test his hypothesis.

As a matter of history Dr. Wisdom seems to me to exaggerate the novelty of the theory which he supports. The impression given is that it was a completely new line of thought when put forward by Professor Popper. But we can admire the very important work of Popper in this field without going thus far (Dr. Wisdom even says, on p. 54, of such contrived theories as that of the Ptolemaic epicycles that "Popper has suggested the appropriate name '*ad hoc* hypothesis'"). Though Whewell's *Novum Organum Renovatum* no doubt differs from the views of Wisdom and Popper in many ways, the basic thesis of Whewell is recognizably the same as that of Dr. Wisdom. Whewell's book can still be read with profit, and not all intermediate writers have neglected it.

Dr. Wisdom deals interestingly with a number of matters not here discussed. He considers the distinction between generalizations and non-instantial hypothesis, for example, in an interesting way. I repeat that in spite of what I

regard as both philosophical and historical exaggeration, Dr. Wisdom has written a useful contribution on a very difficult subject.

J. O. URMSON

The Origins of European Thought about the Body, the Mind, the Soul, the World, Time, and Fate. New Interpretations of Greek, Roman and kindred evidence, also of some basic Jewish and Christian beliefs. By R. B. ONIANS. (C.U.P. 1951. Pp. xvii + 547. 45s.)

More than thirty years ago Professor Onians, then an undergraduate at Liverpool, became dissatisfied with the current explanations of certain of Homer's psychological terms. Of these remote stirrings the present book is the outcome. Its main argument was, he tells us, complete by 1929. But the collection of anthropological material is, as Frazer found, never complete; so the book was left to grow for another twenty years, during which it doubled its original size. It is divided into three parts, entitled respectively "The Mind and the Body," "The Immortal Soul and the Body," and "Fate and Time." In Parts I and II the author aims at laying bare the physiological and psychological assumptions which underlie the language of Homer in particular and of early Greek and Roman writers in general, and are still implicit in many later colloquial phrases and poetic metaphors. To this end such terms as "phrenes," "thymos," "psyche," "aeon" and *genius* are studied in their relation to each other and to the parts of the human organism. Part III opens up a different line of country, but does not fully explore it. It is mainly concerned with the images of spinning, weaving and binding as applied to the working of Fate in early literature; the treatment of Time is brief and incomplete. There follow nearly fifty pages of addenda, of which the longest rather unexpectedly expounds "the original basic interrelations of the Trinity from the standpoint of a liberal Christian."

Most readers will find the book a little baffling. It seems a pity that despite its lengthy gestation the author has in the end allowed his argument to enter the world, as Plato would say, "without a head." Had he provided a summary of his main results and attempted to show their historical importance, at least in general terms, the reader might have found it easier to answer the question that he will certainly ask—in what sense can these be called the origins of European thought? As it is, one is tempted to retort, in words recently used by Mr. Guthrie, that "the history of Greek thought is the process of emanation from such popular preconceptions," and that European thought is founded on Greek thought, not on old wives' tales which Homer had already half outgrown. For the level of "thought" which Onians so painstakingly seeks to uncover for us is, as he says himself (p. 464), "a mode of apprehending reality different from that familiar to civilization." It is a level at which the mind, being as yet incapable of abstraction, possesses nothing that can properly be called a concept, but operates instead with symbolic images linked by association rather than logic. Such images resist systematic description, for they are not a system; they have blurred edges, an indefinite hinterland of implication, and change their shape continually, like the images in a dream. Indeed, many of the images studied by Onians seem identical with those discovered by Freud in the dreams of modern Europeans: e.g. the snake as a vehicle of "life-stuff" (p. 206 f.), the association of birth with water (pp. 230, 247 ff.), teeth equated with seed (p. 233), the finger representing the "procreative life-soul" (p. 496). If I had written this book, I think I should have called it *Some Origins of European Dreams*.

To say this is not to belittle the book's real interest and importance. Its author has a bold and original mind, and an enviably wide range of learning; he draws valuable illustrative material not only from Greek, Latin and English literature of all periods, but from Sanskrit, Norse and other Indo-European texts, and also from Semitic sources. The essence of his method is simple: it consists in trying what happens if we take quite literally the "figures of speech" of early poets, since "in the interpretation of early literature, a readiness to see mere figures of speech in phrases which depart from our conceptions of reality is not a virtue" (p. 326). This is a sound principle, though the reader may feel that Onians presses it at times a little far. In interpreting the evidence thus obtained, he uses with assurance and ingenuity the twin tools of comparative philology and comparative anthropology. He has also acquired what most classical scholars lack, an elementary knowledge of psychology and physiology. The result is a book which, however confusing and however speculative, cannot be ignored by the classical scholar, the general anthropologist, or the student of early religious belief. The first-named will find in it not only novel interpretations of several important words, but also fresh light on a number of difficult passages of ancient poetry (which are recorded in a separate index) and—most important of all—a stimulus to a more sensitive understanding of ancient poetic imagery in general. To the anthropologist, the most striking thing will be the high degree of uniformity which Onians discovers in the beliefs of early peoples both inside and outside the Indo-European family. I suspect some exaggeration here: the sharper the eye for similarities, the stronger the temptation to neglect differences. But when all allowance is made, the measure of agreement is still impressive; Onians seems to attribute it in the main, no doubt rightly, to basic uniformities of physiological and psychological structure. Finally, the student of religious ideas will be especially interested in Onians' contention that the Greek "psyche" is "virtually identical" with the Latin *genius*, and that both represent "the life-spirit active in procreation" (p. 129), i.e. something loosely comparable to the Freudian *libido* (p. 161). It would be unwise, I think, to dismiss this unorthodox thesis out of hand; it fits rather well with a good deal of early evidence (including passages like Anacreon fr. 4, Semonides of Amorgos fr. 29. 14, Aesch. *Persae* 841, which Onians surprisingly forgets to quote). But what it surely does not fit is the evidence of Homer, though Onians would have us believe that it does—an extreme example of blindness to difference.

This is not the place to pursue detailed criticism further. But two general warnings must be given for the benefit of the non-specialist reader. (a) Onians' views were formed by 1929, and he pays very little attention to work published since that date. This is unfortunate. Had he taken account of such books as Leitzke's *Moira und Gottheit* (1930), Ehnmark's *Idea of God in Homer* (1935), and Snell's *Die Entdeckung des Geistes* (1946)—to mention only a few which are directly relevant to his theme—he might in my judgment have been saved from a number of errors. (b) Onians' practice of accumulating evidence without chronological distinction can be seriously misleading, e.g. when he invokes the (Hellenistic) theory of "vapours" at Delphi in support of the view that "thymos" was originally a breath-soul (p. 66). In particular, several of his Homeric interpretations are vitiated by a refusal to distinguish between earlier and later elements in the Homeric poems. Thus, to assert that "animals have psychai for Homer" (p. 105), and hang much argument on the assertion, is to generalize from a single Odyssean instance without considering the possibility that a later poet has here misapplied an Iliadic formula. Similarly, in discussing "moira," the scales of Zeus, and other related

expressions, all the Homeric passages are lumped together, with no attempt to trace a development—surely a retrograde step, and one which yields a thoroughly confused picture.

It will appear that in my opinion this is a book to be used with caution. But it is certainly a book to be used.

E. R. DODDS.

Ralph Cudworth: An Interpretation. By J. A. PASSMORE. (Cambridge University Press. Pp. ix + 120. Price 15s.)

This book should provide a useful introduction to the study of Cudworth and of "Cambridge Platonism" in general and its background. In it much incidental light is thrown on seventeenth-century controversies. It includes a valuable appendix on the Cudworth manuscripts and a useful bibliography. The style, however, is so allusive that it will make difficult reading for those who are not already well acquainted with the field.

Professor Passmore thinks in terms of "influences" which he sees extending in all directions. There are too many proper names in his pages. A typical one before me has the following:

Price, Whichcote, Clarke, Kant, Warburton, Ray, Harris, Glanvill, Berkeley, Platonism, Leibniz, Diderot, D'Alembert, the Encyclopaedia, Paul Janet "and his more famous nephew"—all these on one page. There is too much of this sort of thing, and too little of the "interpretation" which his sub-title leads us to expect.

It is indeed difficult among all the allusions and "influences" to find any clear interpretation at all. The principal fault here is, no doubt, Cudworth's own confusion. He tried to reconcile too much that was irreconcilable both in traditional and modern thought. What emerges is that Cudworth is a focal point of seventeenth-century "influences," in particular reflecting very well the reaction to Hobbes (who emerges from it all with his stature increased). At the same time Cudworth is a traditionalist in the sense that he believes (in spite of new beginnings, Cartesian and otherwise) in the unchanging character of philosophy as "an arena of conflict" in which there are "recurrent patterns of controversy."

Cudworth tried to work out a compromise between Christianity and Platonic Rationalism which would fit what he regarded as the significant problems and contributions of philosophy, religion and science in his own day. Professor Passmore has treated this compromise in an interesting way; but his book would have been more attractive had he given proportionately more space to straightforward exposition.

D. J. McCracken.

The Fundamental Questions of Philosophy. By A. C. EWING. (Routledge and Kegan Paul. Pp. 260. Price 18s.)

It is by no means an easy task to write a good introduction to philosophy, and many who have essayed the task have had occasion to rue it. On the one hand there is the danger of making immoderate demands upon the beginner, and on the other that of presenting deceptively simple and naïve accounts of philosophical issues and procedures in such a way that philosophers will hardly recognize themselves in the description of their work, the latter being by far the greater evil. Difficulties also arise from the great variety of the persons to be catered for, both among laymen and university students. This is one reason why teaching is so indispensable, and there can be no rival to the sort of

introduction to philosophy provided by a wise tutor able to vary the fare according to the interest and progress of his pupil. The author will also find it hard to forget that his work will in fact be read and judged, not only by those for whom it is mainly intended, but also by his colleagues. This complication becomes more insidious because there have been admirable introductory works on philosophy which have in fact contained notable original contributions to the subject. I suppose many of Plato's dialogues could be viewed in this way, and if we want recent examples the two that occur at once are Moore's *Ethics* and Russell's *Some Problems of Philosophy*. The distinction between advanced and elementary work is by no means so easy to draw in philosophy as in other subjects, and the latter has certainly no monopoly of clarity and simplicity. But all this exposes the writer of an introductory work on philosophy to the danger of forgetting his immediate task in the desire to please more experienced readers, and the form of an introductory work has often been adopted as a literary device for the advancement of new ideas, a device which is by no means easy to handle or invariably successful.

Perhaps the best compliment I can pay to Dr. Ewing is to say that he has shown exceptional skill in avoiding the usual pitfalls. He has provided a clear and readable account of the main problems of philosophy without departing at any point from serious philosophical argument. It is philosophy that he always provides, not panegyrics or talk about it, but in a form which can easily be assimilated by the serious student. Ewing very properly warns the reader that mental effort is needed, but subject to their willingness to make an effort readers with any flair for philosophy will find that the author has put his own resources very fully at their disposal. The ascent is the traditionally "steep and rugged" one, but the climber is not likely to tire easily when taken so firmly and inevitably by his guide from one grade to the next. Dr. Ewing's skill appears as much in the neat arrangement of subjects as in the lucid exposition of particular themes. He also maintains admirable fairness in the presentation of opposing views and in the handling of theories with which he has little sympathy himself. This does not mean that his own allegiances are disguised. On the contrary they are very evident, and no one can fail to recognize here the sympathetic critic of idealism who is also a stout defender of intuition and the "Common Sense" view of material things. But this is as it should be, and, as the author's own views do not unduly obtrude themselves, it gives the novice a good impression of the way a philosopher can have firm convictions of his own without closing his mind to alternative theories. The one lack that will, perhaps, be seriously felt by many concerns the linguistic approach to philosophy so much in favour at present. A fuller account of the possibilities and limitations of this method of philosophizing should have been given if readers are to feel at home in philosophical controversy to-day. But the plea may be made that Ewing is not after all attempting a survey of prevailing trends, but dealing directly with fundamental questions, and in that case he could decide for himself what course was most profitable.

Dr. Ewing leaves little for the reviewer to do by way of critical comment on his work as a fair and helpful introduction to philosophy, but this does not mean that the argument is never pushed to the point of provoking sharp disagreement. Many will find themselves at variance with the author, but as he does not attempt a full-dress presentation of his own views in the present volume, this review is hardly the place to join issue with him closely. I will content myself instead with a brief indication of the points at which I find his own theories most open to doubt.

Consider first Ewing's defence of a realist view of material objects. Ewing lays particular stress on the "vast number of predictions [which] are always

being made on the hypothesis that physical objects exist and have certain definite characteristics like some of those which we under favourable conditions perceive when we observe them" (p. 82). A phenomenalist might reply to this that the predictions are equally possible on his account of physical things. Ewing partly admits this in allowing, as a possible view, the suggestion of Berkeley that God produces our sense impressions in a certain order without the intervention of "independent physical objects." The admission is qualified by insisting that it presupposes ideas in the mind of God very similar to real physical things. But it is not plain to me that this follows or that we can be as confident as Ewing supposes about the precise way in which God could be thought of in this context as a cause. Ewing adds two points, firstly that the Berkeleyan view cannot even be shown to be probable, and, secondly, that Ewing's own view is the only possible one for a philosopher who also wishes to make no reference to God. But does not this again assume that some reference must be made to a cause of our impressions external to the impressions themselves, and is there any warrant for this assumption other than the very general requirement that everything should be thought of as deriving in the last analysis from some transcendent source? To meet arguments of this kind Ewing refers to an "instinctive belief" in the existence of physical things, and he urges that it is not possible to analyse this belief in the way the phenomenalist wants. The last point seems to me certainly sound, but it seems equally clear that instinctive beliefs may require very radical modification before they can be accepted at the philosophical level. Ewing also speaks at this point of "direct cognition of physical objects," but although I am myself quite prepared to admit much that he says in general about "direct cognition," I am extremely sceptical of recourse to it in the present context. Since it is admitted that what we "cognize directly" is not directly sensed, does not the direct cognition in that case become so divorced from all that the ordinary person would claim as to be hardly recognizable by him? How, again, are we to deal with cases where we are not merely mistaken about some particular features of a material object but mistaken altogether, in the sense that no such object exists? Suppose, for example, I take an object I see in a mirror to be a real one. Can admissions about the fallibility of intuition cover cases of this kind?

Another difficulty I find in Ewing's view of physical things concerns the ascription to them of some secondary qualities such as colour. It may not be the case that colour is mind dependent, but I am sure that very grave difficulties about spatial relations arise if we maintain that colours exist other than those presented to our senses. This is a feature of spatial relations which realists in fact rarely consider, and the complaint which I make here could by no means be confined to Dr. Ewing.

A further point at which Dr. Ewing's view seems to me very open to dispute concerns his final account of moral freedom. The chapter on freedom is one of the best in the book, and Ewing holds the balance extremely fairly between the rival claims of determinism and indeterminism. At the close of the chapter, however, he makes the suggestion that the difficulties of both views can be avoided if we suppose that although "a man's acts are determined by his character . . . the man's character is not determined by anything, each man being in some degree a genuine new beginning" (p. 205). But in what sense can a man be a new beginning if his acts are determined by his character? Ewing, I am sure, is not supposing that we are morally responsible for something that may have happened at our birth. It is for our conduct now that we must answer, and even if it could be maintained that a man's actions, in spite of being determined, are "not the product of something other than the man

himself," it would still be true (on the view in question) that we were determined, and that is where the sting of the objections made by the libertarian lies.

It must be added that Ewing does take careful note of the importance the libertarian ascribes to the distinction between moral and non-moral evil. But I suspect that he remains unduly inclined to assimilate moral badness to non-moral forms of badness. His observations about blame strongly suggest that to me.

In the closing chapter Dr. Ewing turns to religious questions. He considers especially the celebrated arguments for the existence of God and shows a marked partiality for the "Argument from Design." This accords well with Ewing's own leanings towards some kind of idealism. But it seems to me that the recent emphasis on the transcendence of God, and the better understanding of the implications of this notion, restores the cosmological argument to a position of greater importance. I do not feel that Dr. Ewing has done full justice to the way the cosmological argument has been presented recently by thinkers like Dr. Mascall. And for the same reason he seems unable to address himself squarely to the peculiar problem of the nature and authenticity of religious experience as experience of a transcendent reality. This, however, does not mean that the treatment of these matters is unilluminating. For here, as elsewhere in this book, the reader who disagrees with the author's views will find himself much helped to understand better the implications of his own position. And this holds as much for the experienced reader as for the beginner for whom the book is mainly designed.

It remains only to add that the topics discussed range from the problems of the nature of philosophy, matter and mind, cause, space and time, to the moral and religious topics just mentioned. Teachers of philosophy should be very grateful to the author for a book which will do much to lighten their own labours.

H. D. LEWIS.

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NOTICE

ELEVENTH INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF PHILOSOPHY

BRUSSELS, 20-26 AUGUST, 1953

The Eleventh International Congress of Philosophy will commence on Thursday, August 20, 1953, and will close on Wednesday, August 26, 1953.

There will be two forms of membership of the Congress, (1) Active membership, enabling persons to take part in all the work of the Congress and who will receive copies of the Proceedings; and (2) Associate membership, entitling persons to attend all meetings of the Congress but not to receive the Proceedings or to speak at the meetings.

The entrance fee will be 500 Belgian Francs for Active Membership, and 200 Belgian Francs for Associate Membership, payable either to Postal Cheque A/c No. 7167-33, or A/c No. 83049, Banque de la Société Générale de Belgique (11th International Philos. Congress, Brussels).

I. Organization of Meetings

The Congress will consist of five plenary sessions, in the mornings, from 10 to 12.30, and sectional sessions, in the afternoons, from 3 to 6 p.m.

Speakers in the plenary sessions will be chosen from members who sent in a dissertation. Twenty minutes will be devoted to the exposition of their theme, fifty minutes will be given to discussion.

Speakers in the sectional sessions will devote ten minutes to the exposition, and forty-five minutes are reserved for discussion.

Final arrangement of the divisions of the Congress will be deferred until all texts for discussion have been sent in to the Committee. It is proposed to group the texts under the following headings:—

- (1) Theory of Philosophy
- (2) Epistemology, Metaphysics (ontology, general theory of values)
- (3) Formal Logic and Philosophy of deductive science
- (4) Philosophy of the natural sciences
- (5) Philosophical psychology
- (6) Philosophy of History
- (7) Philosophy of Language
- (8) Social Philosophy
- (9) Political Philosophy
- (10) Philosophy of Law
- (11) Morals
- (12) Aesthetics
- (13) Philosophy of Religion
- (14) History of Philosophy (ancient, mediaeval, modern, contemporary, oriental).

II. Texts for Discussion

(1) All papers of philosophical interest will be accepted. The Committee reserves the right to disqualify those papers which do not conform to this standard. No member may present more than one paper.

(2) Papers should not exceed eight quarto pages of type-script in double spacing. Longer papers will not be printed.

(3) Papers may be in French, English, German, Italian and Spanish.

(4) Authors should indicate under which heading they wish their paper to appear.

(5) The Committee hopes to arrange sessions devoted to the following subjects:—

Experience and metaphysics
Explanation of the natural sciences
The knowledge of other persons
Meaning

The intelligibility of history
Foundation and limits of authority
The occurrence of relativism in moral obligation
Robert de Lincoln, called Grosseteste (d. 1253)
George Berkeley (d. 1753)

(6) All papers must reach the Secretariat before December 15, 1952. Authors will receive a printed proof which must be returned to the Secretariat without delay. In case of delay, the Committee will attend to any corrections.

(7) Authors will receive twenty-five off-prints of their papers, and more may be ordered at their own expense.

III. Publication of the Proceedings

Three months before the Congress opens, the Committee will publish the texts of the dissertations. They will be grouped in volumes under the divisions adopted. It is estimated that there will be fifteen volumes of approximately 200 pages. They will be sent before 31st May to the address of Active Members who have paid their fee. If preferred, they will be sent to them on their arrival in Brussels.

Persons wishing to obtain further information and the application form should communicate direct with the Secretary:—

M. CH. PERELMAN,
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32 Rue de la Pêcherie,
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INSTITUTE NOTES

The following lectures have been arranged for the Lent Term, 1953, to be held at 5.30 p.m. instead of 5.15 p.m., as announced on the Lecture Card.

January 23rd	MORAL PHILOSOPHY IN ANCIENT GREECE A. H. Smith, C.B.E., M.A. (University of Oxford)
January 30th	GREEK VIEWS OF NATURE AND MIND D. A. Rees, M.A. (University College, Bangor)
February 6th]	WITTGENSTEIN'S PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Professor J. N. Findlay (King's College, London)
February 12th}	
February 20th	THEOLOGIANS AND LOGICIANS Rev. Vincent Turner, S.J. (Campion Hall, Oxford)
February 26th	MAN'S IDEAS ABOUT THE UNIVERSE Rt. Hon. Viscount Samuel, G.C.B., G.B.E., D.C.L., LL.D. at the Assembly Hall, Institute of Education, Malet St., W.C.I., at 5.45 p.m.
March 6th	POETRY AND PHILOSOPHY Meyrick H. Carré, M.A. (University of Bristol)

Please note that, contrary to previous announcements, Professor Findlay's second lecture on Wittgenstein will be held on Thursday, 12th, instead of Friday 13th February, and Lord Samuel's lecture will be given on Thursday, 26th February, at 5.45 p.m. in place of Dr. Hartland-Swann's lecture on Friday, 27th.

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CONTENTS

I. THE FUNCTION AND NATURE OF AUTHORITY IN SOCIETY
W. D. Handcock, M.A., B.Litt.

II. REASON AND DESIRE
J. D. Mabbott, M.A., B.Litt.

III. ARCHAISM AND FUTURISM
The Very Rev. W. R. Inge, K.C.V.O., D.D.

IV. BEHAVIOUR
D. W. Hamlyn, M.A.

V. AN ANALYSIS OF SOCIETY
R. J. K. Murray, M.A.

VI. DISCUSSIONS:

(1) IS THE DEFINITION OF THE WORD "FACT" THE FIRST
PROBLEM OF PHILOSOPHY?
G. Burniston Brown, M.Sc., Ph.D.

(2) MODERN COSMOLOGY AND THE CONCEPT OF GOD
Professor W. H. McCrea

(3) GOD AND NATURE
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VII. PHILOSOPHICAL SURVEY: PHILOSOPHY IN FRANCE

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CONTENTS

	PAGE
I. THE FUNCTION AND NATURE OF AUTHORITY IN SOCIETY. W. D. HANDCOCK, M.A., B.LITT.	99
II. REASON AND DESIRE. J. D. MABBOTT, M.A., B.LITT.	113
III. ARCHAISM AND FUTURISM. THE VERY REV. W. R. INGE, K.C.V.O., D.D.	124
IV. BEHAVIOUR. D. W. HAMLYN, M.A.	132
V. AN ANALYSIS OF SOCIETY. R. J. K. MURRAY, M.A.	146
VI. DISCUSSIONS:	
(I) IS THE DEFINITION OF THE WORD "FACT" THE FIRST PROBLEM OF PHILOSOPHY? C. BURNISTON BROWN, M.Sc., Ph.D.	154
(II) MODERN COSMOLOGY AND THE CONCEPT OF GOD. PROFESSOR W. H. McCREA	160
(III) GOD AND NATURE. PROFESSOR H. D. LEWIS	164
VII. PHILOSOPHICAL SURVEY: PHILOSOPHY IN FRANCE	172
VIII. NEW BOOKS	176
IX. INSTITUTE NOTES: NOTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF PHILOSOPHY, BRUSSELS, 20TH-26TH AUGUST, 1953	192

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PHILOSOPHY

THE JOURNAL OF THE ROYAL INSTITUTE OF PHILOSOPHY

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APRIL 1953

THE FUNCTION AND NATURE OF AUTHORITY IN SOCIETY¹

W. D. HANDCOCK

THE subject you have set me is a vast and daunting one, but I have my consolation that if I must inevitably trench a little—though as little as possible—on the issues my distinguished successors are to speak upon, they must equally come back on the ground assigned to me, and will be able to supplement for you my deficiencies and correct my mistakes.

In speaking of the function and nature of authority in society, I had better begin with the more obvious functions. Clearly we cannot do without authority. At innumerable points our common life is made possible only by our acceptance of rules and decisions which we do not ourselves make, at any rate in any direct or personal way. We seek nowadays to domesticate authority, to confine it to tasks whose necessity we recognize, and to modes of action of which we approve, to make it responsible authority. That has been the great aim of the political movement of the last 150 years, since the French Revolution. But whether or not we are satisfied that we have succeeded in this, or indeed that it can be done, we recognize just as freely as our predecessors the need of authority in manifold matters of our daily life. The late Professor Bosanquet had a phrase for its function on these levels which I always remember. The State, he said—and the State is the typical form in which authority of this sort meets us—the State is the great fly-wheel of our social life. The function of a fly-wheel, as you will remember, is to transform the intermittent energy imparted by the strokes of a piston into a smooth and continuous flow: so the State translates impulses which we recognize and acknowledge in ourselves, but which in the stress of

¹ Paper read to the Erasmus Society of Exeter, October 23rd, 1952.

immediate and more personal preoccupations may get lost and overlaid, into a system of administration and law which is a standing monition to us to be ourselves at the level of responsibility at which we like to think of ourselves, but do not always behave. This is authority—idealized, perhaps, but not unrecognizable, I think—in the man to man relations of our daily social life, in the relatively external sphere of our common duty to our fellows, and to the common life.

But there is another sphere in which authority plays a vital, and not so readily acknowledged a part. That is the sphere of our intimate personal lives, that in which we think ourselves most ourselves. We are each of us, ineradicably, in a large part of our beliefs, in our prejudices, whether or not we admit to any, in our habits and customary outlook, the creatures of authority, having taken them over from an external source; whether as children dutifully accepting what our parents tell us, as adolescent rebels adopting fervently the latest intellectual fashion of the day, or as adults, more discriminately, it is to be hoped, looking round for what seems solidest to us in the outlook of our times, and in that of people whom we respect and admire, to find whereon to ground ourselves and our lives. There is a sentence of Professor Cole's which I like to use in this context; partly because of its convincingness and clarity, and partly because its deeper implications do not seem to me to be carried into the rest of the book from which it comes. "The generality of men and women," writes Professor Cole, "take their experience of the social scene about them unphilosophically. They do not reflect upon it; they merely accept it. But that does not make it any the less a real experience, or any the less a part of their mental equipment. They are born into a complex society, and by a natural process that complex society becomes a part of their lives—as real a *Weltanschauung* as any Teutonic philosopher ever imagined." Social tradition exercises an authority over us which none of us escapes, and which indeed provides the ground and scaffolding of our personal lives. This is what Dr. Figgis meant, I assume, when he wrote "Authority is, in fact, the expression of the social nature of men, and the true character of personality." He goes on "Its only true antithesis is a pure individualism which springs in thought from the barest rationalism, and in politics leads to anarchy." Thus the authority with which I have to deal ranges from that which decides, *inter alia*, that the rule of the road shall be the left in England, and the right in France, to that which in conjunction with the attitude that we take up to it, largely determines what sort of persons we shall be.

I will first of all deal with two extremes that I think have to be rejected—the view that authority is everything in society, and the view that it has no rightful function in it. The first is the theory of

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FUNCTION AND NATURE OF AUTHORITY IN SOCIETY

sovereignty, and its classic exponent is Hobbes. Hobbes' argument, if I may attempt to pack it into a sentence or two, is that since it is possible to dispute about anything, and since the subjects of possible dispute cannot be segregated into watertight compartments, if we are to have a peace we can rely upon, and to remove all possible threat to the unity of society, we must be prepared to submit ourselves without limit to authority; and more than that, since an authority that has to be always on the job must be always on the spot, to specific and determinate authority. No society is constituted properly, or can be expected to have other than a precarious existence, which has not a recognized sovereign whose decisions, in all matters, all, or an effective majority of its members are prepared to accept. So put, and *a fortiori* as Hobbes puts it himself, with his inimitable pungency, in the *Leviathan*, the argument is difficult to meet. It is difficult to meet because there is no part of it that is not, in appropriate circumstances, true; because you can find instances in which constitutions and laws have had to be disregarded in the interests of social peace, instances in which claims of conscience, or of the autonomy of the spiritual life have had to be overridden, cases almost daily in which what are normally regarded as individual rights have had to be disregarded. There are various ways of outflanking, or of minimizing the importance of Hobbes' arguments, but so long as we treat political theory as essentially an abstract or general argument, I do not think they take us anywhere very decisive. I would suggest the wholesale way in which Rousseau fell for the Hobbesian argument, despite his intention of founding the city of individual rights and freedom, and the influence that the argument from unity continues to exercise, as substantiations of my point. The opposite theory to that of Hobbes is philosophical anarchism, which underlies a large part of the theory of Locke, was developed by William Godwin, and has its best known nineteenth-century exponents in the Russian revolutionaries, Bakunin and Kropotkin. Philosophical anarchism is both an optimistic theory of human nature; an aspect of which I need not say any more: and a theory of right, a theory that no one ought to exercise authority over another, that power corrupts both parties to its exercise, that complete individual freedom is the only morally permissible regime. In this aspect it clearly has considerable affinities with popular conceptions of democracy. I need only mention the phrase "self-government." This implies, as it seems to me, either an attempt to blink the fact of government by pretending that governors and governed are the same—which nobody who is not consciously talking political theory ever for a moment believes; or an attempt, as often misguided as not, because it starts from a theory with which it dare not finish—for who dares to be consistently democratic?—to

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make government better and more responsible. Actually it is probably a bit of both of these. Now what seems to me wrong with both these arguments—the authoritarian one and the democratic—is that each proves too much. There is authority, and there is freedom, and a lot to be said on occasion for either of them, much room for argument as to the mixture of the two appropriate in any given circumstances, but nothing at all to be gained by a theory of either which attempts to make it swallow the other. Neither the authoritarian claim nor the democratic one merits an argument which proves it right at all times and places. I do not want to spend too much time on the Aunt Sallies I am knocking down; it is rather my business to put up one of my own for you to knock down. But I must express my feeling that the error which infects these views vitiates the whole of the dominant tradition of modern political theory. It is the error of abstract thinking; of social theorizing without first thinking what is involved in the fact of society. Hobbes desiderates unlimited authority in the interests of an irrefragable unity of society. But the very fact of society implies some measure of unity, and on the other hand no society is completely unified; it is diversity on a basis of unity; unity changing its form and content, and diversity ever showing itself in new places. The only societies safe from disruption that I can think of are those that are dead, or the one that Plato laid up in heaven, or the City of God that Augustine dreamed about. The worship of unity for its own sake, apart, that is, from the things wherein we may lawfully unite, seems to me precisely that attempt to challenge human conditions and limitations that is the supreme impiety, and incurs the deepest condemnation of the Gods. Similarly, I cannot, except in theological terms, think of a man wholly free. It is late in the day, perhaps, to seek to draw fresh lessons from the Aristotelian tag that society is prior to the individual. But the failure to apply this seems to me the root of the trouble. Behind the fact of society we are not entitled to go, because the social condition is the primary human condition; and the fact of society, as I have just said, implies both unity and diversity, both authority and freedom. The ultimate postulate of both forms of the modern political theory is the abstract individual, who corresponds to Aristotle's solitary, and is either a beast or a God. For Hobbes he is a beast, to be tamed only with whips and scorpions; for Rousseau a God, whose freedom of will is intangible. Between these poles modern theory, and we may say to some extent modern history, has shuttlecocked to and fro, seeking combinations of the two which are as of oil and water, because the principles are incompatibles. Even the line of thought which begins with Montesquieu and Burke, and does, in my view, take a starting point from which the conceptions of authority and freedom can be both founded and controlled, that is

that of the social tradition, falls a victim, when it comes to Hegel, to the dominant tradition. Hegel's exaltation of the State corresponds to his sense of the necessity of meeting the individualism of the revolution by proving the State itself to be the real substance of individual freedom. The result was thus to provide even more congenial soil for the taproots of totalitarianism, both of the right and the left.

It is time, however, that I indicated my own attitudes to State and Law. The authority of the State I think of as acting on a fairly mundane level, at its highest where it is the instrument of Law. Something comes over to it, in hours of crisis particularly, from deeper than utilitarian levels, but in the main, and except to the eyes of that political apocalypticism which I admit to be widely prevalent, but which seems to me the root heresy of the day, it operates in the daylight, or if some of you think that too kind, in a bureaucratic twilight, serving purposes essential, and practically, no doubt, very complex, but dealing with the surface of life, facilitating, but incapable directly of nourishing that life of the spirit which is the deeper vocation of man. I do not think that this characterization is essentially affected by the form of the State, whether, in the traditional classification, it is monarchical, aristocratic, or democratic. Ultimately the State is judged by pragmatic tests, whether it works and delivers the goods. If it does not, Divine Right of Kings or Divine Right of Peoples will, in the long run, avail it little. The arguments as to the merits of different forms of States—important though they may be—are finally circumstantial and conditional ones. When we come to Law, however, we touch, in my feeling, a deeper principle. Law is nowadays very largely formulated through the State, but it seems to me profoundly mistaken, and to compromise its very nature, to regard it as made by the State, in the sense in which it is often spoken of as representing the will of the State. The hypostatization of social concepts, such as is involved in the attribution of will to the State, is to me a darkening of counsel, if not, indeed, a form of idolatry fraught with very pernicious consequences. We may accept it as a species of convenient mental shorthand, perhaps, provided we remember that in sober fact the State is no more than human beings in special positions, and above all in special legal positions *vis-à-vis* each other and the rest of us. What is common in our relations to those whom we lump together as the State is that in different ways and degrees they claim to make us do what they say, and dispose of means to that end. If, therefore, we seek a generic name for the State, it should be Power, whether power mediated through the ballot-box, or otherwise derived, as has been, and is now the case with perfectly respectable States. At least we can say of Power, as we cannot of the ballot-box, that without it there

is no State. But we do not think of Law as Power, as the material possibility of compelling obedience. It can be law without the power of getting itself obeyed. We think of Law as Authority, as something that we ought to obey. There may be bad laws, but their badness is in subtraction from their legality. Beyond them there is still law, representing values, and a principle of generality by which we live and must live. How then, do I define Law? Here again I prefer to begin with the concrete—with Society. Law is the rule of a society. Now rule is not fundamentally something imposed on a society, it is intrinsic to it, something that we imply in saying society. A society is men and women with common characteristics, living together, and therefore in a common situation, having values and purposes and conceptions of life in common. If there were not these elements there would not be society, and there always has been and will be society. Ultimately law is the externalization of that community, or rather not of the whole of it, but of so much as requires externalization in rule. It is a function of a situation—circumstances as they are, people as they are, their common life as it is, and moving in the direction in which it is moving. The second mark of law is necessity. It is the rule that that situation prescribes, if internecine war is not to break out, if the productive system is to function adequately, if consciences, and perhaps prejudices, are not to be unbearably shocked, if what are recognized as the higher forms of life are not to be inhibited. Thirdly, all social situations are human situations. They are situations in which human individuals are implicated, and the rules that arise from them have to be considered in their relation to those individuals. This raises the question of Justice. Justice, I need not remind you, is of two kinds; justice in relation to accepted common purposes, which takes into consideration persons, conditions, opportunity; and justice in relation to individuals identically situated, which is no respecter of persons. You will notice I have given precedence to the social character of law. Therefore, though I believe in the "irreducible minimum of Natural Law" that Professor Gény postulated, I do not think justice can be approached by way of formulating Declarations of the Rights of Man. I have lately been reading that immensely intelligent work, Simone Weil's *The Need of Roots*, which to my mind expresses the predicament of the individual in face of society much more comprehensively and penetratingly than many of the more orthodox manuals of politics. It was written as a sort of prelude to the work that has been undertaken towards the formulation of a Charter of the Rights of Man. Anyone who reads it will feel, I think, how hopeless it would be to try to turn it into anything like a code of law. So I give you my conception of the authority of law; its root in the uniformities that constitute and are constituted by the social life; its necessity as

rule as a first critical principle, distinguishing it from the merely impositional; vivified by an expanding principle of justice, which is the end, not the beginning of law, "its seat in the bosom of God," as social life itself is vivified by the development within and beyond the forms of law of those higher perceptions of the vocation and duty of man which come not from the State, or even from the Law, but from man to man, or perhaps I should say from God to man. You will notice that I have presented the authority of Law as primarily self-sanctioning. The role of Power is not to impose it on society as a whole, but merely on the casual recalcitrant. If this were not so should we not expect the police to outnumber the citizens?

I spoke of the casual recalcitrant, having mainly the criminal or irresponsible classes in mind. But how about the conscientious recalcitrant, the man who has decided that he cannot obey a given law? If the titles I have cited—the consideration that the law belongs to the society that, so to speak, has bred and nurtured him; that law is necessary to the social life, and that its fabric must to some extent be damaged by his resistance; and that to his fellow-citizens the law appears necessary and just—if these do not incline him to obey, I do not see that we have further burdens that we can legitimately lay on his conscience. If he will resist he must. On the other hand, sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander. If individuals and minorities may conscientiously resist, majorities may conscientiously compel. Law will have the organized power of society behind it, and in general looks very well after itself. I should, however, say something of the role of power in social life. Communities are spiritual things, and depend on an assent which is natural, indeed, but which if it should happen to fall away, cannot, in the ultimate, be forced. What I have in mind is expressed in the popular saying that you can do anything with bayonets except sit on them. Societies change and grow, pass through phases that strain the allegiance of sections of their membership to them; they need to look to their foundations, and keep in repair the ultimate ramparts of their defence, which are in men's breasts. In this sort of sphere force may defend, but it cannot create. It can defend existing unities of interest, feeling, and thought, so far as to repress action directed against them, even acts which take only the form of writing or speech. It seems to me untrue to say that repression of this sort is never effective. There are points at which all societies will feel compelled to take such action, nor do I think so-called imprescriptible rights of freedom of speech and so on, ever will, or even ever should, bar such action in the appropriate circumstances. The true principle of restraint lies rather in the nature of the case, as I have described it. Such action—I have particularly in mind the proscription one way or another of particular opinions—has a tendency so far to outlaw those against whom it is directed.

Once embarked upon it is very difficult to limit or to stop. It also proclaims a weakness, and so may easily intensify it. Therefore I think that particularly in the case of those inner liberties of the spirit whose denial does have the effect of a sentence of outlawry, nothing but urgent necessity—the “necessity that chooses, and is not chosen”—makes such action other than unwise. Contingent danger, the logic of unity, the “right” of the community so to act, seem to me dangerous foundations. The unity that has to be defended is no more than a conditional and pragmatic unity. Legal action is always clumsy in such matters; far more effective, unless the danger to be dealt with permits of no delay, is the impalpable pressure of public opinion exercised in an atmosphere of freedom. This, to me, is the genuine liberty; not a set of rights which by definition are rights to do wrong as well as rights to do right, but a temper of statesmanship that realizes that the sources of unity and strength are spiritual, and achieve lasting results only in an atmosphere of freedom.

I have several times referred to social tradition as the ground of authority in its social field, and in my feeling its principal ground. I now want, as the terminus of my argument, to turn my attention to this subject for some moments. What I have to say will have its roots in the Hegelian tradition, qualified by the criticism I have already briefly made of this; but I shall refer chiefly to the book by which Hegelian politics are best known in England, that great, though in many ways perverse book, Bosanquet's *Philosophical Theory of the State*. Broadly, Bosanquet's argument is that the coherence of our values, the discipline of our moral life, comes to us not so much from effort of our own, though it does, of course, require effort from us, as from our acceptance, unconsciously, with conscious approval, or even under pressure of social approval or disapproval, of the conventional pattern of life, the structure of values, that we find about us in society. “Take the actual casual will of the individual at any given moment” he writes, “... let it be for example, an impulse of sensual passion. It is a commonplace that in such impulses the self can find no abiding satisfaction. . . . Yet they have their meaning . . . they imply a need for union, and an attraction outside the immediate self. . . . The impulse, in passing into family affection becomes both less and more. It is both disciplined and expanded. . . . You can make a life out of the one, and you cannot out of the other. . . . We might compare in the same way the mere impulse to earn our daily bread with the horizon of a great intellectual profession, or the routine of an industry or profession vacantly followed, with the same routine followed conscientiously, in a spirit of enlightenment.” These, for him, are typical specimens of the relation of the individual moral life to the social. But it is what he

goes on to argue that seems to me particularly worthy of attention. In the first place he insists that the social tradition is not a mere congeries of conventions and values, something that merely is, which necessarily influences us, but whose influence we are entitled to accept or reject as we think best. It hangs together, it is a "system adjusted to unity"; the specific social tradition to which any one of us is born represents for him the catholicity of the human spirit, as far as it has got, as it were, at the given time and place. Thus it has authority for him. The first of these arguments, that the social tradition is a unity, is one to which we pay tribute, consciously or not, as it seems to me, when we use such phrases as the spirit of an age, the tradition of a nation; when, for example, we recognize that there will be common factors informing the thought and outlook of a Frenchman different from those we should find with an Englishman, or that we may expect threads of similarity and dissimilarity to distinguish the ideas and outlook, in any and all spheres, of, say, the sixteenth century and the eighteenth century. To Bosanquet this unity follows as a consequence of the primary impulse of the reflective mind, namely to unify its experience. We are not finally happy to follow our activities of thought simply in this or that practical context, or specialized field; we are influenced by what is going on in other fields, we seek to eliminate what we sense as dissonances between the different spheres of our own and of contemporary interest; knowledge, art, and thought impinge on each other, and what is expressed in any one sphere is conditioned by what is going on in all the rest. And what is thought to-day is conditioned by what has been thought and said in the recent and remoter past; the roots of the present are deep in the past. So he argues that the social tradition comes to represent that frame of reference in which alone our specific and individual interests and qualities find the discipline and the integration that they need to validate themselves; in a sense it is more ourselves than our empirical selves. Bosanquet goes so far as to suggest that the principal value of empirical individuality—the differences of apprehension and outlook that mark us—is that they make it possible to "cover the ground," ensure for the social tradition that quality of roundedness and completeness in the expression of human values that makes its contrast with the merely individual outlook, and *a fortiori* with that of the individual divorced, by circumstance or act of will, from sympathetic contact with it. Arising from these views, and the form in which they are best known, because of the many attacks that have been made on it, is Bosanquet's contention that the social system, adjusted to unity in the State, represents the "real will" of the individual, as opposed to his "actual," or empirical will, a more real expression of himself than that which he himself gives out as himself.

With the last part of this teaching I most heartily disagree. Its emphasis on the political seems to me to be utterly wrong, and the attempt to make politics an architectonic discipline, in spite of Aristotle's authority, in the last degree unhappy and misconceived. Politics is instrumental, not creative; unity, in the sense in which it represents integration as opposed to a strait-waistcoat, is more subtly won, and at deeper levels of the spirit than are touched by politics. On the whole conception of the General Will I stand with Professor Hobhouse—"In so far as it is general, it is not will; in so far as it is will, it is not general." But this does not mean that we can ignore the importance of the conception of social tradition for social and political thought, and for the general doctrine of authority. Specific authorities, such as those attaching to office and function, to knowledge and expertise, seem to me shallowly and insecurely rooted unless they have consciously and deliberately reckoned with the traditional bases on which they stand. If we want to think society out for ourselves we must begin by thinking ourselves into society. But this, you will say, leaves social tradition a subjective rather than an objective authority; it prescribes a method of approach to problems, rather than offers a solution of them. I accept this limitation. Once we have abandoned the General Will, and what I call broadly mystical conceptions of the social tradition, I do not see how else we can think of it. I accept the limitation the more freely because I do not think the challenge of our time comes from lack of discipline in action, but from lack of discipline in thought; from short and superficial thinking which has not been ready to reckon with the authority of what has been said and thought and practised before. There are important advantages, too, in this way of looking at social authority. Once we concede that the catholicity and unity of the social tradition, the roots of its authority, represent not the fine adjustments of a single superior social will and intelligence, but rough pressures to unity resulting from the impossibility of dividing life into watertight compartments, and the need to harmonize feeling and thought in all the differing departments of human activity, the conception of social authority carries with it its own corrective, even, we may say, borrowing an Hegelian smirk; its opposite. For so soon as we recognize that social tradition lives, not in the clouds, or in some hypostatized social concept such as the State or the nation, but in the generations of its inheritors, it becomes clear that its authority is in proportion to the vigour with which it is lived, that it is only as people seek to make its lessons real in terms of their own lives and thought—turning themselves to the past for inspiration and nourishment, for wisdom indeed, but turning what they derive from it to contemporary use and criticism, that the pressures to which I have referred, the cross criticism of the different

aspects of life by each other, from which the catholicity and humanity of the social tradition derive, can continue to be efficacious. Thus my challenge, if I may be impertinent enough to consider myself as making one, is as much to traditionalists to state their beliefs in modern contexts and terms, as to march of mind men to consider the past, and to conceive it possible, in the bowels of Christ, that they may be mistaken.

Two more points—not slight ones, though I must treat them slightly—and I have done. The first concerns the locus of the search for authority. Hegelianism placed this in the State, as representing the nation. I do not think anyone to-day would be satisfied to accept the nation as an autonomous source of higher values. We are driven further back, even by the logic of Hegelianism itself, nor can we stop, I think, till we reach the culture. This seems to me the most important conception of the day, both for historical thinking, and for social philosophy, though I do not know that I should feel that its implications in either field have as yet been fully explored. Provisionally we may perhaps think of the culture, in historical terms as the field of historical study which, by and large, is intelligible in terms of itself; and philosophically, borrowing Hegelian language, as indeed, rather than the State or the nation, "the World that the Spirit has made for itself." Descriptively we should say, perhaps, that a culture is a working unity of social life in which modes of living, from the humblest to the highest, have found mutually satisfactory and supporting relationships under the aegis of spiritual values, which are in principle as abundantly present in the workaday activities as in those more specifically devoted to them. I want to stress this democratic aspect of the conception of culture lest I should seem to be thinking too much from an ivory tower; and I would further say that from what I gather of what I have read of the morphology of cultures, they are vulnerable not only to the growth of scepticism as to their higher values, but as much to social and economic change, where the higher spiritual direction of the society, so to speak, has not redeemed the times, and has allowed change to take place without sufficient care to preserve contact between the different spheres of life, so as to secure their mutual penetration and comprehension. The influence that social and economic changes have at the higher levels, as well as at their own, accounts in part for the fact that epochs of such change are ones in which traditional spiritual authority is apt especially to be challenged, and the inference, to my mind, is that the authority of culture cannot be re-imposed, as it were, *ab extra*, but must be achieved by a subtler penetration, in which its modes and forms may well be changed, though its social vitality will stand to be enhanced. Only the most resolute search and expectation of the greatest and exactest things can

provide the intellectual and spiritual basis necessary to the refabrication of cultural harmonies once these have seriously been disrupted.

Secondly, when I accepted your invitation to read a paper to you it was a matter of some concern to me that in the audience to which I was to speak, I, who am neither a philosopher nor a theologian, must expect to find in your minds the question of the authority of faith. It would be cowardice not to face it though I must oppose an unarmoured breast to it. I have hitherto been talking in what I may call humanist terms, as I supposed I was meant to do, and as we all must, first of all, so I imagine. Faith, I would venture to assume, is the fortress of an integrated spirit, which has faced, so far as it has been able, the issues of life, and while it does not pretend, perhaps, to know all the answers, knows, at any rate, the answers that it intends to give. I cannot but suppose that if that integration is purchased at the expense of reason, it is so far the less certain and stable. I should like, too, to be able to assume that revelation is not, if I may put it so, a revelation of all the answers, but marching orders, and a mode of seeing things, of which, on the human side, the justification is that it is the only one adequate to the breadth and height of the human spirit "Thou madest us for Thyself, and our heart is restless till it rest in Thee." I am confident in my own mind, and from my own angle, that if no answers that are patently unreasonable will suffice, it is also true that reason does not know and cannot find out for us all the answers that we need. As a historian I feel I cannot but accept the evidence of this, and that if I want the monuments of the creative and conservative efficacy of faith, the evidence of what, from the purely human point of view, it is able to do, I have only to look around me. But faith itself, apart from the readiness to admit its power which seems to me a conclusion of human reason, comes where it lists, may I take it, and cannot be imposed, or comes, perhaps I ought to say, as God's gift, not man's. What I am trying to indicate is that in my own thought, between the attitude that I have tried to take up, resting on a regard for human achievement and the conditions in which it can be preserved and improved, and that indicated by faith, there is no necessary solution of continuity.

May I finally summarize what I have been trying to say from a slightly different, and perhaps rather profounder angle? I have followed medieval tradition, rather than modern, in thinking of the State as concerned with utilities, rather than with values, in medieval phrase as of man, rather than of God. That is because I follow the older tradition in thinking of man as primarily a spiritual being. By this I do not necessarily mean more than that no life, in my view, has answered itself which has not succeeded in bringing its daily activities and avocations into a scheme involving transcendental elements—though these need not necessarily be more than is

involved in family life, or in the responsibilities and companionship of spare-time duties voluntarily assumed, even in private hobbies or activities, gardening, boats, countryside, reading of some sort—something chosen by the self for its enduring worthwhileness, and made the centre round which the life is organized so far as is possible. That this personal living, this finding out of the self in the context of its concrete opportunities, is what is, in fact, life, seems to me something that novels and poetry, for example, have always freely recognized, and politics and economics not nearly enough. Most of us know people, often in ordinary enough circumstances, whose lives have this integral quality, and recognize in them, as we may not do in lives of much higher ostensible achievement and claim, that what they have found is the secret of living. It also seems to me in principle the secret of higher spiritual achievement, as in art, or thought, or religion. I sought deliberately, however, to phrase myself in terms of everyday life, because, in the first place, it is the breath of the eternal in a man's life that redeems it, no matter how it comes to him, and secondly, because, from what I started out to say, it follows that I want to claim the opportunity for this sort of life as the fundamental human right, perhaps the only one. The issues on which it depends belong, however, to the stuff of personal life, ambition and hope, love and friendship, and their fulfilment or betrayal, the incidental chances and happinesses and tragedies of life. They are remote from politics and the clashes of conflicting ideologies. As human individuals we have only the Psalmist's span to live, or perhaps nowadays a little more, and it is in this span that we have to meet and to solve our problems, and attain our personal significance. We cannot hope for much help from changes in the external ordering of the world, and indeed to look to have the frame of things tailor-made to our needs seems an extravagant expectation. What helps us most, as it seems to me, so far as the ordering of the external world is concerned, is that it should be reasonably stable, that it should give us situations we can stay in long enough to understand them, prospects we can work for and rely on, in a word, footing for the personal life. That is why programmes of fair shares and equal rights seem to me in the ultimate little more than dressed-up and bedizened versions of the ancient, common, and never very laudable ambition of keeping up with the Joneses. The rights that do perhaps begin to matter are historical rights, the expectations to which a man has been bred, as the stuff of which he is to make his life. I make a reservation, and an addendum, to this statement of view. I feel that the ordering of the external life that does not secure to the industrious and rational—I am using Locke's phrase—the means of a stable life, however humble, lived in self-respect, sins against the spirit, as befel us as a nation, in the 'thirties. As to my

addendum, I think that a social life turned towards personal living rather than towards programmes of material and social betterment, would in fact, be rich in goodness and mutual aid, as well as in self-help. I believe that this was in fact so to quite an extent, in Victorian times, and was the root of the best of Victorian progress, as opposed to the confidence in snap solutions of political and economic justice which wrought much of the material, and most of the human harm of that period. The line of thought I am indicating lies behind my feeling for law as the highest political value. Law is above all the ground and guarantee of personal life—"mother of our peace and joy." My wider conceptions of authority rise from the same preoccupations. Personality, in any sense in which it represents integration of our problems, roots far back and widely. This seems to me a conclusion that not only historical, but modern sociological and psychological studies enforce. The conscious and explicit contacts of the integrated personality with the greater intellectual and spiritual achievements of the culture and race need be neither many, nor necessarily profound. What matters is that the frame of reference itself should be capacious and coherent, values stable and orderly, the sense be conveyed of a world continuous and coherent, stretching beyond the immediate personal contacts. Such an atmosphere and outlook cannot be created *ad hoc*, or in a hurry; by persons, or even generations putting out to trade on their private stocks of wisdom and insight. It is a creation of disciplined thought and feeling in many generations, and even centuries. That is why the search for the older and wider references of each problem as it arises, the discipline of thought and feeling that this involves, seems to me the first rule of authority; as the keeping of them bright in modern use seems to me the second. It is not an authority that can be cabined or confined, given any precise circumference or location. It is of the spirit, as authority that is genuine authority must be of the spirit, and it speaks to the spirit. We have built ourselves too many brazen images, and ours is an age of political idolatries, "where ignorant armies clash by night." So it has not seemed proper to me to lay burdens in the shape of objective authority on any man's conscience, beyond those of the plainest social necessity. I have not pretended, indeed, to set bounds beyond which this may not go; I have rather emphasized that in circumstances which can and do arise, it might stretch very far indeed. But the principle I have aimed at has been a minimal one, so far as objective authority is concerned, and beyond plain necessity it has been my feeling that the leading of authority should be no more than what a man trying to do his duty may properly consult, and what he may properly respect. What answer the oracles report to him, let each man say for himself.

REASON AND DESIRE

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I PROPOSE to consider in this paper some points concerning the part played by reason in non-moral conduct. The place of reason in ethics is a separate issue with which I shall not be directly concerned.

"The thoughts are to the desires as scouts and spies, to range abroad, and find the way to the things desired" (Hobbes). "Reason is and ought to be the slave of the passions" (Hume). Here is the first activity of reason in conduct; it discovers means to the ends set by desire. On Hume's view reason alone can never be a motive to action; reason alone can never oppose a desire. Take Plato's example. I am thirsty and see some water. Something in me, however, says "Don't drink it." This, says Plato, must be reason. How might this occur? Reason might say "Higher upstream is a farm; the water is probably polluted." Hume would maintain that reason is here pointing out that this water would be likely to cause me to have a stomach-ache. But the opposition to thirst is then provided wholly by my desire not to have a stomach-ache. Reason alone is powerless. We all know cases to confirm this. We say "Stop and think before you do that." Our friend says "Well, what?" We reply "If you go ahead you will be unpopular." He says, "I know. What about it?" We recall Hippocleides in Herodotus, who stood on his head on a table at his engagement party. When his prospective father-in-law said "You have danced away your marriage," he replied "Hippocleides doesn't care."

But these examples reveal another activity of reason quite different from that of seeking means to ends already actively desired. Reason can show us that actions will lead to or deprive us of other ends which, when we notice them, we feel to be objects of aversion or desire. Now Hume himself admits this second type of rational activity. "Reason can influence our conduct only after two ways: either when it excites a passion by informing us of the existence of something which is a proper object of it; or when it discovers the connection of causes and effects so as to afford us means of exerting any passion."¹ Or, more briefly, "Reason and judgment may be the mediate cause of an action by prompting or directing a passion."² The second of these activities might entitle Hume to call reason "the slave of the passions," but it is an odd slave who can "excite" or generate his own masters, or "prompt" them and make them work when they would otherwise be fast asleep. In the Platonic

¹ *Treatise of Human Nature*, III, i. Edition Selby-Bigge (1896), p. 459.
² *Ibid.*, p. 462.

example, but for the activity of reason, we should not have shunned the drink. Reason here is like a boxing promoter. Without his efforts, there would have been no contest; he produces one of the combatants, who would not without his aid ever have entered the ring.

Nevertheless, Hume may still urge that reason takes no part in the fight. Having introduced the combatants, the promoter steps out of the ring and leaves them to fight it out: he never dons the gloves himself. He may do his job to perfection and yet the boxer he produced may lose the fight because his rival is the stronger man. I may be so thirsty that I risk the stomach-ache.

It must be granted to Hume that most of the cases in which we say that "reason prescribed what we should do," or that "a little thought made us change our minds," come under one of these two heads. And most charges of "silly," "senseless," or "irrational" conduct are aimed against people who do not choose appropriate means to the ends they desire or who do not take note that the means they do choose will lose them something else they would have desired more or will bring on them some consequence they will dislike.

I now propose to argue that there is another group of activities which everyone would call rational and which influence our conduct quite continuously. This group is of special interest because they are activities found only in conduct (though they have parallels elsewhere); while, as Hume rightly points out, the two activities of reason which are the only ones he recognizes are examples of "reasoning concerning causes and effects" and are therefore found equally in purely theoretical or scientific enquiries.

Let us start with a simple example. I hear one o'clock strike. I feel hungry. What can reason do? It can tell me how to satisfy my hunger, by going home to lunch. What else? It may remind me that if I want a book which I can borrow from a colleague, I must catch him now; and I do want the book. Here, according to Hume, the work of reason is ended. The rest is a straight fight between my desire for food and my desire for the book, in which the stronger will win. What in fact is likely to happen? I say to myself, "Lunch can wait five minutes." And I should probably say this even if hunger were the stronger desire of the two; that is, if the circumstances were such that I could not get the book without forgoing my lunch, and if in that case I should let the book go. The ordinary picture (Hume's picture) of a conflict of desires is like a boxing match in which both sides cannot win. What reason does here is to ensure that both sides do win.

We regard Köhler's apes as showing intelligence when they use jumping sticks or make piles of boxes on which to climb to reach their bananas. Should we not be even more astonished if we found

evidence of an animal having two conflicting desires and arranging to satisfy both, one after the other? Should we not be more astonished still if we had reason to believe that the stronger desire had had its satisfaction postponed to that of the weaker? And should we not regard all that as evidence of a level of intelligence higher than anything Köhler's apes display? What is involved here is recognition of time. Any administrator or business man knows that the planning of time (his own time included) is one of the most important and rewarding uses to which he can put his intelligence. We have seen that this often means putting off a present desire with a promissory note. I know of no evidence that any animal is capable of this. Most children will not accept promissory notes. Many adults are noticeably weak in envisaging time-plans as solutions for their problems and conflicts, or in their power to devise such time-plans, or in their capacity to stick to them when they have been devised. And just so far as they fail in one or more of these three ways (and people who fail in one tend to fail in the others) they fall back into the Humean condition of satisfying the strongest desire of the moment and using reason only as its slave. And this is a frequent form of unintelligent and irrational action.

In the simple case I have considered, the two desires remain unaffected by the planning. I go to see my colleague and get the book. Meantime my hunger remains unabated (or increased) until in its turn it, too, is satisfied. But there are many ways in which planning results in altering the desires themselves, and the possibility of satisfying them. The desire whose satisfaction is postponed may diminish or disappear; and when this is known a time-plan may be used to weaken or destroy it. "Count ten when you are angry." Secondly, a time-plan can eliminate the actual occurrence of a desire by the paradoxical method of anticipating it. Civilized people in easy circumstances are seldom very hungry or thirsty; they do not eat and drink *because* they are hungry or thirsty but because their time-plan prescribes it. Their regular meals stave off these desires. Thirdly, a time-plan can check the operation of a desire by ensuring that, when the time comes for it to arise, it will not be possible or easy to satisfy it. If I want to reduce my smoking I put only a few cigarettes in my case before leaving home and keep none where I work; if I am suicidally inclined I give my gun to a friend to keep for me; if I go burgling I leave my gun at home, so that when I very much want to wing my pursuer I shall not be able to do it. Fourthly, I may reduce the extent to which I shall satisfy one or more of my desires (including, perhaps, the strongest) so that other desires may be satisfied too. Or I may reject altogether the satisfaction of one desire (again including, perhaps, the strongest) as being incompatible with the satisfaction of too many others.

Now, with such powers as these, reason seems even less plausibly called "the slave of the passions" except by some such transcendental analogy as enables a domineering bureaucrat to call himself a "public servant" or the Pope to be "*servus servorum.*"

I propose next to illustrate these conclusions by reference to two classic authorities on morals, Butler and Kant. Only a recognition of the activity of reason which I have been describing would have enabled Butler to give a consistent account of what he calls "self-love." Butler rejects the hedonist analysis which would make every desire a desire for pleasure. He agrees with Plato that each desire has its own special object and he adds that this object is always something "external to" the agent. He holds that over and above these particular passions, and often in conflict with some of them we have a principle of "self-love." (With his other higher principles, "benevolence" and "conscience," I am not here concerned.) Butler says, "Every man hath a general desire of his own happiness" and this "proceeds from or is self-love. . . . Self-love never seeks anything external for the sake of the thing, but only as a means of happiness or good."¹ Butler draws no distinction between happiness and pleasure or the absence of pain and in one place² explicitly identifies them. And on most other occasions he treats self-love as the pursuit of our own greatest pleasure and avoidance of pain.

But such a view leaves a number of puzzles. Pleasure or happiness (like anger or knowledge) is a specific state of mind. The tendency to pursue it should therefore rank as one particular passion among the others. But Butler thinks self-love is different in kind from the particular passions and ranks above them in the hierarchy of the self. He believes that self-love is rational in a sense that they are not. He calls it "general" (as in the passage quoted above). He regards it as an expression of the whole self. Now none of this is true if self-love is merely the desire for pleasure. It is true that the pursuit of pleasure will require much reasoning about means to ends, but so may any other desire, for example, the miser's love of money or a pursuit of revenge. I can eat because I am hungry or I can eat sweets because, not being hungry, I desire a pleasurable sensation. The latter is no more "rational" than the former, no more representative of the whole self. Similarly, I can pursue money like a miser, for its own sake, or in order to spend it on a rare postage-stamp. Neither desire is more rational than the other; neither more completely represents the whole self.

Why did Butler fail to see that the desire for pleasure or happiness is simply one particular desire among the others? I think, for two reasons. First, because he had said that all particular passions are

¹ Sermon XI. Selby-Bigge, *British Moralists*, Vol. I, para. 228.

² Sermon I. Selby-Bigge, para. 205.

desires for "somewhat external," and pleasures or happiness is not an "external" object. But this was a mistake. There are hosts of particular desires which are not desires for external objects. Curiosity (whose object is knowledge—an internal state), the desire to dance, the desire for sleep, all these are obvious examples. Moreover, even when it is plausible to say the desire is one for an external object this is really misleading shorthand. When I am thirsty I do not desire a drink, I desire to drink. What would satisfy me is not an external object, water or beer, but to do something with an object. Thus the first reason why Butler may have concluded that the desire for pleasure is not a particular passion was the mistaken view that all particular passions are for external objects, whereas none is. The second reason why he refused to recognize a desire for pleasure may have been the psychological fact which is the basis of all the mistakes of hedonism or eudaemonism. Whenever I desire anything and achieve it, I achieve pleasure or happiness as well. The only way to get pleasure or happiness is to have other desires and have them satisfied. But it does not follow from this that the pursuit of pleasure or happiness has the status Butler attributes to self-love. Here is a mistake and a confusion. The mistake is to suppose that the pursuit of a desirable by-product of a desired end is something higher or more rational or more expressive of the whole self than the pursuit of the desired end itself. And the confusion is one between the desire for happiness and the achievement of happiness. It may be true that I achieve happiness if I have many desires and have all of them satisfied. But I can do this without desiring happiness. Indeed, if I desire happiness—if I enthroned the principle of self-love as Butler defines it—I shall almost certainly lose it. In the same way many of our particular desires have health as a by-product. "A little of what you fancy does you good." We pursue our meals, our walks and our games with no thought of health, yet health ensues. To enthroned the pursuit of health over all our lives is to lose health in hypochondria.

Butler's language occasionally hints at an alternative account of self-love. He sometimes substitutes "good" or "interest" for "happiness" as its object. To say that a man is achieving what is his good or his interest may mean simply that he is getting most of what he wants. When "interest" is used in the plural, this interpretation is even more plausible. "The very idea of interest or happiness consists in this, that an appetite or affection enjoys its object. . . . The very idea of interest or happiness, other than the absence of pain, implies particular appetites or affections, these being necessary to constitute that interest or happiness. . . . Men form a general notion of interest, some placing it in one thing, some in another."¹ "If we will act

¹ Preface to Sermons. Selby-Bigge, Vol. I, para. 199.

conformably to the economy of man's nature, reasonable self-love must govern."¹ "Our interest or good being constituted by nature, self-love only puts us upon obtaining and securing it."² "Human nature is . . . a composition of various parts, body, spirit, appetites, particular passions and affections; for each of which reasonable self-love would lead us to have due regard and make suitable provision."³

These quotations, and particularly the last of them, suggest a different view of self-love. A man is under the influence of a particular desire; he wants X. He considers the results of getting X and observes that to achieve X may involve sacrificing Y and Z which he also wants. He observes that to-morrow or next year he will want A and B though he does not want them now. So far Humean reasoning would allow him to go. But he now goes on to consider how he is to get all these things or as many of them as possible. And much the most common answer is a time-plan. Notice that the making of such a time-plan does not involve the appearance of any new or ulterior object of desire—other than X, Y, Z, A and B—such as pleasure or happiness. It involves the organization of the particular desires I have or expect to have, and not the addition to them or the substitution for them of some quite different desire. And such organization, widened to include all actual or anticipated desires, would be (on this second or alternative view) the activity of self-love.

With this second interpretation Butler would indeed have been justified in regarding self-love as rational in a way in which the particular desires are not. He would have been entitled to give it a hierarchical position above the desires (since it orders and organizes them) but not I think a *morally* higher status. And obviously this interpretation justifies (as the pleasure-happiness interpretation could not) phrases like "the whole self," "on the whole," "general" and indeed the very name "self-love." This interpretation also removes the paradox of self-love. "If self-love wholly engrosses us and leaves room for no other principle there can be no such thing as happiness."⁴ It is very difficult to reconcile this with Butler's repeated assertion of the superiority of self-love to all other aims (conscience alone excepted, and conscience is not here involved). On the first interpretation the paradox is inevitable. "If you would get happiness, forget it." But on the second he could say "Forget about pleasure; forget about happiness; go for what you want. But remember there are other things, too, worth having. See you do not miss them through lack of forethought and design."

We can deal more briefly with Kant because the two alternatives are the same as in Butler and because the contradiction between them

¹ Sermon II. Para. 217.

² Sermon XI. Para. 231.

³ Sermon XII. Para. 241.

⁴ Sermon XI. Para. 231.

has already been brought out very clearly by Professor Paton.¹ (I should add here that Professor Paton is the only writer on moral psychology in whom I have found any recognition of the type of rational activity I am discussing in this paper. Cf. *The Good Will*, chapters vii and viii.) In the *Critique of Practical Reason* we find "a rational being's consciousness of the pleasantness of life uninterrupted accompanying his whole existence is happiness, and the principle which makes this the supreme ground of determination of the will is the principle of self-love."² Here again is the hedonist definition of self-love. But in Kant, as Professor Paton points out, there are even clearer traces of the alternative theory. "All men have the strongest and most intimate inclination to happiness, because it is just in this idea that all inclinations are combined into one total."³ Kant refers also to "man's wants and inclinations, the entire satisfaction of which he sums up under the name of happiness."⁴ Or again, "In the precepts of prudence, the whole business of reason consists in uniting all the ends which are prescribed for us by our desires in the one single end, happiness," though Kant slips back into the utilitarian interpretation by adding to this sentence "and in co-ordinating the means for attaining it."⁵

We may here recall a similar transition in Mill who also held the first view as his main doctrine. "By happiness is intended pleasure and the absence of pain . . . pleasure and freedom from pain are the only things desirable as ends."⁶ But, later on, "money is in many cases desired as an end in itself. . . . Money is desired not for the sake of an end but as part of the end. . . . The desire of it is not a different thing from the desire of happiness any more than the love of music or the desire of health. They are included in happiness. . . . Happiness is not an abstract idea but a concrete whole, and these are some of its parts."⁷

We began this enquiry with the example from Plato of the man who was thirsty yet rejected a drink. Plato's view that in this example the competing elements were desire and reason was contrasted with Hume's that the competitors are thirst and aversion from stomach-ache; and Hume's was agreed to be the more plausible description. But this verdict may now be reconsidered. The example we took was one where the water was foul and a danger to health. But should the desire for health be treated as ultimate? Hume gives an answer to this problem. "Ask a man *why he uses exercise*; he will answer, *because he desires to keep his health*. If you then enquire *why he desires*

¹ *The Categorical Imperative*, pp. 83-7.

² Trans. Abbott. *Kant's Theory of Ethics*, p. 108.

³ *Grundlegung*. Trans. Abbott. *Op. cit.*, p. 15.

⁵ *Critique of Pure Reason*, Second Ed., p. 828. Trans. Kemp-Smith, p. 632.

⁶ *Utilitarianism* (Everyman Edition, p. 6).

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 21.

⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 34-5.

health, he will readily reply, because sickness is painful. If you push your enquiries further and desire a reason why he hates pain, it is impossible he should ever give any. This is an ultimate end."¹ Here is the answer we suggested; he rejects the drink because he wants to avoid a stomach-ache. But in the same passage Hume continues at once to give an alternative answer which opens the way to the true view. "Perhaps to your second question, why he desires health, he may also reply that it is necessary for the exercise of his calling. If you ask why he is anxious on that head, he will answer, because he desires to get money. If you demand why? It is an instrument of pleasure, says he. And beyond this it is an absurdity to ask for a reason." The implication is that pleasure or avoidance of pain are the ultimate ends discovered by such enquiries. But surely the real reason why we wish for health is not just that illness is painful, but that illness is "incapacitating." Health is necessary not only for "the exercise of our calling" but for our hobbies, our social activities, our work for our friends, and so on. Illness prevents us from getting and doing all the myriad things we want to get and to do. It makes planning impossible. And it is this rather than any particular pain or the loss of any particular pleasure which lies behind our desire for health. The activity of reason I have been discussing has escaped notice partly, I think, because our vocabulary includes no words appropriate in this connection and partly because the activity is never pressed to those ideal limits which would make the use of a single word proper to describe it as a "principle of action."

Mill's change of mind is obviously an improvement and the recognition of plain fact, yet "happiness" is quite an absurd name for the "concrete whole" which he envisages, as G. E. Moore pointed out with great gusto.² "Happiness" is certainly in English a name for a state of mind other than all the states of affairs normally desired as ends. It, like pleasure (if they can be distinguished), accompanies or follows the achievement of a desired end. There is no name for the "concrete whole" which is the good for man. But this is because there is no such "concrete whole."

We certainly attempt to order and organize our desires, but "self-love" would be a very misleading name for the tendency to do this. It borrows its normal force from the contrast with love of others. Yet, as Butler points out, love of others in its various forms covers a group of desires which are among those we have to order and harmonize. The same argument which makes Butler refuse to call desires "selfish" or "interested" should make us equally suspicious of calling this organizing tendency "self-love"—though of course on the hedonist or happiness analysis "self-love" would be less misleading.

¹ *Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals*. Appendix I. Ed. Selby-Bigge, 1902. Para. 244, p. 293.

² *Principia Ethica*, pp. 71-2.

But no name is needed. For no one ever attempts to reduce the whole of his life to a plan or to organize the satisfaction of all the desires he has or ever will have. We do attempt these harmonies over limited fields and short periods, and most commonly, perhaps, with only two or three desires. The most extended uses which we ever make of this tendency occur in choosing a career or in planning a holiday. In the latter case, we ask "what are the various things I want to do?" and we try to fit them in or as many of them as possible. Some of them of course have to go to the wall; others emerge in a severely truncated form. Or again, if I ask myself where I should like to live when I retire, I have to consider what sorts of things I am likely to want or to want to do, and how best they, or some of them, can be fitted in. But if anyone asks me what is the tendency in me which thus tries to fit a number of different objectives into a single plan, "self-love" seems an inadequate and misleading name, both because altruistic ends may be among those fitted in and because a holiday or even a career does not cover the whole of human life. "Prudence" comes a little nearer the mark, but it, too, has a selfish ring. I think "intelligent anticipation" is the common phrase most nearly appropriate, but the emphasis in it is on "intelligent."

(The distinction between the happiness analysis of self-love and that I have been suggesting has some relevance in connection with the basic assumptions of economics. Economic theory had for long rested on a utilitarian basis of maximum happiness as the aim of a man so far as he was rational. There have recently been moves, of which Pareto was the forerunner, away from this utilitarian basis towards other criteria of rational decision. Cf. I. M. D. Little, *A Critique of Welfare Economics*, chapters 1-3.)

In stating the aim of this paper I explicitly excluded moral action, but there is here an exact parallel to the use of reason which I have described. I have been considering so far conflicts of desire and noticing how the construction of time-plans can sometimes resolve them and can sometimes prevent them from arising. The parallel is with conflicts of duty. Those who complain of conflicts of duties are often people who have failed to devise a time-plan for their duties or have failed to carry it out when they have devised it. We often find ourselves in "impossible situations" because we have put ourselves in them. One of our obligations is to think before acting. Two types of such thinking are parallel to the types Hume recognized in non-moral conduct. We have to think about means of carrying out our obligations, and we have to consider whether carrying out one obligation will result in shirking others. Moral philosophers tend to stop here, as Hume stopped, and to regard the resulting situation with its conflict of duties as a straight fight in which the stronger ("more stringent") duty should prevail. Yet surely here, too, there

is room for the type of thinking which tries to plan the organized and orderly achievement of our duties or as many of them as possible. They sometimes cannot be combined in a plan but this need not be taken as the normal or the only case; and frequently this special case occurs because of a failure yesterday or last week to plan so that they can be combined.

I have thought it worth while to describe this special function of reason in conduct because Hume's influence is strong to-day and his position very plausible. And it is also the case that the triumphs of science have tended to have the effect they had on Hume—to restrict the use of "reason" to those types of reasoning found in mathematics (and logic) and natural science. And this, if it developed, would result in irrationalist views of conduct and ethics. In "writing up" this activity of reason I may have given the impression that only by such attentive and continuous planning can anyone get along well in life. But there are three cautions to be observed here.

First, in non-moral action, planning can obviously be overdone. It may not allow for the unexpected. The man who solves his problems by time-plans is often the man who refuses to change them when new circumstances arise. Then again it is often advisable to leave some chance for gaining unplanned ends, and this the planner may tend to overlook. His nose is so deep in his map that he misses the kingfisher. Again, there must be a place for spontaneous creative activity, which is often wrongly and abusively called "improvisation." And planning of time, like planning of space or money or energy, itself consumes time (and space or money or energy), and may leave too little of these commodities for the activities planned. The too-rational man then becomes a Hamlet, whose

"native hue of resolution

Is sickled o'er with the pale cast of thought,
And enterprises of great pitch and moment
With this regard their currents turn awry
And lose the name of action."

Fundamentally Hume was right. Reason *alone* cannot move to action. However much the desires may be directed, organized, encouraged, selected, curbed or even eliminated in reason's planning, the desires remain the raw material of action like the paints in the artist's box, and without them planning is beating the air over castles in Spain.

The second caution is that there is nothing specially moral about this activity of reason. The man who so plans is not morally better than the man who does not. Butler was no doubt right in holding that most immoral action is due not to selfishness or "cool self-love" but to the over-development of some particular passion. Yet the

man who carefully plans how to get most effectively all the things he wants may present just as unadmirable a character.

The third caution is a stronger form of the second. There are theories which try to find in the ideal of a unified or harmonious self in which all compatible desires (including of course the social or altruistic ones) are satisfied in due proportion a definition of the moral standard. Plato is not free from this. Butler, in his watch simile, comes near it. T. H. Green's self-realization theory implies it, and, though carefully qualified, it remains a dominating factor in Professor Paton's coherence theory of the good will. But just as the raw material of non-moral planning is the desires, so the morality of actions lies in the ends pursued and the motives from which they are pursued and coherence or organization has here, too, only a conditional or dependent place.

Much of this paper seems to me obvious, not to say platitudinous. But the obvious is sometimes overlooked in the pursuit of one-sided theories or through the adoption of unduly limited views of the nature and powers of "reason" or "intelligence."

A last word. I have been writing throughout of "reason" doing this and "desire" doing that, of desires conflicting and of reason organizing them. It is clear that such language is dangerous and I have used it only because the authorities I wanted to discuss have used it and because its use greatly reduces the length of the sentences we frame. I am sure that it would be safer and more accurate to eliminate these "faculty" words, if strict accuracy was required. Instead of saying "thirst is a desire not for an external object, water, but for an activity, drinking." I should say "When a man is thirsty he would not be satisfied by being given water but only by being allowed to drink it." Or again, when I say "reason arranges to satisfy both desires by means of a time-plan" I should say "A man can properly be said to be acting intelligently when he arranges to achieve at two different times two activities both of which he desires to achieve and which he cannot achieve simultaneously." The whole of the paper could be rewritten in these terms, avoiding the nouns "reason," "desire," etc., altogether, without any change or loss of meaning. It would be twice as long; it would be distressingly pedantic to read; and, unless all the Butler, Hume, Kant and Mill passages were rewritten in this sterilized language too, the connection between their views and those I have been presenting would be lost.

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ARCHAISM AND FUTURISM

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WE are all waiting eagerly for the last three volumes of Toynbee's great *Study of History*, which has brought a new honour to British scholarship. For no English and perhaps no German writer has amassed such a wealth of information on human affairs in every age and every continent. We hope, rather anxiously, that his final diagnosis will not be to expect a "knock-out blow" from the strongest Power, which must be Russia. He is no disciple of Spengler, but the downfall of the West looms before his eyes.

These supreme merits do not prevent his book from being at times intensely irritating. He is in love with a few catchwords—"proletarian, dominant minority, universal State," which he misuses in a sense peculiar to himself, Christianity has never been a proletarian religion. The Galileans were a well-educated and upstanding peasantry, whose prosperity is attested by Josephus. The Epistles of St. Paul and the Fourth Gospel were not written for the submerged tenth. The Western wage-earner is anything rather than a proletarian. He is, if we must talk French, a *petit bourgeois*. The payer of super-tax, mulcted of ninepence or more out of every shilling that he earns, must smile ruefully when he is told that he belongs to a dominant minority. There never has been and probably never will be a universal State. A moderate-sized empire is certainly not universal. We may add that a wastrel does not mean, as he supposes, a spend-thrift, but a worthless person.

In the sixth volume he discusses in a very interesting manner the possible reactions of the citizens in a society which has realized that it is in a state of disintegration. Of these mental states, there are four; the first two, Archaism and Futurism, are methods of escapism. The third, Detachment, is an arrested movement, a withdrawal which ought to be followed by a return. The fourth, Transfiguration, is the way of salvation traced by the Platonists and by St. Paul, followed by the Catholic *philosophia perennis*. "Be ye transformed by the renewing of your mind" is the palingenesia prescribed by the higher religion and by the psychology of mysticism.

It is plain that these alternatives belong only to a society which is dissatisfied with its conditions. There have been times when men have felt themselves in harmony with their surroundings. If they do not say, with Faust, to the passing hour, "Stay with us, thou art so fair," they have no wish to mount a time-machine or to renounce all that the world offers them. Such golden ages never last long, for as Walt Whitman says, "It is provided in the essence of things that

from any fruition of success shall come forth something to make a greater struggle necessary"—*Ubi nil timetur quod timeatur nascitur.* Nevertheless, in the reign of Saturn men do well to be happy.

We look for historical examples, and our education leads us to think first of Hebraism and Hellenism. Our ideas of the former are confused, because the craving for revealed authority, always strong in organized religion, led the early Christians to inflict upon the Church, and the Protestant Reformers with crass stupidity to reimpose, the whole *corpus* of Hebrew sacred literature, folk-lore, patriotic legend, prophecy, moralistic aphorisms, and liturgical poetry. It is seldom realized how completely the religion of the nomad Bedouins was changed after the Jews came under Persian influence. "Apart from the virgin birth, the Son of Man has other features and prerogatives, pre-existence, a touch of something god-like, last judgment, ascension into heaven, which the Jewish Messiah lacks" (Toynbee 6: 163). It seems that we owe more to Zoroaster than to Moses. Jewish Futurism is mundane but not evolutionary. So our pro-scientific theology makes divine intervention discontinuous and catastrophic; modern thought eliminates the word supernatural by bringing God back into nature.

St. Paul says that the Pagans "have no hope," unlike the Jews, who "against hope believed in hope." The mundane hopes of the Jews destroyed them as a State and preserved them as a nation. The Greeks and Romans did not "take Time seriously." They had an intelligent interest in their own past, and produced great historians in Thucydides, Polybius, and Tacitus; but there was no professor of history at any ancient university. The prevailing view was that there is a vast pulsation, a systole and diastole in the natural order, resulting in cycles which in human life resembled or repeated each other. This view of history, which was held by Goethe as well as by Nietzsche, is by no means contemptible; it was accepted by Origen, who believed that each world-order has its beginning, middle, and end, but that the series is everlasting, as the spiritual world, of which it is the moving image, is eternal. Nevertheless, it is rejected by Toynbee with horror and indignation; he even calls it absolute pessimism. It is not pessimistic at all; it would be rather consoling to know that even politicians cannot do irremediable damage. It is almost impossible to become critically conscious of our own habitual assumptions. Doctrines taken as facts are not recognized as doctrines until they have been judged as climates of opinion. The ghosts of a dead eschatology, the belief in a cosmic law of progress and human perfectibility, which Catholics call the last Western heresy, still hover over those who think they have abjured it. We see this in a champion of the perennial philosophy like Urban, and I think in Samuel Alexander, as well as in Matthew Arnold. The ancients

believed that they were living in a period of decline; the men of the eighteenth century that they were living in a period of advance; both were unhistorical. Historicism in fact is a modern creed. The pleasing belief in human perfectibility, which became almost insane in the time of Herbert Spencer, ignored the second law of thermodynamics, which had already been proclaimed by Carnot and Clausius. If Time is real, a day will come after which nothing will happen any more. If God is wholly embodied in His creations, as Pringle Pattison and many others affirm, God will accompany the universe into Nirvana, lost to Time and use, and name and fame. The theory of perfectibility seems to be the only philosophy which can be definitely disproved. And yet the plain man may answer the physicist: "You say that no one and nothing can ever wind up the world-clock again. But it has been wound up once, at a date which we could name if we knew it. Whoever wound it up once may presumably wind it up again." Cycles, after all? We are up against one of the ultimate and insoluble problems, the relation of Time to Eternity.

Toynbee's third choice, Detachment, is not so much a pilgrimage arrested half-way as an attempt to solve an antinomy by suppressing one horn of the dilemma. It is to accept Parmenides against Heraclitus, and to eliminate Time and change. There are degrees of detachment. The Stoic wishes only to be detached from all that is morally irrelevant, including unfortunately love and pity, for a loving and pitiful man is not invulnerable; and to be invulnerable is the goal of philosophy. The exclusive mystic prays, as Crashaw makes Teresa pray, "Leave nothing of myself in me." But we cannot kick down the ladder by which we are still ascending. Time and Space are only the warp and woof of the canvas on which we draw our pictures of things and events. But we are *in via*, not *in patria*. A journey through the unreal is an unreal journey and leads nowhere. He who grasps at the infinite clasps only zero. To be disinterested without being uninterested—that is the problem of Detachment.

Archaism and Futurism, Toynbee says, are both "flying leaps" away from the present into another stopping-place in the Time-series. But no flying leaps are necessary. If we believe that Time is the enemy—*damnosa quid' non imminuit dies*—we are archaists; if we believe that Time is the friend, we are futurists. There are two kinds of prejudice, one says "This is old, therefore it is good," the other "This is new, therefore it is better." The tendency to believe in the old is not peculiar to Solon's Egyptians. Tradition is the stored wisdom of humanity; it is sometimes the petrified wisdom of dead yesterday. *Quod semper, quod ubique, quod ab omnibus* is an impressive slogan, even if the first means "in 1563," the second "at Trent," the third "by a majority." It is no doubt better to be an ancestor than a

descendant, but we can count other descents from King Edward III with some degree of probability, while our grandchildren are likely enough not to be proud of us. It is in religion that Archaism is most potent. We should not value thirty-nine articles of physic drawn up by the physicians of Henry VIIIth, though it is true that Galen was appealed to as an authority not very long ago, but there is an outcry at any suggestion to substitute a simpler creed for the symbol drawn up in the fourth century. Revivals are not always so futile as Mussolini and his lictors; but they are often attempts to restore what belonged only to a past age, and Archaism is responsible for some of the worst blunders of ambitious militarists.

Nevertheless, we must not be blind to the sins of anti-Archaism. We most of us like to consign our parents' household gods to the scrapheap. There was a dignity and gravity in the Victorians which we ought to be sorry that we have lost. We do take care of our artistic treasures from the past, but it has not always been so. The people of Norwich petitioned the Long Parliament for leave to destroy their "vast and useless" cathedral. Molière, in presence of the perhaps even more splendid triumphs of French Gothic, wrote:

Le fade goût de monuments gothiques,
ces monstres odieux des siècles ignorants.

In the Dark Ages there was a general destruction of the incomparable Greek works of art, and the public library at Rome was burnt to provide fuel for the baths. If I remember aright, the sainted Pope Gregory was the culprit. There have, it seems, been times when the sight of the masterpieces of human genius evoked no sentiment except a wish to destroy them.

Futurism is the belief in a good time coming. It has taken many forms. As belief in a future life it has accompanied in many countries the wonderful emergence of a higher religion which occurred almost simultaneously, about the middle of the first millennium before Christ, in China with Confucius, in India with Buddha, in Persia with the spread of the doctrines of Zoroaster, in Palestine with the late prophets, and in Greece with the Orphics. It was often combined with belief in pre-existence, reincarnation, and reward and punishment. But belief in a future life is not necessarily belief in a good time coming. An early view among both Jews and Christians was that the return to earth of the Messiah or Son of Man will be followed by a reign in this world of a thousand years, after which will come the last judgment. Chiliasm has revived sporadically at various times, but has never been a Christian dogma.

A very popular notion now is that a future state of rewards and punishments will be disciplinary. The saved will continue to grow in

grace; the lost will learn by suffering, and perhaps, as Origen thought extending his charitable hopes, like Robert Burns, even to "auld Nickie Ben," may ultimately be admitted to salvation. This is not a Christian doctrine, any more than the other merciful suggestion that damnation may mean total extinction. *Questi non hanno speranza di morte*, says Dante, affirming the orthodox doctrine. Heaven and hell, in orthodox theology, are states of fruition and torment, not of education. But since in our experience almost all men and women seem to be "over bad for blessing and over good for banning," the intermediate state of purgatory has been introduced, this being of course not a "second paper" for those who are near the borderline, but a reformatory for those who will ultimately be saved. But in eternity "there shall be time no longer," and how can there be change except in time? Roman Catholic theologians have seen this difficulty, and have decided that purgatory must be in Time, though apparently not in Space. The difficulty remains; future probation or discipline is hardly intelligible without reincarnation. In spite of this, popular belief in Protestant countries has virtually abolished hell and substituted purgatory under another name.

Early Christian eschatology, though futuristic, was not consolatory, since it was agreed that only a minority would be saved. The majority would be condemned to endless physical tortures, which were graphically depicted on the wall paintings in churches. Some of these, in spite of their antiquarian interest, have been whitewashed over as too painful for a modern congregation. This raises a question of great interest. Cruelty, which for us is the blackest of all wickednesses, was never one of the deadly sins. St. Thomas Aquinas calmly says that in order that nothing may be wanting to the felicity of beatified spirits, a perfect view is granted them of the torments of the damned. Martin Luther rejoices in the thought that through no merit of his own he has been exempted from the fate which all descendants of Adam have justly incurred. Such heartlessness is horrible to us. All eschatology is really symbolic; but because no evidence is available the colours have been heightened and coarsened by imagination till we are presented with pictures of vapid enjoyment and revolting horror. Is it possible that this can be the final dispensation of the God whom the Founder of Christianity came to reveal in His own person? Do we not all sympathize with the well-known protest of John Stuart Mill, who declared that he would call no Being good who was not good in the sense in which he applied the word to his fellow-creatures, and that if there is a God who can send him to hell for not so calling him "to hell I will go"? If this is what we feel now, were our co-religionists until quite recent times very differently made? It is a difficult question; there has undoubtedly been a great increase of humanitarianism in the last two centuries, though there

have been alarming signs of reaction lately. It is perhaps true to say that beliefs about the future which rest solely on supposed revelation are seldom held as firmly as facts in the sensible world. With very many persons who do not own it, the future life is only a half-belief. Letters of condolence are more kindly than absolutely sincere. On this subject we ought, I think, to give importance to a questionnaire conducted in America, and published by F. S. S. Schiller in his *Problems of Belief* (Hodder and Stoughton). The main results of this inquiry were as follows. Fear of hell was not expressed anywhere. Hopes of heaven were weak and hardly rang true. Indifference was surprisingly frequent. The pathetic longing of the bereaved for reunion with those whom they loved was very prominent, and in many cases had led to spiritualistic beliefs. But "perhaps the strongest position is occupied by those who rely on an immediate experience or intuition, which may be called mystical. This mystical belief certainly rings true, which is more than can be said of some of the other types of sentiment." But the mystical belief in eternal life is not futuristic in the ordinary sense. Keyserling says that mysticism, whether it so wishes or not, always ends in impersonal immortality. I do not like the negative word impersonal, and I think there are three ultimate problems to which we shall never find an answer while we live here. These are the relation of Time to Eternity, Personality human and divine, and the Problem of Evil. There is nothing irrational in recognizing a stone wall when it bars our path, instead of knocking our heads against it. But it is true that the mystic is not a futurist. He is convinced that we shall not be simply snuffed out at death, but his view of immortality is very unlike "the shout of them that triumph, The song of them that feast." The words of the wise that he values are such as these. "God is not the God of the dead but of the living, for all live unto him" (Jesus Christ). Οὐδὲν ἀπολέιται τῶν ὄντων, "nothing that really is can ever perish" (Plotinus). *Quod Deo non perit sibi non perit* (Augustine). *Non est potentia ad non esse* (Thomas Aquinas). "All that is at all lasts ever past recall" (Robert Browning). Beyond this, if he has not had the advantage of a classical education, he is content to say with Thomas Huxley, "*agnosco.*"

The scene of the beatific vision has varied greatly. For the Greeks it was *ἐκεῖ*, "yonder," not here. For the Jews, the "days of the Messiah" would be on earth, and probably soon. For the Christians, futurism was dominant over the presence of the Holy Spirit, or the Spirit of Christ, "all the days, even to the end of the world," and the acceptance of the Book of Genesis imposed a very cramped picture of past history. The Renaissance brought back the Elysian fields to earth; in 1789 "it was a joy to be alive." The nineteenth century had a lay religion of its own, a superstition which had enslaved a philosophy,

We cheerfully abolished hell, and, as Macneile Dixon says, the gates of heaven shut with a melancholy clang.

The great question for mundane futurism is this: Is there in the nature of things a *nexus* towards universal meliorism? Are the scales gently tilted in the desired direction? Even the Persian religion, which like original Christianity was much more Manichean than its modernist caricature, gave Ormuzd the best of it. Samuel Alexander believed that God is preparing to emerge. Almost all religions and philosophies have said the same. Only the Scandinavian Olympus is finally to be stormed by the Titans, and when at last Woden meets Fenrir the Wolf, nobody knows what will happen. H. A. L. Fisher could not discern any such *nexus* in history, and was honest enough to say so. Tennyson, always a good interpreter of his generation, has a queer phrase about an "*increasing purpose*," and speaks of one far off divine event towards which the whole creation moves. If we believe our experts, the last event will be anything but divine; it will be a universe of dead moons observed by nobody. What possible unitary purpose can there be for all living species on this planet and for the billions of other worlds scattered through space? Surely it is more reasonable to believe in an infinite number of finite purposes, each having beginning, middle, and end? When they have fulfilled their task they do not pass out of existence, but take their place in the eternal order. We may find many Christian thinkers who have warned us against futurism in our pictures of the spiritual world. In the beautiful medieval treatise *The Cloud of Unknowing* we read "heaven ghostly to as nigh down as up, behind as before, on one side as on another. Whoso had a true desire to be in heaven, then that same time he were in heaven ghostly." The reality of history is superhistorical; Time, as Hooker says, "neither worketh in things any real effect nor is itself ever capable of any." An eternal purpose is eternally frustrate; a single purpose, once fulfilled, remains in the time-series in a frozen world of lifeless forms, against which Plato in the *Philebus* protests so vigorously, half frightened, we may guess at what some might make of his own philosophy.

To place our ideals in the future, says Bosanquet, is the death of all sane idealism. The religion of cosmic progress was in his time becoming a veritable "disease." There will be another Golden Age, and there will be another Dark Age; it may be approaching. *Habet mundus noetess suas et non paucas*, says St. Bernard. The future, as Anatole France tells us, is a convenient place in which to store our dreams; those who turn dreams into apocalyptic prophecies are preparing great disappointments for themselves. Liberal Futurism was evolutionary; revolutionary Futurism is apocalyptic.

No pure hope shall wither, except that a purer may grow out of its roots. The futurist after all has something to live for. Of such men

the writer to the Hebrews says, "They received not the promises. God having provided some better thing." There is no cosmic progress, but there is always good to work for and evil to resist. Toynbee has not mentioned a fifth method of reacting against disintegration, that of the soldier of the Cross, who puts on the whole panoply of God and wrestles against spiritual wickedness in high places. This is not escapism. But we shall agree with him that transfiguration is the true answer to the problem of life. The venture of faith justifies itself as it passes into conviction. If we live as we ought we shall see things as they are, and if we see things as they are we shall live as we ought. We may quote again, "Be ye transformed by the renewing of your mind, that ye may prove what is that good, and acceptable, and perfect, will of God."

BEHAVIOUR

D. W. HAMLYN, M.A.

ONE of the distinctions which Aristotle makes is that between *ἐνέργεια* (activity) and *κίνησις* (movement). *κίνησις* itself is sometimes said to be an *ἐνέργεια*, but one which is ἀτελής (incomplete), whilst *ἐνέργεια* in the proper sense is *ἐνέργεια τοῦ τετελέσθεντος* (activity of the complete).¹ The sense of "complete" here may be given by saying that an activity is something which contains its end in itself, which is carried out for its own sake, and not, as in the case of movement, for the sake of something else.² *κίνησις*, Aristotle says, arises out of a *δύναμις* (a potentiality) and may lead to a *ἕξις* (a state or disposition). The *ἐνέργεια* itself is the realization of that *ἕξις*. Perfect activity would be quite independent of any potentiality (*ἀνευ δυνάμεως*) but human activities only approximate to this state of affairs which is characteristic of the divine. The *πρᾶξις* (conduct) with which ethics is concerned is one form of *ἐνέργεια*.

This seems to be an important distinction, which has consequences for any form of study which is concerned with human affairs—for example, for psychology and ethics. (It has, indeed, importance for any form of study which is concerned with anything which is capable of forming a *ἕξις*, in Aristotle's sense.) Certain things can be said of activities which cannot be said of movements, and one such is reflected in the way in which Aristotle defines the distinction. To say that a movement is incomplete is to say that it is made for the sake of something outside itself. Its final cause is not in itself. But to talk of final causes is one way, and perhaps a misleading way, of referring to the reasons for which the movement is made. No movement is in itself and by itself intelligible. It is always possible to ask why it was made (if it can be said to be made rather than merely to occur, if it can be said to be an *ἐνέργεια* of any sort, even *ἀτελής*), and one form of answer is that in terms of "in order to . . .," or in terms of "because" where there is a sentence beginning with this which is equivalent to one beginning with "in order to." Thus if someone moves his hand towards a pillar-box, and is asked why he made the movement, he can say, "In order to post a letter," or "Because I wanted to post a letter." At the same time it may be possible for someone, say a scientist, to give the efficient cause or causes of that movement, and in doing so he will be treating the movement as something which can be said to occur rather than to be made; he

¹ Cf. *De An.* 417a, 16; 431a, 6; *Phys.* 201b, 31; 257b, 8.

² Cf. *Eth. Nic.* 1174a, 13 ff., where Aristotle says that movement could be complete, if at all, only *ἐν ἀπαντι τῷ χρόνῳ*.

may say what produced the particular muscle-movements in the arm. In the case of an activity it may, in the same way, be possible for the man to give the same sort of answer—"I posted the letter in order to fulfil my promise." But it is intelligible that no answer of that sort should be given. He might refer to the *éξις* from which the activity is derived—"I posted the letter because I wanted to," but to do this would be to imply that no further explanation is or need be forthcoming. The action of posting a letter is quite intelligible in itself; we understand what is going on and at any time during an appropriate series of movements it is still possible to use intelligibly the phrase "posting a letter." At the same time it would be absurd to ask for the efficient cause of the activity, as was possible in the case of a movement. One answer to such a question as "What caused you to post the letter?" would be, "Nothing *caused* me to post it; I just wanted to." This is not to say that the causes of activity can never be given in any sense, for, clearly, if someone posted a letter after having expressed his intention not to do so, we should be quite justified in asking, "What made you post it?" and in expecting an answer. Yet this answer would not give the cause of his posting the letter in the same sense as that in which a scientist might be said to give the cause of his arm-movement if he could give an account of its mechanism. Rather it would afford an explanation of his deviation from expectation, and to refer to the cause here is an elliptical way of accounting for such a deviation by showing that it could be subsumed under some law. When someone expresses his intention of not posting a letter we are justified in expecting him not to do so. If something occurred to make him alter his decision, then we should feel that this accounted for his posting the letter—was the cause of it—if such an occurrence could be said to lead to a change of decision for the most part. That one occurrence leads to another does not mean that the first is the efficient cause of the second, though we might use the word "cause" here in another Humean sense. The fact that we can use the word both in this case and in the case where a mechanism is provided in the strict sense reveals the ambiguity of the word. The mechanism case could be brought within the deviation from expectation case by saying that it accounts for a movement which is a deviation from what we would expect if the series of movements were random. But all the uses of the word "cause" do not imply the possibility of providing a mechanism. No mechanism can be given of activities, as opposed to movements. (This incidentally, shows what is wrong with Freud's characterization of neurotic symptoms as "mechanisms of defence"; in some sense the symptoms do provide defence, but they are the means adopted by the person to secure this, not mechanisms. Freud's hope for a biology of the mind cannot be fulfilled along these lines, for his explanation of the neurosis is

really in terms of what the person does, not in terms of what produces a reaction by that person.)

I take it, then, that the point of Aristotle's distinction, or one of them, is to show that an activity is intelligible in itself—that is, does not necessarily require an explanation in terms of anything else—whilst a movement is not. A movement could not occur unless there was already a possibility of it before it actually occurred. Continual occurrence of a movement in certain situations may, on the other hand, lead to the setting-up of a *ἔξις*. An activity always arises out of such a *ἔξις*, and it is a sufficient explanation of it to point to this, though not perhaps an explanation which is always satisfying, however adequate logically. It is a similar point, I take it, which is often made by moralists when they say that an act which is free is one which is derived from the personality of him who exhibits it. Activity which is perfectly free would be activity entirely so derived, the explanation of which could be given entirely in terms of *ἔξεις*, and none of which is independent of such *ἔξεις*. In Aristotle's terms, activity which is independent of *ἔξεις* would be *ἀτελῆς*, and thus mere *κίνησις*, not *ἄνευ δυνάμεως*.

One of the troubles about the distinction as Aristotle made it is that it sounds as if it is a material distinction, one between different kinds of entity. Are we being presented merely with an account of how activity develops? It may indeed be the case that, with regard to certain features exhibited by a person, to talk of activity is inappropriate, and to talk of movement is not. But where activity is exhibited, it is not necessarily inappropriate to talk of movements, but it will be so to do so in the same context, in the same universe of discourse. To represent the distinction as one between two kinds of entity is misleading, for sometimes the distinction might better be put as one between terms belonging to different modes of talk. Now the term '*ἐνέργεια*', which is usually translated "activity," is equivalent, where people (or organisms in general), are being talked about, to the term "behaviour." The qualification is necessary because Aristotle does not make it concerning '*ἐνέργεια*'; the term is used for a variety of purposes. However, as my interest is in the study of human affairs, I propose to use the term "behaviour" in the following as opposed to "movement" or equivalent terms which I may specify. I am, in general, less concerned with what Aristotle actually says than with the relevance of what I interpret him as saying. In any context, then, in which it is possible to describe a person's behaviour, it seems possible also to describe the movements exhibited by him. Such descriptions will not serve the same purpose, and do not belong to the same level of generality. Indeed, it is fair to call descriptions of behaviour "interpretative." With movements we are concerned with physical phenomena, the laws concerning

which are in principle derivable from the laws of physics. But the behaviour which we call "posting a letter" or "kicking a ball" involves a very complex series of movements, and the same movements will not be exhibited on all occasions on which we should describe the behaviour in the same way. No fixed criteria can be laid down which will enable us to decide what series of movements shall constitute "posting a letter." Rather we have learnt to interpret a varying range of movements as coming up to the rough standard which we observe in acknowledging a correct description of such behaviour as posting a letter. Any form of interpretation implies the adoption of some standard; in this case the standard can be only loosely defined. This, too, is implied by the statement that behaviour is derived from a *ἔξις*, — a disposition or capacity (Aristotle makes no distinction here; '*δύναμις*' should sometime mean "capacity," but '*ἔξις*' is often used in its place without distinction). To refer to a person's possessing a capacity is not to say what will happen on a certain occasion; it is to indicate only roughly what may perhaps happen, although some restriction is put upon what is capable of happening.

At the same time as we can describe a form of behaviour, we can describe the movements which constitute the behaviour on this particular occasion. Are there any occasions on which this is not possible? We have seen that there are occasions on which we can describe the movements, but on which there is nothing that can be described as behaviour, though where the dividing line comes may well be a moot point. A reflex is clearly not a piece of behaviour. Aristotle implies that there are occasions on which we can describe the behaviour but not the movements, for he maintains that sometimes the *ἔξις* and the *δύναμις* are coincident. Sense-perception is an example.¹ It is odd to call perception and the like "behaviour" unless what is meant is the sort of interpretation which is carried out in seeing patterns *as* something. To see something is not to behave in any normal sense; it is, amongst other things, to come up to the standard implied in our ability to identify that something correctly. "To see" is what Professor Ryle calls an "achievement verb" as opposed to a "task verb." It is significant that in *Metaphysics*, 1048b, 18 ff. Aristotle hints at such a distinction and uses it to make his familiar distinction between *ἐνέργεια* and *κίνησις*.² He points out, in effect, that the present and perfect tenses of such verbs as "see" may be used at the same time of any person; and the force of the perfect tense is to point out the achievement. What is odd about the

¹ Cf. *De An.* 417b, 18 and *Eth. Nic.* 1174a, 14.

² Especially *Met.* 1048b, 23 ff. ὅρᾳ δῆμα <*καὶ ἐωρακεῖ*>, καὶ φρονεῖ <*καὶ πεφρόνηκε*>, καὶ νοεῖ καὶ νενόηκεν. ἀλλ' οὐ μανθάνει καὶ μεμάθηκεν οὐδὲ ὑγιάζεται καὶ δύλασται. . . . τούτων δὴ <*δεῖ*> τὰς μὲν κινήσεις λέγειν, τὰς δὲ ἐνέργειας.

point as made in this passage is that learning is classed as a movement. The fact is, I think, that Aristotle has made one distinction where we should make two. We can distinguish between movements and behaviour, and between the latter and achievement. To describe behaviour requires interpretation of movements according to certain standards; to indicate achievement requires interpretation of behaviour according to the standard by which we recognize success. Both the terms "behaviour" and "achievement" are interpretative though at different levels and in terms of different kinds of standard. Aristotle realizes that there is a distinction to be made, corresponding, in material terms, to that between interpretation and description, and often applies this to behaviour and movement, counting perception as a form of behaviour. In this passage of the *Metaphysics* he realized that there was another distinction to be made, but instead of making it, he merely shifted the original distinction up a stage, so that what might otherwise be called "behaviour" is now called "movement." It might be said in justification that the distinction between *ἐνέργεια* and *κίνησις* is really meant to point to the completeness of the former, and that what counts as complete must be relative to the context. Here only success is to count as completeness. But the reason why Aristotle suggests that on some occasions we can describe the behaviour but not the movements (where these terms are being used in the ordinary sense and not that as shifted in the passage of the *Metaphysics*), is that he does not see clearly that on these occasions we are not concerned with behaviour in the ordinary sense but with achievements. We are concerned with "seeing" and not "seeing-as." '*ἐνέργεια*' should not be used to cover both.

Students of human affairs may concern themselves with movements only. Physiologists do so and they might have a claim to be members of this class. In doing so they will be able to investigate, amongst other things, the causal mechanism of these movements; such a mechanism may be very complicated and unlike that involved in classical machines such as clocks. The seventeenth-century view of machines as exemplified by the clock will have to be modified if the movements of animals are to be explained in terms of mechanism. Even if it is too bold to assert that we already know what type of machine is required, we at least know far more than did Descartes. Human movements are not all reflex-like, by any means, and there is some justice in the claim that the simple reflex is, in any case, an abstraction. Granted, however, that it is in principle possible to give an account of some mechanism—perhaps of the self-adjusting type which is now becoming familiar, the study of which has been dignified by the title of "cybernetics"—this mechanism will account for movements only. While physiologists knew little about the structure of the nervous system they were content to deal with such things

as reflex action, which is essentially a movement in my sense, though not one which is made by a person; a reflex merely occurs, and we cannot ask for the reason for it, except, perhaps, in terms of a theory of evolution. Any reaction which is more or less mechanical can be classified as of this sort. The increase in our knowledge about the nervous system should not tempt us to suppose that we can do more. No mechanism of any sort can do more than account for movements, reactions and the like. It may, of course, be the case that a particular movement or series of movements may exemplify a kind of behaviour; it may be classifiable as such, and capable of such an interpretation. It is this possibility which permits us on any particular occasion to describe both the movements and the behaviour, though to do these things will by no means be to do the same thing. Thus, no mechanism can be given which will account for behaviour *per se*, however much we may feel that the behaviour will have been accounted for incidentally in providing a mechanism for the movements which constitute behaviour on a particular occasion. At other times, however, the movements involved may be different, though we may still describe the behaviour in the same way. This is the case because, as Aristotle saw, behaviour is derivable from a *έξις* and is explicable either in terms of this or in terms of what is akin to this—the final cause of the behaviour. Talk of final causes is akin to talk of *έξις* because, as I mentioned earlier, both really provide reasons for the behaviour and not causes, in our sense. I take it that the *έξις* is, in fact, the formal cause of the behaviour. (A certain amount of qualification is needed in attributing these views to Aristotle with consistency. For example, in *E. N.* 1139a, 31, he says that choice is the efficient cause of action or conduct.¹ It is to be noted that he is forced, in consequence, to consider conduct in this case as a *κίνησις*. I take it, however, that this is a surrender to common modes of talk, as when we might say, "His hurry is due to (caused by) his decision to catch the next train." The act of choice, the decision, leads to the behaviour, it is true, but it does not cause it in any mechanical sense.)

As I have said, Aristotle uses the term '*έξις*' both where the term "disposition" and where the term "capacity" would be appropriate. To attribute a capacity to something implies that it has at least a *prima facie* claim to be considered intelligent. (Instinctive behaviour is *prima facie* intelligent, but it fails to pass all the tests; e.g. it is too rigid and insufficiently flexible.) Thus if it is said that behaviour is derivable from a capacity or capacities, it is implied that such behaviour is at least likely to be intelligent. To say that it is derivable from a disposition may or may not imply this. The term "disposition" (in this sense a philosopher's term), is akin to the term

¹ *πράξεως μὲν οὖν ἀρχὴ προαρτεσις—ὅθεν ή κίνησις ἀλλ' οὐχ οὐ ἔνεκα.*

"habit," and whereas we often use the latter in order to point a contrast with intelligent or skilful behaviour, we may do this in a relative as well as in an absolute sense. That is to say that, sometimes, in saying that something is a matter of habit, we mean to imply that there is nothing intelligent about it, that it was purely mechanical and unthinking. At other times, we may use the term "habit" to point to the relative inflexibility of a mode of behaviour, and in this sense it belongs to the same family of terms as "custom" and "usual." In the former sense it belongs to the same family as "reflex" and "automatic." In the latter case it is likely that the habit will not have been instituted without prior behaviour which is both intelligent and spontaneous, to some degree or other. If we called such habitual behaviour unintelligent, it would be in the relative sense—i.e. in that implied by the epithet "stupid." On the other hand, it would be entirely inappropriate to call a reflex either stupid or intelligent. Behaviour can be relatively automatic but never absolutely so. Behaviour can always be called intelligent in the sense of that word which is opposed to "mechanical" or "automatic," though not always in that opposed to "stupid." It is sufficient to say that anything which is capable of behaviour is capable of being intelligent in this former sense. It is not necessary to attribute to human beings any spontaneity other than this, in which the behaviour is explicable by reference to a $\xi\epsilon\nu$, to the personality of the person concerned. Aristotle is not so clear on this point. Apart from suggestions that positive spontaneity may be attributed to human beings on occasions, he tends to identify reason with the divine; and the divine is said to have $\acute{\epsilon}\nu\acute{e}py\epsilon\iota\alpha \acute{\alpha}n\acute{e}v \delta u\nu\acute{a}m\acute{e}\omega\varsigma$. In ordinary beings the forms in which intelligence may be exhibited are limited by the movements which they are capable of making. Aristotle seems to imply that no such limitation exists in the case of the divine. But surely it would be a mistake to identify intelligence with the exercise of pure reason alone.

I think that it will be clear what implications this has for psychology as the science of behaviour. The ways in which we may account for behaviour will not be the same as those in which we may account for movements. Causes of behaviour cannot be given as causes of movements can. It is this very fact that allows us to talk sometimes of behaviour as spontaneous. But the proviso must always be added that in the case of any particular case of behaviour which is exhibited by a particular series of movements, it may always be possible to give the causes of members of that series, to show that they can be subsumed under specific causal laws. But the laws which deal with behaviour will be generalizations of a non-causal sort, if laws are to be formulated in this context. We may say that in certain circumstances people behave in certain ways without implying that

the one is the cause of the other. We might, of course, content ourselves with the programme of accounting for behaviour in terms of the capacities or dispositions from which it is derivable. This, however, is not a scientific programme, but one which may be carried out by anyone with sufficient experience of human affairs.¹

The distinction which, following Aristotle, I have been anxious to make has consequences, also, for two, perhaps connected issues—that of behaviourism, and that of freewill together with the implications which any standpoint on the latter issue may have for the question of the function of moral judgments. The thesis of behaviourism was first introduced by John B. Watson as a methodological postulate, and only later did it attain the dignity of a metaphysical theory. As a piece of methodology it is clear that it would be a useful move against those psychologists who confined themselves to the frustrating programme of investigating and classifying mental states. It would be useful to point out that often, and perhaps generally, mental states, ideas and the like occur in the context of particular forms of behaviour, and should be looked at in this context. But Watson and his successors were impressed by the conditioned reflex and sought to analyse all human activities in terms of this, even thinking. For reasons which I have given this is a mistake, though there might have been some profit in investigating the mechanisms of movements which constitute behaviour on particular occasions. That this mechanism would consist solely of reflexes, conditioned or otherwise, is most unlikely, for reflex movements are not by themselves the sorts of movement which could constitute behaviour on particular occasions; reflex movements occur and are not made by the subject, they are not self-adjusting or purposive, in the sense that we could ask the subject why he made the movement. The point which I wish to make is that the thesis that organisms are entities which behave does not *ipso facto* imply that they are machines of the sort presupposed by behaviourists; conversely the thesis that they are machines would not, *ipso facto*, imply that they are not capable of intelligent behaviour, as long as a sufficiently liberal view of machines were taken. The main mistake of behaviourism, as it has developed, is that of taking the machinery for the behaviour and oversimplifying this. If this mistake is not made there is no bogey to be feared in behaviourism, unless it is the very idea that man may be a machine, albeit a very special one, that is feared. (It must be admitted that the facts of consciousness and all that is implied by that vague expression have to be reckoned with, and to deny this would be foolish, however much it requires analysis.) At any rate as a piece of methodology, behaviourism would be a sound thesis in the modified form which I suggest, in which the distinction

¹ Cf. some of the things said by Gellner—Maxims, *Mind*, 1951.

between behaviour and movements or reactions is made. It is the tragedy of much modern psychology that this distinction has not been made, and much time, labour and expense has been devoted to the vain task of making impossible identifications. That is to say that attempts have been made to identify behaviour in general with mechanical movement of one form or another. Pavlov was right in refusing to call reflexology "psychology," whatever his reasons for this were. Intelligent behaviour of any sort is by definition not mechanical, and it is with behaviour that psychologists are concerned. Human behaviour can be said to be mechanical in a relative sense only. Our ways of accounting for intelligent behaviour must be very different from the ways in which we would account for the movements of machines. Nevertheless, it may be the case that the movements in which behaviour is exhibited on any particular occasion are explicable in terms of some machine, albeit of a peculiarly subtle sort.¹

As a metaphysical theory, on the other hand, behaviourism must be wrong, as must all metaphysical theories which, as distinct from speculative theories, depend upon the misuse of language by the failure to make relevant distinctions. It is important to distinguish between the pursuit of metaphysics and speculation, for whereas many metaphysical theories are incidentally speculative, the reverse does not always hold good. When carried on in the appropriate sphere and at the appropriate time, speculation may lead to important discoveries; metaphysical theories of the traditional sort may even prevent discoveries, for it may be thought that conclusions concerning matters of fact may be reached *a priori*. Part of the seductiveness of many metaphysical theories is due to the fact that they contain statements whose status is uncertain; apparently empirical propositions may be given a character of logical necessity (e.g. statements about sense-data), or partial truths may be generalized. As a form of materialism, behaviourism denies dualism in its Cartesian form and in this, perhaps, it is right. But this does not mean that it is right as a positive thesis any more than idealism. Behaviourists may have been right in pointing out that we do not need to assume a pure ego as a cause of activity, but this does not mean that behaviour is merely mechanical. For to assume this would be to deny what is obvious—that there is a sense in which we may be said to have a mental life; and in whatever sense this is true, it is true in the one which is implied in saying that we have some degree of intelligence. Enough has been said by Ryle, to make it unnecessary to labour that point. As it is, by its very negativeness,

¹ This amounts to a modification, perhaps an important one for some purposes, of what Ryle says on mechanism (*Concept of Mind*, p. 75 ff.), though in other ways it will be obvious that this account is in line with his.

behaviourism has been a hindrance to the progress of the science of behaviour in the true sense. As was the case with sensationalism before it, it has been based upon an atomism (in the one case that of sensations, and in the other that of reflexes), and has consequently presented the problem of how an intelligent animal can be built up out of such atoms. Both the Gestalt Psychologists and those who, like Dilthey and others, have espoused an "understanding psychology" as a cultural science, have been justified in their protests against it. But such protests should not themselves be couched in metaphysical terms. In pointing out that organisms capable of intelligent behaviour are not merely mechanical, the mistake should not be made of making the term "organic" or similar terms such as "gestalt" a source of mystery. Again, because behaviourism of itself cannot help us to understand intelligent behaviour, it should not be assumed that no psychology, as a natural science, can deal with behaviour. It is true that we can always talk of behaviour in an interpretative fashion, referring to an organism's achievements, reasons, capacities and the like, but this does not mean that no laws or generalizations can be formulated concerning behaviour. Clearly the more we know of the conditions under which people behave as they do, the better shall we be able to apply our interpretations also. If Freud had not told us of the correlation between certain childhood occurrences and behaviour in later life, we should understand neurotic symptoms far less. Only the methods of natural science can enable us to establish such correlations. A cultural science could not exist without such matters of fact being known first.

Behaviourism is, then, a bogey. By making a false identification of behaviour with movements it has suggested that human and animal behaviour may be mechanical. This is clearly to go against common sense, for there are clearly occasions on which behaviour might be said to be spontaneous. If, then, it is a bogey, it is not one to be feared. At the same time it has perhaps hindered the progress of science by the suggestion of a wrong model. If the exhibition of any form of behaviour in a concrete form is to be interpreted in terms of a model, that model will not be the type of machine exemplified in the clock. In any case, psychologists are not likely to wish to concern themselves merely with the exhibition of a form of behaviour on a particular occasion in a certain series of movements; nor do they confine themselves to this, but deal with behaviour in general, and in this they are justified. For, the ultimate end of a science is surely to enable us to understand its subject-matter. In psychology we are concerned to understand human beings and organisms, in general, not just the movements of their limbs, however much these may, sometimes, constitute behaviour. As the subject-matter of psychology, behaviour is and must be intelligible in itself. Whereas we

may justifiably expect some answer to the question, "For what reason was this movement made?" we will have no justification in always expecting an answer to the question, "For what reason was this done?" For on some occasions it would be considered silly to ask such a question and it is always logically possible that no answer may be given.

The problem of the freedom of the will is a many-sided problem but what I have been saying has this relevance—that we cannot give the efficient causes of behaviour, and, in fact, that the notion of cause is inapplicable to it, in the sense of "cause" which implies mechanism. One of the difficulties connected with the problem is that of reconciling the obvious fact that our actions are sometimes spontaneous with our increasing ability to predict human actions. This, however, will present difficulty only if this latter fact implies that our behaviour is mechanical in the sense opposed to that of "spontaneous." This cannot be so, for the only sense of "mechanical" which is applicable to behaviour is that equivalent to "stupid" or "unthinking" in being opposed to "intelligent." Behaviour is mechanical only in a relative sense. Thus even if it be admitted that science gives us increasing ability to predict human behaviour, even if it is true that human beings are machines in some sense, this does not preclude some of our actions being spontaneous. Similarly these facts would not preclude our attributing to people responsibility for their actions, for the mode of discourse in which we should talk of their behaviour, actions or conduct is very different from that in which we should talk of them as machines. People are responsible for their actions if it is possible to say that these actions are derivable from a $\xi\epsilon\nu$, from their character. The only sense in which actions could be said to be determined, when this is not meant, is that in which they can be said to be compelled. The sense in which compulsion causes behaviour is again, however, not the mechanical sense of "cause"; rather compulsion provides a motive for behaving in a certain way which is recognized in the context as being unavoidable. What constitutes unavoidability may vary according to the circumstances, but, at any rate, we are likely to hold a person responsible for an action only where it is derivable from his $\xi\epsilon\nu$, in some sense or other. As Aristotle saw, there are some occasions on which decision as to whether the action is derivable from the person's $\xi\epsilon\nu$ may be difficult,¹ and only knowledge of further details of the case can make decision possible. Normally, however, we are well able to decide. In the case of compulsion it is clear that there are grounds for not attributing responsibility, and, *a fortiori*, for saying that the action is not free; but there is no reason for refusing to use the word "free" of behaviour in general.

¹ *Eth. Nic.* 1110a, 4 ff.

I do not wish to pretend that this is all that need be said on this question. It has many sides and many considerations are relevant. I do wish to maintain, however, that the issue of causal determinism versus indeterminism is irrelevant to any consideration about behaviour, as long as they are considered as strict theses. Behaviour is derivable from a *ξεις*, as Aristotle maintained, and this does mean that there must be some regularity about it in order for it to be intelligible. Otherwise it would be reasonable to make the apparently paradoxical statement that strictly spontaneous behaviour would be strictly mechanical, in that no reason at all could be given for it. In saying that there must be some regularity, no reference to the notion of "cause" need be made, however much people might suppose that regularity would not be possible unless causal sequences occurred somewhere. But this is quite another matter, and it is not necessary for present purposes to commit oneself either way. Similarly it is not necessary to say with Stevenson¹ that a limited degree of determinism must be taken for granted in order that our moral judgments may influence behaviour. The sense in which our moral judgments influence behaviour cannot be a strictly causal sense, for, as I have said, the notion of "cause" in the strict sense is inapplicable to behaviour. Stevenson's account of the function of moral judgments is based upon his account of pragmatic aspects of meaning. Moral terms have an emotive meaning which serves to change people's attitudes. Stevenson might say that they have only a disposition to produce such changes, but the same argument applies. It is clearly true that changes of attitude may sometimes be produced by what people say, but it is still necessary to see how this can occur.

What is it to have taken up a certain attitude? Amongst other things it is to have come to exhibit a certain more or less delimitable range of behaviour-patterns on certain occasions. It does not entail that any one form of behaviour is involved, let alone any one form of movement, but only that we can roughly specify what sort of behaviour is likely to be exhibited on given occasions. Clearly nothing could cause us (in the strict sense) to take up an attitude, if that is what is meant, although a variety of means might be adopted in order to lead someone to take up an attitude, or to bring about a change of attitude. Propaganda may present people with bad but seductive reasons for a change of attitude—seductive in the sense that they appeal to motives which people have. It may, by constant repetition of statements, or the like, deprive people of the opportunity for, or interest in, considering reasons for not accepting them. Suggestion would not have any effect unless people had some reason or motive for being willing to accept suggestions. The motives may not always be conscious or explicitly recognized by the person

¹ *Ethics and Language*, p. 314.

concerned, but that is another matter. I take it, then, that the difference between argument and propaganda is that between the provision of good reasons for taking up an attitude and the failure to provide such or to allow such to be considered, whilst at the same time providing bad reasons.

My point is this—Stevenson is sometimes criticized for the view that the function of moral argument is to persuade. Even granted that his account of persuasion and persuasive definition is more subtle than his original account of emotive meaning suggests of itself, if the view attributed to him entails that persuasion is causative or quasi-causative, he is certainly wrong. On the other hand, it is not right to reinforce the criticism by saying that his view cannot account for the difference between moral argument and propaganda, as if this were a distinction between the provision of reasons for the adoption of an attitude and the causing of the adoption of an attitude. Propaganda does not cause the adoption of or change of an attitude, for reasons which I have given. Until and unless we can influence people's behaviour by interference with the mechanism of its exhibition, we will not be able to cause people to behave in any way, in the strict sense. Of course we do use the verb "to cause," especially when followed by an infinitive, in a vague sense, in that the assertion that we caused someone to do something implies only that something which we did led that someone to do something. I am concerned only with the literal sense of "cause." I do not wish to suggest that it is in any way improper to use the verb "to cause" in this other way. But in distinguishing between moral argument and propaganda, we should distinguish between the various ways in which we might influence people, none of which will be causation in the strict sense. Verbal utterances are not stimuli which cause mechanical reactions. In talking in order to influence someone, we always provide a reason or something akin to a reason for that someone's doing what we want. The crucial difference between moral argument and propaganda is that in the former it is possible to say what constitutes a good reason for a particular form of conduct. Good propaganda is not propaganda based upon good or valid argument, but effective propaganda; but it is effective in the sense that appealing to people's motives in certain ways leads them to behave in the desired way for the most part, not because the mere utterance of words causes behaviour. What constitutes a good reason for a moral judgment or decision is another story, but if moral arguments are persuasive this has no or little connection with their validity. If propaganda is persuasive this is all that need be said. At the risk of being tedious it is important to stress that neither cause the adoption of behaviour, in the strict sense. The function of moral judgment is to inculcate certain modes of conduct, but it does this by the provision

of reasons for behaving in this way, by appealing to principles (cf. "unprincipled" as a term of moral condemnation), the acceptance of which can be justified by the provision of different sorts of reasons in other ways; what constitutes a good reason depends on the context. Some systematization of these principles might be possible,¹ but in making moral judgments we do not *ipso facto* provide instruction with regard to them;² rather we presuppose them in making moral judgments at all, however much we may be led to argue about them directly in the course of argument.

"Behaviour," "conduct," "activity" and "action" are words of one particular type, though there are differences of use between them. "Movement," "reaction," "reflex" and the like are of a very different type. "Achievement" must be separated from both of these in turn. So, indeed, must the word "act," as used by moralists such as Ross, in phrases like "act of promise-keeping." An act of promise-keeping is not any one series of movements, or even any one form of behaviour. Promises may be kept by behaving in a number of different ways, in most contexts, and one form of behaviour may or may not constitute fulfilling one's promise in different circumstances. In fact, we can talk of human beings in many different ways, at various levels of generality, with varying degrees of abstraction, with different points of view, or with the presupposition of different standards. It is important not to confuse or run together these different modes of talk. In sum, I have wished to point out that we cannot give the causes of achievements in any sense, and that we cannot give the causes of behaviour in the mechanical sense; but of movements both these things are possible. On the other hand, the notion of a reason is in principle applicable to behaviour (though we would not be justified in always expecting one to be provided), and to movements which constitute the exhibition of behaviour in particular circumstances; it is not, however, applicable to isolated movements which could not be said to constitute behaviour (e.g. a reflex), nor to achievements, although we can give reasons for claiming achievements as such. The form of explanation depends upon the subject-matter and the context. Behaviour is not a series of movements.

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¹ Cf. Hare—Imperative Sentences, *Mind*, 1949. Also his article in *P. A. S. Supp.*, Vol. 1951.

² As seems to be maintained by Hare—*P. A. S. Supp.* Vol. 1951.

AN ANALYSIS OF SOCIETY

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"A SOCIETY is more than a set of entities to which the same class-name applies" (*Process and Reality*, Pt. II, Chap. 3, Sect. II). Taking this *obiter dictum* of Whitehead's seriously, the present paper seeks to elucidate some of the more abstract properties of a society. By "society" I understand primarily human society in the sense in which it is an object of study for social theory, though part of what is said may admit of application to societies in some wider sense. An apology should perhaps be offered for the terminology introduced. The writer's only excuse is that there seemed no other way of expressing the ideas in question.

I take it for granted that a society is constituted solely by its members, who are individuals. That is, I assume that the relation of individual to society is that of constituent to whole.

Viewed in this way, there is no room for contradiction between the ideas of individual and society. Nonetheless these have often been held out as being in conflict. How has this come about? Possibly the confusion has arisen in part because of the evident contrast there is between solitary and social behaviour. This essentially qualitative difference, giving rise to feelings of stress in people, may have led them to suppose that the ideas themselves are opposed instead of complementary. Also it is obvious enough that the individual is sometimes opposed to the majority of his fellows, and it is easy though strictly incorrect to identify the latter with society.

Social behaviour is typically what an individual does in the presence of others, solitary behaviour what he does by himself. It seems natural to identify individual behaviour with solitary behaviour, because in this case individuality is so easy to discriminate. But this identification can lead to confusion. For though some behaviour is not social (the solitary behaviour of a hermit, for instance) all behaviour is the behaviour of individuals. It is improper to identify solitary with individual behaviour and hold this up in contrast with social behaviour, for these concepts overlap.

The distinction between solitary and social behaviour may also break down or become blurred. Take a Tibetan ascetic, for instance, living alone in a mountain cave. On the face of it, all his behaviour is solitary. Yet he studies holy texts he obtained from other men, and he prays in a language he learned in society. This behaviour is socially conditioned—is it not social?

In order to answer this question I begin by assuming that people display social behaviour typically when they are in society. The question then arises, what is society in this sense? A glance at

etymology may help us to get down to essentials. The word "society" stems from the root of *sequi* (Latin, to follow), so its primitive application is presumably to a following, gathering or company. Precisely there do we find individuals exhibiting social behaviour. We are not surprised, therefore, to learn that one of the earliest books on social psychology was Gustave le Bon's *La Foule*.

A point of confusion is that ordinary speech has attenuated the meaning of the word "society" in such a way that it now stands for something of which I am a member even when nobody else is present, e.g. I am a member of a club even when I am not at it. It seems plain that this is an extension of the primary meaning and not *vice versa*. One would be doubtful, I think, about applying the name "society" to an organization none of whose members ever met.

This difficulty may be met by saying that society in the extended sense stands not for a group, but for an institution. What, then, is an institution? Is it a mere abstraction or is it an entity? Legal practitioners, whose opinion we should respect here, for the matter is a practical as well as a theoretical one for them, appear to tend towards the view that they are entities of a kind. Even if the fully fledged doctrine of corporate personality is not embodied in the law, some qualified recognition that institutions are more than abstractions seems to be called for by practical necessities. It may therefore be asked—what kind of entities could institutions be?

Sociologists, too, have extended the meaning of "society," so that they apply the word to, say, the State or the community: something of which I am a member at all times and which never meets as such. Sociologists, it is true, do make a point of distinguishing society and community, but in this connection the difference is immaterial. By this extension the contrast between solitude and society may be lost. Thus the widest possible human society of which I am a member is that constituted by the whole human population of the world. I belong to this society at all times and wherever I go. Even the solitary ascetic is "in society" in this sense.

Now, while it is important to distinguish the different senses of the word "society," it is also important to try and express what these different meanings have in common. To this task I turn next. It calls for a detailed analysis of the idea of society.

Returning to the basic meaning suggested by etymology, society may provisionally be defined as a gathering or company. This is the conception of a number of individuals being present together. The notion of togetherness calls for further elaboration in this connection. "Together" may express a broad or a narrow conception. The broad conception is that of what might be called "subjective" togetherness, viz. the sense in which things are together when they are classed or

counted together. The sole connection between the entities taken together may be that they are so taken. This in itself tells us nothing about the relationships between the entities included. The narrow conception of "objective" togetherness may be contrasted with this. When one says that entities are together in this sense, one means that they are side by side, or spatially near one another, or that they "go together" in some other sense. This may or may not be a simple spatial idea, but certainly the spatial aspect of it is easy to grasp. Two things would not be said to be together in a spatial sense if they were far apart in space or if each was in the same place at a different time.

I start my analysis of the idea of society from this simple notion of "objective" togetherness, and I shall adapt it as I proceed. I should perhaps add that I do not wish to overstress the distinction just outlined between "subjective" and "objective" togetherness. The terms may be badly chosen and the distinction not an ultimate one. But it is sufficient for my present purpose if a rough-and-ready practical dissection along these lines be allowed; for I wish primarily to elucidate the conception of society, and only incidentally that of togetherness.

The idea of "objective" togetherness seems to call plainly for some frame of reference. Thus, to take a spatial instance, an astronomer thinks of the planets and the sun as being together though in fact they are thousands of miles apart. If the frame of reference is called a "place," then the facts may be stated more precisely by saying that the sun and planets are together in the sense that they are side by side in one "place" at one time. The place in question is the general locus of the solar system, and this may be roughly defined in relation to other astronomical entities.

Togetherness is evidently a relationship between entities which mutually exclude one another. So the smallest number of things which are together is two, and the place in which they are together must be at least big enough for both. This sets a lower limit of extension to the arrangement of entities which could be denoted by the word "society." Is there also an upper limit? Well, it is hard to say if we do not confine ourselves to human society. It is for astro-physics to decide whether the cosmos can be said to have a limited extension or not. I take it that they would say it has. Certainly this is so with human society. An upper limit—a practical one, it is true, and possibly a temporary one—is set by geography. Human society extends no further than all the human inhabitants of the earth within the rough dimensions of a global surface. If this is a society, it could be called the "global society of men."

To call a gathering or grouping of this kind a society would be misleading in some ways. The human flavour of the word "society" might, for instance, lead us to overlook the abstract characteristics

such a grouping shares with collections or gatherings that would not ordinarily be called societies, e.g. all the mountain tops in the world or all the pebbles on all the beaches. What we need to pin down such elements is a neutral word free of mathematical or human associations.

I propose to use the word "assemblage" to denote this sort of grouping. The word has the merit of not being in common use. I intend its application to be quite general, i.e. not necessarily confined to human beings or to groups on a world-scale. Thus the stars in Orion constitute an assemblage, and so do the peas in a pod. In both these cases membership of the assemblage is homogeneous. But the stars in Orion together with the peas in a pod might be taken as an assemblage whose membership is heterogeneous.

Of homogeneous assemblages there are two main types: "concrete" ones, whose members are in actual contact, and "discrete" ones, whose members are separate. Discrete assemblages may be loosely knit or closely knit. The difference between the idea of an assemblage and that of a group may be brought out by reference to this property. A group, in so far as it is an entity and not simply an abstract set, is a closely knit assemblage of individuals more or less uniformly distributed in the locus of the group. An assemblage is not limited in this way to a closely knit uniform distribution of members. It is consequently the more general conception. A group, indeed, is a particular species of assemblage.

Compared to a concrete assemblage (such as the parts of a machine) or to a group (i.e. a closely knit discrete assemblage) an assemblage which is loosely knit in part or whole appears to be without order. This, I think, is not really so: it is rather "loosely" or "freely" ordered. The characteristic of this order is that spatial relationships between individuals in a given frame of reference are irrelevant, i.e. apart from falling within the locus the position of the members in space does not matter. In this respect such an assemblage differs from a concrete assemblage or a group.

An assemblage exemplifying this sort of order may be technically called a "stroma," after the Greek word for that which is strewn (*στρῶμα*); the order itself being described as "stromatic." A stroma is therefore defined as a discrete assemblage occupying a definite place within which the members have a definite position but any kind of distribution. It will simplify matters, no doubt, to think of stromas which are homogeneous in composition.

Stromatic order is illustrated when a handful of beans is scattered on the floor. Some of the beans may fall in clusters and others by themselves. A cluster of this kind is what would ordinarily be called a group. The name "cluster" is more appropriate for my purposes as "group" has an abstract mathematical sense as well as an "objective" sense. What determines whether a bean belongs to a cluster? Clearly

its nearness to other beans. But on the scale of a room or larger area all the beans may be said to be near one another, not just the clustered ones; nor are they together as a large cluster. To define a cluster we need a smaller scale—a bean-size scale, in fact. On a bean-size scale only the clustered beans are together; on a room-size scale all the beans are together, and not as a large cluster but as a stroma. Other examples of stromas are the islands in an archipelago or the trees in a park. The need for some such technical word in our vocabulary is shown by the far-fetched analogies to which we may be pressed to express this sort of order in our everyday speech. A group of radio transmitters scattered over the countryside is described as a "network": it is in fact a stroma. A set of shops centrally owned and managed is described as a "chain": it is also a stroma. Neither of these expressions adequately indicates the discreteness of the order referred to.

The idea of a global society of men may now be reconsidered in the light of this conception. The order this assemblage displays at any given moment is not that of a large cluster (or "crowd") but that of a stroma. For it is an assemblage on a global, not on a man-size, scale.

Over a period of time the global assemblage of men is a moving or dynamic assemblage. It moves within limits and irregularly, it is true, but it moves. A dynamic assemblage whose members at any instant constitute a stroma may be called a "sporad," after the Greek *σποράς* ("spread about"). There were some islands in the Aegean called '*αἱ Σποραδες*' by the Ancient Greeks, presumably because of their stromatic distribution. The link with the English word "sporadic" provides a useful overtone of the dynamic to this term.

A purely dynamic sporad would be one whose members are in continuous motion, e.g. the molecules of a gas in a room, or a swarm of bees buzzing round the queen. A human sporad is less energetic than this; its movement is, indeed, "sporadic."

Dynamism, though typical of sporads, need not be confined to them. One can conceive of stromas which are identified or defined by function rather than spatial position. The stroma of iron filings in a pile of metallic chips could be picked out by their movement under the influence of a magnetic field. Similarly there may be functional properties connecting a concrete assemblage of parts in a machine.

Now it is plain that a stroma can be divided up into other assemblages which are stromas of some of the same members, e.g. in an archipelago, those islands with lakes may form one assemblage, those without trees another. Stromas can also be divided up into lesser stromas territorially.

Similar reasoning may be applied to sporads; with this difference, that, as the members of a sporad are moving about from time to time,

some other principle for identifying the constituent members than spatial position is required. Identification may be qualitative, functional or nominal (where the individuals are named or particularly described). Thus the global sporad of men may be divided into lesser territorial units until we reach small sporads such as the people on a street or the players in a Rugby match. Dividing the global sporad functionally we may get small units of wide span, such as two people making a transatlantic phone-call. Dividing it genetically or nominally we may find a family unit which is scattered across the world—parents in London, son in South Africa, one daughter in U.S.A. and another in Singapore.

Sporads of this latter kind may be regarded as having a definite duration. A transatlantic call may last three minutes, a family one or two decades. A family can be conceived as a sporad whose span varies from time to time, sometimes forming a cluster, e.g. at meal-times, sometimes scattered far and wide.

As the individual members of human sporads have a limited life-span, we have to consider the effect of deaths or births upon a specific sporad, e.g. a family. It is plain enough that from a genetic standpoint there is one absolutely basic sporad, viz. the sexual couple, for this is the only reproductive sporad. If a sporad is identified nominally, it would appear most convenient to regard the sporad as altering or ceasing when a member dies or is born, leaves or is added, on the analogy of a partnership-at-law (in Scotland). But we need not commit ourselves to this assumption in general.

The foregoing analysis falls to be applied to the problems earlier raised. One distinction between solitude and society may now be stated with precision. A man is alone, in the primary sense, when he is not a member of a cluster; nevertheless he is still a member of at least one sporad (the global sporad). A man is "in society," again in the primary sense, when he is a member of a cluster. It is suggested that any further difference there may be between solitude and society is a qualitative difference in feeling and behaviour (after all, a man can be lonely and "alone" in a crowd, though this is not usual). It is to these latter aspects, and to these alone, that we must look in deciding whether the behaviour of a recluse is "solitary" or "social" in some secondary sense.

An attempt may be made to define the nature of an institution. It may be regarded as a sporad of long duration whose membership varies, and which is possibly centred in one particular part of its locus. Alternatively it may be regarded as the form characterizing a certain sporad or succession of sporads.

Finally, an accurate definition of society in the sense in which it is an object of sociological theory may be offered. Society is defined as

the global sporad of men and the lesser sporads into which it can be dissected. Different realms of social theory might be delimited by the sort of sporad they consider, i.e. the type of dissection they make. E.g. social psychology, in contrast with the rest, confines itself to small assemblages of short duration meeting largely as clusters.

Some further applications are given in conclusion.

A difficulty which faces the "organism" theory of society may be stated clearly. An organism is a concrete assemblage of cells, whereas a society is a discrete assemblage of men, displaying sporadic order. This points the contrast even if we ignore the internal differences between a man and a cell.

The concept of the sporad enables us to fix the common element in societies of all kinds, sizes and durations, thus freeing us to concentrate upon qualities of behaviour in social contexts exactly defined. There may, for instance, be a limit to the size of sporad in which the sort of behaviour we call "meeting" or "encountering" takes place. There is an obvious lower limit of two, and some people—Martin Buber is perhaps a case in point—might put the upper limit there as well; certainly the maximum is defined by a large crowd.

The sporad concept may also serve to correct the tendency sociologists might have to identify social with crowd behaviour. Evidently a great deal of economic activity in society is carried on in sporads which are small, and in the isolated parts of the economic sporad.

Perhaps most important, the sporad provides us with an additional conception for organizing the functional relationships of society. The prevalent idea of the nation-state is based on a simple geographical foundation. It may be suggested that this conception is inadequate for the creation of a world community—something which is fast becoming a political necessity. The sporad concept points the way to a personal rather than a territorial conception of political organization, akin to that which existed in medieval Europe. Where law or custom is personal its exact sphere is defined not territorially but by a sporad. So in pre-partition India, where common law, Hindu law, and Islamic law were enforced concurrently, the realms of Hindu and Islamic law respectively could have been defined by the Hindu and the Mohammedan sporad.

The exact character of a religious communion, e.g. the Anglican or the Roman Catholic communion, is that of a sporad. Also the Jewish community—legacy of the Diaspora—is a sporad of global span.

What is the status and significance of the analysis I have presented here? It is not, I think, a positive contribution to sociological knowledge, but rather a negative contribution to what might be called—somewhat pompously—"the logic of society." Its function is elucidatory and propaedeutic. That is all I should want to claim for it. On

the other hand, in fulfilling this function it may have a contribution to make on the practical side, e.g. in the field of political organization or law.

It might be argued, of course, that what I have done is simply to demonstrate the absurdity of atomism carried to its logical conclusion in the only field where it would be really likely to succeed, viz. human society. The man is plainly the social atom, and in this capacity he is strictly indivisible. If from the multiplication of such units we cannot synthesize a flesh-and-blood living society, then the likelihood is that the purely objective empirical approach to the study of society is doomed to failure. The decision of this question depends upon the type of supplementary explanatory concepts we find effective.

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DISCUSSIONS:

I

IS THE DEFINITION OF THE WORD *FACT* THE FIRST PROBLEM OF PHILOSOPHY?

THE word *fact* is one of the most-used words in our language and it occurs in almost every book, especially those on science and philosophy. Yet it is hardly ever defined, and when it is defined, the definition is obviously unsatisfactory. To say that a fact is "whatever is the case," merely transfers the difficulty of discovering what the fact is, to finding what the "case" is, and we are given no instructions as to how this is done. Again, Lord Russell's definition that a fact is: "something that makes a proposition true," is too vague to be helpful.

But the clear definition of the word *fact* is of the first importance, and a vast amount of confusion arises through neglecting to agree upon a definition, both in philosophy and (to a much lesser extent) in science.

My attention was directed to this problem when I attempted to write an up-to-date book on the method and philosophy of science. Scientists are said to invent hypotheses and theories to account for facts. The hypotheses and theories are transient, and continually being extended or rejected, but the facts remain secure. This seems clear enough until we come across the words *real* and *true*. For one definition of *fact* in the *Concise Oxford Dictionary* is: "the true or existent reality." Now we are continually being told by writers who ought to know better, that, for instance, when we feel the wind blowing gently against our cheeks, this is "really" the irregular impact of an enormous number of molecules, and that when the wind grows hotter, it is "really" because the velocity of the molecules has increased, and so the blows which they give us are more severe and more frequent.

Here we have obvious confusion of a serious kind, for in science, the bombardment of molecules is part of kinetic theory, and the molecules themselves are postulates of the atomic theory. This bombardment cannot be both reality, (i.e. fact) and theory, otherwise it would make nonsense of any distinction between them, and the ordinary account of scientific method would be invalidated.

The first problem of scientific epistemology, and I think, of philosophy also, is therefore to decide what is to be the definition of a *fact*, since the whole edifice of scientific theory is built on facts.

In what follows, I shall try to put before you some suggestions concerning the definition of such words as *fact*, *true*, and *real*, suggestions which I have already made in a recent book called *Science: its Method and its Philosophy*.¹ I shall not make any pretence of having studied all that has been written on this subject, and a good deal of what I shall say has, no doubt, been said before. My hope is to put the matter sufficiently clearly to form some basis for agreement among scientists and philosophers.

What we know I propose to call *events of consciousness*—sensations of sight, sound, taste, smell and touch, together with feelings of various kinds, thoughts, and memories. At the present moment, for example, I am conscious of coloured patches which are automatically interpreted as people in a room: I am

¹ Address delivered at the Annual General Meeting held at University Hall, 14, Gordon Square, W.C.1, on July 15th, 1952.

² Allen and Unwin, 1950.

conscious also of sounds interpreted as my own voice, birds outside, and the traffic. I have certain feelings some of which are interpreted as the pressure of my feet on the ground, the clothes on my skin, and so on. These, together with thoughts, are the sort of events of consciousness which are all that we ever know, and we cannot doubt that they occur.

Now, should we call these *facts*? Some people think that we should. Spengler, for example, in what I still think is the most profound book ever written—*The Decline of the West*—defines a fact as “a uniquely occurring impression on a waking being.” That is what I have called an event of consciousness.

The reason for rejecting this suggestion is a very strong one, and I want now to consider it. The word *fact* is a symbol, and symbols have arisen through the need for human communication, and human communication takes place almost entirely through the use of words. Consequently if *fact* is to refer to events of consciousness, and is to be useful in communication, we must consider how these can be verbalized.

Suppose a lightning flash occurs. Ought we to say: “I am conscious of a lightning flash,” or should we say, as I think Lord Russell recommended many years ago: “A coloured patch occurs.”

To deal with this very difficult question, I think we must consider as much of experimental research as seems relevant to it. It is found experimentally that, as regards stimuli through the sense organs, we are not able to distinguish between events if they follow one another with sufficient frequency. Everyone knows that the eye does not see the cutting-off of the light by the shutter of a cinema projector, between the successive different pictures; and as regards the ear, a series of taps merges into a continuous note. The time period involved is round about one-twentieth of a second. Events which are not separated by a time interval greater than this become merged in consciousness. But one-twentieth of a second is a long time when we consider the rapidity with which electrical and chemical changes can occur in nerves and in the brain. If, therefore, we look upon the brain, as we do nowadays, not as an inactive receiver waiting for a stimulus to start it in action, but as a centre of great electrical activity into which the sense organs and body feed stimuli, these stimuli will cause some alteration in the activity; and if further, what we are conscious of is some integrating process with a minimum period which is large compared with the time that electrical changes require to circulate, then what we are aware of would be a mixture of incoming stimulus with activities already present. If this way of looking at it is correct, it would follow that a “pure datum” such as a coloured patch, is never known in consciousness. It is always mixed with other events due to changes already occurring and which have been determined, to some extent at least, by heredity and past history.

It seems, therefore, that we must reject such statements as: “a coloured patch occurs,” for the reason that such a pure datum is not given in consciousness.

Also we must reject “I am conscious of a lightning flash” because the symbol “I” does not stand for anything separable in consciousness, for as we have seen, the stimulus and the activity already present are mixed up and we are only conscious of a sort of summation of the two. It is a misleading use of words to set an “I” over against a “datum,” such as a coloured patch, or even an “interpreted datum” such as lightning flash. This does not symbolize what is known in consciousness. If it symbolizes anything, it must be an act of introspective analysis made after the event. Those who have relied on analysis and introspection, without experiment, have consequently been led into great confusion over this vital point.

Perhaps then, we should say: "A lightning flash occurs." This certainly indicates that association and interpretation leading to *naming* has taken place. But equally, it shows only too clearly that such statements are not suitable to form the basis of a reliable structure of human knowledge, since it is common experience that our associations and interpretations are sometimes false. The flash of lightning may have been caused by a photographer's flashlight.

Let me repeat this slightly differently in order to make it clearer. Let us suppose that the latest way of regarding the brain as the seat of great activity at all times during life, is correct. Let us cut out as far as possible all effects due to the external world. This can be done to some extent by lying down in a quiet, dark room. We are then conscious of slight pressure effects on our bodies, thumping of the heart, etc., and also changes in the brain itself which we call "thoughts" or "ideas." Our events of consciousness in such a situation might suitably be symbolized by "I." Now imagine opening the eyes and seeing a lightning flash. The lens of the eye undoubtedly throws on the retina an image which we can call a coloured patch, but it is an illusion to suppose that we can be conscious of this. The lightning flash can be shown to last for as short a time as one-two-thousandth of a second, but this is a time interval far too small for conscious discrimination, and a rapid succession of five such flashes, for example, is seen as one flash. What we become conscious of is the interaction of the stimulus with activity already present, so that the final conscious result might be described as *datum plus association and interpretation*.

This is a strong reason for not using the word *fact* to symbolize events of consciousness. They are all that we ever know, and we have complete certainty that they occur, but being an indistinguishable mixture of datum plus interpretation, they do not form when verbalized, something absolutely unquestionable such as the word *fact* generally implies.

And in addition, of course, such a definition would be very far from ordinary use.

We turn, therefore, to public knowledge. Human communication, as I have said, apart from grimaces, winks, etc., which we can ignore, is performed by means of symbols called words arranged in certain ways in sentences. Originally the association of words with their referents has to be formed in common symbol-situations, or in similar symbol-situations. The activity and structure of the brain is presumably modified in some way, so that when next the same words are fed into it by nerve impulses from the ear (or eye), the association takes place automatically, and so quickly that we are not conscious of hearing the words and *then* deciding their meaning—we hear and know the meaning simultaneously.

Words and sentences can, of course, be used for other purposes than strict reference. They may be used to produce special effects as in poetry, or sermons, or to indicate the attitude of the speaker to the referent or to the listener, but in considering common knowledge and science in particular, we are almost entirely concerned with sentences which assert or deny something, such as: "the Earth is round"; "there are trees in Hyde Park," and so on. Such sentences, I suggested, should be called *propositions*, and propositions are only *known* to be true if they are verifiable. My suggestion, then, was that the word *fact* should denote *propositions which are verifiable*. This use of the word fact would be closer to its ordinary use in science. What are the facts of chemistry for instance? We take a book on chemistry and find, for example:

"Sodium chloride melts at 801° C. Sodium chloride boils at 1750° C. Sodium chloride sublimes at higher temperatures without decomposition." And so on.

These are sentences which assert something that can be verified, and so the ordinary use of the word *facts* for these, agrees with our definition.

Summing up, then, the position once again is this. All we ever know are the events of our own consciousness. We could call these *facts*, but unfortunately they turn out to be composite—not only incoming stimuli but also the effects of these on processes already going on which have been determined to some extent, at any rate, by our past experiences. The result in consciousness is stimulus plus interpretation. But deception and illusions show us that this automatic interpretation may be false. Verbalization of these events of consciousness does not form, therefore, a secure basis for common knowledge.

A further difficulty is that *facts* would symbolize purely private experiences, unshared, unknown, and unverifiable by others.

If, therefore, instead of taking *fact* to refer to the events of private knowledge, the verbal expression of which is liable to error, we take it to refer to the verbal expression of common knowledge, and define it as a proposition that can be verified, then the possibility of error is very greatly diminished. Because although an assertion such as *There are trees in Hyde Park* requires interpretation before verification can occur, and interpretation, as we have seen, is dependent on the past history of each individual and is liable to error, and furthermore, verification itself involves interpretation of visual and tactile stimuli, which are also liable to deception, nevertheless the general agreement of all normal people about the results of verification is the accepted basis of secure knowledge. If all normal people who go to Hyde Park agree that the proposition *There are trees in Hyde Park* is a correct verbal expression of their events of consciousness, then the proposition is verified. We cannot have greater certainty in public knowledge than this. [Note that they cannot agree about their *events of consciousness* when in Hyde Park: no one knows what goes on inside someone else: all they *can* agree on is the *verbal expression*.]

My submission is, then, that the word *fact* should be reserved for what is most reliable in common knowledge, namely, propositions which can be verified.

Corresponding to the powerful noun *fact* is the equally powerful adjective *true*. I suggest that *true* should only be used of verifiable propositions. If a proposition is verifiable it is *known* to be true. Propositions such as *There are trees on Mars* which may be true, but are not *known* to be true, are hypotheses.

In conclusion I must deal briefly with criticisms of this definition.

The reviewer in our journal PHILOSOPHY says the definition means that a fact is a mere string of words. This, of course, is as misleading as saying that a motor-car is a mere string of steel, rubber and other parts. A fact is an arrangement of words so as to make an assertion that can be verified. I may add that more than one philosopher has told me that my definition is wrong, but when I write to ask these philosophers what *their* definition is, no reply comes to my letter.

Another objection concerns historical statements. It is obvious that assertions of the type *Napoleon I died at St. Helena* cannot now be verified. All we can verify now are propositions such as:

- (1) Many people assert their belief in the proposition.
- (2) A very large number of books are concerned with the life and death of a person called Napoleon I, and state the proposition.
- (3) In store-rooms of libraries and museums old documents and letters can be seen, signed Napoleon, in the same handwriting.
- (4) A magnificent tomb of red porphyry in Paris is stated to be that of Napoleon I,

and so on.

If a man doubts any of these facts, a symbol-situation can be arranged in which he can only maintain his doubt by denying the evidence of his senses or

the accepted meanings of words. This is not true of the original proposition *Napoleon I died at St. Helena*. There is no situation we can arrange now to prove it. It is, therefore, an unverifiable proposition which I call a hypothesis. Napoleon I is a term symbolizing a hypothetical person invented to account for facts, the facts being such as I have mentioned (about the documents, tomb, etc.).

Those who do not like to think of Napoleon as a hypothetical person invented to account for facts, should consider historical figures a little further off. King Arthur, for instance—rather doubtful? or Homer—very doubtful!—we just don't know whether Homer stands for one person or several. But where is the iron curtain between Napoleon and Homer, making one certain and the other uncertain? Of course there is none. Our belief in these hypothetical persons varies with the amount of evidence and the time that has elapsed since their death. Calling historical events hypotheses allows for the great variation in the strength of our belief in them—very strong in the case of *Napoleon I died at St. Helena* and very weak in the case of *Homer wrote the Iliad*.

It is, however, important in historical studies to differentiate between hypotheses as to what occurred in the past, and hypotheses as to the causes or motives behind what occurred in the past, and I suggest we might introduce a new term *historical-fact* to denote statements like "Napoleon I was defeated at Waterloo." It is historical-facts like these which a historian may try to explain by means of hypotheses.

This suggestion has caused some confusion, and I have been accused of distinguishing between two different kinds of fact, when, of course, the distinction is between two kinds of *hypothesis*—hypotheses as to what were events of history, and hypotheses as to what were the causes of these events. Perhaps the suggestion was unfortunate, but I made it because I did not expect to be able to persuade historians to drop the word *fact* altogether, and I thought that by tacking the word *historical* on to it (*historical-fact*) a clear distinction would be made between events of history (which are subject to doubt of varying degree) and facts (which cannot be denied without either denying the evidence of the senses or the accepted meaning of words)¹.

But the strongest reason for the reluctance of many philosophers to accept the definition of a fact that I have suggested, arises, I think, through some unanalysed belief in Reality with a capital R. In some way they think the word *fact* applies to it—something that makes a proposition true. But although all of us, no doubt, believe there is an "external world" which is the cause of many of our events of consciousness, what this external world is, is just what we want to find out. If this external world is "what is the case" then we must not call it *fact*, because it is the least certain part of our knowledge and not the most certain, as the common use of the word *fact* implies.²

The most certain parts of our knowledge are our events of consciousness, and, for the reasons I have mentioned, I do not think it would be satisfactory to call these facts. But we could call them *real*.

The use of the words *real*, *fact* and *true* would then be as follows:

All we ever know are our own events of consciousness: these are *real*, and

¹ I should, perhaps, record that one historian of my acquaintance admitted at once that, strictly speaking, there were no facts of history (except statements such as those in 1 to 4 above).

² It only causes confusion to say: "The universe is full of facts that we don't know." We are discussing human knowledge, and human knowledge is what human beings know—not what they don't know. Of course we can invent any number of assertions, some of which may later turn out to be verifiable (such as "There are trees on Mars"), but until they are verified, they are not *known* to be true, and consequently cannot be used in raising a structure of reliable human knowledge.

it cannot be doubted that they occur. Unfortunately they are the consequence of association and interpretation in the brain, so that when verbalized for communication to another person, they may not be accepted, and consequently do not supply a foundation for a reliable structure of common knowledge. They should not, therefore, be called facts. If, however, we use *fact* to denote an assertion that can be verified, we are using it to denote something on which a reliable and progressive structure of common knowledge can be raised, and such an assertion might then be called *true*. This is the definition which I think is implicit in scientific method, and as this method has proved to be the only successful method for enlarging human knowledge, my suggestion is that we should agree to adopt it openly and explicitly.

It only remains to show that the clear definition of the word *fact* is the first problem of philosophy—or, indeed, of any activity which involves rational thought. If in reasoning we make great use of the word, and we do, all the time, then it is important that it should have only one meaning, and that a clear one. Three meanings of the word *fact* have been discussed. It is sometimes used for events of consciousness; sometimes for assertions of common knowledge that all normal people could verify; sometimes for the supposed external cause of everything ("whatever is the case"; "Reality"). The first is private knowledge; the second is common knowledge of as great certainty as can be achieved by human beings; the third is hypothesis.

A word of universal use, carrying such different meanings, cannot be used in rational thinking and argument without causing immense confusion. That is why all who hope to use reason fruitfully must make it their first duty to agree upon a clear definition of the word *fact*.

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II

MODERN COSMOLOGY AND THE CONCEPT OF GOD¹

THE late Professor E. A. Milne was one of the leading mathematical physicists of his time. His later work was much concerned with the foundations of physical theory and he considered that he had gone a long way towards the promotion of physical laws to the status of *theorems* in a purely deductive system. In his concern about this possible significance of his work he showed himself to be a true "natural philosopher." The present book gives a description of the work itself and a discussion of the significance he claimed for it in regard to the nature of physical laws and also in regard to the wider fields of thought indicated by the title.

The book consists of the Edward Cadbury Lectures in the University of Birmingham for the year 1950. Milne's sudden death, at the early age of fifty-four, occurred only a few days after he had finished writing them and before they had been delivered. We are indebted to Dr. G. J. Whitrow for editing Milne's manuscript and to the publishers for the (under present conditions) speedy appearance of the lectures in print.

The title of the book is liable to be misleading on account of its adjectives. We shall refer later to the use of "Christian." As regards cosmology, that treated here is what Milne calls his own brand. Beyond a few passing criticisms, the reader will look in vain for any account of "modern" cosmology in general because Milne declared that he had no faith in theories other than his own. Moreover, Milne's cosmology will be seen to comprise the whole of fundamental physics and not to be merely an application of accepted terrestrial physics to the large-scale behaviour of the universe.

The book is, in fact, a general descriptive account of Milne's *kinematic relativity* presented with particular attention to the questions of significance mentioned above. Milne had brought together his researches in this subject in his two well-known books *Relativity, Gravitation and World Structure* (Oxford, 1935) and *Kinematic Relativity* (Oxford, 1948), but the present book is the only existing comprehensive account that is mainly of a non-mathematical character. It should be said at once that as such it is a brilliant exposition of a brilliant scientific achievement—though a highly controversial one. It will be welcomed by the many scientists and philosophers who have long wished to know what kinematic relativity is without having to master its mathematical techniques. It will be welcomed, too, by those who have some acquaintance with the mathematical treatment but who wish to see the subject as a whole and also to know what were Milne's latest views on its merits.

Kinematic relativity is an alternative to other relativity theories and, in particular, to Einstein's theory of general relativity. From the outset, the formulation is different from that of these other theories. The following is a somewhat crude but, one believes, not misleading sketch: Observers are supposed to be equipped with the equivalents of "clocks" and "radar-sets," these being initially uncalibrated. Using no other equipment, any two observers, A, B, can (under certain general conditions) agree upon a calibration of their clocks which may be said to render them congruent.² Calibrating their radar-sets in accordance with this calibration of their clocks, A and B can then use their equipment in the standard way to assign epochs and distances

¹ *Modern Cosmology and the Christian Idea of God*, by E. A. Milne. (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1952. Pp. 160. Price 21s.)

² This part of the work was expounded by Milne in his paper "A modern conception of time," *Philosophy* 25 (1950) 68.

to any observed events, and the law of transformation from the values assigned by either observer to those assigned by the other can be determined. A general third observer cannot calibrate his clock so as to be congruent to both A's and B's after these have been calibrated as stated. Nevertheless, Milne shows that there does in fact exist (in a mathematical sense) an infinity of observers each of which is congruent to any other.

Milne then studies a theoretical model universe in which such an "equivalence," as he calls it, constitutes the set of fundamental observers, these being identified with observers attached to the nuclei of the galaxies. He then postulates that the model universe satisfies the cosmological principle with regard to these observers, i.e. each of them sees the same "world-picture" as any other. He also postulates that the mathematical statement of any natural law must take the same form for each such observer. I think there is no doubt that he does require this, though his use of it in his later presentations of his work was less explicit than in the earlier ones.

The requirements that Milne thus imposes on his model universe are kinematical in character. Obviously they place restrictions upon the possible behaviour of the contents of this universe. The interesting thing is that Milne's mathematical treatment shows one of these restrictions to be such as we should normally describe by saying that the contents of the universe obey an inverse square law of gravitation. Thus he claims to have *deduced* the existence of such gravitation. He makes further deductions which need not be mentioned here.

In the second stage of his work, Milne looks for mathematical relations that bear a general resemblance to the laws of dynamics and which conform to his postulates. In particular, they must take the same form when we pass from their expression in terms of quantities assigned by one fundamental observer to those assigned by another. It then appears that Milne can write down effectively only one set of equations which play the part of the laws of dynamics in his model universe. So he says that these *are* the laws and he claims to have deduced them as theorems instead of having to take them as empirical laws of Nature. His treatment of electrodynamics is similar. (I do not think that Milne has in fact established the uniqueness of his results, but this is a problem outside the scope of the present review.)

The fundamental difference between Milne's procedure and the traditional procedure is now evident. The latter starts with laws of nature (whether they be framed as empirical laws, hypotheses, or postulates) and seeks to infer the behaviour of the universe. The laws are not regarded as being determined in any explicit way by the actual contents of the universe. On the other hand, Milne starts with the universe (as he postulates it) and seeks to infer the laws of nature. For him, the laws are determined explicitly by the contents of the universe.

Which procedure is to be preferred? Both are open to *a posteriori* criticisms, of which probably the most serious are these. The traditional procedure yields infinitely many "possible" universes, whereas a wholly satisfactory procedure would be expected to yield the actual universe as the only possible one. Milne's theory applies to only one universe, the model from which he starts and which he must identify with the actual universe if the theory is to have any physical significance. There is, of course, a serious difficulty in knowing why we should start from this model, but the more serious one for the moment is that his whole procedure would collapse unless the actual universe is exactly like his model. In particular, his mathematical treatment is impossible unless the universe conforms strictly to his cosmological principle.

Now most cosmologists believe that the universe does conform to the cosmological principle *in the large*, or, as we may say, statistically. But it

manifestly does not conform in detail. Indeed, were it to conform strictly, it is difficult to see that there would be any requirement for laws of nature, since such laws are normally required in order to predict the behaviour of local physical systems whose very existence denotes a departure from uniformity in the universe.

Following out these ideas, the answer to our question appears to be that neither procedure is to be preferred and that the only hope of progress is in a combination of both. A physical law is in general a proposition about local irregularities in the universe; without these irregularities there would be no requirement for the law; but the "constants" in the law, the form of the law, and even the fact that we can have a law, may depend upon the large-scale uniformity of the universe. If this is true, traditional physics fails to reach the fundamental basis of its laws because it does not take account of their dependence upon the actual contents of the universe; Milne's theory fails because it excludes the systems for which the laws are required. (The reviewer believes that Milne's theory has proceeded somewhat further than we should have expected because of certain implicit departures from the programme which he lays down for it.) The most promising procedure appears to be to try to develop the subject from both ends and then to try to render the two developments consistent with each other. The hope is to find that they can be made consistent but only in one way and that this unique theoretical possibility corresponds to the unique actual universe of experience. Until some such hope is realized, we may expect to make a certain amount of progress by the application of either procedure separately provided we recognize its limitations.

All this discussion suggests various comments upon Milne's present book. Undoubtedly, the discovery it records of what one has termed Milne's procedure is a major contribution to thought upon the subject. Our discussion should show why Milne includes so much of physics that is not usually treated under the heading of cosmology; for him, cosmology leads to physics, and not physics to cosmology. But if the argument of this review is valid, much of other current cosmological theory is complementary to Milne's; it is much to be regretted that he viewed it as incompatible with his ideas and dismissed it so unsympathetically.

Here it should be mentioned that the conception of a dependence of the laws of physics upon the actual contents of the universe is held to have originated with Mach, as Milne fully acknowledges. The only other general contribution to which he makes sympathetic reference is that of Eddington. But, except in a very broad sense, there is little in common between Milne's and Eddington's ideas. Actually the cosmology proposed in 1948 by H. Bondi and T. Gold may be regarded as belonging to the same general category as Milne's, but Milne appeared not to appreciate this aspect of their contribution.

It has seemed to the reviewer that the most useful service he can perform is to attempt to state what Milne's theory is and to assess its relationship to other theories. The reviewer does not forget that Milne's first two chapters are a general discussion of "the problem of the origin of the laws of nature." But this discussion covers ground that must be much more familiar than the rest of the book to readers of *Philosophy*.

Still less does the reviewer forget that Milne's theme in this book is "the relationship between Cosmology and Christianity to-day." But Milne asks, "Was not God a geometer to Plato?" and it seems to the reviewer that most of Milne's own thought led him by a fresh route to only the same conclusion. This is, of course, very remote from the Christian idea of God. It is only to be expected that such must be the case since Milne is for the most part concerned with the domains of thought most remote from those to which the idea

naturally belongs. Milne writes in his closing paragraph that "in a larger synthesis one must tread outside these limits" (of the domain of pure physics). One may suppose that he would claim only to have taken here a first step towards this synthesis. It happens that the main point to which this review calls attention in the domain of cosmology is the gain to be expected from the meeting of developments that start from two extremes in the subject. In that connection one could not help regretting Milne's disinclination to take this view. In the domain of knowledge of God we hope also to profit from the meeting of ideas that have widely different origins. In this case, the book supplies every indication that Milne would concur.

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III

GOD AND NATURE

God and Nature. By G. F. Stout. Edited by A. K. Stout with a memoir by John Passmore. (Cambridge Press. Pp. 339. Price 30s.)

Ten years elapsed between the delivery of the late Professor G. F. Stout's Gifford Lectures and the publication of the first volume which he based upon them. That volume, entitled *Mind and Matter*, was not a transcription of any part of the original course but an independent work setting out afresh the views advanced by the author on some of the topics discussed in the lectures. It was notable especially for its refutation of materialism and for a suggestive, but not in my view altogether plausible, account of causality inclining to a somewhat animistic view of Nature. The former has rarely been rivalled and gives the first volume a permanent importance for students of philosophy. In the course of developing his views the author made it plain that there was implicit in them for him the more positive notion of "one universal and eternal Mind developing and expressing itself in the world of finite and changeable beings." It was his intention to set out these ideas also in an independent work; but, anticipating that the project might not be carried out, he also left instructions with his son, Professor A. K. Stout, to prepare the appropriate parts of the original course for publication in the event of the work to be based upon them not being available at the author's death. It is thus the parts of the lecture course that were not absorbed into *Mind and Matter* that appear now under the title *God and Nature*, and it is a tribute both to the lectures themselves and to the skill of the editor that there are only one or two points, the scanty discussion of self-identity for example, where the reader is likely to feel the absence of the balance and unity appropriate to a book.

In addition to the lectures themselves the book contains an editorial Preface, where filial piety is all the more impressive because of its restraint, together with a memoir of the author by Professor John Passmore and a list of Stout's publications. The first part of the memoir outlines the main stages of Stout's career and provides a charming and intimate picture of the manner of man he was. The second part offers an assessment of Stout's achievement which should be of considerable value to students of psychology and philosophers alike.

To turn to the lectures; it is evident to Stout that his argument will not get under way at all unless it be established that the universe has an ultimate all-inclusive unity. His attention is thus first engaged with the notion of the unity of the universe and the prospect we have of discovering something worth knowing about it. The subject is broached with a characteristic appeal to view topics of this sort "in a dry light"; and after wise and timely observations on the kind of neutrality appropriate to the enquiry, including shrewd exposure of the disguised prejudices of the confirmed sceptic as well as of the open dogmatism of believers, Stout brings us to one of his main contentions, namely that if the universe has a unity its nature cannot be as completely hidden from us as Spencer and others suppose. This is on the ground that the nature of a part must give some indication of the nature of the whole. Knowledge so obtained may be not only incomplete but also equivocal in the scholastic sense, Stout having obviously much sympathy with the scholastic

view provided it be not interpreted in too sceptical a sense. But such knowledge is also of first importance to us despite its limitations, and it would be much more misleading to repudiate it than to accept it cautiously. This does not mean, as some idealists have supposed, that if we knew all about the flower in the crannied wall we would know all about God and man. Stout has some very pertinent comments to make on that kind of idealism—"the clue supplied by any one part is only partial" (p. 41 cf. also pp. 224-230). His view is the much more modest one that "we must start from the nature of finite beings and discount as irrelevant what presupposes or follows from their limitations and defects" (p. 32). I doubt, however, whether Stout has done full justice to the more sceptical views he rejects. He notes Spencer's argument that "the unknowable is unknowable because it is absolute in the sense of being unrelated, whereas 'to know is to relate'" (p. 26), and he comments that "if anything is unrelated to what we know, we can have no ground for asserting that it exists at all." This is plausible at first sight, but it does not seem to take due account of the uniqueness of our knowledge of God. It is the radical imperfection in the very process of relating terms that compels us to postulate some other more absolute or transcendent kind of unity for the universe as a whole. In this context it is not pertinent to insist, as Stout does in warning us away from the more cautious, and in my view more discerning, forms of the scholastic view, that "we cannot know how A is related to B without, *pro tanto*, knowing how B is related to A" (p. 28). This misses the peculiarity of the necessity of thinking of a unity of the universe as a whole. One is thus not surprised to find Stout later rejecting the traditional notion of absolute creation. Matter, he contends, "is fundamentally co-ordinate with mind" (p. 231). The Universal Mind is "all-powerful over matter" since matter is "transparent" to it, but it does not create matter. But the traditional view, with its corresponding stress on revelation, seems to me nearer the truth here, and for that reason I doubt also the appositeness of the designation of God, in any strict sense, as a Universal Mind. Must He not be more than that? But this is to go ahead too quickly.

To indicate further how he himself understands the notion of an all-inclusive Universe of Being, Stout next dissociates his own position sharply from that of Hegel. He accepts the substance of Russell's criticism of Hegel when the former accuses Hegel and his followers, Bradley and Bosanquet, of proceeding, by way of a false identification of incompleteness with self-contradiction, to the conclusion that everything short of the one Real Being is unreal or illusory. The reality and distinctness of finite beings must not be jeopardized, they are not to be "merged and lost" in the unity of the whole. But Russell in turn is accused of overlooking the "obviously fragmentary character of everything short of the whole," the close discussion of Russell's theory of knowledge being one of the most valuable parts of the book. It includes a lucid exposition of the "theory of acquaintance" and "knowledge by description," together with criticism based on the view that we can only pass from particulars to knowledge about them if the former are known in the first instance as essentially incomplete. This leads to a discussion of the relation of universals and particulars in the course of which Stout's celebrated theory of universals as distributive unities, developed more fully in his essays, is concisely stated, but without doing much to remove its considerable difficulties. The universal is thought to be a unity of its instances, including possible as well as actual instances, and the essential dependence of the possible on the actual is stressed in a consideration especially of hypothetical and disjunctive statements. The notion that there are no particulars which do not involve universals and call for completion in some unity beyond themselves

prepares the way for a more direct account of the nature of the external world and our knowledge of it.

The key-stone here for Stout is "common sense and science." In ordinary life we assume that "the material world includes a vast system of things having extension, figure, relative position and motion in space, which exist, change their nature and relations and causally interact, quite independently of being perceived by individual minds such as ours. On the other hand, we are in the first instance conversant with this world only by way of sense-perception" (p. 112). The latter "includes, besides much that is logically inference, a certain nucleus which is not acquired, but is primary" (p. 118). The main problem is to determine what this "primary sense knowledge," primary in a logical but not of necessity psychological sense, must be in order to yield knowledge of the material world which we all take for granted in ordinary thought and conduct. The notion that "what we primarily perceive is merely our own sensa" is rejected on the grounds that, even if we suppose, with the Neo-realist, that the immediate contents of sense experience may exist unperceived, the latter could not constitute or even be included "as parts or partial phases" in a strictly physical system. Although sensa are ultimately thought to be material and not mental they fall outside the physical order. For not only do we have sense presentations in dreams and hallucinations without any physical body, but all such presentations are subject to perpetual variations which cannot be ascribed to physical things. It seems thus that while we are only in touch with physical things by sense experience the contents of sense experience are no part of the physical world. In further rejection of the phenomenalist alternative to this obviously difficult view there is advanced the well-known argument that an account of physical things in terms of permanent possibilities of sensation, even "in Russell's elaborate and novel development of the Berkeley-Mill theory," is bound to use the "language of independent physical things" at some point. This is well stated, but again, in my view, not in a way which precludes a sufficiently persistent and careful phenomenalist from avoiding this particular inconsistency. Difficulties due to incompatibilities between immediate tactal and visual sensations, together with similar variations within the same sense, are also stressed; and the Berkeleyan notion that we need only take tangible extension to be physically real is shown to fail in the same way. At the same time, Berkeley is warmly applauded for the view that in sense experience we have contact with material reality, the author being not unwilling to describe himself as a Neo-Berkeleyan and claiming that his view, in this respect, is unavoidable if due regard is to be had to common sense. The plain man believes that he has direct access to material facts in sense experience. But how can we defer to the plain man here and deny to sense presentations a place in the physical system?

Stout's answer is in terms of "a mode of knowing which involves neither inference nor direct acquaintance with what is known" but in which "the place of premises is ultimately (taken by) the essential incompleteness of what is immediately experienced, which cannot be known at all unless in knowing it we know something else connected with it" (p. 134). Other examples of this mode of knowing, adduced to show that it is not introduced *ad hoc* to solve one problem only, are knowledge of universals, the relating of images to the impressions they represent, memory knowledge, knowledge of time relations and knowledge of the relations of premises and conclusion in an inference. None of these seem to me quite to suit the purpose, it being particularly questionable whether in knowing an image we *ipso facto* "know it as the image of an impression." But once this mode of knowing is admitted the way is open for Stout to hold

that in apprehending the sense presentation as essentially incomplete we have thereby some knowledge also of physical reality beyond it, knowledge which we can then proceed to make more precise by correlations of the data of sense.

It seems then that "the physical fact must be primarily and primitively apprehended as connected in nature and existence with the perceptual sensum" (p. 144). These "are more or less akin in nature. The sensum is akin to the physical fact as being of a piece with it. The sensum is the continuation within our immediate experience of something which is not immediately experienced. The physical object is thought of as the prolongation of the content of immediate experience into a region beyond it" (p. 145). This seems to do justice to both of the assumptions of the plain man, namely that in sense knowledge he knows physical facts, which are not thus merely inferred from immediate sensa, and that "what he primarily knows is what he immediately experiences." In this way we can "harmonize common sense with itself and with philosophical analysis" (p. 146).

In terms of this view there is provided next a detailed and fascinating account of the way our knowledge of the physical world is made determinate. In identifying physical objects much depends on the presence or absence of subjective control of what we immediately experience. This process and the part played in it by organic sensibility is carefully described, Stout making important use again of the notion which figured so prominently in *Mind and Matter*, namely that of varying degrees of "effort against resistance" in our contact with physical things. Discussion of the correlation of the data which are found to be external leads to an original account of causation and of the relations of primary and secondary qualities, in the course of which a great deal is said that can stand independently of the particular view of the external world which it is intended to subserve here. I shall not attempt to summarize these highly ingenious central chapters in an already lengthening review. But it seems to me that Stout had a particular flair for dealing with topics of this kind and I warmly commend his treatment of them to students of perception. Whether they agree or not they cannot but find the discussion extremely suggestive. The culmination of much in this part of the volume comes in a short but crucial chapter on "the status of sensa." We are here reminded of the "thorough-going distinction between sense-experience and physical objects, and also their continuity of existence and community of nature" (p. 197). The question then arises of the relation between these two. On this vital question, however, we are told little beyond the affirmation that sense presentations belong to the material world ultimately "as part to whole." For a mind that knew the whole material world "there would be only one immensely complex sensum, having a unity and continuity analogous to the unity and continuity of the content of our own sense experience. But for us only a tiny fragment of the whole is existentially present" (p. 198). Beyond this the author does not take us, and the chapter in question is tantalizingly short. For it is just here that the main questions arise. How can entities so distinct be also continuous in nature, and is it not a very far cry from common sense at any rate to suppose that we apprehend material reality in dreams and hallucinations, the more so in view of the radical distinction between sense contents of all kinds and physical things? Can we also avoid ascribing to the contents of sense experience some location in the one Space with the physical objects with which they are alleged to have such continuity of nature? The relation of part to whole in itself may not require this, but taken in conjunction with the peculiarity of spatial relations and of sense contents, it is far from obvious that they need not all be included in one spatial system. On the other hand, to assume that they are so included raises other very

grave problems, to my mind insuperable ones. But even if these and kindred problems are not insuperable we seem at the very least to have a curious duplication of entities which, by their invitation of the use of a celebrated razor, cast much suspicion on the theory as a whole and on the genuineness of the difficulties it is designed to meet, notably the alleged incoherence of phenomenalism.

A complaint I should like to voice especially is that Stout seems to pass far too easily from the contention, with which I entirely agree, that what is immediately experienced is "essentially incomplete" to his own view of the sort of completion it requires. To argue against Russell that the particular contents of experience cannot be a source of further knowledge unless "in knowing them we know something else"—this is one thing. But it is another to jump to conclusions about physical objects altogether distinct from sense contents. That we cannot "construct a bridge" from atomic data to our knowledge of things seems very true, but it leaves open the question what sort of system is involved in knowledge of the external world. Subsidiary arguments based on the incompatibilities in the way an object is presented to different senses and on the interdependence of primary and secondary qualities (p. 193) seem to me equally inconclusive where the question what sort of independence belongs to physical things is concerned. They do not preclude us from viewing this independence in terms of a completer systematizing of the sense contents themselves. The dichotomy of sense contents and physical things within the one material world seems thus unnecessary, to say nothing of a nest of new problems it engenders.

The last stage of the central argument of the book is reached with the insistence that the immediate contents of sense experience, although presumed for the reasons noted to be material, nonetheless depend on the mind. Several arguments are adduced here. The first proceeds from affinities between the senses to the conclusion that those types of sensa, visual ones for example, which might be thought capable of existing independently, together with those whose status seems uncertain—warmth, smells, taste and sounds—must share the obvious dependence on experience of organic sensa like tickles, cramps, and nausea. The second stresses the peculiarly intimate relation of the contents of sense experience to subjective states like pleasure and pain, while a third argument turns on the similarities of mental images, taken to be patently mind dependent, and other impressions. The position as a whole is reinforced by urging that introspection is not, in the case of sight for instance, a wholly reliable guide here; for we may well be led to ascribe to the impression itself the sort of independence which only belongs properly to the object of which it makes us aware. But once it is established that sensa are mind dependent there seems to be an easy transition to the view that the other elements of the material world which are held to be continuous in Nature with sensa must likewise depend on some mind. We thus arrive, by a route reminiscent of that taken by Green in his account of the Spiritual Principle in Nature, at a view of the system of nature as a whole as involving a single Universal Mind. But it must be added that our guide is much more subtle in argument and more lively than Green, albeit apt to stumble into similar equivocations about the externality of nature.

From the argument I have outlined Stout next turns, in the remaining third of the volume, to "other lines of enquiry" which he himself considers to be the most important, albeit he treats them somewhat more scantly here. These begin with an examination of the origin of mind, it being presumed to have been established in *Mind and Matter* that mind cannot owe its existence to anything not mental. The last assumption, taken in connection with the

view, which seems to me beyond question, that minds such as ours derive from some source beyond themselves, yields the conclusion that our minds must have "their source in mind which already exists" (p. 210). A survey of various forms of mind-stuff theories and monadologies results in the view that, even if we postulate minds other than those now associated with animal organisms, we cannot stop short at a multitude of finite minds, these being themselves derivative. "The unity of the universe" thus points again to the notion "of one underived and universal mind." But this argument will not convince those who dispute the conclusions of the earlier volume.

A study of the concomitance of brain processes and mental processes, in the course of which we are warned not to overlook the further correlation of these with sense presentations, already claimed to be a portion of matter known "intuitively as it is in itself," together with note of the psychophysical conditions of mental dispositions, is taken to reinforce further "the universal correlation of mind and matter" (p. 238) so central to Stout's main contentions. Likewise, an investigation of the problem of "other minds" brings us to the view that, while we are bound to know other persons in knowing ourselves, we are aware of others, not by inference in the first instance, but through "a primary demand for psychical existence beyond the self, founded on the essential incompleteness of the finite individual" (p. 248). This is parallel to the "demand for causal connection founded on the essential incompleteness of temporal occurrences" (p. 248), and as it cannot "be met by positing the existence of any finite individual or group of finite selves" (p. 257), the conclusion follows for Stout that our knowledge of other minds requires the existence of a Universal Mind. There seems to me, however, to be some gap in the argument which passes from "the incompleteness of the finite individual" to a "primary demand for psychical existence"—why of necessity psychical? The latter notion also presents grave problems of its own. Can it be understood, for example, apart from some intuition of other particular minds, a view to which there are well-known objections? If not, it seems rather abstract and remote from the actual knowledge of other minds in which it is supposed to be involved. Stout's arguments against the inference theory have in my view been met by Professor Price (cf. *Philosophy*, October 1938), but much that he says on this head, including a reference to primitive animism reminiscent of the earlier volume, retains its interest for the subject.

It remains to mention arguments of a more general sort, already familiar from the literature of idealism. From the insistence that cognitive unity, being a knowledge of unity, involves as its ultimate correlate the unity of the universe, we are brought, *via* an admirable presentation of the essentials of idealism in the last chapter but one, to the view that unity of interest and striving requires the inclusion of these in "the self-complete unity of a universal good" (p. 309). I will not go here into the well-known difficulties of this view, except to mention the problem, which Stout does little to alleviate, of accounting in terms of it for deliberate wrong-doing. But some further note must be taken of the way Stout conceives of the Universal Mind which he posits in these various ways.

Stout deals expressly with this topic in Chapter XIV which should prove exceptionally helpful because it sets out very clearly matters which have only been vaguely mooted by others. It is plain that for him "universal" is not altogether an apt designation here. For there is no intention of holding that individual minds are in any way parts of some other mind or capable of being absorbed into it. On the contrary the emphasis is on the distinctness of finite minds and the reality of temporal processes. The peculiarly indivisible unity of a mind is stressed. "Eternal," a term which is also used but less

frequently, is thus in some respects apter, although it has some other implications which Stout would not favour. Stout holds that the Universal Mind must be "without beginning or end" and "without change or succession." It knows and determines the whole system of nature. But in knowing the past and future God knows it as past and future, the temporal distinction being as real for Him as for us. Neither can He will what is contradictory. For example, He cannot will that our choices should be free and also determine our conduct. He is the originator of other minds but He does not create matter, matter and mind being essentially collateral. Such a theory has obvious advantages and helps us in some ways to reach a more consistent religious view. It rids us of some of the paradoxes to which a more absolutist or transcendental conception of God commits us, there being limits set to the way we must speak of His power and control over other reality. It also affords a plausible account of our knowledge of Him. For we know Him, on the present view, as essentially akin in nature to ourselves. He is a Mind as we are minds. This does not mean that we can "realize in thought or imagination" what the difference between His Mind and ours "positively means." "There is here a legitimate place for a critical and cautious agnosticism" (p. 223), our analogies being very imperfect. But there is also much that we can safely affirm on the basis of the identity of His nature, as mind, with ours. Nonetheless, alluring though this prospect is, it appears to me that we must abandon it and forswear the simplification of the problem of our knowledge of God which it ultimately involves. The price to be paid for restricting the dimensions of the problem is seen most sharply in the rejection of the notion of God as absolute creator of matter. This is as opposed to religious feeling as to the thought which brings us, in the first instance, logically if not psychologically, to the idea of God. For it is the inherently derivative character of all finite being as such, as opposed to the specific incompleteness we trace, and partially reduce, in the structure of things as we find them, that induces us to posit an ultimate unity of all being; and it is doubtful whether the demand for unification, in the form presupposed and partially met in ordinary thought or science, can stand without the more radical, if less intelligible, unity involved in the very being of anything, not excluding rational relations. Stout never seems to pass beyond the former, indebted though he is to Thomism; and so the emphasis on "essential incompleteness" is not understood in the way which leads most directly to religion and accords with its spirit. These matters have been much stressed of late in theological writings of various sorts and in religious philosophy. One wonders whether Stout would have modified his idealism further if he had written later.

These comments must not be taken to imply disagreement with Stout's insistence on the distinctness and reality of finite beings. He makes it plain, as others have done, that there is no solution of problems by denying inescapable facts in that way. But neither can we avoid some kind of absolutism in our thought about God. Even to say that He knows and wills may be misleading although it may be yet more misleading, in some sense, to deny this. How these and kindred paradoxes are to be treated is not a subject we can consider to any purpose in closing a review. It constitutes the crucial problem of the philosophy of religion in the interesting phase it has reached to-day. But one thing seems certain, namely that particular note must be taken of religious experience and of revelation as a way in which Supreme Reality finds distinctive embodiment in finite facts. Stout himself speaks with great respect of religious experience and represents his own task, in his philosophy of religion, as that of providing a theory consistent with such practice. He insists that "the cogency [of the experience] can be appreciated

only in experiencing it" (p. 255). But all this fits very loosely into Stout's system. It is by no means plain why a unique and mysterious experience is required, there is certainly no absolute mystery for him. The mysteries he allows are super-imposed on what we know independently of God, whereas they seem to me essential at all points. This implies that Stout's enterprise as a whole is doubtful, as is all purely natural theology, although we are not precluded from using much that he says in another way. That appears to me the main significance of the failure and radical artificiality of arguments such as those adduced so skilfully and ingeniously by Stout in support of the notion of a Universal Mind. They seem curiously irrelevant at the properly religious level and far removed from the pressing realities of the religious life. Nor could there be a plainer reflection of this than the definition of religious experience as "an emotional and conative attitude towards the whole of being" (p. 255). It may be this, but something essential seems to be lost in such generality. Religious experiences are specific and peculiar, and it is much better to speak of them in the plural. In considering further how we should think about them, and what patterns they present in themselves and in their relations to other events, there is a great deal that we can learn from a lucid and careful presentation of idealism such as we have in this book. But we shall also go far astray in religion if we do not begin with the sort of mystery which cannot be properly comprehended in any form of rational idealism.

I must, however, hasten to add that sympathy with the sort of criticism I have just been making should not diminish our appreciation of the worth of this book. *God and Nature* is a worthy successor to *Mind and Matter* and it should rank high among volumes of *Gifford Lectures*. Those who have no taste for speculation or religious philosophy will find the book a mine of suggestions for the study of perception and the "mind-body problem."

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PHILOSOPHICAL SURVEY

PHILOSOPHY IN FRANCE

SOME few years ago Henri Gouhier published a book under the title of *La philosophie et son histoire*; now, to complete the balance in a manner typical of the style of its author, comes *L'histoire et sa philosophie* (Vrin, Paris). The history in question is, in fact, primarily the history of "philosophy," though M. Gouhier makes by the way many remarks of interest and concern to the "philosophy of history" in the more general sense of that somewhat dubious phrase. It is above all, however, with the problems of how to study, recount and teach the philosophies, or philosopher's views, of the past that he is concerned. What are the differences between the histories of philosophies, or philosophical systems, of philosophers, of philosophy itself (the *philosophia perennis*), of *weltanschauungen*, in the Diltheyan sense of particular "types" of philosophy, and of *visions du monde*, that is to say the world-views of particular philosophers? How far are these different histories compatible with, or even complementary to, one another? To what greater or lesser extent are each of them more typically historical or philosophical? M. Gouhier himself inclines towards the view that the history of *visions du monde* is the nearest one can get to a non-distorting historical account; but he is concerned with discussion rather than the advocacy of any one view. He is not what one would call a linguistic analyst and is quite prepared to talk of essences; he has, nevertheless, a very fine sense of the ways in which language and thought can dovetail into each other. For much of the time he follows the best French scholarly tradition and lets others speak for him; indeed, his work is so full of references that at times it takes on the character of a conversation piece, arranged, produced and commented on by the author. However, let there be no doubt that it is M. Gouhier himself, who has, of course, done much work in the field which he is here discussing, who is responsible for this brief and suggestive book, which is both a pleasure and a stimulus to the reader.

Many of the problems raised by M. Gouhier must have been faced by Yvon Belaval in the construction of his *Pour connaître la pensée de Leibniz* (Bordas, Paris). The book is divided into two portions, the first, entitled "The Formation," being just about twice as long as the second, entitled "The System." The foreground theme of the first part is indeed the gradual formation of Leibniz's thought, and this is placed against a middle distance and background of the philosopher's life, and the diplomatic, political, religious and philosophic activity of the time. This background is supplied by means of a quite remarkable amount of highly compressed, detailed information, which, for the reader who can be relied upon to supply the broad outlines himself, is calculated to sharpen the focus (though for the reader who cannot may, more probably, blur it). The second part presents a version of the completed system, given, to an admirably large extent, in Leibniz's own words. It is frequently said of Leibniz, of course, that he was a man of two philosophies, one which as a philosopher he believed to be correct, but kept very largely to himself, and one in which he didn't believe at all, but which as a politician he deemed fit for presentation to the public. M. Belaval is, for his part, firm in his insistence on the essential unity of Leibniz's thought; and although he does not exactly conceal the fact that Leibniz was also personally ambitious, his emphasis throughout is placed on the underlying continuity both of his motives as a patriot and of his hopes of bringing about a reconciliation of the

disunited churches. In particular, he attempts to show that the doctrine of a *vinculum substantiale*, which Leibniz expounded in his correspondence with the Jesuit Father Des Bosses, must be regarded as an integral part of the monadological system, rather than as an expedient introduced solely in order to allow for the possibility of the doctrine of trans-substantiation. Certainly, given the position that no state of any monad can be said to be identical with any different state, that all monads are continually active (for action is the nature of Being), and that every monad reflects every change in every other monad, it is hard to see what legitimate account can be given of what it means for a body to retain its organic identity from one (differential) instant to another; though whether the introduction of some sort of formal principle capable of insuring similar phenomena from different collections of monads will do the trick seems somewhat doubtful. At any rate, the discussion is extremely interesting, M. Belaval's suggestion that "the idea of resemblance constitutes effectively in God the essence of the species" and thus "the ultimate foundation of the essence *in so far as it is realized in an actual existence* resides in the *vinculum*" reminding one curiously of Russell's resort to similarity as the only indispensable universal. Still, it remains true that, whatever Leibniz's motives may have been, "even without the *vinculum*, the phenomena would be the same, the logical connections between the monads would be the same; only the basis of reality would be changed"; and whether this addition is one that can fairly be made without distorting the rest of the system is a question that I can only leave to true Leibniz scholars. A similar sort of question, also with its echo in modern controversies, comes up in connection with the problem of whether or not any man can sensibly be said to deserve better than he gets. If an individual, Adam, is only fully defined by the total list of predicates of which he can be made the subject, the answer is clearly not, simply because he can then be no other than what, in the broadest sense of the word, happens to him. But is Adam in fact reducible to the series of his predicates? This is a sort of question that has cropped up regularly in debates over phenomenism; and, of course, people are always asking, in one fashion or another, what it is that names name.

But this is to pick out particular points of interest from what is designed as an overall presentation, the success of which is above all due to the care with which have been developed the connections with Cartesianism, Theology and Mathematics, in particular the Differential Calculus and the Theory of Dynamics. There is a sense, perhaps, in which the book as a whole might fairly be said to aim at a more typically French rather than an English audience, an audience, that is to say, who, although non-specialist, possess a wide background of general culture against which Leibniz can be easily, if he is not already, situated; and who are asking, in effect, to have their knowledge deepened at this particular point. But for anyone who may feel himself to be a prospective member of such an audience, this is a book that can be wholeheartedly recommended.

Raymond Ruyer, in his *Philosophie de la valeur* (Armand Colin, Paris), sets forth the thesis that in any account of value there are three aspects to be distinguished—the agent, the form and the ideal, where, in spite of a certain natural tendency for the second and third aspects to become confused, "form" is to be taken roughly as "type actually realized" and "ideal" as "governing essence"; for instance, an artist, the agent, seeking an ideal of beauty, produces a particular form of picture. All three aspects, M. Ruyer contends, must somehow be held together. However, the difficulty with such analyses is to know how to deal with the "ideal," or "essence," and most present-day English philosophers would doubtless take the view that the language that he

uses is largely responsible for M. Ruyer's somewhat Platonic journey into the "meta-spatial." His other leading theme is that modern science has shown that Nature is through and through "axiological." The argument involved seems to be that the smallest physical components have been shown to act, that is to institute actions, rather than simply to react, and that this they can only do in view of some end or in accordance with some pattern, for an agent only knows what to seek if he knows, in some very ill-defined sense, what he is to become. This seeking after fulfilment of a type is taken to be typical value-seeking activity. But quite apart from the question of whether the majority of scientists would be at all prepared to accept an argument of this type, to stretch "axiological" terminology in this way to be applicable to the behaviour of both the atom and the artist seems to be covering over rather than analysing the difficulties of knowing how to talk sensibly about values.

Le Père Teilhard de Chardin et la pensée contemporaine (Le Portulan, chez Flammarion, Paris) by Louis Cognet is a philosophical work only in a very special sense, for it belongs to a discussion between Catholics on points of Catholic doctrine. Le Père Teilhard, it seems, is a distinguished geologist and paleontologist, who has been trying to work out a view of the world which is both Catholic and in accordance with what he takes to be the viewpoint of modern science. M. Cognet, while welcoming this attempt as courageous and necessary, nevertheless attacks it all along the line, chiefly because he finds it at variance at nearly every important point with the traditions of Christianity as interpreted by the Catholic Church. Certainly, some of the Reverend Father's ideas—sin as a kind of statistical necessity, for instance—sound odd enough from any point of view. However, be that as it may, the book has, I think, a possibly wider interest. Firstly, because it provides a good simple example of the sort of things that a believer who takes seriously the traditions of the Church is committed to saying. And secondly, because it demonstrates the extreme difficulty, at the least, of combining a modern reinterpretation of a historical religion with a maintenance of the doctrinal content which makes that religion the distinctive religion that it is.

I doubt whether *Les Etudes Bergsoniennes*, Vol. III (Albin Michel, Paris) will have much appeal in England, though, considering the influence that Bergson has had on the climate of thought in France, it is, in its way, most instructive, not least in the records that it presents of the meetings of the Bergson Society. Instructive also is Lydie Adolphe's examination of Bergson's dramatic use of images, for it is interesting to see this question dealt with by a sympathizer. Among the many works which would be easier to read for someone with some acquaintance with Bergsonian ways of thinking, is Henri Brocher's *Les étapes de la pensée humaine* (Labor et Fides, Geneva), or at any rate that lesser half of it which does not simply constitute an anthology of anthropological curiosities, but which elaborates a distinction between mystic, mechanist and moral ways of thinking; where the first results from a primitive failure to distinguish between the inner and outer world, the second deals with the outer world alone and the third deals with the inner world and is essentially Christian. The author of this really very slight little book has some odd reflections on the westward path taken by the centre of world thought across the ages, which is now to be found, apparently, round about San Francisco, Los Angeles and Seattle. No less odd, though in a very different way, is *Le principe d'antagonisme et la Logique de l'énergie* (Hermann, Paris) by Stephane Lupasco, who for some time has been engaged in an attempt to show that in whatever direction one may pursue one's research, one will come in the end upon irreducible contradictions. This particular book is designed to elaborate his thesis in the realm of symbolic logic. Though knowledgeable, however, he

seems to have no very clear notion of the nature of logic and of its relation to matters of language and fact in general; nor, incidentally, does he write very well.

For the rest, Pierre Auger, a physicist, who is a strong advocate of the view that there is only one world and that that belongs to the physicist and for whom atoms and men are both individuals in virtue of similar characteristics, sets out, in *L'homme microscopique*, to trace the consequences of applying the ideas and concepts of atomic physics to the whole of human activity, becoming increasingly speculative as he goes along. While Dr. Maurice Vernet, a biologist, whose thorough, if repetitive, study of living phenomena in *La vie et la mort* seems guided by certain metaphysical or religious assumptions, advocates equally strongly the view that Life is governed by a principle of energy in no sense reducible to any physico-chemical principle. (Both these books are published by Flammarion in their *Bibliothèque de philosophie scientifique*.) Paul Siwek, S.I., expounds and attacks Spinoza from a Catholic standpoint in his *Au cœur du Spinozisme* (Desclée de Brouwer, Paris); and Georges Gougenheim and Pierre-Maxime Schuhl present a careful commentary on the test of *Trois essais de Montaigne* (Vrin, Paris), one essay being chosen from each book. Among reprints are *Platon et l'art de son temps*, also by M. Schuhl and first published in 1934; and *Le malheur de la conscience dans la philosophie de Hegel* by Jean Wahl, first published in 1929 and primarily concerned with Hegel's early thinking before his system finally closed down upon him. (Both republishations are by Presses Universitaires de France, Paris.) Translations include two from the Italian; *L'existence de Dieu* by Michele-F. Sciacca, translated by Régis Jolivet (Aubier, Paris), which is notable, in these days, for its firm advocacy of the ontological argument, and *Le temps harcelant* by Enrico Castelli (Presses Universitaires de France), a plaint against the way in which modern life exchanges rush for humanity, which for me was chiefly attractive for the memories of his early life in old-world Piedmont, the memories of another world altogether, which the author evokes by way of contrast. Finally, it may be worth while to draw attention, first to a quite unpretentious little article on "Le vocabulaire comme structure et comme expérience," by R. Michéa, which appeared in *La revue philosophique* of April-June 1952, and which directly is about the advantages and limitations of limited vocabulary systems, but a good deal of which could be taken to be about the advantages and limitations of sticking to ordinary language; and secondly to Vol. 17-18 of the frequently admirable *Revue Internationale de Philosophie*, which is on this occasion devoted to the notion of Verification, and which opens with a brief and excellent introductory article, in English, by none other than Professor Ryle.

ALAN MONTEFIORE.

NEW BOOKS

The Greeks and the Irrational. By E. R. DODDS. (Berkeley, U.S.A.: University of California Press; Cambridge University Press. Pp. 327. Price 37s. 6d.)

Professor Dodds has in this book added a useful and ample documentation to his Sather lectures of 1949, and with them conveniently reprints two articles on Maenadism and Theurgy. He will attain his purpose of interesting many besides classical scholars (whom he properly exhorts to acquaintance with anthropologists more recent than Lévy-Bruhl and Durkheim) and will be found a reliable guide to some often disregarded aspects of Greek life and thought. By some who idealize the Greeks they may have been disregarded because their existence was unwelcome; yet there is some excuse for preferring to give one's attention to that part of Greek life and literature that has inspired or can inspire our own. Prof. Dodds urges, however, that his subject has a lesson for us. If we are to constitute a rational society, we must understand, in order to control, human irrationality. In these lectures he wishes to show how the Greeks attempted but failed to achieve a solution. A short review can do no more than outline the main theme, and cannot do justice to the interest and value of the detailed examination given to many particular topics.

Often the Greeks ascribed to an external agency psychical events for which we should seek an internal cause: Homeric man, lacking a unified concept of personality, frequently believes himself to think, feel, or act on a divine impulse; in the following Archaic age feelings of guilt, created by the structure of society, lead to the idea of jealous, vengeful gods, who are later transformed, to meet human needs, into agents of Justice. Other less usual experiences give rise to the belief in "possession," seen in prophetic inspiration and the enthusiasm of certain religious rites. The same readiness to appeal to external causation appears in the Greek attitude to dreams, on which there is an excellent chapter. Although wish-fulfilment and symbolism were familiar as explanations, there was a persistent tendency to regard a dream as something objective (as always in Homer); and this is part of the reason why the Greeks so often experienced, and acted upon, a type of dream rare to-day, in which a respected figure, even a god, reveals the future or gives instructions.

Another strain of thought is that according to which the *psyche* does not merely survive the body, but is a stranger in it, and can obtain occult knowledge by dissociation from it. Prof. Dodds advances the theory that an impulse to this was given by acquaintance with Thracian *shamans*; that their activities and beliefs were generalized and adapted to give the doctrine of transmigration of all souls, of a universal afterworld with rewards and punishments, and of ritual purification from sins, the doctrine that we associate with Pythagoras and the even more elusive Orphics. This was transformed by Plato, but the *shaman* can still be seen in his philosopher: the trance has become the practice of mental concentration, occult knowledge the vision of metaphysical truth, and the memory of past earthly lives the recollection of the eternal Forms.

Plato had welded this other-worldliness to a belief in the rationality of the soul's true nature, which he never satisfactorily reconciled with his empirical knowledge of man as he is. Prof. Dodds shows that the excessive intellectualism of Socrates and some fifth-century sophists had excited protest before Plato recognized the strength of irrational forces in man. At the same time he had seen towards the end of the century a panic reaction in defence of the old order of things, and the growth of new superstitions to replace those religious

beliefs that rationalism had undermined. The *Laws* provide his response to the inconvenient fact of man's actual irrationality. If society is to survive a modicum of purified religion must be provided and enforced, while men's thoughts must be rigidly controlled.

The tide of rationalism rose again in the third century, the achievement of which is too often underestimated; but Stoic intellectualism, Academic scepticism, and the progress of science and mathematics were followed by an ebb of renewed superstition, mental stagnation, and anxiety for personal salvation. To previous explanations of the Hellenistic failure Prof. Dodds adds his suggestion that it was due to a fear of living a life of free and rational choice, and that if we to-day are faced with a similar problem we may solve it with the resources of modern psychology. If, as is to be hoped, he has an opportunity of expanding these ideas, he might define more closely the meaning of "irrational," and make clearer his view of the value of habituation in conduct and of religious feeling as a mode of experience.

F. H. SANDBACH.

Leisure the Basis of Culture. By JOSEF PIEPER. Translated by Alexander Dru with an introduction by T. S. Eliot. (Faber & Faber. 1952. Pp. 169. Price 10s. 6d.)

Mr. T. S. Eliot, who writes an introduction to this translation of two of Dr. Pieper's recent essays, is not alone in complaining of the present "sickness of philosophy"—although he seems unaware that logical positivism, which he regards as "the most conspicuous object of censure," is already *démodé* in contemporary philosophical circles and only kept in circulation by a few ingenuous scientists. Of the two essays concerned, which are closely interrelated, the first offers a theory of leisure and the second a theory about the correct way to philosophize; and both are stimulating, well written and highly contentious. The importance of Pieper's work, it seems to me, lies in the fact that he argues a case, with undaunted persistence and no little skill, for a complete reversal of the whole trend of philosophy since Descartes and Locke, in different ways, ushered in the modern era. The question is, therefore, whether Pieper's influence will, as Eliot claims, "restore to their position in philosophy what common sense obstinately tells us ought to be found there: *insight* and *wisdom*."

Let us take his theory of leisure first. In order to understand the proper meaning of leisure, we have to recall, as a start, the medieval distinction between *ratio* and *intellectus*—between the power of discursive, logical thought and the capacity of simple intuition or "that simple vision to which truth offers itself like a landscape to the eye." On this view the process of knowing is the action of these two together; as Pieper puts it, "the mode of discursive thought is accompanied and impregnated by an effortless awareness, the contemplative vision of the *intellectus*, which is not active but passive, or rather receptive." The point he wishes to establish is that whereas *ratio* involves "real hard work," intellectual contemplation, the other vital part of the epistemic process, is "essentially not work." Thus Kant was wrong in declaring philosophy to be genuine only in so far as it is "herculean labour," and the Marxists are equally wrong in their use of the term "intellectual worker"—for this misleads us into believing that the pursuit of knowledge is on a level with other activities concerned with utilitarian ends, and that man can never be more than a functionary or official even in the highest reaches of

his activity. In short, intellectual contemplation, which was derided by Kant but is in fact the mark of the educated man who takes in the whole world, is incompatible with the inner meaning of the concepts "intellectual work" and "intellectual worker."

This brings us closer to the main point of the essay, for we are now in a position to proceed to a definition of leisure. "Leisure . . . is a mental and spiritual attitude—it is not simply the result of external factors, it is not the inevitable result of spare time, a holiday, a week-end or a vacation. It is an attitude of mind, a condition of the soul. . . . Compared with the exclusive ideal of work as activity, leisure implies (in the first place) an attitude of non-activity, of inward calm, of silence; it means not being 'busy,' but letting things happen." But it is not just non-activity; it is something more. For instance, feast-days and holy days are the inner source of leisure, for on such occasions man affirms his "fundamental accord with the world." It is because leisure "takes its origin from 'celebration' that it is not only effortless but the direct contrary of effort; not just the negative, in the sense of being no effort, but the positive counterpart." Leisure, then, is not a break in one's work, a link in the chain of utilitarian functions; it runs at right angles to work—just as intuition is not the prolongation of the work of the *ratio*, but cuts right across it, vertically. *Ratio* used to be compared to time, *intellectus* to eternity.

Much of this argument—which is hardly new—will doubtless gain some measure of assent, even if "*intellectus*" is one of those slippery terms which mean everything or nothing. It is true enough that we need insight, in all branches of study, and that we also need, at times, to think disinterestedly—which is what the contemplative or leisurely attitude should promote. But Pieper's crucial point is to follow. "Celebration is the point at which the three elements of leisure emerge together: effortlessness, calm and relaxation. . . . But if "celebration" is the core of leisure, then leisure can only be made possible and indeed justifiable upon the same basis as the celebration of a feast: and that formation is *divine worship* . . . cut off from the worship of the divine, leisure becomes laziness and work inhuman." Thus humanism, in these irreligious days, is not enough—for "it is quite futile to defend the sphere of leisure in the last ditch but one." In short, "culture lives on religion through divine worship. And when culture itself is endangered, and leisure is called in question, there is only one thing to be done: to go back to the first and original source." Hence, just as Plato, who understood this conception of leisure, allotted a place for divine worship in his Academy, so must we to-day, if we value leisure, make similar provision. But since, so Pieper holds, it is impossible "to find any other worship whatsoever in the Europeanized world," it is only Christian worship which can properly provide the core of leisure and the basis of culture.

I fear this is an excessively partisan conclusion; and it will certainly offend members of other faiths, such as Buddhists, Moslems and Jews, as well as those who subscribe to no particular faith. It seems almost ludicrous to ignore the fact that there are many intelligent people who for one reason or another entirely reject the dogmatic claims of Christian theologians, but who are nevertheless humanists in the best sense of that much abused term and fully alive to the necessity of preserving culture and leisure against totalitarian attack. Hence, to demand an indissoluble link between leisure and divine worship, and more narrowly between leisure and the Christian Church, is to demand something which will arouse the deepest hostility on the part of large numbers of educated men and women. Indeed, some will feel that Pieper is trying to reintroduce the religious bigotry of the Middle Ages.

This attempt to put the clock back is strikingly developed in Pieper's

second essay entitled "The Philosophical Act." Even if we admit that modern philosophy sometimes resembles a blocked road, it is hardly helpful to suggest that the theological escape route is the right way out of the impasse. However, we must in fairness examine his thesis.

Dr. Pieper asks first of all, What does philosophizing mean? The preliminary answer is that "to philosophize is to act in such a way that one steps out of the world of work in which man earns bread by the sweat of his brow"—one becomes concerned with the "common good" rather than the "common need." This distinction is developed by pointing to a dictum common to Aristotle and Aquinas—that philosophy is akin to poetry in that both are concerned with wonder or marvelling (cf. Plato's *Theaetetus*), a feature that promotes transcendence of the everyday world. Philosophy, moreover, is a "free" as opposed to a functional knowledge—which it is not allowed to be in totalitarian States, for there it is merely assigned the task of defending and demonstrating the validity of some particular ideology. So far, I think, there will be a good deal of sympathy for this view—west of the Iron Curtain at least. But this sympathy is soon likely to be dispelled by what immediately follows. For Pieper goes on to claim that we can only contemplate or "theorize" in the full sense "if we are able to look upon the world as the creation of pure spirit." We must accept Aquinas' enigmatic proposition *omne ens est verum*, we must "fix our mind's eye on the totality of being" and we must agree that a philosophical question cannot be put without bringing into play "God and the world." Indeed, "the distinctive mark of a philosophical question is that it brings out what constitutes the essence of spirit: *convenire cum omni ente*, in harmony with everything that is."

Now there is much to be said, in these analytic days, for any thinker who tries once more to achieve a synoptic approach to philosophical problems; but a modern synoptic approach does not imply a return to Thomism. Yet this seems precisely what Pieper would have us do. For he goes on to affirm—what it is the great merit of all post-medieval philosophy to have denied—that philosophy must take its cue from, or (as he puts it) be "trained on," theology, as it was in Aquinas' system. And let there be no half-measures. "The philosopher who reflects upon the things of this world in the light of the revealed doctrine of the Logos, will attain to knowledge that would otherwise remain hidden from him . . . philosophical knowledge of things in themselves." Hence, although Sartre's atheistical existentialism may be a vital philosophy (since it appears to involve certain theological presuppositions), for a philosophy to be vital *and true*, it "must be the counterpoint to a true theology, and that, *post Christum natum*, means Christian theology."

All this seems most unfortunate. In the first place, how can we be *certain* that Christian theology is any more or less true than Moslem or Jewish or Hindu theology? All the main competing theologies in the world are based on allegedly authoritative interpretations of certain sacred texts—but there is no available criterion, which would appeal to philosophers *as such*, for deciding which, if any, is divinely inspired and therefore true. In the second place, Pieper talks of Christian theology in the singular as if he were ignorant of the fact that there are a score or more of Christian theologies all differing on vital points of dogma. It is surely necessary for him to state clearly which particular dogmas are in fact to be regarded as the minimum basis for philosophical speculation. (A religious sceptic would also want to ask whether Dr. Pieper was acquainted with Biblical criticism, and particularly with the scholarly work of Alfred Loisy, when making his claim.) However, the fact remains that the reorientation of modern philosophy recommended by Pieper involves that philosophy should "receive its impulse and impetus from a

prior and *uncritically accepted* interpretation of the world as a whole" (my italics)—and that this interpretation is to be furnished by a Christian theology.

This is medievalism with a vengeance; and I imagine that such a recommendation will be as unpalatable to philosophers who are also Christians as to those who are of some other faith or of no faith at all. If it is true that philosophy is in an unhealthy condition at the moment, it must be cured by other methods than those proposed by Dr. Pieper.

J. HARTLAND-SWANN,

Bertrand Russell's Theories of Causation. By ERIK GOTLIND. (Uppsala: Almqvist & Wiksell's Boktryckeri AB. 1952. Pp. 164. Price not indicated.)

This book contains a lucid exposition and careful examination of Russell's theories of causation, which occupy an important place in his philosophical work. The development of philosophy in the first half of the present century coincides to a considerable extent with the development of Russell's thought. Mr. Götlind's monograph will thus be welcome both to readers who are concerned with Russell's views for the sake of their philosophical content and to those who are interested in the history of recent philosophy.

To Russell philosophy is philosophical analysis of the results of scientific inquiry and of common-sense beliefs. Although he has nowhere at length explained his conception of philosophical analysis two of his methodological assumptions seem fairly obvious. First, analysis is translation, if necessary with modifications, into a precise language whose structure is or approximates to that of *Principia Mathematica*. Second, while the philosopher has first-hand knowledge of common-sense beliefs, he is in the analysis of scientific propositions largely dependent on the judgment of scientific experts. This means in practice that his translations of scientific propositions are less free than those of common-sense beliefs.

Mr. Götlind shows how Russell throughout his work on causation has taken his epistemological marching orders from natural science, in particular from physics. When paying attention to "pre-scientific" and non-scientific causal propositions he tends to regard them as provisional rules of thumb to be replaced by scientific propositions even when the manner of the desired replacement is for the time being not clear.

The greatest change in Russell's views on causal propositions occurred after the advent of relativity and quantum-physics. Mr. Götlind makes it, however, quite clear that Russell's epistemology is sensitive even to comparatively minor changes in the field of physics such as the transition from Bohr's to Heisenberg's theory of atomic structure. It might indeed appear that on Russell's principles epistemology is in danger, if it is a danger, of becoming an *ad hoc* commentary on the rapid changes in contemporary physical theory. Mr. Götlind seems to recognize this when he distinguishes the relation of Russell's views to contemporary physics from their relation "to the great slow-moving philosophical debate, where there may be centuries between the replies" (p. 77).

Russell's first detailed treatment of causal laws is found in his *Principles of Mathematics* where he expresses the laws of classical dynamics in terms of the logical language first developed in this work and later refined in *Principia Mathematica*. These causal laws, which involve differential equations, are, as Mr. Götlind shows, regarded as formal implications. It might have been worth while to dwell in greater detail on this feature of Russell's analysis for at least

two reasons. On the one hand, Russell adhered to it throughout his work on causation. On the other hand, recent discussions of unfulfilled hypotheticals have thrown serious doubt on the analysis of causal propositions into formal implications and consequently on Russell's fundamental assumption that the logical system of *Principia Mathematica* is a generally suitable tool of philosophical analysis.

From his analysis Russell deduces two important corollaries which he also never abandons: first that scientific causal propositions are not merely descriptive but, roughly speaking, predictive, and second, that certain philosophical maxims about the nature of causation are wholly inadequate if applied to Newtonian and post-Newtonian physics. Most of these maxims, e.g. that the effect must resemble the cause, have been proclaimed long before Galileo. After a detailed discussion Mr. Götlind accepts these corollaries with some qualifications.

He traces admirably the development of Russell's views on scientific causal propositions and on the related topics of induction and probability from the *Principles to Human Knowledge*. He also shows clearly how concern with the problems of the external world and the continuity of the self has led Russell to the recognition of different types of causal propositions and thoroughly discusses their nature.

In the last chapter of his book Mr. Götlind considers Russell's almost Kantian attempt to discover the essential postulates by whose adoption scientific inquiry as we know it becomes possible. He argues (unconvincingly, I believe) that these postulates are empirical propositions and gives reasons why, in his view, they are not sufficiently strong to fulfil their alleged function.

It is not possible here to mention all the important points raised by Mr. Götlind. I have noticed a comparatively large number of misprints, none of which, however, is an obstacle to the understanding of the argument which is often illuminating and always full of philosophical interest. S. KÖRNER.

The Chief Currents of Contemporary Philosophy. By DHIRENDRA MOHAN DATTA. (Calcutta University Press. Price Rs.10/8.)

This is a longish book (it extends to 531 pages) and the purpose of its author is "to share with a wider reading public, interested in modern problems, his studies in the chief philosophical movements of the present century in Europe, America and India." Prof. Datta writes in a lucid and uncomplicated manner and has succeeded in giving an adequate and indeed scholarly account of the modern philosophical scene, starting with the Neo-Hegelians and ending with the logical positivists. Some contemporary thinkers exhibit, as we know, an extreme impatience, not only with the great figures of the past, but with all modern philosophers who do not appear to show sufficient proficiency in linguistic clarification. It is all the more necessary, therefore, for the unbiased student to be able to judge for himself the sense or nonsense of what has been said in the last fifty years. This of course may seem to some a rather formidable task. We may be glad, therefore, that Prof. Datta enables the interested student to master, in (say) one week's comfortable reading, the main features of all significant modern philosophical writings, and that he provides, at the same time, a definite impetus to the study of some original texts.

The most noticeable characteristic of Prof. Datta's approach is his sympathetic handling of every system or philosopher considered. He does not of course fail to point out weaknesses—and particularly any lack of self-consistency—but he makes it clear that even the seemingly oddest doctrines put

forward were the result of strenuous efforts to attain truth. The chapter headings, which by themselves give only a bare indication of the amount of ground covered, are as follows: Neo-Hegelian Idealism, Italian Idealism, Indian Idealism, Pragmatism, Philosophy of Bergson, Realism, Philosophy of Sense-Data, Emergent Evolution, Whitehead's Philosophy of Organism, Logical Positivism and the Philosophical Aspects of Marxism. (There is also an Appendix on the contribution of Modern Indian Philosophy to World Philosophy.) It is difficult to single out any one chapter since the standard of exposition is so evenly maintained; but I found the account of Neo-Hegelianism excellent and the chapters on Bergson, Whitehead and the Logical Positivists comprehensive without being dull. I should stress, perhaps, that Prof. Datta makes no attempt to emulate those popular works of "philosophy without tears" of which we have already had a sufficiency. We may hope that this book will soon be published in this country and thus become more readily available to English readers.

J. HARTLAND-SWANN.

Bertrand Russell's Construction of the External World. By CHARLES A. FRITZ, JNR. (Routledge & Kegan Paul. 1952. Pp. 231. Price 23s.)

The author's avowed object in this book is to give an account of Russell's method of "logical constructions" and, in particular, of his application of it to "the problem of our knowledge of the external world," i.e. of material objects and the entities of physics. A third of the book is taken up by a brief general introduction and a fairly long explanation of Russell's analysis of cardinal and real numbers, of descriptions and of classes. This is ground that has been covered a good many times before, by Russell himself as well as by his expositors. The author has nothing new to add here, but he tells the story more clearly, I think, than it is usually told; and this part of his book might have considerable value for students. He seems somewhat uncritically to accept the view that we are faced with the alternatives of adopting some such analyses as Russell's or assuming that there exist "entities denoted by" numerals, descriptions and class-names; and that we had better avoid making this assumption if we can. The author does not explain the meaning of the question, whether numbers or classes are entities, or the sense in which the view that they were entities would be an alternative to Russell's or just the sort of risk we should run in supposing that they were. But it would perhaps be disingenuous to suggest that the need for an explanation of these points has very generally been felt.

The rest of the book is devoted to an examination of Russell's attempts to solve his main epistemological problem, viz. that of justifying, on the basis of what alone he holds to be certain (the "hard data" of "immediate experience"), both the theories of physics and our ordinary beliefs about material things. The author describes the evolution of Russell's views from the earlier programme of replacing "inferred, non-sensible entities" with logical constructions from sense-data and sensibilia, to the later enumeration of postulates which, if accepted, would serve to justify certain of such inferences. The story is worth telling and is conscientiously if a little repetitively, told. The author does not seriously question the general form in which Russell states his problem, though surely grounds for questioning it are fairly well known. But within the limits thus set, he produces reasonable criticisms of Russell's solutions. In particular, he effectively questions Russell's claim to be using a new, metaphysically neutral, purely logical method in philosophy.

This is, in the ways and within the limits I have indicated, a useful and interesting book.

On p. 32, line 2, the first "by" is a misprint for "be." On p. 43, line 3, the phrase "or equal to" should, I think, be omitted. P. F. STRAWSON.

The Existentialist Revolt. By DR. KURT F. REINHARDT. (Bruce Publishing Co., Milwaukee. 1952. Pp. vii + 245. Price \$3.40.)

Dr. Reinhardt is a Professor of Stanford University who studied in his early years under Husserl, Jaspers and Heidegger. In *The Existentialist Revolt* he has given a very clear and useful account of seven existentialist philosophers, including his tutors. He himself is a Thomist who holds that Aquinas inaugurated a revolution in metaphysics when he turned the philosopher's interest from "form and essence, where it had lingered for so many centuries, to the act of existing," thus becoming the first existentialist, the first philosopher to recognize the primacy of the act of existing over essence. Dr. Reinhardt regards all true Christian thinking as "existentialist" in that it is not concerned primarily with pure thought or pure knowledge but gravitates towards "existence," towards a "way of life"; he defines existentialism as a kind of thinking concerned with calling to life, with making and re-making the life of the unique, responsible person.

As a Christian existentialist Dr. Reinhardt takes a critical view of Nietzsche and Sartre, especially the latter. The atheist existentialists are indeed at one with the Christians in their attempts to rescue the individual from the abstract generalities of idealism and from submersion in the impersonal collective. But the idea of freedom in Sartre, whom Dr. Reinhardt describes as "the ape of Lucifer," is one of self-deification; Sartre annihilates all value in order to choose himself in absolute autonomy as the one and only value. The Sartrian hero, Orestes, in *Les Mouches*, claims his crime of matricide with pride as his own because he has chosen it. On this view one should never repent of any deed, whatever it may be, that one has freely chosen. "The man," says Sartre, "who has been smitten by his freedom as by a flash of lightning, is beyond good and evil." Dr. Reinhardt regards as pernicious this denial to value of all objectivity; the Sartrian freedom is the freedom of Lucifer, born of pride and a refusal to serve.

Although Jaspers lays stress on the value of a personal relationship to God or Transcendence, Dr. Reinhardt criticises him because his doctrine is a philosophy of "becoming" rather than of "being," because he rejects any attempt to define rationally the nature of man, because in his ideal of personality he is concerned almost exclusively with man's capacity for continually creating and re-creating himself. "The highest forms of spiritual life," in Dr. Reinhardt's opinion, "are characterized by quiet and an utter simplicity, individual beings becoming more perfect the more they approach the immutability of the Divine Being."

While his Thomist views lead him to many criticisms of all the existentialists, except Marcel, Dr. Reinhardt admits that his attraction to the school has been so great that the writing of his book has been a matter of compelling urgency, "a necessity of thought." He values all the seven thinkers with whom he is concerned for their devotion to the freedom and integrity of the human person, and holds that they are useful also in helping to rescue Christianity from certain of its besetting temptations.

J. B. COATES.

PHILOSOPHY

Theory of Beauty. By HAROLD OSBORNE. (Routledge & Kegan Paul. Pp. 220.
Price 21s.)

This is a closely argued attempt to salvage something from the rather battered stronghold of "objective aesthetics." The adversaries most considered are those who hold the "subjective relational" view that "anything is beautiful which is related as . . . expression to . . . emotion." I suppose the best known modern supporters of some such view are Wordsworth, A. C. Bradley, Croce and Collingwood. Though all these appear in the very extensive bibliography, none except Wordsworth is mentioned (quite incidentally) in the text; and from the author's criticism of "expression" and "emotion" it would hardly appear that he knew the sense in which any of them use these words. He describes his own view as *similar in type* to that of Clive Bell and Roger Fry that "anything is beautiful which is *both* potentially an object of a unique mental state *and* has a specific objective structure." He allows that our only data for aesthetic theory are those experiences in which we recognize a common unique character that we call aesthetic. But he paradoxically asserts that such experience is only stimulated by "works of art." I certainly recognize such a common quality in my experience of Chartres, the Medici Tombs, some Rembrandts, Chardins, Vermeers, Botticellis and some tragedies, but no less clearly in my experiences of many natural objects: mountains, storms, flowers, clouds, animals and the human face; and these latter differ from the former set no more than those from one another.

The thesis of the book is that "if it could be shown that there is some objective property common and peculiar *more or less* to those things which are the objects [= stimuli?] of this mental state or activity we should have a solid basis" for an objective aesthetic.

What then is the "work of art" which, it is hoped, may turn out to have such an objective property? Not the pigmented canvas or worked marble or musical score or written or recited words; not any physical shapes or vibrations even when perceived as colours or sounds. That which has such a property is "no continuous existent" nor even the collection of sensa occasioned in you or me by the physical object, for the sensa will differ according to the capacity and training of each. "A work of art [which alone and always is beautiful] is a permanent possibility which is actualized when any *competent* observer [my italics] looks at a picture or sculpture . . . or hears the organized construct of sounds . . . or words which is that work of art." And the "competent observer" turns out to be the one who is himself capable of *constructing* "a special kind of organic complexity" out of the presented sensa. We are warned that probably no two persons experience the same work of art, nor does any one at different times. "The appreciator must always perform something of the functions of a performer."

Such a view of "the work of art" seems quite compatible and indeed comparable with Croce's account of the "truth" of aesthetic experiences (*Estetica XVI*), which has I think been refuted; his purpose was only to account for the possibility of communication, but the different purpose does not affect the validity of the arguments.

I am not convinced that works of art (still less all "beautiful objects") are all and alone "organic wholes," that is to say, that the class of aesthetic experiences is empirically found to coincide (even "more or less") with the class of objective organic wholes or of the organic wholes constructed out of sense data by "competent observers." If it be emphasized that only one "special type" of such construction is in question, we shall indeed question what that speciality is.

It will have become clear however that it is well worth the while of any student of aesthetics to read this book and judge for himself. E. F. CARRITT.

The Logic of Personality. By BERNARD MAYO. (London: Jonathan Cape, 1952.
Pp. 188. Price 10s. 6d.)

This book covers a very great deal of ground. Among the topics discussed are the nature of perception, the nature of language, the nature of "the Self," aesthetics and ethics. These separate topics are all treated as "different approaches to the problem of personality."

Mr. Mayo, in his Introduction, sets two basic questions: "What is the difference between understanding persons and understanding other things?" and "What constitutes knowledge of persons?" He at first contrasts "knowledge about things" as "knowledge of properties" with "personal knowledge" as "knowledge of the unique." This "knowledge of the unique" is "an entirely different sort of knowledge, which we shall call *acquaintance*." It is soon seen that what bothers Mr. Mayo is not so much the differences between our knowledge of things and persons, as the differences between our knowledge of the general and the particular. Because of its generality, psychology "fails to take account of the essential element of personality. . . . We must try a different approach, suggested by the implied difference between knowing that a person has certain characteristics or personality traits and knowing that person." These "limitations" of psychology reveal nothing about the logic of personality, for Mr. Mayo might find the very same limitations in physics and in pursuing the "problem of individuality" he does just this.

"What makes the table *the table*?" Mr. Mayo asks. It can't be in terms of its properties. "For what differentiates one table from every one of nine others may not differentiate it from every one of ninety-nine others." It is not anything about the table itself that makes it *ultimately* different from other tables. What can it be then?

"I think we are now in a position to say in what its individuality consists. It consists, not in any property or relational property, but in the unique one-to-one relation in which it stands to myself."

It is not easy to see how this is consistent with his saying that "Things, as well as persons, are unique individuals with which we can become acquainted." He seems to imply both that things and persons are unique and have individuality apart from our acquaintance with them and also to say that they are unique and individual in virtue of our acquaintance with them.

What does this "one-to-one relation" amount to? Mr. Mayo, throughout the whole book, gives extraordinarily few cases and illustrations. The nearest thing to a case is the following. Concerning my pipe, "its relation to me is what gives it its individuality; in a box of other pipes at the tobacconist's it has no individuality." It is clear that my pipe gets individuality from my personal relation with it if, for example, it has my teeth marks. It becomes obscure what sort of individuality it gains from an indescribable, unique personal relation.

Perhaps the best way in which to understand what is being done here is to see that Mr. Mayo slides from talking about things and persons to talking about experience of the moment. "We can be directly aware of persons and things just as we are aware of coloured patches." This is what is "unique" and devoid of "generality." "It [knowledge of personality] must be knowledge which is confined entirely to a particular, unique situation and does not involve any generality, any extension beyond the particular." My experience of the moment does not involve "extension beyond the particular" because what looks to me now, what appears to me now, is not challenged by what looks to me later, or by what appears to me later.

With the personal relation condensed to the "particular, unique situation," what we *do* with things, *say* to persons, evaporates away, for all of this *does* involve "extension beyond the particular," and most certainly is describable. Mr. Mayo attains the unique and particular but then attempts to give it a use, a logic that it cannot have.

"Knowledge of personality" is not to be contrasted with "knowledge of things" for it is described in terms of "acquaintance," and Mr. Mayo asserts that we can be acquainted with things as well as persons. The distinction that Mr. Mayo makes between a person and a thing is that a thing can stand in a personal relation to somebody, but somebody cannot stand in a personal relation to it. My pipe can be mine, but I cannot be my pipe's.

Mr. Mayo does not emphasize the fact that pipes unlike people do not see sunsets, feel sad, dream, hold silent meditation. There is a strain of behaviourism in the book that makes people all too like pipes.

"To say that the organism is aware of something is to say no more than that it reacts in a characteristic way to that something or that its behaviour in the presence of that something is regularly different from its behaviour in the absence of the something."

C. B. MARTIN.

The Claim of Morality. By N. H. G. ROBINSON. (London: Gollancz, 1952.
Pp. 333. Price 21s.)

What is Value? By EVERETT W. HALL. (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul,
1952. Pp. xiv + 255. Price 25s.)

These two books are in many ways complementary. Between them they illustrate well the change that has come over moral philosophy in the last twenty years. Dr. Robinson's book is written in the idiom of a generation ago: to open it is to be carried back to that court in which *Ross v. Prichard* is for ever up for hearing, *Carritt* intervening. The old issues are debated, and Dr. Robinson's own suggestions are modest: he nowhere acknowledges the metaphysical assumptions behind his chief questions ("What are the bearers of the fundamental moral qualities? Do they belong intrinsically to acts and the like, regardless of whether these are the objects of a moral consciousness?"), so he finds nothing much in the literature since Ross's *Foundations of Ethics* worth mentioning. Professor Hall, on the other hand, is painfully up to date, both in manner and in references, and the result of his labours is not so much a book as a scrap-book or commonplace-book, in which the author debates with himself the relevance of all the latest articles and books to his own central interests: this may not be easy to read, but it is absorbing, and one hopes that Dr. Robinson and those who think like him will have a go at it—for the very first of the things that Professor Hall calls in question is that which Dr. Robinson takes for granted, namely, that "right," "good" and the like are the names of qualities. And he questions this, not as a subjectivist questions it, because he is intent on putting feelings or attitudes in as "the true referents" of moral words, but rather as one who is determined to find a respectable place for "value" in the world, despite his dissatisfaction with the traditional assumptions. Nevertheless, the results of his analysis are fairly exiguous: all genuine value-sentences are declared to be irreducibly normative, but what it is for this to be so is not elucidated, and the different character of the different types of value-sentences is not touched on. One finds oneself up once more against the fundamental unsatisfactoriness of moral philosophy: Professor Hall convinces one that *il faut reculer pour*

mieux sauter, yet one cannot help suspecting at the same time that toujours reculer, c'est jamais sauter.

For this reason, readers of PHILOSOPHY may get more direct enlightenment from Dr. Robinson, especially from his refreshing chapter on "The Moral Situation." Still, even in his rehash, they may find intuitionism as bad as open subjectivism: one may respect a man's judgment on moral matters, but that does not mean that the propriety or admirability of an action turns on his judgment about it. They may also feel that his metaphysics makes things unnecessarily hard for him: are there not several different noun-partners with which the moral adjectives can work equally happily? Need there be any competition between these nouns for the dubious title of "bearer" of the "fundamental moral qualities"? After all, if I write a cheque to my bookseller in settlement of my account, one might ask the question "Is it the bookseller I am paying, or the bill, or my debt, or £8 13s. 6d., or some complex combination of these?"; but one does not have to ask this question, since one does not have to choose between these answers. If one stuck to the adjectives "right," "good," "objectionable," "admirable," etc., instead of dealing always in "characters" (such as "ought," p. 165!), qualities and other such nouns, would the old perplexity remain?

Here Professor Hall's treatment is more illuminating, though even he finds himself in the toils over "facts." Some kinds of sentences he is not worried about: "declarative" sentences, he feels, have good solid "facts" to authenticate them. The problem is, to find something analogous for value-sentences. This is a problem indeed, but again an unnecessarily hard one: the respectability of "value-sentences" demands, not tangible or visible verifiers, but rather that there should be some moral and aesthetic truisms, things which are, in the moral or aesthetic field, beyond serious question, things to be accepted as in fact so, and not just matters of opinion. And this, of course, is something which in practical life we never—or hardly ever—have occasion to doubt.

STEPHEN TOULMIN.

The Religion of China, Confucianism and Taoism. By MAX WEBER. Translated and Edited by HANS H. GERTH. (The Free Press, Glencoe, Illinois; agents: George Allen & Unwin Ltd. London. Pp. xi + 308. Price 32s. net.)

It is a truism that there are grave dangers in using only secondary sources, especially in dealing with such inward phenomena as religion and philosophy. A Chinese who had never been to the Occident, who was not a Christian, and who used only Chinese accounts of the West, would inevitably produce a quite distorted account of Christianity. Chinese have indeed attempted such accounts—and the results have been as should have been expected.

It is hence not really surprising that Max Weber, who did not read Chinese (p. 64), had never resided in China, had no direct acquaintance with Chinese society, and used accounts written by others, should have come to a similarly bizarre result. The facts that he has, are consequently often misapplied and used without a realization of their limitations. A generation ago it was quite common for occidentals to describe the one corner of that land which they had seen and declare that it represented China. Yet Chinese are quite as different from one another as are Europeans. De Groot, upon whom Weber chiefly relied, was guilty of this error. De Groot, moreover, over-systematized and set up philosophical theories for Chinese religious practices, about which most Chinese know nothing. So Weber was seriously misled about Chinese religion. Had he used such a realistic account as that by H. Maspero, "The

Myths of Modern China" (in J. Hakin, *et al.*, *Asiatic Mythology*) he might have been spared many errors.

Not being a sinologist, he was, moreover, unable to distinguish first-rate sources from poorer ones. There is perhaps more misinformation about China than about any other civilization. His quite wide reading was therefore largely misapplied and his attempts at being critical (cf. p. 272, n. 7) were quite inadequate. For example, Wang Mang, who attained the throne by trickery and intrigue and never led an army, is said, since he became the court commander-in-chief, to have been a "victorious general proclaimed emperor by the army" (pp. 26, 65). Weber was also victimized by the large amount of mistranslation from the Chinese. He picked a poor translation of the Lao-tzu's work and consequently reaches quite mistaken conclusions about this philosophy (pp. 181-190).

Like some of the older writers about China, he assumes an unreal uniformity in Chinese civilization through the ages. He recounts together practices which have the same name in the early Han period of the second century B.C., in the programme of Wang An-shih in the eleventh century A.D., and in that of the Chinese Nationalists, without realizing their fundamental differences (p. 93). He assumes that the characteristics of taxation in the Manchu period were those of all periods (pp. 55-56). Even worse, he fails to understand the radical changes in Confucianism during the last two and a half millennia (Chap. VI). He takes the teaching of Confucius as typical of Confucianism—as if we should take that of Socrates as typical of neo-Platonism. Confucius was not interested in technical metaphysics, because his personal religion, which was very much the same as that of Socrates, satisfied this need. So Weber declares that Confucianism is "in large measure bereft of metaphysical interest" (p. 154). Yet Confucianism produced one of the world's great scholastic metaphysicians in Chu Hsi—about whom Weber appears largely uninformed.

What Weber does know about the changes in Chinese culture is, moreover, often mistaken—he states that in Confucianism the idea of a personal god was "upheld in the eleventh century but vanished in the twelfth century" (p. 23). But the dominating Confucian philosopher, Hsüntze, in the third century B.C., had already denied the existence of all gods and spirits! The gradual adoption of Taoistic ideas by Confucianism during its first millennium and a half leads Weber to declare that "originally the meaning of [Lao-tzu's] doctrine did not differ in the main from that of Confucianism" (p. 177). Yet the Lao-tzu was actually a radical opponent and extremely caustic critic of Confucianism.

The upshot of Weber's fundamental methodological errors is that, to the sinologist, this book is an extraordinary collection of howlers. He declares that "the Chinese tongue has been unable to offer its services to poetry" (p. 124). The total amount of Chinese poetry, good and bad, however, far exceeds that of any other civilization! Of this culture with a rich collection of unwritten folk tales (cf. W. Eberhard, *Chinese Fairy Tales*), he says, "All phantasy and ardor fled from the poor and formalistic intellectualism of the spoken word" (p. 124). A Chinese had already in the fifth century calculated the value of π correctly to the equivalent of seven places of decimals. A learned descendant of the Ming emperors enunciated, before 1584, the musical scale of equal temperament, calculating $\frac{12}{2}$ and using it to fix the length of his pipes, yet Weber says that the Chinese have lacked "all training in calculation" (p. 125).

The really remarkable feature in Weber's book, however is the number of keen insights it contains, especially in connection with social phenomena. For

example, he sees that the precise character of the alleged Chinese "democracy" lies in the unusual strength of Chinese clans (p. 96). He explains how the failure of China to develop an industrial capitalism is due to the structure of the Chinese State (p. 100). His account of the economic functioning of the literati (pp. 136-141) is keen indeed. His explanation for the absence of Natural Law and for the nature of the Chinese administration of law (pp. 147-150) should be pondered by every student of Chinese society. That such keen insights should have been reached in spite of his poor knowledge of Chinese philosophy and religion, can only be genius. Weber is not primarily interested in philosophy and religion, but in the sociological position and influence of the forces concerned (p. 180). In that respect, this book is admirable; in others, it is often very poor. This book is then one which the non-sinologist had best avoid, for he will inevitably be misled. But it is also one which, because of the fine pearls it contains in its often muddy water, should be read by all persons who know Chinese culture well enough to pick and choose the unusual insights here presented.

HOMER H. DUBS.

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Le XI^e Congrès International de Philosophie qui se tiendra à Bruxelles du 20 au 26 août et assuré dès maintenant du plus éclatant succès. A l'heure actuelle, plus de quatre cents communications sont déjà parvenues au secrétariat. Toutes ces communications seront intégralement publiées dans les volumes des Actes, qui paraîtront trois mois avant l'ouverture du Congrès et seront expédiées aux membres actifs afin de permettre une préparation sérieuse de la discussion. On prévoit que le nombre des membres actifs dépassera très largement le millier.

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
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IV. Sleeping and Waking:	M. MACDONALD
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VI. The Mechanical Concept of Mind:	M. SCRIVEN
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CONTENTS

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Viscount Samuel

II. ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF HEGEL
W. H. Walsh, M.A.

III. EXISTENTIALISM
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CONTENTS

	PAGE
I. MAN'S IDEAS ABOUT THE UNIVERSE. VISCOUNT SAMUEL .	195
II. ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF HEGEL. W. H. WALSH, M.A. .	207
III. EXISTENTIALISM. J. B. COATES .	229
IV. A. N. WHITEHEAD ON GOOD AND EVIL. PROFESSOR R. K. HARRISON	239
V. IMAGES, SUPPOSING AND IMAGINING. ANNIS FLEW, B.A. .	246
VI. DISCUSSIONS:	
(I) JASPERS' CONCEPT OF TRANSCENDENCE (GOD) IN RECENT LITERATURE	255
(II) THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF BUDDHISM, TAOISM AND CON- FUCIANISM	260
VII. PHILOSOPHICAL SURVEY: PHILOSOPHY IN ITALY.	265
VIII. NEW BOOKS	268
IX. INSTITUTE NOTES: ANNOUNCEMENT OF KIERKEGAARD FELLOWSHIP	288

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Later came philosophers, applying the power of reason to investigate the processes of Nature and the phenomena of life and mind. They inquired, searched, discussed, generalized. They let thought loose in speculation; they arranged it into induction and deduction;

¹ This lecture was first delivered, somewhat expanded, as the Roscoe Lecture for 1952, under the auspices of the Liverpool Literary and Philosophical Society, at the Royal Institution, Liverpool, July 3rd, 1952. It was repeated in its present form to the members of the Royal Institute of Philosophy, at the Institute of Education of London University, on February 26th, 1953.

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PHILOSOPHY

THE JOURNAL OF THE ROYAL INSTITUTE OF PHILOSOPHY

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JULY 1953

MAN'S IDEAS ABOUT THE UNIVERSE¹

By VISCOUNT SAMUEL

I

WHEN man emerged from the millions of years of evolution in the Early and Late Stone-ages he had shed his ape-like characters; he was erect, large-brained, and he had become an agriculturist and a craftsman. He must have wondered—as we wonder still—at the sun, the moon and the stars, the land and the sea, the thunder and lightning, at his own birth, and growth and death. Endowed with intuition and reason, and with curiosity, he must have concluded—as we conclude—that all this did not explain itself. There must have existed, and still exist, Something Else, that he could not perceive and did not understand. Endowed also with imagination, he peopled the earth and the sky with spirits—gods and demigods, ghosts and fairies, demons and angels. There followed beliefs in direct communication from this other world, through dream or trance, ecstasy or intuition; sometimes an individual assurance of personal contact and inspiration. So religion came to be: in the form, first of animism, then of mythology, finally of monotheism.

Later came philosophers, applying the power of reason to investigate the processes of Nature and the phenomena of life and mind. They inquired, searched, discussed, generalized. They let thought loose in speculation; they arranged it into induction and deduction;

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they formalized it in logic. Then some among the philosophers specialized in the study of Nature, and became what we now call scientists. In modern times science made startling discoveries and produced marvellous inventions; it outgrew philosophy, and in the end separated itself altogether. Leading its own life, absorbed in its own work, developing its own technologies, it gives to the civilization of to-day its distinctive character.

So we find, when we investigate man's ideas about the universe, that they have been the product of those three factors. First, they began in an atmosphere intuitive, mystical, mythical, imaginative: out of it came, after long ages, the great religions that we have. Second, philosophy brought to bear that powerful instrument of the intellect, the faculty of reason. Thirdly came science; firmly based on man's daily experience of his own environment and his perception of the cosmos beyond; supplementing his bodily senses by the help of appliances of exquisite ingenuity; expanding vastly his knowledge and ever enlarging his powers.

Each of the three—Religion, Philosophy, Science—has presented its own picture of the world. It is not surprising that they have often differed from one another. They differ still. So that, when we try to survey as a whole the situation, intellectual and moral, in which we now find ourselves, we see at once, as its most obvious characteristic, that it is in a state of confusion. Religion will teach one thing, philosophy sometimes another, and science perhaps something different again. Within each of the three, are faiths and sects and schools at variance with one another. And we are so accustomed to this that we look upon it as natural: we think it would be foolish to suppose that things have ever been, or ever will be, otherwise. I believe that when we set out to seek the causes of our present troubles in the sphere of politics, or economics, or social behaviour, we shall find, if we probe deep enough, that they lie here and nowhere else—in this chronic confusion, and in this complacent, or even cynical, acceptance of it as inevitable. The blunt fact is that the leaders of thought—philosophers, scientists, and men of religion—have failed us: they fail to give to the age the understanding of things as they are, and the guidance towards things as they should be, for which it craves.

II

This is not to suggest that nothing has ever been solved, that there has been no clarification of ideas. On the contrary—let us compare, for example, the more ancient religions, in the forms that they retain, essentially unchanged, in Asia, with the ideas on religion current in the Western world to-day, and we shall realize how profound has been the effect of the impact of philosophy and science. Popular

Hinduism, with its hundreds of symbolic, fictional gods; Buddhism, looking for a sanction for morality in the fantasy of reincarnation and transmigration of souls—of bad men into animals and of good men into imaginary higher beings; Islam, with its fatalistic doctrine of submission—How are we to strive against events, since events are the handiwork of God?—none of these have gained, or are likely to gain, the assent of the Western mind. Or we may take examples of change and progress from the realm of science itself. No one believes now that eclipses of the sun and the moon are portents divinely sent to warn and guide human beings: or else are the work, as they believed in China and India, of an invisible enemy—some dragon or demon—who was to be driven off by the beating of gongs and the firing of crackers. No one now thinks, as men thought for centuries, that the sun, moon, planets and stars move in spheres round the earth, each one propelled by an attendant spirit. Few now accept, as almost everyone accepted till a hundred years ago, that the different kinds of plants and animals were the product of sudden and separate acts of creation. (Although, indeed, it is only a few years since that the Legislature of the State of Tennessee passed a law forbidding grants of public money to any school or university which taught the principles of evolution.)

When two people have been discussing some issue and agree at the end still to differ, they often break off with the amiable formula, "After all, there are two sides to every question." There are two sides to every question for the simple reason, that when one side has been shown to be wrong and its advocates have been silenced, the matter is settled and ceases to be a question. On any of the issues I have quoted as examples, which all were once, and some in the East still are, very much alive and strenuously argued, there are not two sides to-day among the Western peoples.

The fact remains, of course, that many old problems in religion and philosophy—among them some of the oldest—are still unsolved. And beneath the solved problems, fresh ones appear. "Under every deep," says Emerson, "a new deep opens." But that need be no deterrent to persistent inquiry. On the contrary, the fact that some have been settled is an encouragement to attack old ones that remain and new ones that appear, in an attempt to find a way out of our present confusions. And the deeper they lie the better it is; for only if we can get our intellectual and moral foundations right can we hope to build securely the structure of the future.

On this occasion, however, I do not propose to touch upon matters which belong jointly to philosophy and to religion. I ventured to do that in an address, with the title "Decline or Revival of Religion," which I gave to the Institute in October 1948, afterwards included in a short volume of lectures and broadcasts. To-day I turn to some

matters, also controversial, that are the joint concern of philosophy and science.

The revolutionary discovery of J. J. Thomson and Rutherford, some fifty years ago, that the atom has a structure, consisting of particles of various kinds in exceedingly rapid motion, gave rise to intense activity among theoretical and experimental physicists all over the world. It was not long before Heisenberg discovered that such researches had limitations, which, for reasons into which I need not enter and which no one disputes, cannot be overcome. There is a region beyond those limits, therefore, in which scientific certainty is impossible. This is Heisenberg's Principle of Uncertainty, which is universally accepted by physicists and with which, in itself, philosophers have no quarrel. But physicists soon went further, and deduced from it that this uncertainty applies, in however small a degree, throughout Nature. Therefore, they say, the strict Law of Causation —on which all science had been based and which philosophy had accepted from science—no longer holds. All that our knowledge is left to depend upon is probability, based upon statistics. In place of an invariable rule of effect following causes, what we term Chance becomes the ultimate factor in the universe.

This is the first of the points, in this province where science and philosophy meet and overlap, to which I would invite your attention. For many, probably most philosophers have never accepted, and do not now accept, this deduction from Heisenberg's Principle. They see no reason to doubt the validity of the long-established Law of the Uniformity of Nature. This may be formulated as follows: Where a specified combination of events has been followed by a particular event, then any other precisely similar combination will be followed by a similar event. They contend that, since centuries of investigation into matters that are within our knowledge have shown that events are always the consequence of causes, identical causes producing identical effects, with never an exception, it is legitimate to infer that, in matters beyond the range of our knowledge, the same law holds, unless there is reason to believe the contrary. As to "Chance," that they urge is a fiction, not to be found anywhere in the universe: quite incapable of playing any part whatever in the processes of Nature. "Chance," as was well said by Leslie Stephen, "is a name for our ignorance."

Nor is it only philosophers who refuse to accept this impugning of the universal law of Causation. Some of the greatest physicists of our time have also rejected it. Einstein, the author of the Theory of Relativity, and Max Planck, the promulgator of the Quantum Theory, have both declared themselves against it. Rutherford, the joint discover of the electron, would never endorse it. I remember Madame Curie, the discoverer of radium, saying, when I had the

privilege once of meeting her and raised this particular point, that, although, being an experimental and not a theoretical physicist, she did not feel qualified to express an opinion, she felt pretty sure that, if we could become small enough to get inside the atom and watch what was going on, we should find the laws of Cause and Effect applying there as they do everywhere else.

It seems to be time therefore that physicists should consent to recognize that Heisenberg's Principle has no application to general philosophy. Measurement is one thing and causation is another, and, as Bertrand Russell has said, this Principle has to do only with measurement, not with causation. Because mathematical physicists have found that an insuperable uncertainty restricts their own methods and limits their own conclusions, we are not obliged to assume that a corresponding uncertainty must prevail in the processes of Nature. If the idea of a fundamental uncertainty is withdrawn from the field of philosophical discussion one, at least, of the sources of confusion that now hinder the advance of thought, will be removed.

III

A second point in dispute is the nature of Reality. The school of philosophy which I am here supporting—empirical philosophy—holds that there exists a real universe which man must accept—objective, given, wholly independent of his own mind and ideas. But the metaphysical physicists, who have been for some time dominant in the scientific world, do not agree to this. They hold that all that men can think about effectively is their own sense-data—the impressions brought by their sense-organs to affect their own minds. What the universe really is in itself, that, they say, we do not, and cannot know.

Take as an example a beautiful sunset. People go out to look at the glorious display of colours, and they are moved by its beauty. But those who are scientific-minded know quite well that there are in fact no colours out there in the sky, and no beauty. What is happening is that light-radiations from the sun are being refracted by water-vapour and dust particles in the atmosphere, and split up into light-waves of various wave-lengths. The human eye has the capacity to differentiate between those wave-lengths, and the brain can form consequential impressions which we designate as colours; waves of one set of wave-lengths causing us to see violet, others, about twice as long, red, the rest of the spectrum falling, in a uniform series, in between. Further, the mind is so constituted that certain combinations of colours, on a vast scale in the sky, stir it to emotion, and we say "there has been a lovely sunset to-night."

Or take a familiar object such as a table, these physicists say. We had always believed it to be hard, solid, smooth, brown, static. But we have learnt now that in fact it consists of atoms, and the atoms of particles; and that these are not hard, solid, smooth or brown, and they are not static but in violent motion. It is the same with everything else; so that, when we take away, one by one, the man-made qualities which we have ourselves put in, there is nothing left. The familiar universe has dissolved into unreality.

But those students of Nature who belong to the other school say that all this is fallacious. It is not true that when we take away the man-made "qualities" there is nothing left. In the sunset, there is left the sun and its radiation, the earth and its atmosphere, the clouds and the dust, the light of various wave-lengths, and the mechanism of our optic organs and nervous systems. In the table, there are the particles, organized into atoms, the atoms into molecules, the molecules into pieces of wood; and there is the capacity of the wood to hold together and resist pressure, and of its surface to reflect light-waves of one colour and to absorb the rest.

It is evident, therefore, that we are dealing in these matters with two categories of things and not only one. The first is a given universe, of marvellous variety, which existed long prior to man, and is wholly independent of him; it is real in its own right. The second category consists of our own impressions of some parts of that universe, our own appreciations and interpretations. These are such as the character of our own bodies and minds makes possible. Our interpretations are often mistaken. Many of man's ideas about the universe in primitive times were found to be wrong and have been corrected. But how would it have been possible to say that one thing was false and another was true; how would it be possible now for science to progress from error to truth through hundreds of observations and experiments, unless there existed some factual, objective universe to set the standard and decide the conclusions?

Nor is it the case that the table in its familiar shape and substance is any less real than the same table as a congeries of atoms. That it is solid for us, and for the cups and saucers we put on it, must be accepted as given fact. Consider also the window of the room: it is solid for the hand that presses against it, if the hand breaks the glass it may cut itself; it is solid for the bee that has blundered into the room and is struggling to get out; or for the rain and the wind beating on it from outside. But it is not solid for the sunlight that passes through it almost as if it were not there. Or consider the walls—solid for anyone who comes against them or for a nail that is being driven in; but not solid for broadcasting-waves on their way from a distant station to a portable radio-set isolated in the room. The question is in fact one of scale, not of reality or unreality. The

MAN'S IDEAS ABOUT THE UNIVERSE

universe is just as real at the size level of our own terrestrial experience as it is at the molecular level, or at the atomic level, or the sub-atomic. The right distinction to be made is not between degrees of reality, but between our first category—the phenomena of Nature as they are in themselves, apart from man; and our second category—man's perceptions and interpretations of the same phenomena through his fallible senses and mind.

IV

But there is yet a third category in the field of physics—namely the forms of measurement and means of calculation that make up the apparatus of mathematics. These are indispensable, both to science and to the practical activities of civilized life. But they are not part of the objective universe; nor are they part of the sense-data in human minds that are direct reflexes from the phenomena of Nature. Mathematics consists of fictional abstractions, of figments created by the human imagination. These are not to be found anywhere in the cosmos. They are not merely unobservable; they are non-existent.

In this third category we may place the following and their like: arithmetical numbers, algebraical quantities, euclidean points, lines and planes, statistics, probabilities, differential equations; all geometrical systems; longitude and latitude; scales of temperature. Also to be included are space, time and spacetime; the electromagnetic field, inertial systems, mass, velocity and momentum; together with the theoretical "observer" of relativity, with his isolated frame of reference. (The character of the quantum is still a matter of debate.) Being figments, none of these can be admitted as factors in the physical processes of Nature. They are not dynamic. They cannot *do* anything at all.

But mathematical physicists appear not to admit this. Whitehead—eminent as mathematician as well as philosopher—has said, of the situation in which we now find ourselves, that it is a case of "confining thought to purely formal relations which then masquerade as reality. . . . Science relapses into the study of differential equations. The concrete world has slipped through the meshes of the scientific net. . . . There can be no true physical science which looks first to mathematics for the provision of a conceptual model. Such a procedure is to repeat the errors of the logicians of the middle ages."

V

The consequence is that present-day physics has brought us to a dead-end. It gives no answer—and at the moment does not attempt,

or even desire to give an answer—to questions, essential to an understanding of the factual world in which we live, questions which both the philosopher and the practical man are legitimately asking.

For example, when the radiation of the sun's light travels to the earth in a period of about eight minutes, what is it that carries it? That there is some process going on all the way and all the time is evident; for when there is an eclipse of the sun by the moon, the sunlight is stopped at the level of the moon's orbit; if a cloud comes across the sky, there is interference at the cloud level; if I move into the shade of a tree it is in order to benefit by interference at the level of the tree's foliage. Or consider again a radio-set when you tune in to a programme from a distant broadcasting station. What is happening, between the place where the station is and the place where your set is, that enables you to hear the music or the talk, whatever it may be, that is going on there, far away? We know that there must be a process, because the transmission is liable to interference at any point, by atmospheric disturbances, or perhaps by deliberate jamming from other stations; also the signals are stronger in hours of darkness than when affected by sunlight; and further the beams can be reflected by ionized layers in the stratosphere. None of this would be possible unless something was travelling between the one point and the other. There must be a process; and it must be physically real—of the same order of reality as the broadcasting station itself, with its engines and generators, and valves and antennae; or as the radio-set, full of complicated apparatus, which you can manipulate by turning little knobs with your fingers. Whatever it is that leaves the station must be physical, and whatever arrives where you are and reproduces the programme must also be physical. We are bound to infer that what carries it must itself be physical and real, and not metaphysical nor yet mathematical.

Again, we may ask what it is that transmits gravity. As Bertrand Russell has said, a philosopher may doubt the reality of gravitation, "but if he steps over the edge of a cliff he can expect a nasty bump at the bottom." What is it, too, that permits momentum? If I have a ball in my hand and open my fingers the ball moves to the ground; but if I make a throwing movement with my arm and then release it, why does the ball continue to move in the direction of the throw, and not drop at once to the ground the moment it leaves the hand? What is it that sustains it in a horizontal line against the perpendicular pull of gravity which is affecting it all the time?

Or consider a shell, fired from one of the big guns of a battleship, that is travelling, perhaps five or ten miles, towards its target. Think of it, weighing half a ton or more, high in the air over the sea, moving at great speed. How is it that it should be moving? The effect of the expanding gases from the explosive in the gun that started it on its

journey was spent long ago. The physicists tell us that it has "gathered momentum" and "moves by its own impetus." But the "it" which is in question is an inert hollow piece of metal, filled with a chemical substance and fitted with a fuse. It does not comprise any motive force of its own, like a bird or an airplane or a rocket. What physical process is indicated by the words "momentum" and "impetus," "gathered" and "moves"? The shell in itself is passive and static: it cannot "gather" anything or "move" anywhere. To speak accurately we ought to say, not "it moves," but that "it is being moved." What is it that is present, invisible, unrecognized, but physically real, which is carrying the shell onward, up there through the clouds, and at the end will impel it to crash with great violence into the target? What will be occurring, there and then, to make that happen? If we want to understand the physical working of the universe, somehow we must get to understand what it is that does that.

We may ask yet another question. Nuclear physicists find that, in certain experiments in the laboratory, new particles of various kinds appear—most of them quickly disappear again; some are stable and may endure for a considerable time. This is giving rise to a theory of Continuous Creation. What is the matrix out of which such particles come, and into which they relapse? Some of the exponents of the theory of Continuous Creation—Hoyle and Bondi for example—have said, and do say, that they are "created out of nothing." But that is quite unacceptable. That is mere magic—not science.

Such questions as these, left unanswered, have revived the old problem of the existence of an ether—of some universal medium, physically real. But it cannot be the quasi-gaseous ether accepted by many physicists in the nineteenth century, and earlier. Convincing reasons against this were given; it was abandoned, and no one now tries to revive it.

The spacetime continuum of relativity theory was offered by Einstein as a substitute, and this has found a place in the teaching and the text-books of physics ever since. But the argument put forward in this lecture, if it were accepted, would not endorse this. It regards the spacetime continuum, and the whole system of relativity, as constructs of the human mind. They are fictional abstractions. They are not to be found in the objective universe. Nor are they even sense-data directly springing from phenomena of Nature, such as the colours of a sunset or the solidity of a table. They are not in our first category, nor yet in the second; they belong to the third—to the mathematical figments, which—valuable, necessary as they are to science—can of themselves play no part in the workings of Nature.

Sir Oliver Lodge gave the Roscoe Lecture of twenty-five years ago, 1927. He took as his subject "Energy." He argued that there must be an ether, and he held that it consisted of energy. He said, "Matter seems to become a sort of accident in the universe. The real thing is the intangible and insensible ether, the thing of which all these things are made, in my view." And again, "We shall find that the fundamental thing in the material universe is the ether in its various forms of energy." He also wrote, about that time, a short book on the same theme, with the title *Ether and Reality*.

J. J. Thomson, one of the great figures of modern science, the discoverer of the electron, towards the end of his life wrote this to a correspondent: "I differ from you about the value of the conception of an ether, the more I think about it the more I value it. I regard the ether as the working system of the universe. I think all mass, momentum and energy are seated there. . . ."

Recently Professor Dirac, of Cambridge, the most eminent mathematical physicist in this country at the present time, has published a paper which he begins by saying—"If one re-examines the question in the light of present-day knowledge, one finds that the ether is no longer ruled out by relativity, and good reasons can now be advanced for postulating an ether"; and ends—"with the new theory of electrodynamics we are rather forced to have an ether." So it is possible that there may yet be a change of heart among the physicists!

There is a difficulty, however, in conceiving a universal medium consisting of energy, if by that is understood, as we usually do understand it, energy in action. It would seem that that could give us nothing but a raging chaos, instead of the ordered universe that we have. But if we conceive that energy may exist in two states, quiescent and active, passing easily from one to the other, this difficulty can be overcome. Nature gives us innumerable examples of the same entity existing in more than one state. Objects may be hot or cold—in a state of thermal agitation or not. The same molecules may be at one time in a gaseous state, at another liquid, at another solid—steam, water, ice, for instance. So the surface of the sea may be quiescent or stormy, the atmosphere calm or windy; our memories, again, may be dormant or active; people at a philosophical lecture may be asleep or awake. It should not be regarded as extraordinary, therefore, if, underlying all phenomena, there were an ocean, so to speak, of energy, universal and eternal, normally quiescent, but capable, in particular places and at particular times, of being stirred into activity. If that were so we might discover in such transformations a single and simple answer to all our questions—as to radiation, gravitation, momentum and the rest. Such transformations

need not be harder to conceive than the transformations of energy which we observe every day, and are often able ourselves to bring about—light, heat, electric currents, gravity producing hydroelectric power, mechanical work—most of these interchangeable with one another. And as to the physical reality of energy—observe the effects of a stroke of lightning; watch the tide creeping up the shore; think of the explosion of an atomic bomb; or consider streams of radio-active particles in an atomic research establishment such as Harwell, flying about the place, liable to cause deadly injury to the bodies of the scientists at work there, if not stopped by screens of lead or the like; or again, at the other end of the scale of magnitude, see the planets circling in their orbits. These are all examples of energy. And they are real. They are not the product of mental constructs; they are not the outcome of differential equations; they are not to be accounted for by metaphysics.

Those who would wish to pursue this subject may care to look at a little book that I published in 1951, with the title *Essay in Physics*, in which possible consequences, in the sphere of natural phenomena, of a conception of this kind, are suggested for consideration.

VII

In all this I have been discussing the physical universe, the subject-matter of the sciences of physics and chemistry. But that is not all that exists. My three categories have left something out, and something of the greatest significance. There is still another category: there is what we term Life and Mind.

The relation between these on the one hand and Matter on the other has always been one of the chief sources of controversy in both philosophy and science. Materialists hold that sooner or later life and mind may be explained in terms of matter. Idealist philosophers try to persuade us that matter is the product of mind, and that ideas only are real. But the world has never been convinced by either the one school or the other. There seems to be a stubborn difference between mental and material processes which cannot be reconciled. The thoughts and actions of the creative artist, for example, our judgments between right and wrong, our valuations of beauty or of truth, seem to be of a different order from the combination of two atoms of hydrogen with one of oxygen to form a molecule of water, or changes in the weather, or a landslide, or a flash of lightning. No one has yet been able to solve the problem of the physical basis of mind, of the relation between mind and brain. We are reduced to the acceptance, at all events for the time being, of a duality. That was the conclusion reached by the late Sir Charles Sherrington, our greatest physiologist: he wrote, near the end of his long life, "That

our being should consist of *two* fundamental elements offers I suppose no greater inherent improbability than that it should rest on one only." The new sciences of biophysics and biochemistry are pressing forward eagerly into this province: they have won some preliminary successes, and it may be that some day they may help us to solve the problem. But for the time being there seems to be little prospect of any conclusion being generally agreed.

And beyond this lies another mystery—this one unlikely to be solved—the ultimate mystery. How is it that anything exists at all? Our own bodies; the earth on which we stand; the stars and their planets; the galaxies, each with hundreds of millions of stars; the visible cosmos of hundreds of millions of galaxies; the ether; matter, mind, life, ideas, God—how is it that anything exists? How? Where? When? Why?

That is beyond the range of human conception. On that there is nothing to be said. That is, for us, the realm of silence.

What is the upshot of this brief survey of man's ideas about the universe? Simply this—that the present generation, and the next, have the duty to try to disentangle the intellectual confusion that now leaves the world without leadership, wandering bewildered: to try to unravel the twisted tangle of ideas—philosophic, scientific, religious—that discourages the will and dissipates the purpose. Let us unpick the knots and straighten the strands and lay them side by side. Then we may twist them into a cord—a threefold cord, very strong, strong as a climber's rope. And, indeed, the task that faces modern men is very like that of a band of climbers, trying to make their way, roped together, through difficult and dangerous passes, and onwards up dizzy untrodden slopes. Perhaps—who knows—we may prove to be the pioneers for all the future generations. When once we have crossed the steep and difficult barrier, we may be finding new ways into spacious regions, pleasant and fertile, that lie beyond—new conquests yet to be made by the undauntable spirit of man.

ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF HEGEL¹

W. H. WALSH, M.A.

IN asking me to talk about Hegel in your series on synoptic philosophies, I take it that you were anxious to discover whether there are any positive merits in Hegel's ideas. I need hardly remind you that such an approach to this particular philosopher is not a very common one in this country to-day. Indeed, of all those who have been thought, at one time or another, to have produced ideas of lasting philosophical importance, Hegel is at present easily the least in repute. Nor is it the case with him as with certain other writers (Spinoza, for instance, or some of the Scholastics) that his ideas are uninteresting or unintelligible to the present generation but are thought all the same to be likely to have an appeal and an importance at some future date when the general intellectual climate has changed; the common verdict on him is far less friendly than that. If opinions on the subject were canvassed among students of philosophy in Great Britain to-day, there can be little doubt that the majority would write Hegel off as the supreme example of a philosopher who tried to construct an elaborate metaphysical system in the most blatantly *a priori* manner, and who succeeded in getting himself taken seriously only because of his adroitness in verbal tricks. Modern logic having exposed these tricks as what they are, the whole Hegelian system can now be revealed as being without content and value, and Hegel himself be dismissed as the intellectual charlatan Schopenhauer long ago declared him to be. To this some would add that his charlatany was the more contemptible because it involved not only fraud but fraud undertaken for a sinister purpose: the object of the whole vast construction was nothing less than to induce people to put up with the burdens of a reactionary political regime. Hegel was the official philosopher of the Prussian State, according to this account, and accepted without shame the task of making the actions of the authorities of that state appear in a favourable light by proving that whatever is real is reasonable.

I must obviously begin by trying to meet these charges, or at any rate the cruder versions of them now in circulation. The second will be familiar from the writings of Dr. Popper. "When in 1815 the reactionary party began to resume its power in Prussia," Dr. Popper writes (*The Open Society*, vol. II, p. 28), "it found itself in dire need of an ideology. Hegel was appointed to meet this demand, and he did so by reviving the ideas of the first antagonists of the open society,

¹ A lecture given to the University of London Philosophical Study Group, November 1951.

Heraclitus, Plato and Aristotle." Again (*op. cit.*, II, p. 30): "There is nothing in Hegel's writing that has not been said better before him. There is nothing in his apologetic method that is not borrowed from his apologetic forerunners. But he devoted these borrowed thoughts and methods, with singleness of purpose, though without a trace of brilliancy, to one aim: to fight against the open society, and thus to serve his employer, Frederick William of Prussia." "I shall try," Dr. Popper announces (II, p. 33), "to show how much light is thrown on Hegelianism if we interpret it in this way, that is to say as an apology for Prussianism." In my opinion a little attention to dates and places will show that the amount of light thrown is precisely nil. Hegel was not a Prussian at all but was born in Stuttgart; he was educated in Tübingen in Swabia, and taught in one capacity or another in Bern, Frankfurt, Jena, Bamberg, Nuremberg, and Heidelberg (none of which was then under Prussian rule) before being appointed professor in Berlin in 1818. By that date he was 48 years old, had published three of his four main works—the *Phenomenology of Mind* (1807), the larger *Logic* (1812) and the *Encyclopaedia* (1817)—and had worked out not only the main ideas of his philosophy but most of the details as well. To suggest in these circumstances that his system was devised as a support for the Prussian monarchy seems utterly fantastic. It is true that the only book Hegel published during his tenure of office in the University of Berlin was his notorious *Philosophy of Right*, which appeared in 1821, and that he left no doubt in that work of his own attitude to contemporary liberal movements. The fact remains, however, that the principles of Hegel's political views, as of his general philosophical position, were arrived at long before he came to an official post in Prussia. Many of the features of his political thought which we find least attractive to-day—for example, his emphasis on the rights of the State against those of any other association, and his contempt for what he called "morality of conscience" as opposed to "social ethics"—are to be found not only in the part of the *Encyclopaedia* which corresponds to the *Philosophy of Right*, but also in the essay on natural law which he wrote when a lecturer at Jena in his early thirties. The doctrine of the Organic State was not invented by Hegel to bolster up reaction in Prussia, but was held by him throughout his life; and his holding it is to be connected as much with his general cast of mind and admiration for the political life of the ancient Greeks as with its bearing on contemporary politics.

But to absolve Hegel from the charge of being a timer-server is not, of course, to show that he deserves to be taken seriously as a philosopher; and here we must turn to the first objections raised above. Was not Hegel (we may well be asked) a metaphysician in the worst sense of that term, one who sought to foist on his public what

looked like a series of instructive propositions but was in fact the product of nothing more than verbal jugglery, helped out by the grossest disregard for the doctrines of elementary logic (flagrant violation of the principle of contradiction, for instance, and open confusion of predicative with existential statements)? And is not the poverty of his thought shown by the absurdities of his philosophy of nature, where, as every undergraduate knows, he offered logical proofs of "truths" which we now realize are not true at all? How could a philosopher who let himself in for extravagances of that kind have anything to say which might be of interest or importance?

Since my whole paper is, in effect, an attempt to answer these criticisms so far as they can be answered, I shall not at this stage make a direct reply to them, but shall merely put forward preliminary comments on one or two points.

First, I think it is fair to claim that Hegel himself contributed substantially, by the way in which he set out his work, to the picture of himself as a word-spinning metaphysician who sought to deduce empirical truths *a priori*. In the *Encyclopaedia*, which alone gives a conspectus of his philosophy as a whole, the first topic treated of is "logic" or "the Idea," and it is only after a series of discussions, as oracular as they are abstract, of concepts of a high degree of generality that the argument moves on to the spheres of nature and mental life in which these concepts are alleged to find concrete embodiment. Hegel is insistent throughout on the logical priority of the Idea to Nature and Spirit (to use his own terms), and this suggests that he first evolved an abstract conceptual scheme from the depths of his own consciousness and then insisted that it must be reflected in the order of fact. I think myself that this way of looking at Hegel's mature philosophy is not wholly without foundation, but it must be pointed out on the other side that it cannot stand for a moment as an account of his own philosophical development. The publication of his early writings and lectures in the last fifty years has made abundantly clear that Hegel's original interests were not at all in questions of logic or metaphysics, but rather in certain topics belonging to history, theology and politics, and that it was from reflection on these that he first developed his dialectical scheme. Historically, the Hegelian logic was subsequent to some parts at any rate of the Hegelian philosophy of Spirit, a fact which makes his observations on questions connected with, e.g., history more worthy of our attention than might at first sight appear.

Secondly, it should be said that if Hegel does violence to the rules of formal logic, he at least does it with his eyes open. He would certainly not have agreed that any system of thought which fails to acknowledge those rules as absolute must be dismissed as absurd. His aim was to substitute for the traditional logic, which in his view

dealt entirely with lifeless abstractions, a new logic of living thought; and the point of view he adopted in carrying out this task was necessarily very different from that of formal logicians, whether of his day or ours. This is not to say that Hegel's attitude to formal logic and his claim to have discovered a new kind of logic are capable of defence; it is merely to make his position on these points clear.

Finally, for the benefit of those critics who lay particular stress on the absurdities of Hegel's philosophy of nature, it is perhaps legitimate to point out that, of all the parts of philosophy, philosophy of nature seems to have occupied Hegel's attention least. There is no evidence that he concerned himself with it at all until he came under the influence of Schelling about 1800, and though he retained it as an integral part of his philosophy from then on he never seems to have had the first-hand interest in the natural sciences which he clearly had in the humanities.¹ To judge his whole enterprise by his success or failure in this particular field seems accordingly a little severe. Of course the fact that Hegel thought it necessary to construct a philosophy of nature and nevertheless botched the job in the way he did is a serious reflection on him on which his critics are perfectly right to insist; but his deficiencies here are not enough to condemn him out of hand. For the possibility remains that his theories, whilst lacking the overall truth Hegel himself claimed for them, are considerably more effective in some fields than in others; and this is a possibility we can test only by looking to the points at which he may be expected to be strong as well as to those where he is generally recognized to be weak.

Most of those who criticize Hegel (or, for that matter, any of the classical philosophers) to-day follow the procedure of first selecting from their author an isolated statement or set of statements which looks as if it might be interesting and informative, and then showing, by reference to some independent standard which all sensible persons might be expected to acknowledge, e.g. the results of formal logic, the deliverances of common sense or "ordinary language," that the statement in question is meaningless, vacuous or at best false. This procedure is one which can be used with particular effect to discredit a writer like Hegel, who is given to writing in an oracular way and whose portentous pronouncements can be made to look ridiculous without undue difficulty. Nevertheless, I suggest that the procedure is never a very satisfactory one, and that it is particularly unsatisfactory when applied to Hegel. It should scarcely be necessary, in these days when philosophers pride themselves so much on their attention to language, to make the elementary point that the same

¹ For some evidence on the other side see, however, H. Glockner, *Hegel*, Vol. I, pp. 359 ff. (I am indebted to Prof. T. M. Knox for this reference.)

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form of words may be used by different people to convey different ideas. When Bradley said that time is unreal, Moore took him to mean that there are no temporal situations, and thus that it is false that it is whatever time it is now; but whatever Bradley meant by his pronouncement, he clearly did not mean that (and indeed he said as much). Those who criticize Hegel by selecting isolated statements from his work and then asking whether they are true or false without regard to their special context or the special features of their author's vocabulary and way of thought fall into much the same mistake. They fail to realize that before you can criticize a system of ideas effectively you have to think yourself into that system; and this is particularly true where the concepts concerned are, as they are in the case of Hegel, of a very strange nature, the thought being remote from common sense, though the language in which it is expressed has at any rate some relation to ordinary speech. I suspect that, in the end, much the most effective way of confuting any philosopher is to show that his theories break down from within; to show, that is to say, that there are points he is forced to concede which he cannot satisfactorily explain on his own principles. I admit that the word "satisfactorily" here leaves a loop-hole for what may be called independent criticism, the possibility of which I do not wish to rule out. I feel sure, however, that such criticism is without value unless it has been preceded by criticism of the internal kind.

But how are we ever to put ourselves in a position to examine the theories of Hegel; how are we to think ourselves into this very difficult system of ideas? The method commonly adopted by historians of philosophy and Hegelian apologists for making us see sense in it is to try to show us how Hegel's problems and solutions arose directly out of those of his predecessors, especially his most recent predecessors in German philosophy. This way of looking at his philosophy is one which Hegel himself encouraged: as is notorious, he thought his own theories summed up whatever was of importance in all previous theories. Despite this sanction, the method is not very satisfactory. For one thing, few students of philosophy in this country to-day know much about the classical German idealists, except perhaps Kant; and even Kant they tend to see in a very different way from that in which Hegel presented him (thus Hegel placed special emphasis on the Kantian doctrine of antinomies, which tends to be thought of as a minor affair by those who, like most of us now, are more interested in the strong empiricist element in Kant). Moreover, this approach to Hegel, representing his thought as it does as the result of an effort to grapple with a number of highly technical questions, fails, for the beginner at least, to breathe any life into it. When we are told that Hegel developed something called "Absolute Idealism," which contrasted with, though it was descended from,

the "Subjective Idealism" of Kant and Fichte, we do not get very far towards understanding him. For we do not see, on this way of going about the matter, what it was that set him thinking at all; what experiences or features of experience so impressed him that he felt compelled to elaborate his extraordinary system to do justice to them. Yet this is precisely the subject we should wish to know about if we are to assess him as a synoptic philosopher.

You will see from this that I am assuming that Hegel's philosophy was evolved not merely to solve certain technical difficulties in the work of his predecessors, but to embody what I must call some fundamental insight of his own. I have tried to argue elsewhere that metaphysical systems come into being when a philosopher seizes on some key idea which proves especially illuminating in a limited field of enquiry and proceeds to give it unrestricted validity, reading all experience in terms of it. This thesis, whatever its merits as regards other philosophers, can be given empirical confirmation in the case of Hegel. For, thanks to the publication of the early writings which was referred to above, we are in a position to reconstruct pretty well the whole development of his thought. We can see how he began with studies which were in effect not philosophical at all, but primarily concerned the interpretation of certain movements in the history of religion, and went on to attach progressively wider significance to the ideas he found valuable in connection with them. And this gives us a very different picture of Hegel from that painted by most historians of philosophy. Instead of the arid metaphysician whose whole preoccupation was with empty logic-chopping, we now find ourselves confronted with a Hegel whose central interest was in a special class of facts, and who developed his philosophy on the basis of his understanding of those facts. Whatever we may think of his ultimate results, we must agree that the general procedure he followed in arriving at them is as intellectually respectable as that of any other metaphysician.

In trying to substantiate this thesis, I shall begin with some remarks about Hegel and Romanticism. Philosophical movements are often most readily understood when seen in relation to the non-philosophical interests of their time, and Hegel's philosophy is here no exception. He was born in the year 1770, and thus grew up to manhood at a time when the popular *Weltanschauung* of the Enlightenment was everywhere under attack—by poets and religious men who were repelled by its dry intellectualism and antipathy to the feelings and the passions, by political thinkers and enthusiasts who could find no satisfaction in its predominantly individualist formulae for the warm aspirations they felt under the influence of an incipient nationalism, finally by philosophers who found their urge to speculate heavily checked by the prevailing emphasis on the need

for thought to be clear and precise and by injunctions to observe the inevitable limits of human knowledge. Romanticism is perhaps best characterized in general terms as an anti-scientific and anti-intellectualist movement. In the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, when scientific advance was so rapid, no limit appeared to be set to the possible triumphs of the human intellect: there was no field on which the light of dispassionate analysis could not be turned with profit. After the great achievements of the seventeenth century in the field of the physical sciences, the special task of the eighteenth century, as the sub-title of Hume's *Treatise* reminds us, was to apply the same type of reasoning to "moral subjects," i.e. to human affairs. But though this programme was carried out with diligence, its results were less satisfactory than had been hoped. Foundations were laid for economics, psychology and (we may perhaps add) philosophical analysis as they exist to-day, but the understanding of human nature which was originally hoped for proved elusive. As the century wore on men became more and more aware that the philosophy of the *Aufklärung*, comprehensive as it was, was also uncommonly thin: that there were whole aspects of life to which it did scant justice. And their dissatisfaction with this state of affairs expressed itself in the form of a general distrust of the intellect. The intellect, it began to be said, is the great divider: moving as it does entirely in the sphere of abstractions, it necessarily separates what in reality is united and in so doing distorts the true nature of things. There is an interesting passage in Hegel's *Encyclopaedia* where the point is made with commendable clarity in the context of a critique of empiricism:¹

In order to form experiences [he says] Empiricism makes especial use of the form of Analysis. In sense-perception we have a concrete of many elements, the several attributes of which we are expected to peel off one by one, like the skins of an onion. In thus dismembering the thing, it is understood that we disintegrate and take to pieces these attributes which have coalesced, and add nothing but our own act of disintegration. Yet analysis is the process from the immediacy of sensation to thought: those attributes, which the object analysed contains in union, acquire the form of universality by being separated. Empiricism therefore labours under a delusion, if it supposes that while it analyses objects it leaves them as they were: it really transforms the concrete into an abstract. And as a consequence of this change the living thing is killed: life can exist only in the concrete and one. . . . It is where analysis never gets beyond the stage of partition that the words of the poet are true:

Encheiresin Naturae nennt's die Chemie,
Spottet ihrer selbst, und weiss nicht wie:
Hat die Teile in ihrer Hand
Fehlt leider nur das geistige Band.

The declaration here that "as a consequence of this change" (intel-

¹ § 38, *Zusatz*, translated by W. Wallace.

lectual reflection on an object or situation) "the living thing is killed; life can exist only in the concrete and one" would have been endorsed by many of Hegel's contemporaries besides Goethe, the author of the lines quoted. The thought was indeed both a commonplace at the time and one which played an important part in the development of Hegel's philosophical opinions.

It remains true, nevertheless, as M. Jean Hyppolite¹ has pointed out, that this emphasis on life as undivided totality was too widely shared in the closing years of the eighteenth century to serve as a mark of differentiation for Hegel's philosophy; nor for that matter could Hegel be characterized without inaccuracy as a simple philosopher of Romanticism. For one thing, the Romantic movement had already found philosophical expression by the time he came on the scene, notably in the theories of those who, like Jacobi, combined hostility to the intellect with belief in the existence of non-rational powers of immediate apprehension. "What is absolutely and intrinsically true," Jacobi wrote,² "is not got by way of reasoning and comparison: both our immediate consciousness of ourselves and our conscience are the work of a secret something in which heart, understanding and sense combine." But this shallow sort of intuitionism was not at all to the taste of Hegel, who rightly saw it as slurring over the real difficulties. The intellect might divide and distinguish in the way Jacobi said, but the fact remained that "we cannot do without this division, if it be our intention to comprehend."³ A satisfactory theory of knowledge must not merely contrast intellect and intuition as black with white, but must account for the existence of each, showing how each is necessary to the other and how the two can be united in a further form of knowing not identifiable with either in its simple form.

Here we have the well-known pattern of opposition and reconciliation, thesis, antithesis and synthesis, which is so prominent in Hegel's mature thought. The point about it which ought to be stressed in the present context is that the negative element or "moment," as Hegel calls it, is just as essential to the scheme as is the positive. Hegel's was no simple philosophy of identity, in which all distinctions were swallowed up in an undifferentiated unity, a "night in which all cows are black," to use his own phrase. On the contrary, it was a theory whose author went out of his way to stress differences and oppositions, and to insist that the only true unity is one which overcomes differences but nevertheless preserves something of each of the different terms. This is indeed the characteristic

¹ "Vie et prise de conscience de vie dans la philosophie hégélienne d'Iéna": *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale*, 1938.

² Quoted by W. Wallace, *The Logic of Hegel*, p. 406.

³ *Encyclopædia*, § 38, Zusatz.

feature of Hegelianism, which serves to mark it off from other philosophies with which it might well be confused.

Those who are familiar only with the later works of Hegel, where the dialectical process operates with the regularity of clockwork, or who remember the criticism of Kierkegaard that Hegel saw as united what life shows as divided, may well be sceptical about this claim; they may tend, moreover, to think of the dialectical pattern as something which Hegel imposed on his material in an arbitrary manner, as a merely logical device thought up for the purpose. I want now to try to show, by reference to some of Hegel's earliest writings, that his insistence on oppositions and crucial transitions was not entirely arbitrary, but was suggested to him by certain facts or supposed facts, and that he based himself on certain experiences when he suggested that oppositions could be at once cancelled and preserved.

In the volume of essays recently translated into English by Professors T. M. Knox and R. Kroner, under the title *Hegel's Early Theological Writings*,¹ are to be found the results of a number of attempts on Hegel's part, made when he was between the ages of 25 and 30, to bring out the true nature of the Christian religion. The details of these works, which are not philosophical in the strict sense, need not now concern us. What is important for our immediate purposes is to notice how Hegel goes about his task by opposing Christianity to the religions it displaced and showing how the latter gave way to it. Thus in one place (pp. 151-67) a long contrast is drawn between the "imaginative" religion of the Greek city states and the "positive" religion of Christianity, and there is an interesting analysis of the reasons why these pagan cults, spontaneous expression as they were of the religious life of those who practised them, were none the less forced to yield to a type of religion which was everything they were not—other-worldly when they were this-worldly, universal in its appeal when they had strictly local associations, a religion of all men as opposed to a religion of citizens. Unlike the philosophers of the Enlightenment, Hegel sees the explanation of this change not in the primitive character of Greek religion and the superior rational force of Christianity, but in the fact that each was peculiarly suited to the circumstances of its time: the religion of the city states disappeared because the city states themselves were superseded. The longest and most mature piece in the collection, "The Spirit of Christianity and its Fate," similarly develops a contrast between Judaism and Christianity. The religious life of the Jews is subjected to an incisive and extremely critical characterization in which Hegel interprets it as based on the relation-

¹ The passages that follow are quoted in this translation. It should be pointed out that the essays were not published by Hegel himself.

ship of master and slave (God for the Jews was a far-off tyrant with a big stick, whose word had to be treated as law), and contrasts it violently with the teaching of Jesus, who came to preach a religion of love not to be tied down to any legal or moral code. There is less stress here on the social background of religious beliefs, but once more Christianity is presented as the antithesis of the religion which preceded it, even if it remains true that some features of Jewish belief and practice survived to mar the purity of the new creed. The suggestion is already emerging, though the idea remains so far imprecise, that the rhythm of history is a rhythm of opposites.

At this stage there is no word of the reconciliation of opposites, but it is already clear that Hegel is moving towards that idea. What is more, evidence is not wanting of the nature of the models on which he relied in thinking it possible. Of particular interest in this connection are two short pieces printed at the end of the *Early Theological Writings*, with the titles "Love" and (somewhat misleadingly) "Fragment of a System." The essay on Love, which actually antedates "The Spirit of Christianity," contains much which anticipates the later system. Consider for example the following passage:

The lover who takes is not thereby made richer than the other; he is enriched indeed, but only so much as the other is. So, too, the giver does not make himself poorer; by giving to the other he has at the same time and to the same extent enhanced his own treasure (compare Juliet in *Romeo and Juliet*: "The more I give to thee, the more I have"). This wealth of life love acquires in the exchange of every thought, every variety of inner experience, for it seeks out differences and devises unifications *ad infinitum*; it turns to the whole manifold of nature in order to drink love out of every life. What in the first instance is most the individual's own is united into the whole in the lover's touch and contact; consciousness of a separate self disappears, and all distinction between the lovers is annulled (p. 307).

More ponderously, Hegel speaks in an earlier passage from the same essay of the way in which, in love, "life has run through the circle of development from an immature to a completely mature unity" and of how love cancels the oppositions which it generates itself, by depriving them of their foreign character. "In love the separate does still remain, but as something united and no longer as something separate; life senses life" (p. 305). The lover puts aside all thought of himself, to discover himself again in a richer form in his beloved. As Bradley saw (*Ethical Studies*, pp. 186-87), the thought behind Hegelianism is much the same as that expressed in Shakespeare's poem *The Phoenix and the Turtle*:

So they loved, as love in twain
Had the essence but in one;
Two distincts, division none:
Number there in love was slain. . . .

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 Reason, in itself confounded,
 Saw division grow together:
 To themselves yet either neither
 Simple were so well compounded,

That it cried, How true a twain
 Seemeth this concordant one!
 Love hath reason, reason none,
 If what parts can so remain.

Bradley's comment that "philosophy does not reach its end till the 'reason of reason' is adequate to the 'reason of love,'" serves to set out Hegel's philosophical aspirations precisely.

The "Fragment of a System," which dates from 1800, gives a different turn to a discussion of the same general problem. Here the suggestion is made that the concept of life, which, as I have already pointed out, bulked large in contemporary thinking, might serve for the purpose of thinking opposites. A living being could be represented without difficulty as a unity in diversity, a whole whose parts necessarily had an identity of their own but could not function apart from each other. The model thus seemed a plausible one, and was of course one on which later idealists placed great reliance; it was nevertheless emphatically rejected by Hegel in the context referred to. The notion of life, even that of infinite life, could not, he argued, be all-embracing, for the concept of life presupposes the concept of that which is not alive, and this it fails to comprehend. What is more (and here the argument is given a particularly interesting twist) the fault is not with this particular concept but with the human intelligence as a source of concepts:

Every expression whatsoever [Hegel says] is a product of reflection, and therefore it is possible to demonstrate in the case of every expression that, when reflection propounds it, another expression, not propounded, is excluded. Reflection is thus driven on and on without rest . . . (p. 312).

Here Hegel states his case against the reflective understanding in what was to become his classical manner. The passage continues:

But this process must be checked once and for all by keeping in mind that, for example, what has been called a union of synthesis and antithesis [? by Fichte] is not something propounded by the understanding or by reflection but has a character of its own, namely, that of being a reality beyond all reflection.

It is religion, apparently, not philosophy which enables us to affirm the existence of this reality beyond all reflection and to raise ourselves from the level of finite to that of infinite life; though the few pages of the manuscript which remain throw little light on how Hegel worked out this position or attempted to resolve its obvious paradoxes. The fragment, however, remains of special interest both

for the points on which it anticipates Hegel's later ideas and for those on which it does not.

If Hegel never again assigned to religion the priority over philosophy given it in this particular paper, it remains true that his thought was penetrated by religious ideas, and thus that, as Mr. G. R. G. Mure has recently put it,¹ "the theological language he often uses in the Logic is for him barely metaphor." Certainly he drew extensively on the symbols and dogmas of the Christian religion in seeking confirmation for, and illustrations of, his basic idea of opposition and reconciliation. The doctrine of the Trinity, for instance, was an obvious prototype of the Hegelian triad, which was also exemplified, though not entirely to Hegel's satisfaction,² in the ceremony of the Communion service (the spirit of Christ taking external shape in the bread and the wine, to return to its original form as they are consumed). It would not be too much, in fact, despite the suspicion Hegelianism has often excited among religious men, to describe it as offering a theocentric view of the universe; though it might be misleading in so far as it failed to do justice to the breadth of its author's interests. None the less, it is important for anyone who wants to make a dispassionate appraisal of this system of ideas to get this aspect of Hegel's thought clear. I should like to quote one more passage from his early works, this time from "The Spirit of Christianity," in illustration of it:

The culmination of faith [he says, *op. cit.*, p. 273], the return to the Godhead whence man is born, closes the circle of man's development. Everything lives in the Godhead, every living thing is its child, but the child carries the unity, the connection, the concord with the entire harmony, undisturbed though undeveloped, in itself. It begins with faith in gods outside itself, with fear, until through its action it has separated itself more and more; but then it returns through associations to the original unity which now is developed, self-produced and sensed as a unity. The child now knows God, i.e., the spirit of God is present in the child, issues from its restrictions, annuls the modification, and restores the whole. God, the Son, the Holy Spirit.

In this piece of theological exegesis, which forms part of a long commentary on the teaching of Jesus, the central doctrines of Hegel's later philosophy are once again foreshadowed. The motifs of the circle returning on itself, and of the progress from implicit unity through self-estrangement to fully self-conscious unity in difference, are dominant in all his major writings from the *Phenomenology* onwards.

I must now leave this question of what ideas were important in Hegel's formative years, and pass on to a brief account of the

¹ *Philosophy*, vol. XXV, 1950, p. 394.

² Compare the discussion in *Early Theological Writings*, pp. 248-53.

working out of his finished system. Once he had decided (as he did about the year 1800) to give his main attention to philosophy, Hegel found himself confronted with two main tasks. One was to make good the bold claim, to which he had finally committed himself, that philosophical reason could achieve what in the "Fragment of a System" he had declared it could not, namely, demonstrate the possibility of a kind of thinking superior to the thinking of the understanding, about whose limitations he was now convinced; this amounted to the construction of a new sort of logic. The other was to come to grips with the philosophical ideas of his contemporaries and immediate predecessors, in the first place those of Schelling, which he began by thinking important but later came to consider as merely superficial, in the second place those of Kant, whose rigid dichotomy of sense and intellect and whose continued emphasis on the limitations of human knowledge had to be shown to be without foundation before his own theories could begin to seem plausible. The second task involved first, a determination of the comparative priorities of Nature and Spirit, and, second, a reconsideration of the problems about knowledge discussed in the *Critique of Pure Reason*.

I will begin with a few remarks about the problem of Nature and Spirit, which is perhaps less puzzling than may appear from the unfamiliar terminology in which it is necessary to refer to it. The problem was that of whether a unified interpretation of experience such as Hegel proposed was better presented in terms drawn from the study of nature or in terms drawn from the study of mental life. Schelling in his *System of Transcendental Idealism* (1800) sketched a metaphysical system whose categories were fundamentally biological; he thought of nature as a vast organism, and attempted to interpret all natural processes in organic terms. Hegel was sufficiently impressed by Schelling's attempt to find it necessary to have a philosophy of nature of his own and to make that philosophy rest on a rejection of the contemporary mechanistic conception of nature, but he attached far less general importance to biological concepts than Schelling. It was not in the sphere of nature that he found the most ready illustrations of the processes of opposition and reconciliation referred to above, but in the various manifestations of mind: both in the mental life of individuals and in what Hegel called "objective mind," mental life objectified in the form of institutions, traditions, customs, laws and so on. Nature differed from mind, for him, in being an order of things spread out over space and time and thus external to each other, a circumstance which made it impossible for the dialectical process to be fully reflected there. But the basic thought behind that process had been derived, as we have seen, from Hegel's interpretation of certain phases or aspects of human experi-

ence, and it is not surprising in consequence that it was to the products of human action, the spheres of history and politics for instance, that he turned for plausible illustrations of it. For him what was primarily intelligible, outside the abstractions of logic, was mental life or "concrete Spirit," as it has been called; nature was but a poor reflection of this, which owed such intelligibility as it had to the fact that it was striving to become like mind, though the attempt was doomed to perpetual failure. This point is perhaps worth bearing in mind to guard against the dangers of taking too literally the terminology in which Hegelian doctrines are sometimes presented; we should remember, for example, when it is said that he thought of the state as an organism, that this was not the real thought he was trying to express.

Hegel's criticism of the Kantian theory of knowledge is a subject I have discussed at length elsewhere. To avoid undue repetition, I shall concentrate here on a single point in it. As readers of his famous transcendental deduction of the categories will remember, Kant had made great play with the notion that the human intellect is a discursive faculty, i.e. that it is not a primary source of knowledge, originating materials of its own, but works on data furnished by another faculty. Kant's sharp separation between the senses, whose business it is to "intuit," and the understanding, whose whole function lies in thinking, is an immediate corollary of his holding this doctrine, whilst his conception of the thing in itself, if not logically entailed by it, was at least closely connected with it in his own mind. It was natural in these circumstances that Hegel, in common with many others of his generation, should have looked on this particular part of the Kantian philosophy with a baleful eye. It should be noticed, however, that he did not deny all truth to it, but rather tried to incorporate it in a wider account of his own. He admitted that a survey of those intellectual operations with which we are most familiar—a survey of common sense and scientific thinking—confirms the view that the human understanding is primarily a discursive instrument; but to this he added that there were other forms or levels of thought of which such a survey took no account. So far from its being true that human thinking moved on a single level, or at best on two, the muddled thinking of common sense and the clear thinking of science, the truth was that a large number of such levels could be distinguished, ranging from a stage where the element of thought was so little present that it might readily be confused with pure sensation, through the stages of common sense and scientific thought proper, where the element of discursive thought became most explicit, to a higher level which Hegel designated the thinking of reason, and whose main characteristic was that it claimed to be concrete rather than abstract, combin-

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri
ing the main features displayed by both sense and scientific thought. On this view there was an element of discursivity or "mediation," as Hegel called it, at all levels of human thinking, but just as it was unimportant, because only implicitly present, in sense-perception, so again it was no longer of primary importance at the level of reason, which Hegel took, perhaps not altogether wisely, to be exemplified in philosophical thinking.

The plausibility of this theory of Hegel's turns on two main points. First, on whether he can give any good reason for putting the different kinds of thinking he distinguishes on a single scale, so that they form a developing series in the members of which the "true" nature of thought is progressively better brought out; and secondly, on whether he can give a clear account of the highest state of all, that of reason or philosophy.

It has become customary in recent philosophical discussion to denounce the thesis of "reductionism," according to which one type of language or set of concepts is taken as basic, and all others must be "reduced" to it if they are to claim logical respectability. Hegel would be in agreement with this recent move as regards its main point, but he would not be content, as the opponents of "reductionism" apparently are, to maintain that there just are irreducibly different kinds of language, and leave the matter at that. Now it must be admitted that Hegel's attitude here is greatly influenced by his tendency to see unity in all things, a presumption which strikes many present-day philosophers as wholly gratuitous (though why it should be gratuitous to say that all things are one but not gratuitous to say that everything is different from everything else I fail to see). But in addition to this general presumption he did have an argument on the subject which it would be well to consider. Put in terms which may be more readily intelligible than his own, his argument was that, at whatever level of language we operate, whether we use the relatively imprecise speech of everyday life, or the more carefully thought out language of scientific discourse, we tend constantly to see imperfections in our way of talking, to be dissatisfied with ourselves because we never quite manage to say what we mean. Such self-criticism, Hegel argued, would be impossible unless the critic had got beyond the stage of simply operating with a language: the thought of something better must also be present to his mind. And this something better, he added, was the same in every case: a single ideal of adequate speech dominated all our linguistic operations, though it must be admitted that our awareness of it varied greatly from one level to another.

Assuming now (which is perhaps hazardous) that this is a fair account of Hegel's thought, let us consider briefly whether the argument can stand up to criticism. That it would be criticized by many

modern philosophers I have no doubt. We might be told, for instance, that, like so many other traditional philosophical doctrines, it presupposed without any attempt at justification the primacy of the descriptive mode of speech, and fell down just because of its failure to recognize the fundamental difference between, say, issuing an order, expressing a moral judgment and stating a fact. And even if that objection were set aside as raising problems too large for discussion here, it might still be asked whether, taken only as applying to descriptive language, Hegel's conclusions were at all warranted. That we do tend to feel dissatisfaction with this sort of language or that—that, for instance, we frequently condemn common speech for its lack of precision or scientific language on the score of being too abstract—must indeed be admitted; but many contemporary philosophers would say that our condemnation here was simply misconceived. Common speech (they would argue) could not fulfil its everyday function without being vague and imprecise, whilst scientific language was of its nature abstract. Yet the fact remains that we do seem to be obsessed with the idea of a way of talking which combines the precision of scientific language, however paradoxically, with what Dr. Waismann has called the "open texture" of everyday speech; or, to put it in more traditional language which is nearer to Hegel's own, which operates with universals, but universals which are concrete not abstract. So far as the descriptive function of language is concerned, at any rate, it seems to me perfectly proper for Hegel to stress this fact. It remains true, however, that if he is to make good his position, whether against Kant or against modern linguistic philosophers, he has to do more than simply point out this common aspiration: he has to show that it is capable of realization in some degree at least. The presumption, after all, is that the ideal as Hegel conceives it involves an attempt to combine incompatibles, a search for a description which is at the same time a proper name or for a proper name which is at the same time a description; and this presumption must be met if the theory is to be taken at all seriously.

It was in his writings on logic that Hegel himself tried to deal with these questions. Few modern readers find these writings other than bewildering, and it will perhaps be best to make clear at once some of the reasons for the bewilderment. Part of the trouble, no doubt, lies in their very title: seeing the word "logic" we expect a treatment of, e.g., the forms and formal relations of propositions, or of other topics falling under the same general heading in philosophical tradition; but it is clear enough that Hegel had no such treatment in mind. A further source of difficulty is the baffling language Hegel uses to expound his ideas: there is a wealth of technical terms, which, however, seem to shift their meaning from context to context in a

way we might expect in a work of imaginative literature, but scarcely in what purports to be a scientific treatise. But the main difficulty of these works springs from the task Hegel had set himself in composing them. In the earlier part of this paper I have tried to show how his preoccupation with the idea of opposition and reconciliation, suggested to him by certain crucial experiences, combined with his antipathy to the abstractions of the reflective understanding to produce in his mind the notion of a completely new sort of logic, which would be in effect a logic of living thought, capable of overcoming the sharp antitheses of abstract conceptual systems by thinking opposites as at once diverse and united. The section on logic in the *Encyclopaedia*, and still more, the two-volume *Science of Logic* published in 1812, constitute the results of Hegel's efforts to give substance to this notion. The thesis of both works is that there is an aspect of thought of the very greatest importance to which no previous philosopher has done full justice; that no proper account can be given even of more familiar forms of thinking unless this aspect is recognized, since they can all be shown (or so Hegel thinks) to point forward to it; finally, that it is by stressing this aspect of thinking alone that we can hope to meet the Romantic criticism of the intellect as a purveyor of lifeless abstractions. To defend his thesis Hegel must not merely talk about the possibility of a living logic: he must actually show us what such a logic is like; and, being a bold man, it is this task which he attempts to carry out.

With the detail of this attempt I do not propose to concern myself now: only a full-scale commentary, considerably longer than Hegel's own cryptic though none the less substantial writings on the subject, would have any chance of doing justice to it. I should, however, like to remark on one feature of the enterprise which has, as I think, a certain interest for present-day philosophers. I refer to Hegel's attack on what he calls "the understanding" and his argument that the reasonable man must abandon its outlook in favour of Hegel's own. By "the understanding" Hegel intended to refer to the intellectual operations we perform, generally only in a half-conscious fashion, in everyday life, and with more explicit consciousness when we think about things scientifically. Underlying these operations are to be found, if Hegel is to be believed, both a logic and a philosophy. The logic is the formal logic of tradition, which Hegel accepted at its own level in an uncritical manner; the philosophy is that of most of his predecessors, but gets its clearest expression in the writings of Kant. It is characteristic of the understanding, on Hegel's interpretation of it, to try to see everything in a clear-cut way: to erect precise antitheses and make sharp dichotomies, insisting that whatever does not fit under one of a pair of opposing heads must unequivocally go under the other. Thus it is a feature of the logic of under-

standing that it gives unrestricted validity to the law of Excluded Middle, thereby ensuring that we declare of any statement that, if it is not true, it must be false; and of the philosophy of understanding that it seeks to achieve its ends by the use of antitheses, such as the division of propositions into synthetic and analytic, which claim to be exhaustive of their subject-matter. The assumptions here involved were vigorously attacked by Hegel, who pointed out that in many situations we find ourselves wanting to affirm both of a pair of propositions which, if taken literally, must be declared to be mutually contradictory, and argued that all sharp antitheses of the synthetic/analytic type (formal/material, as applied both in logic and in ethics, was his own favourite example) turn out to be inadequate because we come across border-line cases which we could put in one category or the other, but which have claims to belong to both. From the first point he concluded that the logic of the understanding (and for this purpose his imperfect grasp of the possibilities of formal logic is unimportant) is too rigid and too crude an instrument to bring out the nuances and subtlety of our actual thought; from the second that the associated philosophy is an inherently unstable one, resting on principles which it cannot sustain under criticism. Hegel himself sought to press home the last point by a trenchant criticism of the philosophy of Kant, but his condemnation, if valid, would obviously apply to a wide range of philosophers, including the classical empiricists and their successors to-day.

So far there is a curious similarity between Hegel's attitude on these points and that of some recent philosophers of the linguistic school, such as Dr. Waismann and Mr. Hampshire; but there are also important differences. For one thing Hegel would want to extend his strictures on the shortcomings of the understanding to cover the theories of, e.g., Professor Moore as well as those of Mr. Russell. Whilst admitting that the appeal to "what we say" is in some circumstances a valid philosophical move, he would not agree that "ordinary language" constitutes an independent court in which philosophical statements can be tested. Common language, on his view of it, may suggest philosophical truths, but this is precisely because it is not free of philosophical implications. On the contrary, it embodies a philosophical outlook, but one which is relatively incoherent, and would be seen to involve incompatible assertions if subjected to examination. Hegel diverges from recent philosophers still more radically in the conclusions he seeks to draw from the criticisms they agree in making. Whilst a writer like Dr. Waismann is content to show us that if we try to divide statements exhaustively into, e.g., analytic and synthetic there will always be cases which do not obviously fit into either category, with the implication that a broader classification is called for, Hegel attacks the idea that any

rigid form of classification could be satisfactory. Rigid classification, like abstraction itself, belongs in his view to a stage of thinking which philosophy must seek to transcend: however indispensable to the scientist, its shortcomings are such that it must involve those who use it in distortion and falsehood. Thus, the moral drawn by Hegel from reflection on the unsatisfactory character of the distinctions put forward by philosophers of the understanding is not that we should replace these by other distinctions, or cease to think philosophically, but rather that we should proceed to think in a way which does not involve hard-and-fast distinctions at all.

Without wishing to endorse Hegel's conclusion here, I suggest that it raises a question not sufficiently considered to-day. The spectacle of analytic philosophers taking the distinctions hazarded by their rasher colleagues and more innocent predecessors and showing how crude they are is by now a familiar one. But the critics here seldom tell us what we are to think when we reflect on the spectacle. Is it just that the world is full of a number of things, each of which is what it is and not another thing? We might be led to that conclusion by being made to see first, that every type of utterance has its own special logic, and, second, that there are far more types of utterance than might at first be supposed. But would not the logical conclusion of this line of thought be to abandon the consideration of types of utterance altogether and to concentrate, if that were possible, on elucidating the logic of particular statements? If we cannot satisfactorily classify propositions under two or three heads, what reason have we to suppose that we can do it under seven or ten? What guarantee have we that further scrutiny of individual cases will not reveal differences even inside classes previously thought to be homogeneous? The effect of recent work by analytic philosophers in this field is certainly to cause one to have grave doubts about the tenability of *any* classificatory scheme put forward in a philosophical context; it would be interesting to know whether this is in fact the lesson the philosophers in question mean to teach.

Now it may well be that Hegel's own solution to these difficulties is an impossible one. It amounted to the recommendation that we should abandon the logic of tradition, which took its stand on the notion of abstract identity (or, less mysteriously, on the principle of Excluded Middle), and elaborate instead a logic whose central concept would be that of identity in difference. Seen in the light of developments in formal logic in the present century, this might seem a reasonable enough programme: is not Hegel (we might ask) intelligently anticipating the modern demand for multivalued logics? But there is in fact a significant difference between these systems and that of Hegel, which we can perhaps bring out as follows. In a

three-value logic, to take the simplest of the non-traditional forms, the principle of Excluded Middle is indeed abandoned, and an attempt is made to work with concepts less precisely defined than the concepts envisaged by traditional logicians. Yet it remains true that in such a system at least one principle is assigned absolute validity, namely, the principle that every proposition must take one of the three values true, false and doubtful (the principle of Excluded Fourth), and the concepts involved must be defined with sufficient precision to make this principle applicable. *Mutatis mutandis*, the same must be said of any system of logic of the kind recent logicians have envisaged, whatever the number of its truth values: in every one some rule must be taken as absolute, and some rigidity be found in the conceptual system employed. Hegel's logic, by way of contrast takes its stand on the view that to make any logical rule absolute, or give any concept fixed boundaries, is to fall into the cardinal error of the understanding, to divide what is in fact united and unite what is in fact divided. Rules of thought there must indeed be, for all thinking demands some sort of precision, but they must be rules of a curiously elastic kind, capable of adaptation to particular cases, like the *μολίβδινος κανών* of which Aristotle speaks in the *Ethics*.¹ Similarly there must be concepts, which is to say there must be general terms; yet to no such term must we assign a precisely fixed meaning, for the significance of each will vary from context to context. Concepts with sharp edges and a clear-cut content are "abstract," whereas the concepts of Hegel's logic claim to be "concrete."

For my part I find it very difficult to see how these requirements of Hegel's could be satisfied. Regardless of what we may think of any particular rule or conceptual scheme, it is surely of the nature of a rule *not* to vary from case to case and of a concept to have *some* definite content. Rules which can be modified to suit individual cases are just not rules at all, while concepts which lack all determinate content, even for the person who uses them, are incapable of application. Nor do I see how Hegel's appeal to the notion of identity in difference helps in this connection. To the criticism just made he might reply that he is not saying anything so silly as that the various instances of the use of the same general word are simply equivocal, but is prepared to allow that a recognizable identity runs through them all. The point is, however, to discover what this concession amounts to. If Hegel means what he says—if he agrees that, however ill-defined its boundaries, each concept has a central core which remains the same in all its concrete applications—then he seems to be involved in the same kind of abstraction he imputes to his opponents, and his logic does not differ in principle from theirs. And

¹ *Ethics*, 1137b, 30.

If he denies that this is his position, what alternative is open to him? Is there in fact any alternative consistent with a continued use of general words? And if Hegel's logic requires him to dispense with the use of general words, how can he even formulate his own theories, let alone communicate them to others? A philosopher persuaded of this conclusion would be reduced to the predicament of Cratylus, who said nothing but merely wagged his finger.

Yet to dismiss Hegel's logic, and with it the whole Hegelian system, with a comment of this sort is after all scarcely satisfactory. At the least we should give Hegel the credit of his negative achievements. More clearly than any previous philosopher he saw the limitations of a logic of the traditional two-value type; he realized that on many occasions we say things which will not readily fit the requirements of such a logic ("it is and it isn't," "that is not quite true," are familiar examples), and grasped correctly that this fact has important philosophical implications. That he himself drew what seems to be the wrong lesson from the situation in his polemic against the understanding is less important than that he saw there was a lesson to be drawn. It may well be that, if we are to say anything specific at all, we must make more concessions to the understanding and its principle of abstract identity than Hegel was in practice prepared to make; though it is fair to remember that in theory he left ample room for such concessions, as his stress on the "negative moment" in thought testifies. But even if our final verdict on Hegel's own logical system is unfavourable, it will not follow that the whole idea of such a logic must be denounced as absurd. As noted already, the criticisms we make of common speech on the one hand and scientific discourse on the other strongly suggest the operation in us of an ideal of the Hegelian type, in which the virtues of both are combined in a way of speaking which is neither; and the instances to which Hegel points of the reconciliation of opposites lend some support to the view that the ideal is not an empty one, even if they will not bear the full weight Hegel seeks to put upon them. Finally, there is this point to be noticed. Even though we find ourselves forced to accept the dictum (with which incidentally Hegel himself would be in formal agreement) that whatever can be said can be said clearly, there is none the less constant pressure on us to recognize that there are many things we want to say but cannot say clearly. Poets, novelists and mystics at any rate find themselves in this position, and their existence is enough to cast doubt on the view that understanding of the world can come only from following scientific methods in the narrow sense of the term. Hegel had the great merit of taking seriously these non-scientific forms of utterance and of trying to assimilate the obscure insights they appear to embody: his philosophy, whilst in intention a form of rationalism, was built on a far broader

basis than any previous philosophy of the same general type. It is this feature of it, I suspect, which is the main source of its strength, and which makes it, for all its obscurity and the undeniable extravagances of its author, worthy of fresh attention from philosophers to-day.

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EXISTENTIALISM

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If one takes a course in philosophy to-day at a British university, a discreet silence is usually observed about existentialism. Often the professors understand little of its methods or its doctrine. If their excuse in part is the inaccessibility in English of standard existentialist texts, it is true also that philosophers trained in the "critical philosophy" now in vogue feel a certain aversion to existentialism or, at all events, to the notion they have formed of it. If Christianity was a scandal to the Greeks and remains a scandal, as Dr. Brunner has recently told us, to contemporary humanists, existentialism is a scandal to the positivists. The latter are aware that the existentialists habitually trespass in the fields of religion, ethics, aesthetics and psychology, fields which, on the positivist view, should be reserved to other disciplines than philosophy, which has its own distinctive subject-matter and approach. They know that certain existentialists, notably Heidegger, provide a happy hunting ground for examples of "metaphysics." They have heard that existentialism has sought to turn the tables on positivism by accusing it, if not of metaphysics, at all events of a barrenness of significant content, of a preoccupation with mere logistics which removes philosophy completely from men's business and bosoms. If the positivist accuses the existentialist of perpetrating "nonsense" in a technical sense, the latter retorts by accusing the positivist of reducing philosophy to nonsense in a pragmatic sense. Most positivists would indeed agree with Wittgenstein that philosophy, as they understand it, is concerned with Nothing, that it tells you nothing about the world. The provision of data about the world they hold to be the function of science. The challenge of the existentialist to the positivist is essentially with regard to this basic assumption of the latter as to the true function of philosophy; to meet the challenge needs a better understanding of the existentialist position than the positivist usually possesses; it is much safer and easier to ignore it.

Mr. Blackham's excellent book¹ on six leading existentialists should make it increasingly impossible for British philosophy to occupy this ostrich-like position. He has taken his thinkers seriously and has been richly rewarded, and his readers can reap the advantage. He writes: "When all is said and done, these six thinkers remain formidable persons, marvellously gifted, highly trained, masters of Western culture, with exceptional seriousness of purpose

¹ *Six Existentialist Thinkers*, G. H. J. Blackham, Routledge 15s.

and a profound personal experience. One may not be convinced by the total philosophy of any one of them, but, odd as they are, they are representative because they are trying not merely to think but personally to live the situation of man embedded in the situation of their time. They are profoundly in touch; whatever one makes of them, to have no use for them is to be profoundly out of touch." Mr. Blackham has penetrated deeply into their thought; better than any other English interpreter up to the present date, he has understood them. If I were to make any criticism of his book, it is that he has kept himself too much in the background and given us little or no indication of his own approach; the general estimate at the end of his work remains still a summary and not an interpretation. However, our especial need at this juncture is a greater understanding of the thought of the existentialists and his contribution to that end is extremely useful.

It may be of value to attempt some brief statement, with the help of Mr. Blackham's book, of the basic positions of the existentialists, and to draw some tentative conclusions on their place in the development of thought. First of all, it is clear that existentialism belongs to that category of philosophies which derive from a powerful moral impulse and are based on a distinctive ethical affirmation. The existentialist affirmation is as to the value of the "authentic" in human personality. All the thinkers of the school distinguish between the authentic and the inauthentic in human beliefs and attitudes and give a detailed analysis and description of the modes of personal existence that are involved. In Kierkegaard the authentic person is called "The Individual." Kierkegaard dedicated his works to "The Individual," wished "The Individual" to be inscribed on his tomb, declared that "The Individual" was the category through which man in the course of his history was destined to pass. "The crowd" was "the lie." "To exist" was "to stand out" from the crowd, whether the crowd of conforming Christians whose Christianity was essentially "geographical," or the crowd of "dons," meekly and faithfully expounding the Hegelian System. "To exist" one must "choose oneself" or "choose to choose." "Existence" was founded in the first place on a fundamental ethical choice, on a decision on the ideal for which one was prepared to live or die, though as personality is a continuing revelation, and authentic persons are continually engaged in making and re-making themselves, the act of choice has continually to be repeated so that to pass through periodical crises of decision, in particular through a capacity to open oneself to grace, is the clearest indication of the authentic. "Subjectivity is truth" declared Kierkegaard; he poured ridicule on the idea that truth could be handed by one person to another as a body of results; it must spring from experience "indivi-

dually appropriated." Kierkegaard's hostility to Hegel was to his conception of truth as an elaborate speculative system claiming objective validity. If a complete system of truth could be produced by the mere exercise of dialectics, there was nothing left for man to do when he had acquired it by the necessary intellectual effort; no living and developing relationship to God, to himself, to other persons or to his social situation was called for. "Man cannot live in these enormous systematic buildings," Kierkegaard remarked. The truth that really mattered was the fruit of the choices, the discoveries, the adventures, the inspirations of unique persons relating themselves to situations no less unique.

While the most crucial of Kierkegaard's decisions was his rejection of speculation for Christianity, Nietzsche was an atheist, yet there is a marked similarity between their basic positions. Nietzsche's attack on Christianity as "slave morality" is parallel to the war on Christendom which occupied Kierkegaard's last years. Kierkegaard saw history as moving into the category of "the individual"; Nietzsche regarded the vision that came to him of mankind passing away from the stage of customary morality, in which no clear distinction was made between the "free" and the "evil," to a stage "beyond good and evil," as these had been previously understood, as dividing history into two halves. The work of his middle period was a thorough-going critical analysis, mainly in aphoristic form, of the entire body of traditional ethical and religious conceptions. Kierkegaard disavowed any intention to form a school; it was precisely the persons who evaded the responsibility of personal decision by attaching themselves to a school whom he condemned for inauthenticity. Zarathustra, similarly, dismissed his followers to express his contempt for men unable to stand by themselves.

The conception of "anguish" in the existentialists is closely related to that of "authenticity." Kierkegaard knew from his deeply troubled experience that the man who embarks on a life of "authentic" decisions has at the same time left behind him clear and straightforward courses. The conception of "anguish" in the thought of Heidegger and Sartre is similarly associated with their doctrine of authenticity. In their view man finds himself "thrown" into existence, just like that; he does not know why, nor can he ever know why. He is *de trop*. He finds himself in the middle of a fool's journey, travelling without pilot or compass. He will never find any meaning in life except what he himself is able to put into it. Also, he is condemned to be free. He must make some kind of choice as to how he shall live his life. His easiest course, for there is always a powerful pressure on him to follow it, is that of conformity to established usages and opinions, of being assimilated to the general forms of human existence. By this means he becomes "one among

many," he achieves anonymity, he becomes buried in the impersonal *Das Man*. Life becomes easy, but at the expense of a flight from personal responsibility, the escape into inauthenticity. Sartre applies the opprobrious epithet "salaud" to the person who thus sacrifices the world of his possibilities, however characterized by "anguish," to the craving for security. What is the position of the man who chooses to be "authentic"? He has personally to confront his situation, to assume the responsibility for giving meaning to life in that situation. It is a situation in which he cannot escape a certain servitude both to his own material necessities and to other persons. Both Heidegger and Sartre, but more particularly Sartre, interpret man's relationship to other persons in terms of servitude. The other is always the person who regards me as an object so that I fall into the category of "being-for-another person" instead of "being-for-one self." The source of original sin, Sartre tells us, is the existence of others; most people become the "for-another person" type and sink into inauthenticity. Yet salvation is to be found in this situation, Heidegger and Sartre tell us, by a full acceptance of one's responsibility and a genuine confrontation of reality. One has to recognize that one's situation is inescapably, in Heidegger's phrase, "Being-with-others-in-the-world"; one must realize, Sartre tells us, that there is no escape, without manifest evasion, from taking responsibility for the whole world seeing that whatever one does affects the whole world. Man loses his sense of servitude to other persons if, having been awakened to his human condition, he assumes it, accepts total responsibility for it and engages himself unreservedly in it. Heidegger posits a similarly heroic morality. Man has to face the absurdity of his existence, that he is cast into the world merely to die there, that when he has thrown away the comfort of established ideas, he is left with Nothing, so that he has to build his own world of meaning by his choices. But if he escapes from illusions, making a full-blooded acceptance of what existence implies, taking charge of his destiny, he finds a world of almost boundless possibilities open to him, though, as he has always to confront a given situation, his freedom is always limited, authentic existence being necessarily a synthesis of the imposed and the willed. Such an existence, Heidegger tells us, is the only possible one for the enlightened and resolved human being.

Karl Jaspers' contribution to an "authentic" ethic seems to me of particular interest. He admits, in the first place, the great debt that he owes to Kierkegaard and Nietzsche and begins his analysis of the human situation where they left off. In his opinion they effectively shattered the framework both of traditional philosophy and of ethics, and made it necessary to make a fresh start. Jaspers finds the complacency of modern man in face of the collapse of

traditional religious beliefs and of any true basis for social cohesion a terrifying fact. The truth is that a transformation of man's ethical and religious beliefs no less radical than the change that is taking place in objective living conditions may be a condition of survival. Jaspers remarks that the doctrine of authenticity taught by Kierkegaard and Nietzsche provides rather the conditions for arriving at a solution of the problem than the solution itself. Kierkegaard and Nietzsche are "exceptions"; they must not be regarded as exemplars. In Jaspers' view the solution Kierkegaard found for himself, his acceptance of Christianity through the leap of faith, through The Absurd, is one in which we cannot follow him. But Nietzsche has even less claim to have shown us the way out. Mr. Blackman sagely remarks that only the most foolish of his followers have attempted to occupy any of the intellectual homes he built for himself in his last years. Jaspers has sought to build a philosophy for modern man and for modern society in terms of the principle of authenticity. He discusses the nature of a right relationship to tradition, one by which man makes sure he is not cut off from his roots and yet does not slavishly follow the past; of an authentic relationship to customary values, one through which, if a man does not merely conform, but adopts traditional values, if he does adopt them, by an act of choice, he nevertheless takes care not merely to pass them by. Finally, he discusses the problem of man in society, of how a consensus can be created for social living by other means than the pressure of a depersonalizing social structure which imposes a rigid thought and behaviour pattern. He finds the key to this problem in communication, remarking that the true spirit of reason in our time becomes the desire for boundless communication. Jaspers remarks, "Boundless openness to communication is not the consequence of any knowledge, it is the decision to follow a human road. The idea of communication is not utopia, but faith. Each man is confronted with the question whether he believes in our potentiality really to live together, to speak together, through this togetherness to find our way to the truth, and thereby finally to become authentically ourselves."

I have given this prominence to the examination by the existentialists of the problem of authenticity because their central philosophical doctrines will be found to follow from it. They have rejected both of the main philosophical positions which have dominated thought through the period since the age of scholasticism and which we can describe as idealism or rationalism, on the one hand, and empiricism or naturalism on the other. Kierkegaard's onslaught on Hegel, in which he was followed by Nietzsche, was decisive. Since Kierkegaard it has no longer been possible for the philosopher to imagine that he can erect a totalitarian explanation of the universe

by the mere exercise of the speculative reason. Existentialism, it should be added, is not an irrationalism. There have been few more skilful or subtle dialecticians than Kierkegaard; he was in no sense concerned to undervalue the part that must be played in philosophy by the rigour of thought and the cogency of disciplined reflection. But the thought must always be the thought of the existing person and be related to his interests and choices. The world of concrete existences cannot on this view be fitted into a merely conceptual framework. Philosophical doctrines must take full account of the bewildering complexity of the experience of existents in its concreteness and multiform modes. Compared with the interpretations of the existentialists the idealist systems of such thinkers as Leibnitz, Spinoza and Hegel seem to have little relation with life as it is lived.

What is the precise point on which the existentialists base their criticism of scientism, of the positivism or common-sense empiricism of the British school in particular? It is not a question of any hostility to science. The existentialists are at one with the empiricists as against the idealists in their recognition of the importance of brute fact, of the formal emptiness of systems in which there is not a continual checking of speculation by fact. Jaspers has remarked that it is hardly possible to exaggerate the significance of that really unlimited inquiry, accompanied by boundless self-criticism, which is the essence of science. Whatever is manifested in the world science can take as its object, our consciousness of every reality thus becoming sharpened and clarified. Philosophy must take into account the whole body of verified knowledge that science provides. But, the existentialists claim, science is concerned with only one aspect of the world, the world in its objectivity, what Jaspers calls "Being-there" and Sartre *l'en-soi*. But the world of personal existences, which is also the world of ethical and aesthetic valuations, is a different kind of world, a world which cannot be known truly by being either observed objectively or studied analytically, after the manner of science, but must be discovered by participation in its life. The primary subject-matter of the existentialists is personal existence and its ethical interests. Now it is precisely in this field that science, whether proceeding by detached observation or deductive analysis, gives such unsatisfactory results. A person, Heidegger and Sartre tell us, is a No-Thing; it is not a fact that can be placed before us for scientific scrutiny, but a possibility, an entity that makes and re-makes itself by its projects and valuations. Kierkegaard, referring to the growing preoccupation with science that characterized his time, remarked that the person absorbed in the discovery of fact usually forgot what it meant to "exist." The "existing" person was concerned with giving meaning to every part

of his life by his decisions in the field of his relation to God, to himself, to other persons and to political society; the scientific observer tended to be dissociated from that life of drama and decision, of love and beauty, by his preoccupation with the process of splitting up into its parts some item of the rich and varied and exciting world of concrete existences. Jaspers argues that Being reveals itself to us in various aspects or modes which are basically discontinuous and cannot be fitted into any unified scheme. If the idealists seek to fit the real into a conceptual scheme, the empiricists attempt to fit it into a framework of objectively observed fact. Both methods fail to imprison in their net the world of existence.

In his *The Perennial in Philosophy* Jaspers has made a vigorous attack on the merely empirical approach. He argues that its direct and indirect ethical fruits are disastrous, while its method of isolating and positing and absolutizing some particular phenomenal aspect of the real prevents it from grasping the real. He maintains that it is illustrative of the basic contradiction involved in empiricism that the British logical positivist school, which claims to be in principle empirical, has found itself in practice preoccupied with merely formal and logical problems.

It is noteworthy that such positivists as Russell and Ayer have by implication admitted the limitations of positivism in relation to the problems of ethics and aesthetics. Russell has argued that personal valuations do not belong to the realm of knowledge, that neither science nor philosophy can throw any light on their validity. Ayer denies indeed that ethical statements are meaningful propositions seeing that there is no way of discovering whether they are true or false. This drastic step of eliminating ethics and wisdom from the sphere of philosophy the existentialists have refused to take. It seems to them that any philosophical method which leads to such consequences is self-condemned.

The earliest of the existentialists, Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, were inspirational thinkers rather than systematic philosophers. The later exponents, notably Heidegger and Jaspers, who have occupied professorial posts and present existentialism in terms of the philosophy of the schools, have been influenced by the phenomenology of Husserl. They have been concerned with phenomena, with the concrete forms of consciousness, seeing that "things in themselves cannot be known," but their special preoccupation has been with the capacity of consciousness to intuit meanings and essences. If, then, existentialism studies concrete existences, it is always from the point of view of the meaning of the experiences which are examined. Thus its attention is mainly directed to modes of consciousness and situations which have some particular significance. There is the situation of "anguish" which receives a variety

PHILOSOPHY

of interpretations; it refers in general to man's doubt and uncertainty, often of an agonizing kind, when he feels no longer able to take refuge in the inauthentic and yet realizes that all safe ground has been taken from under his feet. There is the situation of solitariness in which man, awakened for the first time to a consciousness of his situation, realizes the difficulties, in some respects insuperable, of communication. The existentialists have given especial attention to the problem of the relation between the human person and "the other." While Sartre has regarded personal relationships as basically relationships of servitude, in other thinkers of the school they are seen as the source of the chief meaning and greatest fulfilment of existence. Jaspers and Buber interpret the primary ethical problem in terms of the relationship between the "I" and "Thou"; the "I" must fully recognize the "otherness" of the "other," that he is both essentially different and fundamentally inaccessible, and yet must feel a "call" to the life of community through openness, generosity and communication, which must always be sought without being ever fully achieved. Marcel has shown profound insight in his analysis of the relationship of fidelity. Man's relationship to Being or Transcendence or God is a central *motif* of the existentialists, especially in the case of Kierkegaard, Jaspers, Heidegger and Marcel. Hence the part played in their thought of the concepts of revelation and testimony and the distinction made by Marcel between a Problem and a Mystery. When one encounters a problem, all the factors of the situation are known and there is no reason why every competent investigator should not reach the same solution. In all the significant situations in life, in Marcel's view, we are involved in Mysteries not problems, for there are factors involved deriving in part from the fact that we are participants and not mere observers and in part from our relationship to Being, that "metaphysical Atlantis whose presence in reality confers on our experience its volume, its value, its mysterious density." The existentialist philosopher is bound to find himself interpreting these and other basic human situations in terms of his own experience; in his view philosophy can only attain complete objectivity by losing significance and the sense of existence. Yet he has to relate himself to the world, and we all live in the same world, so that where his experience is authentic he can speak to our condition unless we have sought an escape in the inauthentic, or he may call us into existence. It is not his business to provide his reader with objective truth but to call him to responsible living so that he will learn to build a structure of thought and value for himself.

Mr. Blackham remarks in his very sage and able work that perhaps the time has not come when it is possible to take a judicial view of the existentialists and so determine their place in the development

of thought. It may indeed be true that all that most of us can hope to do at the present stage is to attempt individually to appropriate, to use a Kierkegaardian phrase, what they have to give us. But I should like in conclusion to make three general comments.

(1) It seems to me that it cannot but be salutary for thinkers trained in the British school of philosophy to attempt genuinely to confront the challenge of the existentialists. I have an impression that the school of logical analysis is reaching or has reached a dead end. The game of classifying propositions in terms of their logical content, of hunting out unnecessary categories by Occam's razor, of exposing the "nonsensicality" of metaphysical sentences, is not unlimited in its possibilities and, after a time, assumes a certain air of futility. It is easy to over-estimate what can be achieved by formal logic. Collingwood remarked that nothing was ever demonstrated by logistics that could not be proved just as well without it. The entire structure of symbolic and mathematical logic, as we have seen, tells us nothing whatever about the world of experience. The long enterprise of seeking to demonstrate by logical method the validity of science is losing something of its fascination. Dr. J. O. Wisdom has surely said the last word on this when he points out that scientific investigation is not in fact based on induction but on the hypothetico-deductive method, and that one's belief in the validity of the latter depends entirely on whether the assumption is justified, which in fact scientists make, that we live in a rational universe that is favourable to scientific procedure. Some of the positivists are indeed realizing that there are new and worthwhile tasks to engage them if they can get out of their present rut. More contact with and understanding of the existentialists might hasten the process.

Russell has persuaded the positivists to believe that wisdom is not their province, that philosophy should restrict itself to the problems of logic and epistemology. Russell remarked that the philosophers who believed it was their task to teach wisdom and promote the necessary minimum of good behaviour sacrificed truth to propaganda and became lost in mists of fallacy and obscurity. That seems to be a case for attacking their fallacies and obscurities but not for depriving philosophy of its richest province. It is time that British philosophers followed the existentialists in concerning themselves with what Mr. Blackham calls "personal existence and its ethical interests."

(2) I attach great importance to the unanimous testimony of the existentialists to the value of what they call authentic existence or authentic personality. Throughout human history till our own time the lived morality of the masses of people, including those who are widely accepted as *good*, has been essentially *mores*, the customs of

some particular social group. The existentialists hold that the age of The Individual has arrived, of what personalists call the "person," the age in which it will be recognized that the significance of personal life depends on a refusal merely to conform to the mores of the group. My own view is that men's chances of survival depend on the extent to which they can transcend the morality of custom and transform themselves into persons. If this is true, existentialists and personalists are prophetic thinkers in a highly significant sense.

(3) My final point is that those of us who have been influenced by the existentialists must not forget perhaps the most important thing they have to teach, that existentialism is not a body of "results" we are supposed to accept. Every existentialist philosophy is necessarily a personal interpretation; it is limited by the limitations of its author; if the quality of his experience is not on a high level, his thought will display his mediocrity; if he is lacking in wisdom, his interpretations will record his folly; if he is a neurotic, his failures of adjustment will be manifest. Kierkegaard and Nietzsche were neurotics; if much of their thought is of great value, much of it is repellent. Jaspers and Buber are the wisest of the existentialists, Berdyaev the most inspiring and prophetic. I find Marcel's practice of leaving his arguments suspended in the air profoundly irritating; merely to see "*le penseur pensant*" at work is not sufficient for me. Jaspers has told us not to regard Kierkegaard and Nietzsche as exemplars; the remark should apply to the whole existentialist school. Let us not follow any of them but, nevertheless, learn from them to relate ourselves authentically as unique persons to situations equally unique.

A. N. WHITEHEAD ON GOOD AND EVIL

PROFESSOR R. K. HARRISON

THE many comments on good and evil found in the writings of A. N. Whitehead are exhibited in his mind against the two categories of positive and negative value. His concern in value-considerations is with the "trinity" of truth, beauty and goodness on the one hand, and with falsehood, ugliness and evil on the other.¹ For him, "value" is a word employed for "the intrinsic reality of an event"² and very frequently in his treatment of the value-theme he uses the term "importance" as having equivalence to "value."³

Reality for him consists of a systematized accumulation of what he designates as "actual entities," or "actual occasions," which, he states, are "the final real things of which the world is made up."⁴ An actual entity corresponds to a "subject" or "self," which is so constituted as to be able to express the data-products of other actual entities.⁵ For the purposes of this paper it will be necessary to consider what Whitehead describes as "eternal objects," or general possibilities, since these categories have an integral relationship to good and evil in his philosophical system.

An "eternal object" is defined as "any entity whose conceptual recognition does not involve a necessary reference to any definite actual entities of the temporal world."⁶ One of their most important properties is the relational essence which they exhibit, and an eternal object can never properly be considered apart from its relations to other eternal objects. Such an object would be "redness," "man," "good" as simple quantities, whilst a complex eternal object would exhibit simple eternal objects in specific relations, or in his own words it would be a "definite finite relationship involving the definite eternal objects of a limited set of such objects."⁷ Now these eternal objects exercise an important influence over actual entities in the sense that they act as guiding ideals which very generally direct the process of experience of an actual entity, but this happens only because an actual entity uses them for that specific purpose. For example, they govern the consideration and absorption of a datum (positive prehension), within the experience of an actual occasion, or its examination and rejection (negative prehension), and so assist the actual entity to realize the ideal concept (or eternal object) within

¹ *Adventures of Ideas* (1933), p. 11.

² *Science and the Modern World* (1929), p. 136.

³ *Aims of Education* (1929), p. 63. ⁴ *Process and Reality* (1929), p. 27.

⁵ Cf. *Ibid.*, pp. 337 ff. ⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 70.

⁷ *Science and the Modern World*, p. 239.

its experience. So then every actual entity can be regarded as exhibiting value, whether positive or negative, although it may only have a potential form until the abstract eternal object is realized as constituting actual values for it. But this fruition of value rests upon the comprehensive operation of what Whitehead calls the subjective aim¹ of an actual entity (i.e., the guidance by the ideal or eternal object), and not only on one phase of that activity.

We can now examine the relation of the human mind, which in itself is a society of actual entities, to the existence and recognition of eternal objects. Whitehead claims that the mind is so constituted as to be able to realize conceptually certain abstract categories which upon subsequent and more detailed examination prove to be consistent with their preconceived attributes. "The human intelligence can conceive of a type of things in abstraction from exemplification. The most obvious disclosures of this characteristic of humanity are mathematical concepts and ideals of the Good."² Good can be claimed as realized within experience when an actual entity succeeds in exemplifying the eternal object "good." Just how completely or appositely such a realization is likely to be effected is a matter upon which Whitehead finds it difficult to be specific. Probably he would maintain that absolute exemplification does not fall within the common run of experience of actual entities.

Having indicated the ability of the human mind to conceive such abstract quantities as the "good," Whitehead then proceeds to describe the manner in which the eternal object "good" is in fact achieved. In this process the element of pattern plays an important part. This is not of a purely mechanical or functional order, but seems to reflect the mathematical background of the philosopher, and his desire to stress the fact of order and harmony in the general concept. This incidence of pattern is a necessary prerequisite for the attaining of the "good," though the pattern itself is a neutral significant, or in his own words, "in itself a pattern is neither good nor bad."³ Uniformity is not necessarily characteristic of such a state of affairs, for the existence of an element diverse from that of the "good" may be integral to the nature of the eternal object. As with the eternal object "beauty," which may exhibit certain necessary characters of discord,⁴ so "good" as an analogous category may likewise contain certain disorder, and even an actual quantity of evil. Whilst the "right chaos and the right vagueness are jointly required for any effective harmony," yet "chaos is not to be identified with evil."⁵ The conditions which Whitehead maintains as necessary for

¹ *Vide Process and Reality*, pp. 37 f.

² *Mathematics and the Good*. (*The Philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead*. Ed. Schilpp.), pp. 672 f.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 679.

⁴ *Adventures of Ideas*, p. 3.

⁵ *Process and Reality*, p. 171.

Good to be realized are the "infusion of pattern into natural occurrences, and the stability of such patterns, and the modification of such patterns."¹ Unfortunately he does not deal with the specific varieties of patterns, but merely assumes that they exist, and presumably that changes or rearrangements of pattern will in some way exemplify the eternal object "good." From the standpoint of humanity, the capacity of the mind is apparently such that the individual concerned is able to prehend positively those particular patterns which will assist in the ultimate exemplification of the eternal object "good."

Professor Whitehead cautions us against a facile acceptance of the idea that the "good" is a "stationary" concept. Though the eternal object "good" is unchanging, particular situations may exemplify it at one time and not at another, and it must also be borne in mind that new exemplifications are constantly occurring. It must be noted that his whole philosophy of "novelty" and "adventure" has always in view the distinctively progressive element, for without it "life degenerates when enclosed within the shackles of mere conformation."² In his book *Religion in the Making*, he vigorously attacks the concept of static goodness, with all that it implies in the way of smugness and self-satisfaction. "Good people of narrow sympathies are apt to be unfeeling and unprogressive, enjoying their egotistical goodness . . . they have reached a state of stable goodness so far as their interior life is concerned. This type of moral correctitude is, on a larger view, so like evil that the distinction is trivial."³ The close connection between good and evil which is possible, as evidenced in the foregoing quotation, may lead us to examine their relationship somewhat more closely, and also the general nature of evil itself. We have already been prepared for considerable intimacy of relation by Whitehead's assertion that evil—or in a reduced form, disorder, which he associated with the "Bad"⁴—may be an integral part of the eternal object "good." It would appear that in his philosophical thought, goodness and badness have a fundamental bearing on the structure of the cosmos. "Specific goods and specific evils may fade from experience, but goodness and badness are inescapable elements in all experience."⁵

With regard to the nature of evil, Whitehead makes a careful analysis of the situation which culminates in the enumeration of several distinct types. We have already noticed the "evil of triviality"⁶ which exhibits evil as the "half-way house between perfection and triviality"⁷ itself. Where patterns block each other there is the

¹ *Mathematics and the Good*, p. 678. ² *Modes of Thought* (1938), p. 109.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 98. ⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 108.

⁵ A. H. Johnson, *Philosophy of Science*, II, No. 1 (1944), p. 23.

⁶ *Mathematics and the Good*, p. 679. ⁷ *Adventure of Ideas*, p. 355.

"intrinsic evil of active deprivation" in the experience of an actual entity, and this evil may be subdivided into three types: "a concept may conflict with a reality, or two realities may conflict, or two concepts may conflict."¹ Further, there is the more obvious variety of evil with which we are familiar as the "brute motive force of fragmentary purpose, disregarding the eternal wisdom. Evil is overruling, retarding, hurting."²

Where the pattern of evil exemplifies its nature as a norm, it has the character of a "good," judged by its own standards. Beyond this it becomes an evil to itself, as well as to things outside itself, and thus contains the elements of its own destruction. For this reason Whitehead insists that the nature of evil is one of essential instability.³ Regarding pain and suffering, he maintains that its activity can produce a state of mind which will not merely transcend it, but ignore its functioning altogether.

The relationship of God to good and evil may merit brief consideration at this juncture. The relation of God to "eternal objects" is one of considerable complexity. His "primordial nature," which is comprised of various conceptual prehensions, is expressed in the principle of concretion, whereby God arranges the eternal objects and makes them available for prehension by actual entities.⁴ This function on the part of God is what Whitehead calls the "ultimate irrationality," a basic fact of the universe which must be accepted unquestioningly. His "consequent nature" or the "physical prehension by God of the actualities of the evolving universe" implies that God may be developing continually by virtue of His imbibing some of the many experiences of the actual entities. Within this area may be seen the place of evil in the Divine nature, and Whitehead states explicitly that evil does in fact have a definite place within the experience of God, albeit speaking of the "overcoming of evil by good" and "the transmutation of evil into good"⁵ in the sense of contributing to good. This shows the subordinate position of evil to good in the nature of God.

Thus his formulation of the matter is as follows. "God has in his nature the knowledge of evil, of pain, and of degradation, but it is there as overcome with what is good. Every fact is what it is, a fact of pleasure, of joy, of pain or of suffering. In its union with God that fact is not a total loss, but on its finer side is an element to be woven immortally into the rhythm of mortal things. Its very evil becomes a stepping-stone in the all-embracing ideals of God."⁶

¹ *Immortality* (Whitehead in Schilpp, ed.), pp. 686 f.

² *Science and the Modern World*, p. 276.

³ Cf. *Religion in the Making*, pp. 97 f.

⁴ *Process and Reality*, p. 134 *passim*.

⁵ *Religion in the Making*, p. 155.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 156.

The position which Whitehead adopts on this question of good and evil calls for some discussion. In the first place, it is not at all clear as to what he understands by the use of the term "good." It is clearly an eternal object, but are we to infer from this that it has a nature uniform with others of its kind, and in any case, what is the special characteristic which may be taken as distinguishing it, and making it recognizable and desirable for what it is? We are assured that the good arises as the result of patterns which exhibit variations. But how, we may ask, do these patterns arise, and how do they fall within the discernment of actual entities? To imply that the type of pattern which brings the achievement of goodness within reach is the variety which exemplifies the eternal object "good" tells us very little about the specific breakdown of the pattern, and comes dangerously near a tautology. Is it necessary, we may ask, that the good should exhibit pattern? May it not rather be found in a "simple" or "naïve" form, without reference to functional arrangement? Whitehead does not offer any cogent proof of his assertion, and so it must remain an open question for the present. Nor does he seem to take adequate cognizance of the possibility of degrees or grades of goodness, and this is rather important in view of the fact that he waxes wroth on "static goodness." Is goodness for him a concept which is apprehended in totality and final form as a result of prehension by an actual entity, or is the experience gradual and sustained as a result of continuation? If God is capable of developing by prehension, then perhaps the same may be said of "good" also.

Whitehead claims that exactness of achievement of the "good" is impossible at the present, but since he does no more than generalize upon the conditions which might be regarded as ideal for its fruition, one is left wondering whether such a realization can ever become part of the experience of an actual entity. Until positive variations and pattern-forms are specified, instead of the vague references to "modification" and "stability," his treatment of the situation leading to the actualization of the "good" can have little concrete meaning. But perhaps we ought not to expect too much in view of the fact that his method of investigation as a whole consists in a generalized description of what he has found to be the case from experience.¹

Again, is it not a rather gratuitous assumption on the part of Whitehead that the human intelligence is so constituted that it is able to conceive abstractly certain types of eternal objects? For the majority of people the cognizance of such things as good and evil, to limit our choice to the considerations of this paper, are elements which the intelligence lays hold on through personal experience, with its corresponding rewards and chastisements, and are seldom conceptualized in abstract form. We may, further, "feel in our bones"

¹ *Process and Reality*, pp. 19 ff.

that an ideal of goodness exists, and we may even align that ideal to the concept of "God"—though Whitehead probably would not—but its experience in the living of most people is of a very rudimentary order, and is never actualized either by mystic or by naturalist. Our concepts of "good" and "evil" are acquired against the background of society, for without this factor they would be powerless. So these eternal objects appear to us largely as the result of our social training, and less as the fruit of abstract contemplation by human intelligence.

Whitehead apparently attributes a complex nature to "good" when he speaks of it exhibiting elements of disorder and even evil. This is at once an interesting and involved speculation. He does not explain the proportion of evil which may be compatible with the good, in that eternal object, nor does he show the manner in which evil arrives in the pattern as a whole. This leads to another important question. If "evil" is a recognized part of the eternal object "good," can the reverse situation be maintained? If this is possible—and Whitehead's system appears to leave room for such a contingency—then the terms "good" and "evil," along with many others, are merely relative in their description of eternal objects, and tell us nothing of significance about the nature, and especially the constitution of the categories under consideration. Thus, as ideals for the guidance of actual entities, they are apt to become somewhat confusing on examination, to say the least of it. One rather feels that there lurks in the remote background of Whitehead's mind something of the spirit of Heraclitus—and Hegel—as exemplified in the "law of complementary opposition" or the "cosmic tensions" of which he wrote.

It would appear, then, that the recognition of the eternal objects "good" and "evil" for what they are as patterns of functioning is by no means as easy a matter as might appear at first sight. In fact, one can hardly help wondering as to exactly how far an actual entity has any real cognizance of their nature as it actually is. The possibility then arises of one pattern being exemplified in experience in mistake for the other. This is by no means a remote possibility, since "evil" exhibits its own harmony and pattern just as "good" does. Presumably the only certain way of apprehension is by means of "intuition," which itself would, in certain philosophical quarters, be construed as an appeal to ignorance.

One must comment favourably upon the discernment which Professor Whitehead evidences in his remarks on the place of evil in the nature of God. The reality of evil is, of course, fully recognized, but Whitehead is careful not to overstate its importance, or unduly exalt its position in the scheme of things. It is a part of the cosmic pattern, not the whole of it, and whilst its experience is credited, it is

A. N. WHITEHEAD ON GOOD AND EVIL

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thought of as operative in a subordinate capacity, and as integrated to the formulation of ultimate harmony, to which it is a contributing and necessary factor. Whitehead's entire analysis of the eternal object "evil" is very penetrating and satisfactory, and it is unfortunate that, to the present writer, the same clarity of exposition has not been applied to a description of the eternal object "good."

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IMAGES, SUPPOSING, AND IMAGINING

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[I should like to acknowledge my gratitude to A. G. N. Flew for his frequent discussions on the subject of this paper and for his criticisms of the paper itself; he is largely responsible for any merits it may have.]

IN this paper I shall do three things. *Firstly*, I shall distinguish between three senses of "imagine": one in which (the context makes clear that) the word is used to report the occurrence of mental imagery; a second in which "imagined" is used as substantially equivalent to "thought"; and a third in which "imagine" is used as substantially equivalent to "suppose." (And I shall argue that in neither of the two latter senses does imagining necessarily involve imagery.) *Secondly*, I shall discuss Hume's thesis about imagination: both because, although this is set out as a plausible (but mistaken) generalization about psychology, it nevertheless seems to me that Hume dealt with a central philosophical problem concerning imagination—the relation of descriptions to imagery—in a way that is suggestive and fruitful; and—the main reason for mentioning Hume—because a study of the relation between imagining (when this is imaging) and imagining (when this is supposing) will help us to reinterpret his thesis from a mistaken one about psychology into a correct one about logic and language. *Thirdly*, I shall give the central arguments and the conclusion of the chapter on Imagination in *The Concept of Mind*, and comment on them. Although Ryle is correct in saying that imagining—or at least imagining (supposing)—is in some sense—a sense we shall try to elucidate—a sophisticated process, and requires that we should have learnt and not forgotten a language; yet I want to show that the arguments by which he reaches this conclusion are unsatisfactory. Though comprehensive, they are crude; and on the way he manages to conceal the case of imagining (imaging). And thus he is precluded from applying his conclusion that imagination is a sophisticated process to the problems of the description of mental imagery. But, as I will show, this is precisely where we should apply the conclusion.

(1) In any discussion of imagination, attention tends to centre on mental imagery. This is unfortunate. For though I may always have a mental image of my father jumping a five-barred gate, to imagine something it is not necessary to have an image. "Imagine what would happen if your father jumped the gate at his age": I require no mental picture to make me reply "No, certainly he mustn't do it"; though I may as a matter of fact have (had) an image. This command ("Imagine what would happen if . . .") resembles one "Just suppose

he were to do it" or even "Think of what would happen if . . ." In certain uses "suppose" and "imagine" are interchangeable. Furthermore, a good many metaphors about picturing and pictures are in fact used without entailing that anyone has an image. I can try to put someone in the picture about the American constitution, without necessarily being concerned to induce imagery in his unimaginative mind. (And this in spite of the fact that mental or physical pictures may help one to teach or learn a subject. The main difference between the two *kinds* of picture here being that mental ones are of less use for the purpose than physical ones: it is easy to present the pupil with a chart, and say "*this* is how the U.S. Constitution works"; but one has to describe a mental picture, and make oneself understood, before one can even begin to use it in communication. Precisely because mental pictures are private to one, whereas physical pictures are public to all.) Again, I can say that I had a different picture of rock-climbing before I began to climb: but this may only mean that I didn't know it rained all the time; it does not necessarily involve my ever having had a mental image of rope work on Clogwyn dûr Arddhu.

So far I have dealt with two senses of "imagine": one, that in which "to imagine" means "to have a mental picture"—which I call the "imaging" sense (for example, "I'm imagining what it will look like when it is erected").¹ The other, that in which "imagine p" means the same as "suppose p"—which I shall call the "propositional entertainment" sense, and where the verb is usually in the imperative (for example: "Imagine what would have happened if we had not had the Spitfire"). There remains the third sense of "to imagine," where if I say (usually in a past tense) "I imagined p" this implies that I am now at least doubtful whether p is the case, or know that it is not the case. (For example: "I imagined that they were relying on some secret guarantees.") I shall call this the "(perhaps mistaken) thinking" sense. These three senses are radically different, and demand individual attention. If we assume that "imaging" is equivalent to "propositional entertainment" we get at the beginning to where Professor Ryle takes us at the end; that is, we find we have joined him in an effort to hush up the scandal of the occurrence of mental imagery. It may be possible to produce yet further senses of "imagine," and would certainly be possible further to subdivide the senses we already have: but for the purposes of this paper it is sufficient to distinguish these three major senses; noting in passing that the sense of the formations "imagination" and "imaginative" is not uniquely derived from "imagine" in any one of these senses.

¹ The context does not by any means invariably make it clear and certain whether or not "imagine" is being used in this sense; which entails the occurrence of imagery.

(2) Now for Hume. In the *first* place he ignored the possibility of our imagining (supposing) anything without an accompanying image. (And, for that matter, he also ignored the possibility of our imagining [perhaps mistakenly thinking] anything without imagery.) In the *second* place, he held that we could not imagine anything that we had not previously experienced wholly or in part; ". . . All simple ideas and impressions resemble each other; and as the complex are formed from them, we may affirm in general, that these two species of perception are exactly correspondent" (*T.H.N., Everyman*, vol. i, p. 13, para. 3). The exception to this rule lay in the case of the man who could imagine a shade of blue that he had never met before, when presented with a colour card in which this shade was missing from the scale; but "the instance is so particular and singular, that it is scarce worth our observing, and does not merit that, for it alone, we should alter our general maxim" (*T.H.N., Everyman*, vol. i, p. 15, para. 2). Hume presents his argument that images are the product of experience as a very safe empirical generalization. He says (*T.H.N., Everyman*, vol. i, p. 14, last para.), ". . . whenever, by any accident, the faculties which give rise to any impressions are obstructed in their operations, as when one is born blind or deaf, not only the impressions are lost, but also their correspondent ideas, so that there never appear in the mind the least trace of either of them." Now there's no reason to suppose that he (or anyone else at that time) had done thorough research on this point.¹ But the fact that Hume is so certain that a blind man could have no idea of red, suggests that for him the whole matter is not simply one of empirical research; and though there is no passage where he says that it would be logically impossible for a blind man to describe his visual imagery in a public visual language which he himself understood; yet this is, I think, a legitimate reinterpretation to give to the passage I have quoted. (Though I do not say that this is what Hume *really* meant. Hume, being a competent prose writer and an honest man, really meant what he actually said—except when he was being ironical.) The last passage quoted from Hume at least suggests the following analysis: since we learn colour words by having coloured things pointed out to us, a man born blind could not have learnt to apply colour words. If he *claims* to have red images, we then reply "you *can't* know what 'red' means." Imagine that such a man gained sight; on looking at a scarlet pillar-box he comments "you know, all these years I have been having images of just that colour." Now this would be a very remarkable fact; and we might be very sceptical about it. In the present state of neurophysiology the only evidence that can be produced to prove it is the man's testimony

¹ William James quotes a man who had done such research. *Principles of Psychology*, vol. ii, p. 44.

after he has got sight, and learnt to recognize red in the normal way; and even if we were ready to admit (accepting his testimony or/and neurophysiological evidence) that, when blind, he had had images of the colour he now (rightly) calls red, yet there is no reason for us to say that he knew what the word "red" meant when he was blind—for then he had not learnt the word; it was pure coincidence he used it right. "Knowing" when you get the answer right by a fluke is not knowing.

There is throughout more to Hume's thesis than an unproven statement in psychology, an assertion of psychological incapacity; and this is most clearly seen if we substitute for what (with Hume was always) a case of imagining (imaging) another case—one of imagining (propositional entertainment). "Imagine such-and-such—that Britain had a closed economy." There is no suggestion here of a mental image, for whatever would a mental image of a closed economy be like? I need not have "taken a photograph" of the whole, or part, of the beast at any time; how indeed could I have done? Nor is there any reason for us to generalize about the psychology of the speaker, his ability or inability to form images. Yet we can (logically) only make an utterance of the form "*Suppose p and understand it ourselves*" if we already know how to use language correctly. Similarly, though I may have images which I can't describe, these are, like all images, necessarily private; (if they were not they would be not mental images but physical objects). If I am to describe mental images correctly, understanding what I am saying (and not just perhaps be right or intelligible by a fluke) I must be able to talk about them in public language. And to have learnt the language entails (in Ryle's words) "some perceiving." So Hume's insistence that before we could have a particular image (*idea*) we must necessarily have had particular experiences (*impressions*) can be reinterpreted into a thesis that to describe any (private) image with understanding we must have learnt and not forgotten (public) lessons in the use of the words in which we are to describe that image.

Hume's assumption that we cannot have images without a corresponding experience is attractive because, though imagery may well be "like nothing on earth," "like nothing I've met before," nevertheless we all somehow do think (by a sort of intuition of empiricism) that this *cannot* really be so, that somehow this imagery is a kaleidoscopic confusion of what we have seen and heard before. The difficulty here often is describing a situation which I seem to have no suitable words to describe: and this is a real difficulty. But we must not mistake its implications. For while we may have images which, with our present vocabulary, are indescribable, and while this would certainly tend, if anything, to disprove Hume's psychological thesis

about the necessary priority of impressions to their corresponding ideas: the contrary fact that in some particular case we can find words to describe an image (*idea*) does not necessarily prove that we have ever "experienced" an original which corresponds to it (have ever had a corresponding *impression*); nor yet that we must have had *impressions* corresponding to all the *parts* of that image (*idea*). It only proves that we must have had whatever *impressions* it was essential to have had in order to learn the meanings of the words used in our description.

To demonstrate the difficulty that often lies in finding words: in experiments with mescal the subject who has taken the drug has very vivid imagery, which he may be able to locate in space—e.g. "between me and the wall"—but which tends to be unlike anything seen before. In one experiment¹ an extended vocabulary was agreed on beforehand: by using a collection of reproductions of paintings by very different artists (e.g. Goya, Turner, Van Gogh, etc.) as reference points a new set of public analogies was made available both to the subjects and the experimenters. Clearly we may be able to describe our images more or less completely; Hume's man with the colour card could have done so pretty effectively and in precisely the way in which Hume has in fact contrived to explain to us the case he had in mind. The character in Wells who (most improbably) saw a new colour and called it "wing-colour" failed to make himself fully understood. He made himself partially understood by saying it was a new colour (and not a new sound); yet he could point to no specimens. A man who had (or has) a new sensation peculiar to himself would have (or has) even greater difficulties, for with sensation quality is all and that *ex hypothesi* he cannot indicate in anyone else.

Before going on to Ryle on Imagination, I want to make one further point. This is to underline the fallacy of treating a hypothetical capacity to imagine something as a proof that the description given to whatever it is that we do in fact see in our mind's eye, makes sense. Consider Schlick, who in the article "Meaning and Verification" (Feigl and Sellars, *Readings in Philosophical Analysis*, p. 159) says "I can easily imagine, e.g., witnessing the funeral of my own body and continuing to exist without a body, for nothing is easier than to describe a world which differs from our ordinary world only in the complete absence of all data which I would call parts of my own body. We must conclude that immortality . . . is an empirical hypothesis, because it possesses logical verifiability. It could be verified by following the prescription "Wait until you die!" But the fact that I can imagine (image) something which I am inclined to

¹ Now going on in Aberdeen: not yet published. Philosophers, psychiatrists and psychologists are co-operating.

describe as "witnessing my own funeral" doesn't in any way even tend to prove that immortality is an empirical hypothesis, if the description is not a proper and possible one. And until Schlick can prove that the description "I am witnessing my own funeral" is proper and possible (with no sniggering inverted commas round "my own funeral" as there were when Harry Lime reported that he had just witnessed "his own funeral") it is useless for him to try to induce images in an attempt to prove that the expression "I can see myself witnessing my own funeral" has sense. A picture (mental or physical: the only relevant difference is that the former is private and so of less use) may help someone to understand a sentence which describes that picture, and may even help him to see that a suggested description of it makes sense. But no picture can provide an argument that a doubtfully significant suggested description of itself does indeed make sense. And that is what is at stake here. (Surely Schlick has confused "Imagining—knowing what it would be like to be at Schlick's funeral" with "Imagining—knowing what it would be like for Schlick to be at Schlick's funeral." The former is straightforward, while the latter is perhaps a self-contradictory supposition.)¹

(3) And so to Professor Ryle, who in his chapter on Imagination in *The Concept of Mind* mentions Hume in two contexts: firstly to say that he "notoriously thought there exist both impressions and ideas . . . and looked in vain for a clear boundary between the two sorts of perceptions" (p. 249); and secondly to say that he "put forward a causal theory that one could not have a particular 'idea' without having previously had the corresponding sensation, somewhat as having an angular bruise involves having been previously struck by an angular object" (p. 271). This is all; and after what I've said it's not surprising that I should think it unduly ungracious to Hume. But for the moment I will leave him out of it.

Ryle comes to deal with imagination hot from the battle about the status of minds; he is, then, primarily concerned to prove that images are not physical phenomena and so that they are nothing at all. He claims that the smile a child imagines on her doll's lips is not in fact on its lips; nor can it be unattached like the grin which survived the vanishing of the Cheshire Cat—so it is nowhere and nothing. We are told, in a paralysing broadside, that such a smile is not a physical phenomenon nor a non-physical phenomenon; though pictured it is not a picture, nor is it a real phantasm. "There is not a real life outside, shadowily mimicked by some bloodless likenesses inside; there are just things and events, and people fancying themselves witnessing things and events that they are not witnessing" (p. 249). I have moved at speed; but we now know Ryle claims that

¹ This paragraph is drawn from a forthcoming paper on "Is disembodied existence conceivable?" by A. G. N. Flew.

there are no such things as images (which is simply false); and that to imagine one sees or hears something is to fancy or suppose that one sees or hears it. (Which is perfectly true in one sense of "imagine": my [perhaps mistakenly] thinking sense.) There follows the first attack on Hume; if images are to be distinguished from sensations as less lively, this must mean either that they are less intense, or that they are less vivid and lifelike than sensations. Ryle makes two points in reply: (1) a sensation cannot be lifelike, any more than a real child as opposed to a doll can be life-like; while (2) an imagined noise is neither more nor less intense than a real one—it isn't a noise at all. His first point is sound and well taken. But the second is quite mistaken: for it is perfectly possible to confuse real and fancied noises; and we frequently do just this ("Was that the bell, or did I imagine it?"). Ryle's last negative contribution is to show that the ordinary use of "to imagine" doesn't describe a single, central activity; how absurd it would be to doubt whether a novelist was imaginative, on the ground that one didn't know what was in his mind's eye when he wrote. "There is no faculty of Imagination, occupying itself single-mindedly in fancied viewings and hearings. On the contrary, 'seeing' things is one exercise of imagination, growling somewhat like a bear is another; smelling things in the mind's nose is an uncommon act of fancy, malingering a very common one, and so forth" (p. 158). "The search after the unit is the delusion" (A. B. Johnson). The positive part of Ryle's argument begins with an analysis of the sophisticated operation of pretending—sophisticated in the sense that it is an operation which requires that we know what the original was like. To imagine that one sees x is logically equivalent to fancying one sees x, and fancying is a special case of pretending; here is the slippery slide. So imagining is a special case of pretending and is therefore a sophisticated process, too; we cannot make clear what we were imagining unless we know the language in which to express ourselves. "Seeing Helvellyn in one's mind's eye does not entail what seeing Helvellyn and seeing snapshots of Helvellyn entail, the having of visual sensations. It does involve the thought of having a view of Helvellyn and it is therefore a more sophisticated operation than that of having a view of Helvellyn. It is one utilization, among others, of the knowledge of how Helvellyn should look, or, in one sense of the verb, it is thinking how Helvellyn should look" (p. 270). And (p. 272) "we learn how things look and sound chiefly and originally by seeing and hearing them. Imagining, being one among many ways of utilizing knowledge, requires that the relevant knowledge should have been got and not lost. We no more need a para-mechanical theory of how to account for our limited ability to see things in our mind's eye than we need it to account for our limited

ability to translate French into English. All that is required is to see that learning perceptual lessons entails some perceiving, that applying those lessons entails having learned them, and that imagining is one way of applying those lessons."

We seem to have got back to where we were after reinterpreting Hume; but Ryle's conclusion is too narrow to be at all satisfactory, and the arguments that get him there, though astoundingly comprehensive, are simply incorrect. The most important points to be made in reply are—Firstly, to conduct the discussion in terms of real and non-existent objects from the start is to stack the cards in Ryle's favour before the game begins. Instead we should insist that people do, in fact, have mental images. Then the thunderous attack—is an image a physical or non-physical phenomenon, a picture or a real phantasm?—simply passes us by. People do have images; and so why not talk about images? Secondly, we should resist the bullying about the location of an image. Ryle makes a psychological mistake when he says the imaginary smile is not (and we suppose never would be) on the doll's face. When imaging is involved, why shouldn't it be? To say that it is, does not involve treating the image smile as unattached, a smile without a face to smile it, like that of the Cheshire Cat. We can say that it is (apparently) located on the doll's face (or anywhere else; in mid-air for that matter); but it's not a smiling face but an image of a smiling face—so only the person who has it can see (have) it. The subjects in the mescal experiments could place their images even when they couldn't describe them; and I can say that I see a red patch between the door and the desk. (And incidentally this is one of the very few occasions when it is correct to say "I see—or better, I *can* see—a red patch"). Thirdly having insisted that people in fact have images we can then agree, with Ryle, that there is no nuclear process to imagining. Fourthly, we can add that, though the situation must remain confused until at least our three major senses of "imagine" are distinguished, still it is clearly wrong to pretend that imagery does not occur; just because we realize that its occurrence is, for purposes of communication, idle and supererogatory. Perhaps Ryle's extreme, mistaken, view has been adopted in reaction to Hume and others who made out that imagery was essential to significant communication; for when Ryle is not concerned—as he is in the chapter on Imagination in *The Concept of Mind*—to show that images are (at least in some ways) superfluous and idle, he does not adopt this ruthless attitude but admits that imagery does occur. On page 27 of *The Concept of Mind* he says "Much of our ordinary thinking is conducted in internal monologue or silent soliloquy, usually accompanied by an internal cinematograph show of visual imagery." That he should make his later strictures in spite of his earlier admission of the

obvious is, I think, evidence in favour of this suggestion. Perhaps the paradox of the denial of the occurrence of imagery is in part at least a misleading and unfortunate consequence of his systematic use of the material mode of speech. Compare, for example, what Mr. Heath says about his denial of volitions in "The appeal to ordinary language" (*Philosophical Quarterly*, January 1952, p. 4).

To conclude: in this paper I have tried *firstly* to distinguish between three senses of "imagine"—which I have called the imaging, propositional entertainment, and (perhaps mistaken) thinking senses. *Secondly*, I have used this distinction between imagining (in the sense of imaging) and imagining (in the sense of propositional entertainment) in order to treat Hume's thesis about imagination; and show that this can be reinterpreted from one about the physical capacity or incapacity of people to have images, to one that it is logically necessary to learn a public language before one can describe a private image. (Whether we can usually describe images satisfactorily is another matter; but the problem here is to find words in which to do so, and be intelligible.) I have also shown how irrelevant the question of capacity to have images is; when we are concerned with whether or not a putative description of what is imagined makes sense. (Here I gave the Schlick example.) *Finally*, I gave the main points from Ryle's treatment of Imagination. I said that it was mistaken to try to suppress the case of imaging, and suggested various reasons why Ryle should have wanted to do this; one of them might be the fact—which I hope this paper has served to bring out—that images are superfluous, and as it were idle, in communication.

DISCUSSIONS

I

JASPER'S CONCEPT OF TRANSCENDENCE (GOD) IN RECENT LITERATURE¹

I propose to consider briefly some critical points that have been raised against Jaspers' concept of God as *the reality*, which can only announce itself, but never become object of thought, because it is impossible to reach the reality which is beyond all phenomenal thought. There remains only on Jaspers' premises the ever to be renewed movement towards the Transcendent, to be disclosed in the reading of the language of the cipher by which Transcendence is felt in this world but never made available as an object that can be laid hold of in its actual reality. This is the more significant because the demand for a transcendent supreme reality is justified, as its absolute character would be lost by descent into human thought, by the objectifying effort of which it would be coloured and conditioned. Since the realm of Transcendence is inexhaustible, the human mind at its farthest point of progress in knowledge must still see stretching away before it as its limiting condition, the region of the Unknown—the unfathomable depth of that Being of which any figurative or objectifying effort must be denied so as to keep its transcendent character pure. This is not, as the critics assume, to suspend the Transcendent in the air. It is rather meant to keep the movement towards the Transcendence going, and not to paralyse it into a possessive inactivity. That is why Jaspers developed, on the Kantian basis, his conception of a God not liable to the dangerous distortions of an anthropomorphism which have been prevalent throughout history. It was not merely that he found God to be indescribable in human speech, but also to transcend the utmost power of human thought. For this reason and on account of the failure of words or symbols, in which there is no longer anything corresponding in our imagination, many thinkers adhered to the theory of the negative attributes of God (according to which all affirmative statements about God are false). But that theory was found wanting for it came near emptying belief of all content. Unable to rest content with this purely negative position, other thinkers, starting from the premise that God's image as the fountain of all creation must indwell and therefore be discernible in that creation assumed that we might draw conclusions as to His character at least indirectly, by way of analogy, passing from the finite to the infinite, thus supplementing by an affirmative theology the theology of negation.

On the grounds of this theory, resting upon analogical inference, J. B. Lotz, J. Collins, and, on somewhat similar lines, J. N. Hartt and von Rintelen have challenged Jaspers' position in that respect. In fact, it is worth while to reproduce the main argument that has been put forward by Lotz, and following him by Collins, in the adequate English rendering that has been given to it by Collins as follows:

"But in seeking to safeguard the uniqueness and absoluteness of the transcendent God, we need not so separate Him from our existence that He Himself is treated as non-existent. . . . To be, to exist, and to know are perfections which do not involve any intrinsic defect, and hence they are

¹ Taken from a thesis, entitled "Jaspers Concept of God," submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy to the University of South Africa.

most properly attributed to the transcendent reality in which, as Jaspers admits, there can be no becoming, possibility or imperfection. . . . Thus the analogical unity of being as studied by metaphysics enables us to speak and speak significantly, though not comprehensively, about the source and end of being.”¹

In considering what is involved in this principle of analogy, we come to see that it justifies, by its method of arguing from effect to cause,

“a discursive ascent from the immediately given to the transcendent, even though such an ascent will give only an imperfect understanding of the term of this movement.”²

In thus advancing into the Transcendence, we are not conquering what belongs to an alien territory, but we are rather reclaiming ground of reality that is by analogy to be identified with ourselves as created in the image of God. The argument, then, to which these considerations are held to lead, is as follows:

“The richness of the object of metaphysics is of two sorts: an immanent secondary kind which coincides with categorical being, and the transcendent richness which is primary and supracategorical. Thus concrete things are included within the order of essences or categories, which are present in, and yet surpass, the individual instances embodying a given perfection. And essences for their own part are included under being and its attributes, without exhausting the resources of being itself. The immanent fullness of categorical essences and concrete finite things supposes a primal reality in which the transcendental perfections of being are realized absolutely, and in which the reality of essences and things is also found in an eminent way. Along these lines the Scholastic theory of transcendence provides the metaphysical foundation of the doctrine of analogy as understood from the standpoint of the creature.”³

The presupposition which constitutes the cause of inquiry is that according to Lotz,⁴ analogical knowledge surpasses the realm of the categorical and by doing so establishes, still within the bounds of the rational, the realm of the supracategorically Rational—a realm which in Jaspers’ system is totally cancelled out. In addition, the supracategorical would give Transcendence a fullness of essence, thus making possible a concept of God, however incomplete and in suspension. On any other supposition, the act of Transcendence, while without content and therefore empty, could not yield a picture of God and would finally sink to the level of an empty sphere which while all-comprehensive, yet cannot develop into an object that would stand over against us. In this connection Lotz points to Jaspers’ statement to the effect that “though God is, however concealed, yet all-present as the reality,”⁵ it remains doubtful what in fact reality does seem to assert. In like manner the cipher, though for philosophy the transcendent reality in the world, can only point to a transcendent reality that is emptied of any content, whereas in the philosophy of analogy God appears as an independent Real, as infinite spirit, restoring for the human mind a worthy object of worship and adoration.

The difference between the two kinds of metaphysics, that of the cipher and that of the analogy, or the stages through which knowledge (of Transcen-

¹ J. Collins, “An Approach to Jaspers” in *Thought*, 1945, pp. 688 ff.

² Collins, essay c.p. 600.

³ Collins, e.c.p. 687.
⁴ J. B. Lotz, “Analogie Und Chiffre,” in *Scholastik*, 1940, pp. 40 ff., and in *Stimmen der Zeit*, 1939, pp. 71 ff., and in *Orientierung*, 1948, pp. 121.

⁵ Jaspers, *Existenzphilosophie*, 1938, p. 70.

dence) passes, is, therefore, defined by Lotz in these terms: "The metaphysics of analogy is one of fulfilled transcending and consequently of the Transcendence itself whereas the metaphysics of the cipher is one of unfulfilled transcending."¹

"Thus what Lotz calls the explicative or interpretative method of the theory of ciphers is an incomplete process of transcending, reaching only to the immanent depths of the given. It finds its justification and completion only in the metaphysic of analogy, for the analogical method not only completes the transcending process, but also rises by mediate knowledge to a transcendent and subsistent reality."²

The standard by which the admissability of the symbol of the cipher is to be judged must also be given attention according to Hartt for, he says,

"The notion of Symbol, so important for Jaspers' system, is cheated of its full significance and power by the underlying Kantian epistemological perspective. . . . But at the end, Jaspers lumps the whole scale together in a blanket denial that any analogy yields positive knowledge of God's nature."³

Having thus attempted to show in what respects this aspect of Jaspers' system is inadequate Hartt concludes:

"For me this remains the most perplexing question of all: does God become positively meaningful even then? Or is he left as Wirklichkeit mysteriously expressing itself through its modes, all of which are 'signs and symbols,' including existence itself. But how are the symbols to be interpreted, unless symbol and reality symbolized are somehow or other positively and simultaneously embraced, and unless this embracing, this primal apprehension can be brought up out of the vagueness and mistiness of the 'merely intuitive' into conceptual clarity?"⁴

It is noteworthy that F. J. von Rintelen⁵ carried this reasoning still farther, pointing out that our awareness of ultimate Being is intrinsically possessed of cognitive reference to the Transcendent. It is asserted that one has to attribute to Being, be it in its space-time reality or in its spiritual expression as cosmos, a trans-subjective meaning, an essence, an inwardness that in ultimate depth discloses itself to the inwardness of the individual. This interaction is according to von Rintelen not to be defined as appearance merely. The argument does take into account that Jaspers' difficulty does not lie in a denial of objective Reality, but rather in the fact that it cannot become an object of our thought and therefore not an object of any proof. Von Rintelen furthermore draws the conclusion that in our existential encounter and final act of decision and intellectual appreciation of what is significantly conclusive, the Unconditional is bound to become objectified content at least in so far as we intend one particular thing rather than something else. Thus, when this question of moral action is raised, the appeal is to an act of judgment. Here, again and pre-eminently, though recognizing the existential self's historical situation particular to itself only, one has to assume, so von Rintelen argues, that the

¹ Lotz, *Analogie Und Chiffre*, pp. 55-6.

² Collins, e.c.p. 691.

³ J. N. Hartt, "God, Transcendence and Freedom in the Philosophy of Jaspers" in *The Review of Metaphysics*, 1950, p. 256.

⁴ Hartt, e.c.p. 254-5.

⁵ F. J. von Rintelen, *Philosophie Der Endlichkeit*, 1951, pp. 80, 381 ff. (Westkulturverlag, A. Hain, Meisenheim/Glan.)

existential self seizes a certain and specific content of truth—claiming objectivity.

The entire discussion has but a single point. It aims to show that Transcendence as assumed by Jaspers is endangered by the fact that it cannot become an object of thought. It is only through an objective bond which can sustain relations to existential Selves and their activities, it is argued, that Transcendence can subsist. But enter upon this road and, according to Jaspers, the time is sure to come when the appropriate object of thought is stripped of all its transcendent character, and by becoming final and self-sufficient, Transcendence will be found to be lost for ever. It is the ulterior problem of Jaspers' system to make Transcendence, and not just the ever changing results of the process of thinking about Transcendence, prevail in human experience. Those results, gained in limit-situations, will be saved in Jaspers' system by his theory of communication. In any sense in which objectivity is legitimate boundless communication is of the essence of life. The capacity of existential Selves to enter into communication and thereby generate further meanings in respect of existence and Transcendence more profound and far reaching than those from which they sprang, guarantees to human existence what Jaspers' critics seemed eager to deduce from a concept of Transcendence that, on their view, should be available to categories of human thought.

So much for the problem of (fulfilled) Transcendence. Returning to the main subject of our discussion, we must now examine the claim of the supporters of the doctrine of analogy. What, then, shall we say of the justice of the claim of the critics? We do not hesitate to affirm that it does not seem in principle sound—for the process of analogy also lands us in a dilemma, and, indeed, some would maintain that it sets as many problems as it solves. Much as we should like to accept analogical inference it would be a futile guide in questions of the relationship between the finite and the infinite, which differs from the finite not merely in degree. For if we are content to register analogies taken from human life and history, what criterion have we for choosing between the claims of conflicting revelations? Then, again, if we take the analogies seriously we may fall a victim to our anthropomorphic tendencies, making an image of God in the light and likeness of our own predilections. But, on the other hand, if we stress the otherness of Transcendence as difference in kind, we are back again in the teachings of negative theology. A way out of this impasse is offered by Jaspers' teaching of immanent Transcendence, generated in direct experience of the existential self's ascent to freedom, which gives rise to positive expression, not of the essence of Transcendence, which must remain beyond the reach of knowledge, but of the actions of God in relation to man in their historically determined mode of existence. In fact, it is here that the clue lies to Jaspers' acceptance of the fundamental principles of the Bible. These were disclosed to man at the limit situations in which he found himself, yielding, as a result of the struggle with the conditions of a secular order, that insight which was in boundless communication, taken up into a wider movement of thought never to be arrested and unveiling to us the secret of our capacities for good and evil. That process may reflect God's love, but it can never freeze into a fixed substratum of a knowledge of the Transcendent for man which, if it were possible to attain, would rob man of his freedom. In order that freedom, however, should remain the necessary condition of the realization of man's individual destiny, we must refrain from any pretence to a knowledge of the Transcendence; this would have the effect only of destroying the most essential link of man with God, namely freedom. In their zeal to vindicate Transcendence and assure its permanence in the life of man by appealing to its analogical character (thus bridging the gulf between the finite

and the infinite), the critics have shut their eyes to the truth of the fundamental presupposition of Jaspers, which at the same time constitutes his "critique of Transcendence," namely that

"God exists for me in the degree to which I in freedom authentically become myself. He does not exist as a scientific content but only as openness to existence. . . . Since that which is for us must be manifested in the temporality of the world, there can be no direct knowledge of God and existence. There can only be faith."¹

Another recent critic of Jaspers ought to be mentioned here as well: Heinemann² maintains that the philosophy of existence in the latest works of Jaspers "completes itself, suffers shipwreck and then overcomes itself." It completes itself because its purpose is from the start to pave a way (and keep it open) to Transcendence; but by doing so it suffers shipwreck as a philosophy of existence, because it cannot establish any logic or ethics; it then overcomes itself by recognizing a metaphysics of the Comprehensive, with its acknowledgments of the principles of the Biblical religion, thus breaking the chains of the sphere of existence.

This interpretation merely takes sentences from the main work of Jaspers out of their context in order to prove a particular thesis. We maintain that there is a harmonious development of Jaspers' ideas towards their climax in his latest works. Further, against Heinemann, who thinks that a world-spirit guided by Jaspers' ideas could not create anything, for on Jaspers' premise no fixation in the form of any object or thing in nature would be admitted, we must say that such fixation seems to be possible, on Jaspers' own premises, in the existential decision, which could, however, not be a lasting one as it is continually involved in further progress. Further we cannot adopt the standpoint of God and look at things from that Divine viewpoint as Heinemann attempts to do. Likewise, ethical demands naturally follow from Jaspers' theory of Communication, which in fact led him to the adoption of Biblical principles. Thus the idea of moral demands ("ought") remains unconditional for the existential self, whose realization alone assures to it (the existential self) its possible freedom to develop into authentic existence while relating itself to Transcendence.

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¹ Jaspers, *Way to Wisdom*, pp. 45-6 and p. 82 (E.T. by R. Manheim, Gollancz, 1951).

² F. Heinemann, "Was ist Lebendig und was ist Tot in der Existenzphilosophie" in *Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung*, 1950, pp. 17 ff. In this connection it is of interest to note that Jaspers himself in a letter (10.3.1951) to me expressed his opinion on Heinemann's point as follows: "Nicht das Gestalten und Objectivwerden wird von mir in Frage gestellt, sondern nur die Fixierung und Verknöcherung darin."

THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF BUDDHISM, TAOISM AND CONFUCIANISM

The ultimate teachings of Buddhism, Taoism and Confucianism are in essence completely similar. It is said: "The more you know, the less you really know; and the less you know, the more you really know."

What is the reason for this? "The more you know" pertains to a knowledge merely discursive and rational. "The more you do not know" pertains to divine knowing of the pure intellect. Because profane knowledge comes from the outside, there is a distinction between the knower and the thing outside the knower. So you have the separate entity that knows, and the thing or object known. When this distinction exists, what is known is only the appearance of things, the gross corporeal modality, while nothing is known of our true self or inner being. Therefore, the more you know of appearances the less you know of reality. For example: water for the human being is different from water for the fish; for fish the water is his true atmosphere. Night is a time of darkness for man, but, for an owl, it is his day. Filth is rejected by humans, but is home for the insects. Therefore, since the needs and environments of every particular being vary, each point of view is relative to the particular creature; all knowledge received from sense impressions is approximate and relative, and has little to do with the true reality.

Should a cosmological explanation be given by the fish, the owl or insects, we should laugh at them. However, for the owl, the moon is his sun, for the fish, the water is his atmosphere; and for the insect filth is his delicious food and fine home. We laugh at them because they are ignorant of the true nature of things, and we realize that the more they think they know, the less they actually know. It is the same for human beings; for we, too, gain our perceptions as other animals do, through external appearances. The animals can thus laugh at us in our ignorance.

Knowledge known from the outside is of appearance, and is not of reality. Therefore, the more we know, the less we really know. But in what way can we know reality? We must know our true or Inner Self; the principle of our birth and becoming which we share with all things in the universe. Therefore, if we know our own True Self, and our gross physical self, then we shall know all things. The scientists work day and night in measuring the quantity and quality of things. But these things all exist very near to us—as close even as breathing. We can find them directly in the organism and in the cells of our own self.

The Chinese philosopher said, "it is wonderful that men can use their eyes, their ears, and their thoughts, to see, to hear, and to think of things outside of themselves. Why cannot they use their ears, their eyes, and their thoughts, to hear, to see, and to think inside themselves?—for there is much circulating and moving within, since there are many parts such as lungs, liver, heart, and intestines, etc. We should use our mind for understanding our own self, for the source of all hearing, seeing, and thinking, etc., lies within. Alas, man can see and hear that which is outside of him, yet that which is inside, and so very near, few men know. If we could know the principle within, then we should know our True Self, and thus all things."

What is this reality, and how may we come to an awareness of it? First, we must know the one principle of all things—when knower, knowing, and known

become one. True knowledge is by identification, consequently, there is no duality. True knowing is therefore identical with what is known, we then have not rational knowledge but pure intelligence. This pure intelligence does not know appearances, but rather knows the essence of things.

An important question might be asked. Why do men think that knowing, knower and known are different? Why cannot we be aware of our True Self, and thus know the essence of all things? The answer, according to Buddhism, Taoism and Confucianism is that we are bound to illusions by appearances, by physical objects. Therefore, if we can liberate ourselves from becoming, from that which is unreal, we shall then know the reality of all things.

For solving this problem of obtaining true knowledge, we find in Buddhism, Taoism and Confucianism three different systems or ways, but each path leads to the same goal, which is freedom from appearance, and awareness of true reality.

The method of Buddhism is by contemplation and observance or discrimination. Contemplation means to empty oneself of all irrelevant thoughts, so that the pure reason may emerge, and we may keep it pure. Water, if there is no wind, is clear. If dirty water is allowed to stand, the dirt will settle, and the water will become clear.

Observance or discrimination means that we must continually be aware of the unreality of the material world, until finally we see that all things are unstable and but a flux: then the pure intelligence is complete. There are many types of discrimination in accordance with the different natures of men. For example, if a man is trying to free himself from indulgence with a lovely girl, he would at first imagine in his mind a beautiful girl, and then in his mind imagine her deprived of her skin, after which the blood would flow in a red and terrible colour. There remains little of beauty now. He would further in his mind cut open her abdomen, and there find the intestines, stomach, etc., full of digested food and filth. Further, we might picture that the girl is dead, and imagine her state after one or two years. There is no more flesh now, but only many white bones. Can you love her bones? Therefore, to "resolve" the girl from the beginning to the end, we find that all is emptiness, appearance, illusion. This is called the "white bone observance," and if this observance is followed every day, sensualism will naturally disappear.

Again, if someone indulges in worldly property, he might follow the "observance of emptiness," and find that all his property is really illusory, and will pass away. There are many kinds of such observances.

A most important observance is the "not I observance," which means that there is no more myself, but only a temporary *mixture*, or fictitious self. In the teaching of Buddhism, all evils come from the idea of "I." If we have the idea of "I," there is a wall that separates us from reality and the integral One. According to the teaching of Buddhism, all the world of knowledge is based upon the idea of separation, and the notion of separateness is duality, and this is the source of all evils.

In order to free ourselves from this idea of selfhood, at first we must know that the human being is but a temporal fictitious mixture. In fact, there is no such thing as an "I," for the "I" or self is not a stable or immutable being.

Why is this? According to Buddhism, the structure of man consists of four parts: Earth, the solid principle; water, the fluid principle; fire, the principle of heat; and wind, the breath principle. These principles determine the material world; they are the "four greatnesses" according to Buddhism; they are the foundation of the world of Nature and man, although they must not be confused with corporeality itself, for they are principles. They are also called the four great germs or essences, not corporeal, but potentialities. Man

has eight senses or consciousnesses, all connected with mind. These are the senses of hearing, seeing, smelling, tasting, touch; the sixth consciousness is equal to mind, and the seventh consciousness is a transition between the sixth and eighth consciousness, the eighth consciousness (or the king consciousness) being the source of all the senses or consciousnesses. Such is the structure of man.

Now, if we have the idea of "I," we try to discriminate and find out who this "I" is—what particular part represents the "I." If we suppose it to be the solid part, this is obviously a part of the whole body, and since it is a part, it cannot be the "I." Or if we suppose it to be the other parts—fluid or heat or breath, this is also impossible. And, further, we must know that we cannot even possess the same quality of the solid, the liquid, or the breath elements in the same or at a given time. Why is this? Every one knows that man is a being that has a birth and death, which he shares with all material organisms in the universe. We also know that every one passes through different stages, from the baby to boy, to young man, to old age, to decay and to death. This means that the material elements of our flesh change, are ever in a state of flux. These changes do not come suddenly, but continuously, so that the body is changing every minute, every second. It is undergoing a perpetual process of decay and growth. This changing we can perceive in breathing. You cannot possess the air in the breathing at a given moment, for, in the inhalation and expiration, the air is constantly changing, and when you try to grasp the breath, it has already gone far away. Similarly, with all the other parts (the liquid, the fire, and the solid), you cannot possess them at a given moment. All is flux, all is illusory, all is like a dream. Who are you? With which part can you know yourself? Discriminating in this vein, you lose all sense of self.

Again, you might imagine that even if we cannot find ourselves through our material parts, we could find ourselves in consciousness, that is to say, in the mind. Because there is some thing known, and some thing is known by a knower, we might say that the knower is the true self. If you think that this is true, you would discriminate again. Who is the consciousness? Who is the knower? You could not find it, for if you suppose the sense of seeing, hearing, smelling, and tasting is the true self, that is wrong, for the activities of the five senses are limited by their separate perceptions. They are different from each other. They cannot form a complete whole. Then, we might suppose that the sixth consciousness is the true self, for it can receive all senses of smelling, seeing, hearing, etc. This is also wrong. For since the activity of the sixth consciousness is limited to comprehending and perceiving things, it also is temporal.

In spite of the fact that the seventh consciousness is eternal, it is likewise incorrect to suppose that it is the true self. According to the Buddha, the relation between the sixth and seventh level of consciousness is like that of a light to a candle, the light representing the perceiving and discerning power of the sixth consciousness; while the root and source of light is the candle, the seventh consciousness. The candle, however, is light in potential; so, also, is the seventh consciousness (the perceiving and discerning power is potential only); it is unconscious, and has no knowledge of itself.

We may suppose that the eighth consciousness (or the king consciousness) which comprehends and summarizes all consciousness and remembers and possesses all things must be our true self. But according to the teaching of Buddha, this is not the case. To illustrate: one sees the water of the ocean; the foams and waves arising from it are of different forms and sizes, and show only the appearance of water. But we cannot identify them with the essence of the water. The essence (or nature) of the water is its calmness and tran-

quillity; it is neither identical with its manifestation (waves, foams), nor is it completely different from them. Rather, it possesses a nature of neutrality. Thus, the eighth consciousness, which is the source of all consciousness, possesses and remembers all things, but in itself is neither consciousness (of self), nor unconsciousness (of self), but it is of the "nature of neutrality."¹ Therefore, we cannot find out who we are from the eighth consciousness.¹

And in addition, the idea or sense of consciousness is as much in flux as is the breathing which was described above. When you make up your mind to possess your idea and to find your self, it is impossible that a conception should be immutable, for thousands of ideas are in a constant state of flux and interchange, like a series of pictures continually moving. You cannot possess any idea in your mind at a given moment. Therefore, any idea you have in your mind is not your real self.

Discrimination is thus necessary in order to free us from the bond of self. When we find that there is no immutable self, we enter into the unified intellect, and if we participate in this super-rational intellect, we then become identical with every object in its manifestation. Thus, we find our own true self.

In summing up the teaching of Buddhism: the suppressing of desire is not an end in itself, but is a way to lead us to reality. Our nature is ignorant of reality. But the Buddha knows the reality, and returns to this world to teach us to see the reality ourselves, very much as the men of Plato's cave, after seeing the light, return to the cave to teach those in darkness. The first step then is to learn to discriminate between appearances—to find a door into reality. The second step is to enter into this reality, and to grow in awareness of it. The third step is to attain perfect realization of the supreme identity.

Although there are many very valuable and important philosophical theories in Buddhism, Buddhism is not propounded for the sake of knowledge or to establish a philosophical system; but, on the contrary, Buddha wants to reduce the appearance to the reality, in order to lead man to observe and discriminate, and to enter into reality. These teachings belong to Mahayana Buddhism, and it wants us to enter into the world in order to help all human beings to become Buddha. So, at first, Buddha recognizes the world; second, he discriminates the world; third, he discovers the illusory character of the world; fourth, he points out the unreality of the world; and fifth, he advises all human beings to leave the appearance and enter into reality. So the teaching of Mahayana Buddhism is reasonable, while the teaching of Hinayana Buddhism is just the opposite. Thus Hinayana Buddhism gives us more meditation teachings, in order to get one's self-salvation, and does not instruct us to return again to this world to teach reality to mankind.

The way of the Taoists is to follow certain breathing exercises, in order to control the circulation of the blood which finally influences the organism of the body, so that our pure reason is liberated from the flesh. There are three stages or exercises in Taoism: (1) the biological exercise, to control the physical organization; (2) the psychological exercise, to control the mind; (3) spiritual exercise, which is the last stage and is the great liberation of the spirit or soul. We can see that the Taoist methods are more scientific and naturalistic, because the Taoist is very familiar with the biological structure of our physical organization; consequently, most of the Chinese medical doctrines came from the Taoist school.

The method of Confucianism is based upon ethics. Confucius' chief teaching

¹ There is no equivalent terminology for the seventh and eighth consciousness in Western philosophy. I want to apologise for these terms, which seem unclear to the Western mind.

is piety in everything, and the practice of the pure reason in everything. Here "piety" does not mean wordly piety, but is the starting point of the pure reason. You must control and preserve your pure reason every minute. The method of piety is non-self-indulgence, for if you are not self-indulgent, then pure reason opens to you. Our strength, therefore, lies in restraining our desires. Piety does not come from the outside, but is the very nature of pure reason.

To practise the extension of the pure reason in everything is to start with ethical love for parents; then to go to brothers and sisters; then to friends; then to all men, and then even to all animals, trees and grass, until you eventually embrace the whole universe. Thus the illusory "many" becomes "One."

The teaching of Confucianism, on the one hand, is directed to consciousness itself, which is pure reason. Feed it and it flourishes. Buddhism and Taoism, on the other hand, teach the killing of the desires of the flesh. But although these are different methods, the end is the same. For the one, when we destroy desire, the pure reason appears; for the other, when there is pure reason, there is no desire. They therefore have the same end.

GI-MING SHIEN.

PHILOSOPHICAL SURVEY

PHILOSOPHY IN ITALY

AMONG the most notable works on the history of philosophy that have appeared in Italy in recent years those of Mario Dal Pra must undoubtedly be reckoned. Already author of a monograph on *Scoto Eriugena e il neo-platonismo medievale* (1941) and of one on *Condillac* (1942), Dal Pra has in subsequent years issued the following studies, all published by Bocca of Milan: *Hume* (1949), *Lo scetticismo greco* (1950), *La storiografia filosofica antica* (1950), *Giovanni di Salisbury* (1951), *Amalrico di Bene* (1951), and *Nicola di Autrecourt* (1951). The criteria that govern this intensive and widespread historical activity have been frequently stated by Dal Pra in articles in the *Rivista Critica di Storia della Filosofia*, which he directs; but they can be read in a more ordered and exact form in the introduction to *La storiografia filosofica antica*. Dal Pra maintains that the correct point of view for a historian is that for which the unity of the history of philosophy is not "guaranteed and established" but is rather "to be realized as far as possible." It is not a question of discovering "a given historical unity" but of constructing "a possible historical unity," since to take the unity of history as established destroys its historical value, while to consider it as possible and capable of practical integration is to make it historical. From this point of view it is possible to obtain a new understanding of both the *systematic* and the *objective* requirements of the history of philosophy. The former is expressed in the search for the greatest possible unity, the latter in the particular and determinate consideration of the various philosophies, "motivated by the persuasion of the free autonomy in which they have been stated and developed." This, which is the correct point of view, by means of which the activity of the historian can comprehend, construct, and realize the historical unity of philosophy, is in opposition to the other, for which this unity is already realized and guaranteed as that of one sole philosophy which evolves through necessary impulses and has outside itself nothing but aberrations and errors. This second form, which is then romantic history, or, more specifically, Hegelian, is designated by Da Pra as "theoreticist," while he calls the first "practicist" or "transcendentalist-practical." Now I fully share Dal Pra's historical point of view, which for my part I try to realize in my historical writings, but I find the proposed denominations improper and somewhat confusing. "Theoreticism" and "practicism" are terms that seem to presuppose a separation and antithesis between theory and practice which it would be difficult to justify, or which, at any rate, require a whole system of metaphysics for justification. Further, so-called "practice" may be (and sometimes has been and is) as dogmatic and necessitarian as a dogmatic and necessitarian theory. Moreover, that every so-called "theory" is such is an unjustified assumption, since Dal Pra's same historical point of view could, under a certain aspect, be considered as a "theory."

It is, evidently, a question of linguistic convenience; but, as often happens in philosophy, such a question implies another more substantial one. In fact, to designate as "theoreticism" and "practicism" the two typical points of view by which the history of philosophy and, in general, as Dal Pra maintains, any philosophical activity may be conducted, *may* signify the abandonment of further investigation into the logico-linguistic instruments, the functional categories, of which historical research and philosophical activity

avail themselves. That is to say, it is possible to foresee a danger that, under the name of "theoreticist" or "practicist," a philosophical position may be maintained, in consequence, that everything has been said concerning it, and further search into the categories that constitute its basis may be evaded. Dal Pra does not wholly avoid this danger in his theoretic essays; it seems less serious in the historical investigations with which we are now dealing. For instance, he sees in Hume a fundamental "theoreticist moment" in his "credulous and uncritical adherence to the values of experience"; this would be the dogmatic and negative aspect of Hume's philosophy. But this does not hinder him from following sympathetically the developments of Hume's analysis and underlining his most noteworthy conclusions. Hence, Dal Pra's monograph on Hume, while not adding much to Kemp Smith's, is a solid and well directed work from which the figure of Hume emerges illuminated in all its aspects.

The monograph on *Lo scetticismo greco* is, I believe, Dal Pra's most successful work. In it his speculative interest and his gifts as a historian are harmoniously united in the reconstruction of a philosophical position in comparison with which Dal Pra has tried the better to define his own. The work makes use of all the available sources and the literature on the subject, and concludes with the statement that scepticism is theoreticism, exactly like dogmatism, and with the need to find a "third way" between scepticism and dogmatism, a way which Dal Pra indicates in the "transcendentalism of praxis." Dal Pra reaches this conclusion after having distinguished three forms of scepticism. The first is that which asserts the nonexistence of truth or of the absolute significance of reality. The second is not dogmatically fixed in this negation but suspends all judgment, and avoids giving that same *époque* any ontological value whatever. Finally, the third is that which abandons itself to "uncritical adhesion, immediatistic and pragmatic, to any fact of consciousness and action," without troubling to bestow on such an attitude even the value of negation of absolute truth. This last form would be the "critical" phase of scepticism; and evidently all three of these phases are more or less present in the ancient sceptics. But none of these, not even the third, according to Dal Pra, escapes from the theoretic circle. Since the suspension of judgment does not avoid "the complete handing over of the destiny of man to contemplation," and the uncritical adhesion to an immediate fact, and renounces any attempt at justification, it merely closes completely the theoretical circle, without crossing it at any point. The third way, which is that adopted by Dal Pra as surmounting both dogmatism and scepticism, envisages "the critique of existence, the need to consume existence without residue in a radical justification that will confer on it a meaning in virtue of other than existence, or rather in virtue of its practical concretion within a horizon that seems to reabsorb existence from infinity." However, he does not succeed in discerning clearly what may be the conceptual and linguistic instruments which such a search might dispose of, or to what objects or fields of investigation it might be directed. Thus, as it is presented, Dal Pra's thesis is a generic invitation to research, a search as impartial as one could wish, but extraordinarily poor in instruments and deprived of information on its possible objects. Contemporary science claims for itself the right to an unprejudiced and radical research, and seeks as far as possible to be critical in the comparison of its instruments of investigation and its objects. But Dal Pra criticizes adversely the thesis of Léon Robin (*Pyrrhon et les sceptiques grecs*, Paris, 1944), that scepticism, by eliminating the illusion of an absolute consciousness, has opened the way to science, and he sees in this thesis a dogmatic positivism. Perhaps Dal Pra has not considered how much science

has departed from the positivistic dogmatism of a century ago, or (as also may be said) how far the positivism of the present day has travelled from nineteenth-century positivism.

Dal Pra has ventured on a very uncultivated territory with his study on *La storiografia filosofica antica*. Here, however, the results he reaches are more modest. The material collected is abundant and has been well arranged, but no conclusions have been reached that serve to throw light on the way in which general philosophical work evolved in ancient Greece. Least successful of all are the pages devoted to Plato and Aristotle. There is insufficient explanation of the relation between Plato and Socrates (which is nevertheless decisive for the philosophy of Plato) and of that between Aristotle and Plato. For Aristotle Dal Pra confines himself to collecting some observations by Jaeger, Mondolfo and Banfi.

Even in the field of medieval philosophy Dal Pra turns his attention for preference to figures in whom the critical and negative attitude prevails over the systematic and constructive. Amalric of Bène, John of Salisbury and Nicholas of Autrecourt are three among such figures, to whom Dal Pra has devoted precise and well-ordered studies. According to Dal Pra, of the two fundamental themes of Christian neo-Platonism, God as first principle of reality and God as transcendence, Amalric has coherently developed the first, and has thus succeeded in demonstrating the contrast of this with the second. But precisely on this account he is linked with Scotus Erigena and the school of Chartres, who form the central points of the historical development of that neo-Platonism. Hence Dal Pra can justly insert the thought of Amalric in medieval philosophy, from which the Catholic historians (especially De Wulf and Gilson) had tried to expunge it, reducing it to an insignificant aberration.

In John of Salisbury Dal Pra stresses principally the probabilistic attitude, in which he sees, not a superficial literary eclecticism, but a position of thought which was later to be affirmed and dominate scholasticism with the occamistic movement. And to a notable figure of this movement, Nicholas of Autrecourt, he has dedicated his most recent monograph, basing it chiefly on the treatise *Exsigit ordo*, published in 1939 by O'Donnell, and drawing inspiration chiefly from the studies of Vignaux and Weinberg. The points on which Dal Pra throws light in the philosophy of Nicholas of Autrecourt are the following: his treatment of the problem of faith, his doctrine of evidence, the conception of metaphysics as hypothesis. They are the points on which, according to Dal Pra, this medieval thinker can indicate even to contemporary philosophy the way to free itself whether from the absolutism of reason or from that of experience.

NICOLA ABBAGNANO.

(Translated from the Italian by Beatrice Allen.)

NEW BOOKS

Experiments in Living: A study of the nature and foundations of ethics or morals in the light of recent work in Social Anthropology. The Gifford Lectures for 1948-49, delivered in the University of St. Andrews. By A. MACBEATH. (London, Macmillan, 1952. Pp. ix + 462. Price 30s.)

This book is noteworthy in that it represents the only serious attempt by a contemporary British philosopher to take into detailed account in ethics the data supplied by modern anthropology. In fact no less than five of the fifteen chapters consist in a systematic study, by way of illustration, of the social institutions and ethics of four contemporary primitive peoples. (As the author admits, the term primitive is not very satisfactory, but it is hard to think of another. The peoples that anthropologists can investigate are certainly not primitive in the sense of being the earliest or simplest human peoples who have existed on the earth or anything approaching this.) The general picture drawn of primitive peoples differs in fundamental respects from what was till recently the accepted view. They are pictured as more rational, more utilitarian, more secular in their ethics, more considerate and flexible by far than I should have expected, more, in fact, like modern civilized men, whose thinking, it must be remembered, also contains marked analogical elements. Except for the belief in witchcraft (which has its modern analogues) and the relative lack of economic efficiency due to ignorance of modern science, the institutions described strike me as actually comparing very favourably at any rate either with modern communism or with the nineteenth-century system of unrestricted economic individualism. It is a salutary lesson to learn that we are not as much above "primitive men" as we are apt to suppose, and it would be excellent if Chapter X, which effectively demolishes the theory of the mental inferiority to us of such peoples, were read very widely indeed.

It appears to be by no means the case that the ethics of primitive peoples are mainly derived from religious beliefs of a type which we do not now accept or from any ideas of the supernatural at all. Primitive, as more developed, religion, it is admitted, plays a very important part in increasing the readiness of men to fulfil their acknowledged moral duties and in affecting their emotional life; but this is not to say that the moral rules are derived from or prescribed mainly by religion, a very important distinction indeed that is often blurred in considering the relations between ethics and religion. With the tribes taken as illustrations and with most others what supernatural beings there are concern themselves very little with ethics, yet religious ceremonies train their participants in unselfish co-operative action for what is at least believed to be the common good and help to give them a feeling of relative security in life. Where there are supernatural sanctions they commonly prove insufficient if the rules backed by them are really irksome to the individual, and these are in that case commonly evaded unless they can be shown to have a purpose of a more mundane kind for the benefit of the community. This can hardly apply to all primitive peoples—one asks, what about human sacrifice?—but it seems to apply to a good many. The general impression which the author seeks to convey is that, when we have allowed for the consequences of different beliefs as to matters of fact, especially the belief in the disastrous effects produced by not performing the right magical ceremonies, the institutions of primitive people are essentially rational on the whole, and that they, to an extent not incomparable with ourselves,

obey moral laws because they see them to be a necessary part of a way of social life which they on the whole apprehend as good and not because they just take them on faith in abstraction from their consequences.

What is the bearing of these anthropological studies on philosophical ethics? I think that the anthropological chapters will appear more interesting to most readers than the philosophical, but the book is not written for the purpose of a study of anthropology as an end-in-itself, but for the purpose of supporting a philosophical view in ethics and refuting others. This is where my function comes in. I am not qualified to deal with the anthropological evidence as such, but may discuss at least the conclusions drawn from it for philosophy. On the former I can only say that, while the author seems convincing on many points including those I have summarized above, he occasionally introduces a statement for which he does not cite the evidence, which seems very implausible because it ascribes too much rationality and which we can see it would be very difficult to establish empirically. Thus, while denying all intuitions of the obligatoriness or even *prima facie* obligatoriness of particular kinds of actions, he attributes to primitive men the intuitions that what is required by the way of life which is on the whole good is obligatory, and that the doing of what is obligatory because it is obligatory is morally good (p. 396). These principles are so abstract, with their distinction between the three terms obligatory, good, and morally good, that it is very hard to see in what sense they could be held to be intuited by people without literary education, and the position is made more difficult by Professor Macbeath's insistence that for an intuition to be valid it must be recognizable by all men as such. Does the primitive man usually regard an opponent who does conscientiously what he believes wrong as morally good? That requires a higher level of moral intelligence than is apparently reached by the mediaeval inquisitor or the modern Communist. And, in general, is the author sufficiently aware of the extreme difficulty of determining *why* primitives hold their moral beliefs? Even civilized people are liable to be far from clear as to why they hold the beliefs they do. The fact that a man gives a utilitarian justification of a belief when asked does not prove that he really holds it for that reason and not primarily because it seems self-evident, or "on faith," the alleged reason being a rationalization.

What is the philosophical purpose of all this investigation? The chief use which has been made of anthropological material in the past has been to cast doubt on an objective view and suggest a naturalist explanation of ethics, but the author does not use it for any such purpose at all and hardly discusses the question of the issue between objectivism (which he supports) and these theories, though summing up his position effectively on pp. vii-viii. His purpose is rather to refute the kind of objectivism which rests its faith on self-evident propositions, supposed to be apprehended intuitively, about the right or the good. He is indeed primarily thinking of the view of Sir David Ross, but he regards his work as also refuting Ideal Utilitarianism of the ordinary type. For the Ideal Utilitarians, as well as Ross, rely on judgments supposed to be final and self-evident about elements of the good life taken in isolation, differing only in that they insist that these concern not primarily the right but the good. Both sides, Professor Macbeath holds, err in abstracting rightness and goodness respectively from the institutions in the context of which acts are seen to be right and ends good, and the book is intended to show that an account of the morality of primitive men is impossible except in terms of their institutions and then on the basis of the assumption that they are not fundamentally different from ourselves to draw a similar conclusion about our own ethics. For, it is contended, if the propositions about

prima facie duties or what is intrinsically good are really self-evident, all people must be capable of seeing them to be so. Our author even goes so far as to maintain that a judgment which differed from ours here would not be moral at all.

What are we to think of Professor Macbeth's case against his opponents, assuming his anthropological data to be correct? I do not hold that it is quite the knock-down disproof that he seems to think it to be. He shows convincingly in his account of the primitive peoples discussed that a practice which seems to us quite absurd and even repulsive may be justified for a person who holds the factual beliefs assumed and is familiar with its actual working in the context of their institutions. But in most cases at least, these differences in primitive institutions do not presuppose any discrepancy with Sir David Ross's list of *prima facie* duties. The same exceedingly general rules that the latter mentions, it can easily be shown, justify in different social environments quite different courses of detailed action. But there are two much more serious points made. (1) It is pointed out that a number of primitive tribes, otherwise fairly well developed morally, have apparently no sense at all of the wrongness of lying, even to members of the same community, except in cases where it is obviously directly harmful to individuals. That lying is wrong or even *prima facie* wrong, cannot then be an intuition self-evident to all men. It is, however, relevant to point out here that Sir David Ross does not in fact include in his list of ultimate *prima facie* duties the duty to abstain from lying, but makes this derivative from the *prima facie* duty to keep promises, because entering into conversation involves an implicit undertaking not to tell lies (he adds "at any rate by civilized men," *The Right and the Good*, p. 21). Now in a community in which lying was not condemned except when it was seen to be directly harmful to a particular individual, a person could hardly be held to have committed himself to such an undertaking by using language since truthfulness would not in general be expected of him, and therefore it might perhaps be argued that the reasons other than utilitarian for telling the truth would disappear. It is not the mere use of language that puts us under the obligation, but only its use under contexts (unlike that of novel-writing) where it would be assumed by the listener to give true information. That the peoples in question take too narrow a view of the utility of truth-telling Professor Macbeth would no doubt agree. He thinks the prevalence of lying is largely caused by the belief in black magic and the terrible atmosphere of suspicion it often engenders. (2) It is pointed out that primitive peoples commonly do not recognize any obligation to those outside their tribe or group of tribes. If they apprehended moral rules as self-evident in themselves, it is argued, this would surely not be so, but it is easily explained if they think of them as bound up inextricably with their system of institutions, these embodying a way of life which they regard as on the whole good. This is the most formidable argument against Sir David Ross, but I must note that it seems to contradict one of Professor Macbeth's main premisses, or at least a combination of two of them. Professor Macbeth insists (a) that primitive minds do not operate on radically different principles from ours, (b) that, if a person does not accept what is really self-evident to us in ethics, his mind must be radically different from ours (p. 10). But to pass from the recognition of moral rules as valid only for members of the same community to the recognition of their universal validity is surely quite as big a step as the step constituted by the apprehension of one of Ross's *prima facie* duties. It does not indeed seem so difficult to me to defend an intuitionist view according to which all men capable of morality did not intuit all the laws from the start but only came to do so through varying stages of confusion. But as has

been felt very widely, there does seem to be something unsatisfactory about in ethics which bases everything on a list of unrelated *prima facie* duties, each just supposed to be seen intuitively to be valid without reference to the others. There does seem to be need here for a use of coherence in some form, at least as a principle for testing.

What does our author put in place of the views he rejects? He calls his the self-realization theory, but when he has made the qualifications needed to save the view from the charge of egoism, as he does, I can see nothing to justify the use of the term. His aim is a theory which will put the concept of rules and the concept of good on a level, either requiring the other (v. pp. 33-4). But the theory calls for further development with the help of particular illustrations. The author claims that it brings to light the principle which can decide what is right in case of clashes, while the intuitionist theory leaves the moral agent in such cases without any guiding principle (p. 383), but he does not show at all how it achieves this in detail. And he does not answer the question whether there are or are not cases in which a rule should be obeyed although obedience to it in these particular cases does not produce the greatest good. He is helped, I think, to take a more utilitarian view than would otherwise appeal to him by a confusion between utilitarianism in the sense which justifies an action by its particular consequences and the justification of an action by reference to the bad consequences which would follow if everybody broke the rule.

Professor Macbeth insists strongly on the unique position of moral goodness as compared to other values. Moral goodness, he contends, is never itself part of the end aimed at, but is realized in the pursuit of any end because it is believed right to pursue it (pp. 62 ff., 417). He thus claims to avoid the dilemma which arises because moral goodness, if treated as one end among others, has to be compared with other ends in a way which seems to derogate from its supreme position. But it may be doubted whether he is successful in this. There is not, we may admit, a special duty to be moral apart from the duty to perform any of our particular duties, but may not a particular duty consist in taking steps which are likely to improve in preference to steps which are likely to impair our own moral character in the future, and may not that duty conflict with others? E.g. it is a commonplace that posts to which much power, prestige and wealth are attached are liable to be bad for a man's moral character. Might not the question arise for a man who knew himself distinctly liable to the temptations which these things bring whether he ought to take the moral risks of accepting such a post for the sake of the greater happiness of other people or not? And might he not have to choose, e.g. in educating the young, between a measure which he thought conducted slightly more to the moral good of somebody else at the expense of a great deal of pain and a measure which he thought slightly less likely to produce these good moral effects but much better for the person's happiness?

It seems to me that it would be a great gain to have a theory which would serve to bring our ethical judgments into much more of a coherent whole than does the theory provided by Sir David Ross or even by the ideal utilitarians, who have to face irreducible differences between different kinds of good, if not between good and ought. It is towards such a theory that Professor Macbeth is feeling his way. And when he insists that people in general think more in terms of institutions and less in terms of rules than is commonly realized, and that moral philosophers should do so, too, I am not altogether disinclined to agree provided, as is the case, he means that the rules must be brought into an organized context and is not just appealing to existing institutions. He is quite prepared to bring the relative merits of

different systems of institutions themselves under the coherence test. His theory needs developing much more in detail, but I certainly found the book one of the most stimulating and interesting of recent contributions on ethics.

A. C. EWING.

The Continuum of Inductive Methods. By RUDOLF CARNAP. (The University of Chicago Press. 1952. Cambridge University Press. Pp. vi + 92. Price 26s.)

This monograph is the forerunner of Vol. II of Professor Carnap's work on *Probability and Induction* of which Vol. I appeared in 1950 under the title of *Logical Foundations of Probability*. It seems to me of great importance and suggestiveness.

Professor Carnap believes that two distinct concepts are needed at the basis of a complete theory of probability, and he calls the one, the degree of confirmation of a given sentence or statement relative to given evidence, and the other, the estimate of the frequency of a given character in a given class of objects, relative to given evidence. Of these two, in his view, degree of confirmation is more fundamental, and he bases his theory on it, choosing his theory of estimation to correspond with it.

All this was expounded in Vol. I. What he does in this monograph (which can be read independently of Vol. I) is to ask the general question, what kind of formula it is reasonable to take as giving degree of confirmation. In a discussion of great interest he shows that our general notions about probability do not compel us to adopt one formula, but leave open a wide choice of alternatives. Among these he takes a particular set, wide enough to include all the formulae hitherto proposed by theorists, and puts forward certain statistical tests for deciding which of them will, in given conditions, be most satisfactory to use as the basis for estimates of relative frequency.

His discussion is limited to what can be said in a language which permits a number of individuals to be described by primitive predicates (logically independent of each other), without any questions arising of causal interaction, etc., and where all we are concerned with is the choice of a formula for giving degrees of confirmation and estimates of relative frequency, either before or after a single sample has been examined.

I have no space to bring out the richness and the complexity of his treatment, but a simple illustration will, perhaps, show the kind of thing he is doing. Suppose we know that there are N balls in a bag, each either black or white, and that a sample selection of s balls showed that s_1 were white, the rest black. Let us now ask, what is the probability (Carnap's "degree of confirmation") relative to this evidence, of the statement that a particular ball, not yet drawn from the bag, is white; or again, what estimate is to be given, relative to this evidence, of the proportion of white balls in the bag.

On one extreme view (which may be called the logical view) the only relevant evidence is that each ball is either white or black; and on this evidence the answer to both our questions is a half. On the opposite view (which gives what Professor Carnap calls the straight estimate) the only relevant evidence is the proportion of white among the balls drawn, and on this evidence the answer is s_1/s . Professor Carnap suggests that we should examine a formula which gives weight to both kinds of evidence. His formula would give in the above case

$$\frac{W_1 \cdot s_1/s + W_2 \cdot \frac{1}{2}}{W_1 + W_2}$$

where W_1 and W_2 are the weights to be attached to the two estimates. Here it is only the fraction W_1/W_2 which matters, and this may be chosen by us for a variety of reasons. Professor Carnap uses a constant λ , which equals $s.W_2/W_1$, so that his formula becomes, in the above case

$$\frac{s_1 + \lambda \cdot \frac{1}{2}}{s + \lambda}$$

It is easy to derive the formula in the case of a complex predicate. If $\lambda = 0$ we have the straight estimate, if λ is infinite, the logical one.

In Part I of the monograph Professor Carnap shows that a general formula of this sort for degree of confirmation enables us, given the simple type of language to which he has limited himself, to determine the degree of confirmation of any sentence in the language on the evidence of any other sentence or set of sentences. And if the estimate of relative frequency of a predicate (simple or complex) among the individuals in the population is based on the degree of confirmation of the sentence attributing this predicate to an unexamined individual, then the formula defines a complete inductive method. Any numerical value of λ from 0 to infinity satisfies the general probability conditions. This formula then contains a "continuum of inductive methods," any one of which can be chosen by an investigator as his guide in his estimates.

The problem then arises, how are we to choose between them? This is a practical question, to be determined by reasons of economy of working and satisfactoriness of results in relation to the kind of world in which the method is being used. Professor Carnap proceeds in Part II to apply statistical tests of satisfactoriness. Suppose an investigator, who takes a sample of size s , and on its basis estimates the frequency of a particular predicate, using a selected value of λ . He makes a long series of such estimates for the same predicate, keeping s and λ the same. An umpire, who knows the actual frequency, tests the investigator's success by finding how widely the various estimates differ from the actual frequency; and for this the mean of the squares of these differences (the mean square error) is the measure he uses, calculating the value of λ which gives the mean square error the minimum value. Professor Carnap shows that this value of λ is always different from 0 except in the case in which all the objects possess the predicate.

He goes on to show that the investigator (who of course does not know the actual frequency of the predicate) can always choose a value more suitable for his estimates than the value $\lambda = 0$, except in the case just mentioned. This can be shown, as he says, with deductive certainty: and he concludes "It seems to me that this result shows a very serious disadvantage of the principle of preferring unbiased estimate-functions and of the straight rule" (p. 79), i.e. of taking $\lambda = 0$.

There is no doubt that what he has now demonstrated is of great theoretical interest for the further development of the subject. But at the present stage, as his own numerical example suggests and as can, I think, be seen from an exploration of possible numerical values, the value of λ resulting from his rules is always so small that the estimate of relative frequency based on it does not differ significantly from that given by the straight estimate: so that the rules have no direct practical importance.

The fruitfulness of his general mode of approach is beautifully illustrated by his discussion in the Appendix of the *Minimax Principle* of A. Wald.

On page 88, in (iv) at the top of the page, e (Gothic letter) should have a dash. In (v) a factor s has been dropped out from the second expression in the numerator, and the same factor has been dropped out from the corresponding expression in the numerator in (vi).

L. J. RUSSELL.

Recovery of Belief. By C. E. M. Joad. (Faber and Faber. Pp. 248. Price 15s.)

I do not think this book is an unmitigated success, but it is hard to know just what standard to apply to it. Is it intended to convince the really sophisticated intellectual agnostic of the truth of theistic religion, or at least to convince him that there may be something in it worthy of further enquiry? Judged by this standard, I believe it fails; the first chapter on "The Plight of the Intellectual" would not be likely to make such a one feel either that he was in a "plight" or that religion would help him out of it; it might just as well be entitled "the plight of the traditionally religious." I do not find anywhere in the book a discussion of the question why one should bother about religion; nor of the question what can be meant by theological assertions about God, the soul, redemption by Christ, physical resurrection and the like. But these are precisely the questions which the intellectual agnostic begins by asking. The received opinion in intellectual circles is that such assertions are strictly meaningless or else very roundabout and strained ways of speaking about features of sense-experience; or just expressions of emotion. Anyhow when life is so short, why concern oneself with such obscure matters about which there seems to be no prospect of any agreement among the professors of them?

"So long as the philosopher declaimed in the old way either for or against him (sc. the theologian), he was at least being contradicted. Now he was not even taken seriously enough for that. It is an ominous sign when a man's friends no longer contradict him" (Basil Mitchell in *The Socratic*, Blackwell, Oxford). If this book is addressed to people even moderately acquainted with modern philosophy, surely to make no mention whatever of the Verification-principle is a grave defect? Though I suppose no one now maintains that "the meaning of a statement is its verification," yet it would be a great mistake to think of this principle as disposed of; in a modified form it has become part of the current coinage of thought. Are the theologians willing to allow that any conceivable experience whatever should rank as evidence in favour of or against their assertions? If not, such assertions will seem idle to most modern men—not perhaps strictly meaningless, but uninteresting, since if anyone makes a contradictory assertion, there is nothing to be done about it.

A book of this kind ought to take seriously such a statement of the modern empirical attitude as J. Wisdom's "Gods" (in Flew: *Logic and Language*). Now it may well be argued that present empiricism puts an excessively restrictive meaning upon "experience," and ignores the fact that thought has certain immanent criteria of its own in deciding how to formulate experience; but such argument is not to be found in this book.

Such matters are touched in Chapter IV. "That Religion is merely subjective"—a chapter that contains much that is good on the claim of religious experience to be cognitive, although involving feeling. Religious experience can be shared, and therefore must be to some extent communicable. "Because it is felt not to be purely subjective, it demands to be mediated, that is to say, placed in some sort of framework by reason. . . . Religion then, so far as it is an assertion of propositions that claim to be true, is reason's formulation of what man feels and has always felt intuitively about the nature of the universe" (p. 103). But what is the status of these propositions, and have they all the same status? Joad says (p. 99): "The believer may be said to know that at a particular moment in history God became incarnate—though this belief is presumably confined to Christians." Most people would retort that this is an odd sort of knowledge, and Joad does not defend the statement—indeed he seems to contradict it on p. 243. One feels that more is needed on the relation of experience, faith and formulations than we are given.

Again, if the book is addressed to the informed agnostic, surely there should be some reference to Freud's "explanation" of religion. One page only is devoted to modern psychology, and on this no mention of Freud's theory occurs.

For the sophisticated reader the book seems too unsystematic. Surely such a one is aware that there are varieties of religion, among them varieties of Christianity, in the world, each tenaciously held by its own adherents, no one of them at first glance quite obviously superior to the rest. Some effort should be made to relate this fact to the general theistic position taken up, and to the doctrines of the Church of England which Professor Joad himself adopts. Is it not odd to include a chapter in defence of the Church of England *followed* by a "Postscript on Christianity," for which the book, so Joad says, "though it holds a brief, makes no case" (p. 243)? In general, as the chapter-headings show, the book gives an impression of being hastily thrown together.

But, it may be said, such standards ought not to be applied to "an account of some of the reasons which have converted me to the religious view of the universe in its Christian version" (p. 13). And indeed, given an acquaintance with some of the author's other works, it is not impossible to detect the thread upon which these reasons have been strung. It is a polemic against his former friends whose views he advocated in *Counter-Attack from the East*, whose best-known representative is Mr. Aldous Huxley. He is quite justified in taking note of this movement, which Mr. Langmead-Casserly with magnificent arrogance has recently called "The Retreat from Christianity into Religion" and judges to be as dangerous as irreligion. Joad is also quite correct in holding that Mr. Huxley does not attach such importance to the fact of moral evil or to the hope of personal immortality as Joad now attaches to these. But it is in my judgment unfair polemics to apply matter-of-fact logical standards to the "mythology" of one system, while refusing to apply them to a rival system, and this is just what Joad does. Space permits only one example out of many. As a "logical objection," he asks (on p. 170): "If reality is a single universal consciousness, how does it come to be split up into, or get expressed as, a number of individual consciousnesses. In the first place, why should it do so? . . . How, in the second place, *could* it do so?" To this one may retort: These are not logical objections, but rhetorical appeals to the difficulty of thinking how and why something utterly unknown to us could happen; surely there is an *equal* difficulty in understanding *how* and *why* a personal God should have created the world out of nothing? Joad rightly refuses to apply logic here. Such matters are not to be settled by tests of necessity and contradictoriness, but by preference—on balance—for one analogical image rather than another; reasons for such a preference, if any can be made explicit, are subtle and cumulative. Oddly enough, when he does come to explain creation, he uses an image of Shankara's, the founder of the most extreme school of pantheistic monism (p. 222). If anyone really says "God is my toenail" (and the Zen Buddhists say that sort of thing), such a statement ought to be treated in the same way as "Christ ascended into heaven," which Joad says is to be believed because it is impossible (p. 243). But fair and helpful controversy on such matters should lay myth beside myth. Similarly the argument from the survival of Christianity, on which Joad lays great stress, ought to take account of the survival of Islam, and still more of such a pacifist religion as Buddhism.

The real reason for Joad's antagonism to Aldous Huxley is not a point of logic; it is much more important. It is his sense of the cardinal importance of moral struggle, and in consequence his feeling that God ought above all to be an assigner of "moral marks" for moral effort (p. 30); also that God ought

Himself to be *meritorious*, for nothing "can be deserving of worship unless it has merit" (p. 159).

This is essentially Kant's point of view (*minus* Kant's recognition of the "holy will") and it raises the whole problem of the relation between morality and religion—far too big a subject for a review. It must, however, be said that Joad's view is extremely onesided. One must start with the "phenomenological" fact that there are two streams of thought among sincerely religious men, both found within orthodox Christianity. One stream makes the sense of sin and moral struggle central, and regards God primarily as the righteous Judge. But there is certainly another stream which emphasizes that moral evil is a privation, that moral acts imposed on oneself have little value, that a gradual conversion to love of the good is what really matters, and that God sends His rain on the just and the unjust alike. In his account of the mystics (p. 105) Joad should have mentioned their absolute unanimity that evil is in some sense "nothing," "a privation."

Predominance of the former stream of thought in Protestant Christianity may seem to lead to that hatred of enemies and that self-hatred which are both such a feature of our times. Joad, however, is convinced that above all greater emphasis on the wickedness of man is what is needed for the Church to be taken seriously again. I wonder.

He rightly devotes a chapter to re-habilitating belief in a "soul," holding that the so-called mind-body relation must be our model for thinking about transcendence and immanence. His treatment of determinism, though not new, is good. He puts forward a "Pure Ego" theory of "soul" as a normally inaccessible, co-determining factor (with the body) of the "mind," which is a Humean bundle of ideas. He appears to me to shirk the issue whether this soul is really quite unaffected by events that happen to the body, and to refuse to think about Averroes *v.* Aquinas. "The soul is the vehicle of God's immanence. It is that in respect of which we are, if not divine, at least in contact with the divine" (p. 203).

It is not agreeable to criticize anyone who undertakes a task of this difficulty and importance. The book is quite free from the slickness and disingenuousness of much Christian apologetic, modest and apart from some blemishes of composition, pleasant to read. What he writes about environmentalism, science, the ends of life, the inadequacy of behaviourism is well done, and needs doing by someone of Joad's great powers and opportunities. Only, judged by the measure of these, it seems to fall short.

C. SUTTON.

Gravity and Grace. By SIMONE WEIL. (Routledge and Kegan Paul. Pp. xxxvii + 160. Price 15s.)

This book confirms the impression I had already formed that much of Simone Weil's writings will be found to have an enduring value after the politico-ecclesiastical dust raised by their publication has died down. These brief aphorisms are evidently a distillation of much bitter experience, they show a distinction of style quite uncommon in writers on these topics, and a remarkable freshness of thought. The lapidary quality of her work does seem to spring from a love of truth, from an urge to formulate something very important to her very exactly. The interest of her work for students of religion, of politics and of modern French culture is now widely acknowledged; I am concerned here only with its merits as philosophy. There is little doubt that she would have so described it; she was after all—among other things—a teacher of philosophy in several girls' high schools, and steeped in the classical philosophers as well as in mathematics and physics.

It is, however, not at all the sort of thing which is currently regarded as philosophy in England. It is the sort of philosophy that makes its task to formulate and communicate aspects of life that slip through the nets of the sciences, which often are barely communicable except by an effort akin to the artist's. The philosopher to whom she bears the most striking resemblance is Nietzsche. Though acquainted with him, she does not bear any special marks of his influence, and the conclusion of her reflections—"leftist" and "near-Catholic"—may seem at first sight very different. But their conception of their task is identical, the way it works itself out in language is strikingly similar, and in fundamentals they are much akin—"necessity" in Simone Weil, for example, plays much the role of "eternal recurrence." She is quite free from the tendency to rhetoric and heavy joviality which occasionally mars Nietzsche; but in compensation she betrays now and then what one is inclined to call feminine whimsicality, especially when she comes to mention Jehovah or classical Rome, her *bêtes noires*, or her favourite Pythagoreans and Egyptians. In her, as I believe in Nietzsche, there is behind the aphoristic mode of composition quite a coherent system of thought; her thought in her more or less finished works shows a high degree of intellectual responsibility. Her notebooks, however, of which *Connaissance Surnaturel* (Paris, Gallimard) is a verbatim reproduction, show that she put down on paper absolutely everything that occurred to her, for though a mystic she was, as we learn from M. Thibon, prodigiously talkative. That book is an absorbing psychological document, but quite other standards ought to be applied to it.

Gravity and Grace is also based on notebook jottings, but selected and arranged by M. Thibon. I doubt whether it is the best book to start with. The main lines of her philosophy are to be found in more readable form in *Waiting on God* (though its subject is mainly religion) and in the latter part of *The Need for Roots* (though its subject is mainly politics). There are, however, excellent things in this book, and it is much better translated than was *The Need for Roots*. M. Thibon in his Introduction succeeds in giving a vivid impression of this lovable but uncomfortable personality at one stage of her life.

The barest facts of her life are given in the prefatory note to *Waiting on God*, and rather more fully in the joint study by MM. Thibon and Perrin (S. Weil, Paris. La Colombe) which, however, is somewhat tantalising in its omissions and almost entirely concerned with her attitude to the Church. In brief, she was a child of wealthy and, it seems, worldly Jewish parents; after brilliant success at the University (under Alain) and as a teacher, she made up her mind to share the life of the poor, worked in the Renault works ("La Condition Ouvrière"), fought with the Reds in Spain, had certain mystical experiences that brought her in contact with the Church, worked as an agricultural labourer in the Midi, then at Free French Headquarters, London, where she died at the age of 34, after long ill-health. Would her works be devoid of interest apart from the aura of romance cast by this life? I do not think so.

Now characterize briefly this type of philosophy? One might start by calling it a highly individual amalgam of Plato, Buddhism and pre-Ignatian Christian mysticism. Fundamental is the "experimental ontological proof" (G. and G., p. 90) of being "raised up" out of one's ordinary character by attention to certain experiences.¹ These are especially: contact with the radiance and compassion of saintly persons, contact with the beauty of the world, contact with such religious ritual as has "remained pure." Thence

¹ Cf. Robert Barclay: "When I came into the silent assemblies of God's people, I found the evil weakening in me and the good raised up."

reflection leads us to acknowledge the occurrence of "implicit love of God" in men; this occurs as something "infinitesimal" within the network of necessity or "gravity" (I think this term is coined to denote the genus of which physical necessity and psychic motivation are species). This "implicit love of God" is fully analysed in *Waiting upon God*.

Simone Weil's theodicy is in extreme contrast to that of Leibnitz, for it emphasizes the contrast between the seemingly infinitesimal factor of Grace and the evil necessity of the world. The world *exists* because it has issued from God; it manifestly falls short of full being; it is created to wean our desires from the things of sense. Through contemplation of the world's brute necessity and especially through 'letting it enter our soul' by way of unconsoled affliction, we may become *de-created* and so re-enter God. This is the inner meaning of the Christian images of incarnation and crucifixion.

Of course the contrast is not as simple as that. The contemplative attitude of "extreme attention" (a central concept) discovers unsuspected beauty in brute necessity and in tragic human attachments. And there is a certain limited place for voluntary effort, itself also a queer kind of necessity. Morality is a "violence that we do to ourselves." It should be restricted to clear and inescapable duties. We have to contemplate moral good and evil with an equal eye in order to be drawn towards the Good. Goodness of heart comes not from morality but from Grace.

She faces quite candidly, I think, the special difficulties of this type of philosophy. And one may fairly call hers a *philosophical* mysticism; her "extreme attention" is to intelligible similarities and differences rather than to sensuous imagery. Her attitude to the Catholic Christian fund of wisdom on the one hand and to ecclesiastical claims on the other, and her emphasis on the need to purge Christianity of Judaism seem to me worth pondering. Her conception of philosophy is in line with the Greek view of *Theoria* as a process of conversion towards the divine (G. and G., p. 118 ff., abridged):

Science offers only three kinds of interest: technical applications; a game of chess; a road to God. It will either have to seek a source of inspiration higher than itself or perish.

The use of reason makes things transparent to the mind. We do not, however, see what is transparent. We see that which is opaque through the transparent. . . . The uncomprehended hides the incomprehensible, and should on that account be eliminated.

The world is a text with several meanings. . . . We have to welcome them all, but arrange them vertically, placing them on suitable levels. Thus: chance, destiny, providence.

Intelligence can never penetrate the mystery, but it and it alone can judge of the suitability of the words which express it. For this task it needs to be keener, more discerning, more precise, more exact and more exacting than for any other.

Claud Sutton.

Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge. By KARL MANNHEIM. Edited by Paul Kecskemeti. (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. 1952. Price 25s.)

In his introduction to these essays, Dr. Kecskemeti remarks that Professor Mannheim "never really cut adrift from philosophy." Add to that the fact that the philosophy was German, that Mannheim himself was of Hungarian origin and that his sociology was developed in England and in English, and

you have a mixture which goes far to explain the obscurity and turgidity, which in varying degree mar all Mannheim's writings. Only in his later work did these characteristics begin to yield to greater concreteness of expression, a process which was unhappily cut short by the author's untimely death at the age of 52.

The articles in the present collection were all originally written in German and belong to an early phase of Mannheim's thought; they certainly impose very severe demands upon the reader's ability to cut through Teutonic verbiage to the realities behind. Most of the papers deal with some aspect of "the sociology of knowledge"; though that on *The Nature of Economic Ambition and Its Significance for the Social Education of Man* is concerned with a relatively straightforward analysis of the different conceptions of success favoured by various types of society, and of the adjustment (or mal-adjustment) of the educational process to the realities of the world for which the young are being educated. Essentially, the common thesis of these essays seems to be that understanding and knowledge are themselves conditioned by the social environment, and that this fact must influence our conception of scientific truth. Cultural phenomena, in the author's view, differ from the data studied by, say, the physicists, because they involve interpretative work, and are necessarily local and temporary: they cannot, therefore, be made the subject of universal generalizations comparable to the laws of the natural sciences. At the same time, Mannheim does not press this doctrine to the point of denying that scientific truth is attainable in the sociological field. He sees the difference as a matter more of method than of the result attained—the sociologist substituting "sympathetic participation" for the physicist's detachment.

What this adds up to in terms of epistemology, philosophers are no doubt better qualified to judge than sociologists. Sociologists, however, are never happy with the notion that philosophic speculation can be conducted in a vacuum. On that issue they will count Professor Mannheim on their side, even if, in these essays, he has hardly succeeded in practising the empirical method which he appears to be preaching. And for the defects of this volume, posthumous publication must bear much of the blame. Had the author lived, it is more than likely, in view of the later trend of his thought, that he would have radically rewritten all these papers before presenting them to an English public.

BARBARA WOOTTON.

The Glorious Presence. By ERNEST E. WOODS. (London: Ryder and Co. 1952.
Pp. 248. Price 18s.)

This work is described on its title page as "a study of the Vedānta Philosophy and its relation to modern thought." Its author is an Englishman long domiciled in America, and the work seems primarily intended for the growing number of Americans who, having fallen away from their ancestral churches, find scepticism or materialism psychologically unpalatable, and turn to Asia for a substitute faith, which they discover in a "streamlined" Vedānta.

The book is in four sections, of which the first is an outline of the author's neo-Vedāntic philosophy. Here the axiom "All is one" is elaborated and developed by homely analogies and specious arguments. A relation exists between cat and mouse—therefore cat and mouse are identical. The second section tries to adapt the Hindu system of mental and moral training, loosely known in the West as yoga, to the conditions and needs of an alien civilization. Here the author makes liberal concessions to the ideals of an acquisitive society—thus: "Some say: 'Kill out desire altogether.' No, no, be rational

about desire. We have no reason to kill out desire any more than to kill out thought."

The third section is a translation of the *Dakṣināmūrti Stotra*, a short religious poem attributed to the great Hindu theologian Sankara, with a lengthy and discursive commentary by Mr. Wood. The title of the poem is translated quaintly and literally as "Ode to the South-Facing Form," but in the text "the South-Facing Form," actually an epithet of the god Śiva, becomes "The Glorious Presence." But otherwise the translation is accurate, and if the commentary often interprets the text rather freely, the author is perhaps justified by the precedent of Sankara himself.

The last section is a brief review of European philosophy, from Plato onwards, in the light of Hindu thought as interpreted by the author. Plato, Aristotle, Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Kant, Fichte, Hegel, and Schopenhauer are weighed in the scales of Vedānta and found wanting, though Schopenhauer almost tips the scale. Emerson is praised, as to all intents and purposes a Vedāntist. Though the author writes of the relation of Vedānta to modern thought he mentions only two twentieth-century philosophers, William James and A. N. Whitehead. Mr. Wood accords high marks to America's most famous philosopher with the startling statement that "Pragmatism is well on the way to Vedānta." Whitehead, who lived many years in America, is described as "standing up like an Everest in these Himalayas." The logical positivists, dialectical materialists, and existentialists, whose systems leave no room whatever for the one reality behind all illusory appearances, are beneath the author's notice. Science, philosophy, literature, and art, all tend to the one truth, which "ancient Aryan thinkers" realized long ago, and which the world is too deluded to learn.

Let us not, however, be unjust to Mr. Wood. He achieves what he set out to do—to provide food for thought for moderately well read men and women, who are desperately in need of faith in a world which denies it to them. To the social historian this book may be of some interest; to the student of Indian thought it is of little use; to the philosopher it is worthless.

A. L. BASHAM.

The Subtle Knot: Creative Scepticism in Seventeenth-century England. By MARGARET L. WILEY. (London: Allen and Unwin. 1952. Pp. 303. 25s.)

Although intended for students of literature, this well-written book deserves a notice here. It has a thesis about the nature of genuine scepticism, with an addendum that this scepticism was at its height in our seventeenth-century men of letters, and that the literary scepticism of the eighteenth century was of a superficial sort, unvirile and infertile. The former was instrumental, the latter terminal.

The opening contention that the genuine scepticism was bodied forth in Greece by Pyrrho and his like may be left unexamined. All that matters is the author's identification of it with what the ordinary Greek meaning of the term suggests—a spirit of untiring inquiry, a process or method that knows no end and therefore cannot abridge and rest itself in any particular doctrine. It stifles no questions, but being a search for answers it is not the mere negation of common views; it denies with hesitation and only provisionally, being distrustful of the finality of its present light, and being rather inclined to *epochē*, suspense of judgment, though not to the point of buying thereby an inhuman neutrality in matters of practical concern. It is the foe not of belief but of dogmatism, whether negative or positive, and whether of unthinking fideism or of intellectual arrogance. It labours in humility and agony, with

the occasional and transitory reward of that gathered serenity which the ancient Sceptics (and the Stoics and Epicureans) called *ataraxia*. In particular, it is the full embracing of complexities, the refusal to simplify problems by ignoring any of the multitudinous and conflicting factors.

This is the sort of scepticism which the author, following the prints of other investigators, finds in some of the outstanding and typical literary minds of the seventeenth century. Most of us are, I suppose, familiar with it in the "metaphysicals," even though its seriousness is sometimes half-concealed under an extravagant love of paradox. Of them Miss Wiley gives a chapter to Donne, for the rest choosing, with a chapter for each, Sir Thomas Browne, Richard Baxter, Jeremy Taylor, and Joseph Glanvill. She seems to me to unfold her powers most in her treatment of Browne. All these men are religious sceptics, all men of strong belief yet obedient to the rational demand for clarification and evidence, and toiling on from partial to less partial truth, never claiming theoretical finality, their faith being that more and more are ever discoverable, and that the whole and certain truth will be, as Browne puts it, "an accessory of our glorification." They used the sceptical instrument to purify and ground convictions that could be lived by, whereas the sceptics of the next century used it either negatively or for a show of intellectual modesty; and they struggled with "the subtle knot" (an expression taken from Donne), whereas the later sceptics either cut it or, in Miss Wiley's words, reproduced it "in tissue-paper rather than in hemp."

A book like this (with similar studies to which the author refers) is useful in helping us to know the attitudes and ideas, philosophical in essence, behind the Cambridge Platonists and Locke, and enables us to make a truer contrast between their century and the so-called Age of Reason. The blunders in the Greek and Latin quotations, the frequent and uniform occurrence of "isosthenia," and some carelessness in French accents, are quite untypical of the level of competence.

T. E. JESSOP.

The Place of Hooker in the History of Thought. By PETER MUNZ. (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Pp. X + 217. Price 18s.)

This book contributes a great deal to the understanding not only of Hooker but also of his complex age. In his century, as in the Middle Ages, the question of the proper relation between Church and State and the deeper ones of the relations between divine and human law and between faith and reason, stand in the foreground of philosophical reflection.

Mr. Munz argues that the attitudes of the political thinkers in and before Hooker's time are closely related to their general metaphysical assumptions. If they follow Augustine in regarding faith as absolutely superior to reason and the State as the consequence of sin, then they will defend the absolute superiority of Church over State. If with Aquinas they consider faith and reason as two complementary modes of cognition and the State as the result not of sin but of God-given human nature, then they will hold that spiritual and secular government are two co-ordinated aspects of any Christian community. Lastly, if they hold the doctrine of double truth or the view of Marsilio of Padua that faith and reason are entirely separate, they are likely to give a great deal more to Caesar than they would do otherwise.

The author shows that these doctrines and the conflict between their defenders cut across the division between Catholics and Protestants. The central point of his book is the thesis that Hooker's position is in the main an unsatisfactory compromise between Aquinas and Marsilio. While Hooker

attacked Puritanism in the spirit of Aquinas (see, for example, Appendix A), he had to accept some elements of Marsilio's theory in order to justify the Tudor monarchs as Christian rulers.

To the student who is forced to rush through the history of political thought many of the sixteenth-century ideas must seem lifeless. By considering them against their general historical and metaphysical background Mr. Munz shows why they were real problems of real people. This, it seems to me, is the chief merit of his well-written book.

S. KÖRNER.

The Interpretation of Plato's Republic. By N. R. MURPHY. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1951. Pp. viii + 247. Price 18s.)

This is an interesting book, which would repay reading by any serious student of Plato. It is learned and scholarly, and contains many acute and judicious comments. And yet taken as a whole the effect is curiously disappointing. Certainly, no one should read it with the expectation that it is going to make Plato easier to understand. Indeed, the probable reaction of most readers would be to say that they had never realized that the *Republic* was so difficult. It may sometimes, of course, be a good thing to point out difficulties that were not apparent at first sight. But I cannot help thinking that Mr. Murphy makes it unnecessarily hard, and that some of his difficulties are not very real ones.

As a study of the *Republic* the book seems to me to fall between two stools. It is not a continuous commentary on the book. The order of treatment is not always the same, and some important points are hardly discussed at all. The political side of the argument, in particular, is very inadequately treated, which is a pity, as what Mr. Murphy does have to say on this contains many very sound remarks. On the other hand, it is not successful as a general study designed to bring out the main features of Plato's ideas. The argument is close and detailed, sometimes rather repetitive, and worries so much over particular points that it is hard to see the wood for the trees. What clearly interests Mr. Murphy most of all is the metaphysical theory and the associated theory of knowledge. And here I find his argument particularly difficult to follow. So far as I have understood it, I should disagree with a good many of his conclusions.

In general, the impression that the book gives—I hope that it is not an unfair one—is that the author is less interested in the attempt to put himself at Plato's own point of view than in the analysis of the argument as it stands from the point of view of contemporary modes of thought. I feel pretty certain that the amount of attention given to different sides of the subject is quite out of proportion to what Plato himself intended. There sometimes seems to be a tendency to criticize Plato for not having arrived at certain modern ideas. Thus, he is apparently blamed (e.g. on p. 91) for not appreciating the distinction, so often made nowadays, between the right and the good. But would any Greek have done so? And is it self-evident that he is wrong? What is more important is the almost complete absence of any discussion of the historical background of ideas and institutions in which Plato wrote. This is a serious lack in itself, and I think sometimes leads the exposition astray. Thus Mr. Murphy, like some other contemporary writers, raises what seem to me largely unreal difficulties about the meaning of Thrasymachus' point of view. Yet if this is looked at in its historical context there is no great difficulty in understanding it. Again, there is no serious consideration given to the question of what a dialogue is, what its limitations are and what Plato's

intentions were in writing in that form. Thus, he is apparently criticized (p. 181) for not having given us a systematic exposition of what he means by the Idea of the Good. Yet, it is evident, both from his practice and his own statements in the Letters, that he would not have thought it possible or desirable to attempt this in a written dialogue. It may, indeed, well have been an ideal of explanation which he did not think that he himself had yet attained. Taking all these points together, then, I feel obliged to say that, interesting though the book is, it is not the satisfactory exposition of the argument of the *Republic* for which there is still a crying need.

G. C. FIELD.

Medieval Logic—An Outline of its Development from 1250—c. 1400, by PHILOTHEUS BOEHNER, O.F.M., of The Franciscan Institute, St. Bonaventure, New York. (Manchester University Press, 1952. Pp. xvii + 130. Price 12s. 6d. net.)

Lord Russell once said of the pure mathematician (1) that he never knows what he is talking about, and (2) that nothing that he ever says is true. Albert of Saxony towards the close of the fourteenth century in his *Perutilis Logica* and Walter Burleigh in a treatise bearing this highly significant title, *De Puritate Artis Logicae*, written in the earlier part of the same century, adopt a similar view in regard to the function of the pure logician. Truth-relations are doubtless implied in the definition given by Albert of Saxony of the term "antecedent," as the author suggests in the paraphrase which he gives of the definition on p. 71; but Albert does not use the word "truth": he speaks only of the conditions under which the antecedent will signify what it purports to signify. In Latin the definition runs:

Ista propositio dicitur antecedens ad aliam, quae sic se habet ad eam, quod impossibile est qualitercumque est significabile per eam, stante impositione terminorum, sic esse, quin, qualitercumque alia significat, sic sit.

A proposition is said to be the antecedent of another proposition when it is so related to it that it is impossible for what *can* be signified, no matter how, by the first proposition to be in point of fact signified by it (*sic esse*), unless—given that the terms retain their meaning—what the other signifies, no matter how, is in point of fact, signified by it (*sic sit*).

Given two propositions, *p* and *q*, it is impossible for the relation "if *p*, then *q*" to hold between them unless, when *q* is actually significant, *p* is also actually significant.

Nouns, verbs, and their derivates, adjectives and adverbs, were called by Scholastics "categorematic words" or "categories." They all have what Peter of Spain calls a *suppositio naturalis*, i.e., they refer to objects, and, when used, the logician supposes that we know to what objects they *can* refer. Words of their very nature are such that they can be used in order to denote objects, i.e., they are significant; and hence, when used, they purport to denote at least one of the objects signified. From the standpoint of logic this suffices. To ask what objects are signified by this or that word is, from the standpoint of the pure logician, irrelevant.

On the other hand, to examine the various ways in which words are used in order to denote objects is relevant to logic. Hence the need to discuss the significance of what Scholastics called "syncategorematic words," i.e., words such as "every," "some," "no," "not," "and," "or," "if-then," which have significance only when used in conjunction with categorematic words already having significance. These words are discussed in Part II, Section I, of

Medieval Logic under the heading "The Syncategoremata as Logical Constants." Since they form "the real skeleton of logical discourse" they were at first classed together, but "as the scholastics developed the formal character of logic," they "gradually came to be presented in their proper place in the general scheme."

How this came about is shown in the next two sections of Part II, which is by far the most important and most interesting part of Fr. Boehner's work. In Section II, which is entitled "The Theory of Suppositio," the distinctions drawn by Peter of Spain, William Ockham, and Walter Burleigh between the different ways in which syncategorematic words may be used in conjunction with categoric words in order to denote objects are discussed in considerable detail. They correspond to the use of what are now called "quantifiers." In Section III, which is entitled "The Theory of Consequences," the author expounds the theory of implication as it was developed by Ockham and Albert of Saxony, and shows how this theory came to be regarded as a general theory of which the syllogism is but a particular case. Burleigh's theory of consequences is omitted because the author hopes soon to publish the tract, *De Puritate Artis Logicae*; but to Albert of Saxony he devotes two appendices, one dealing with his *Sophismata* and the other giving, both in English and in Latin, the rules of supposition which appear in his *Perutilis Logica*.

There can be no question but that Fr. Boehner has done what he set out to do, namely to show that the modern logic of Russell, Whitehead, Carnap, and Quine is by no means so revolutionary as it is commonly supposed to be. In embryo it is contained in the writings of Scholastics of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, long since forgotten and by neo-Scholastics ignored. To confirm this Fr. Boehner has expressed the rules given by Ockham, Albert of Saxony and others in the symbolism used by modern logicians.

The long lists of logical treatises given in Part III make dull reading, and the technical terms used will, I fear, prove unintelligible to most readers. The author's English, too, is often awkward and sometimes inexact. What he means to say is not always what he actually says. But Fr. Boehner's work will none the less prove to be of great interest to modern logicians, and will be studied, one hopes, by any neo-Scholastic who should be contemplating the writing of a new textbook.

LESLIE J. WALKER, S.J.

The Imagination of Reason: Two Philosophical Essays. By ERIC UNGER, Dr. Phil. (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. 1952. Pp. vii + 134.
Price 12s. 6d.)

In a passage in this unusual book the late Dr. Eric Unger stated that "to philosophize is a general faculty of the human mind—like understanding music. It is not in the first place a faculty acquired through study, although it can be studied too—like music. The study and profession of philosophy can just as well promote as kill the faculty." This passage is characteristic. It reveals some of the weaknesses of Dr. Unger's English—for example, for "general faculty" he should presumably have written "special ability"; but it also brings out his main thesis that philosophy is an activity of imagination, controlled by reason and closely analogous to aesthetic activity and appreciation.

In his first essay Unger argued for a philosophical study of group relations as essential to ethics. In the second, he discussed philosophical method, stressing the importance of imagination.

Both these essays will repay careful study; but they will certainly require it,

for they are often obscure. Those who disapprove of attempts to reinstate metaphysics are unlikely to make the necessary effort.

D. J. McCracken.

The March Toward Matter: Descensus Averno. By JOHN McPARTLAND.
(New York: Philosophical Library. 1952. Pp. 80. Price \$2.75.)

This little book attacks materialism from the Roman Catholic and Thomist standpoint. The author, however, is no mere pamphleteer. He believes that there is continuity between the attitudes of academic philosophers, with which he is well acquainted, and the contemporary world situation—for example, between their hostility to the speculative employment of the intellect and the external military threats of countries whose regimes have an ideological basis in materialism. Mr. McPartland tends to look eastwards for the worst examples of materialism. It may be suggested that he could find equally bad ones nearer home.

Mr. McPartland argues with sincerity, piety and learning. His book is a challenge to all spokesmen of modernity in philosophy; and those who do not ignore such challenges should find it interesting and stimulating—even when, like myself, they cannot “march” with the author. D. J. McCracken.

Books also received:

W. K. C. GUTHRIE. *Myth and Reason.* London School of Economics. 1953. Pp. 20. 2s.

W. BURRIDGE. *The Ego, Consciousness and Other Ideals.* Reprint from *The Medicus*, Karachi, 1952. Pp. 160–168. No price stated.

GEORGE W. HILL. *The Radiant Universe.* New York Philosophical Library. 1953. Pp. 489. \$4.75.

MARTIN BUBER. *Eclipse of God.* Victor Gollancz Ltd. 1953. Pp. 192. 15s.

A. CAMPBELL GARNETT. *The Moral Nature of Man: a Critical Evaluation of Ethical Principles.* New York. The Ronald Press Co. 1953. Pp. viii + 278. \$3.75.

PAUL SCHILPP (Ed.). *G. E. Moore* (2nd edition). New York: The Tudor Press (London: Cambridge University Press). 1952. Pp. xv + 727. 55s.

A. G. N. FLEW. *Logic and Language: 2nd Series.* Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 1953. Pp. vii + 242. 21s.

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KARL JASPERS. *The Origin and Goal of History* (Trans. Michael Bullock). London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. 1953. Pp. x + 294.

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SIR S. RADHAKRISHNAN (Ed.). *History of Philosophy, Eastern and Western*. London: George Allen & Unwin. 1953. Pp. Vol. I. 618; Vol. II. 462. 65s.

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KATHARINE GILBERT AND HELMUT KUHN. *A History of Esthetics*. Indiana University Press. 1953. Pp. xxi + 613. \$7.50.

GUSTAV E. MUELLER. *Dialectic: A Way Into and Within Philosophy*. New York: Bookman Associates. 1953. Pp. 234. \$4.00.

VERGILIUS FERM (Ed.). *The American Church of the Protestant Heritage*. New York Philosophical Library. 1953. Pp. 481. \$6.00.

AXEL HÄGERSTRÖM. *Inquiries into the Nature of Law and Morals* (Trans. C. D. Broad). Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell. 1953. Pp. xxxii + 377. Sw. Kr. 25.00.

KARL HEIM. *Christian Faith and Natural Science*. London: S.C.M. Press. 1953. Pp. 252. 21s.

KARL HEIM. *The Transformation of the Scientific World-View*. S.C.M. Press. Pp. 262. 21s.

R. B. BRAITHWAITE. *Scientific Explanation: A Study of the Function of Theory, Probability and Law in Science*. (Based upon the Tarner Lectures, 1946.) Cambridge University Press. 1953. Pp. xii + 376. 40s.

JOHN COWPER POWYS. *In Spite of: A Philosophy for Everyman*. London: Macdonald & Co. 1953. Pp. 312. 15s.

HERBERT WEISINGER. *Tragedy and the Paradox of the Fortunate Fall*. Routledge & Kegan Paul. 1953. Pp. vi + 300. 21s.

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FRANCIS A. WEIL. *Refutation of the Theory of Relativity*. Pp. 15. No price stated.

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MAURICE CRANSTON. *Freedom: A New Analysis*. London: Longmans, Green & Co. 1953. Pp. vii + 177. 12s. 6d.

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
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